WHILE the political failure of the Musharraf regime is now being accepted widely in the country, the claim for its survival and perpetuation is being staked on its dubious economic achievements during the past eight years.

Ironically, while the political U-turn that Musharraf took seven years ago, may be difficult to reverse, the time for an economic U-turn the country has avoided for so long may now have come.

My esteemed friend and former colleague, Professor Aly Ercelan, who has made an admirable transition from the academia to social activism, not unlike that of his more renowned Vanderbilt contemporary, Nobel laureate Yunus, without giving up his forte of rigorous analysis, has forcefully exposed (Dawn, Jan 19.) the thin veneer of ‘success’ that has been achieved in recent years (as epitomised by the ice-cream-pizza-hamburger consumerism, the bank-credit financed automobile explosion and the LBOD-Chashma-Tarbela-Gwadar mega project development strategy) and its impact on the poor.

The atta crisis is just the tip of the iceberg which has resulted in our titanic economic failures. As the economic shipwreck hovers on the horizon, the embattled crew is busy arranging the deckchairs to assure the passengers that it is nothing but a passing turbulence in the sea. What is really surprising is that the regime and its supporters not only continue to be in denial about the looming disaster, but that the president has made it a prerequisite for future governments to adhere to the continuity of policies that have been its genesis.

The general (retd)-president has embarked on an eight-day largely self-imposed, politically-motivated European tour, including Davos and London, to underline his key role as the guarantor of the flawed western agenda of globalisation in Pakistan. He would try to convince the Davos crowd that, without him, Pakistan will not only become a political, but also an economic disaster. A major aim of the trip is stated to be ‘image-building’ and there are no prizes for guessing whose image is at risk.

With the Bush administration already having given him the assurance that his services will continue to be needed in the war on terror, he hopes to somehow extricate himself from the external and political pressures mounting on him to give up the reins of government to ensure credible elections. Whether this gratuitous foreign tour in the midst of a critical period of extreme uncertainty and insecurity in the country, is based on false bravado or complacency, the future alone will tell.

Although Pakistan’s economic development since the Ayub years had been based on elitist and inegalitarian foundations, there was some moderation in them during the ‘democratic interregnum’ of 1972-77 and 1988-99, forced by the need to adopt populist policies in an electoral democracy. That desirable course was reversed and pushed back by the now-retired Gen Musharraf towards the Ayub era of the 1960s, which for all its faults had at least a modicum of economic rationale behind its development strategy, and failed largely because of its inability to get a majority of the population living a thousand miles away from the centre, into the loop of a virtuous circle of growth.

The Musharraf years have been bereft of any economic vision, other than the regime’s focus on reviving the economy through the largesse received from the US and other western countries in lieu of services rendered during the war on terror and the distribution of the benefits of the windfall among the regime’s political allies. The underlying socio-economic philosophy of the Musharraf-Shaukat Aziz era was callous towards the poor and obliging towards the privileged.

A fundamental tenet of this tunnel vision has been the almost total withdrawal of the state from its economic and social responsibility, including the provisioning of essential commodities and utilities, as succinctly pointed out by Ercelan. However, the distinctly militarist character of the regime so conspicuous in its political agenda has been equally transparent in its economic programmes.

While profitable public enterprises, such as Pakistan Steel Mills and Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation have been cheaply privatised after being run down by the meddling of the government in their functioning, the military-run commercial enterprises were continually strengthened and kept out of the pale of privatisation.

Luxurious housing complexes, including farm houses and shopping malls, have been developed around major metropolises by the defence housing authority through the acquisition of land from small farmers and transfer of the acquired land at below market prices to military personnel. The military also gave a shot in the arm to feudalism by evicting farmers on its land.

On the other hand, no serious attempt was made to provide affordable housing to the poorer sections of the population, the cost of which along with that of transport, constitutes an increasingly high proportion of their budgets, making it impossible for them to cope with the rising prices of food and fuel.

While the poor stand in long queues outside under-stocked and poorly-managed utility stores (which fail to cater to those who can’t afford to buy 20kg bags), the well-heeled and privileged buy their provisions from defence canteens and department stores, providing fuel to the fire of disgust, anger and violence.

Along with the military, the foreign aid and loan dispensing agencies have encouraged the privatisation of social services, especially education and health. Poverty alleviation programmes, allegedly ‘home-grown’, were meant mainly as a sop to insistent donors and were bureaucratically-run, with minimal impact on poverty reduction.

A major problem with the assessment of the economic performance of the Musharraf years has been the credibility of the data used for measuring economic growth and poverty alleviation. Despite repeated calls by economic experts for creating an autonomous statistical commission to ensure the quality and reliability of economic data, the government has continued to doctor the data to suit its political ends.

The tall claim of economic resurgence, made on the basis of high foreign exchange reserves and high GDP growth rates is now under serious doubt, as the macro-economic situation (on which the recent quarterly report of the State Bank has raised alarm bells and that poverty reduction and social indicators and the shortfalls in MDG targets indicate) has been rapidly deteriorating in the past few years.

If US foreign aid and foreign direct investment, which have provided artificial respiration to the economy, also react adversely to the worsening perception about the Musharraf regime, worse could follow.

Before it becomes too late, the doctrine of continuity of economic policies should be buried, along with kindred doctrines of necessity, indispensability and unity of command, which were forced down gullible brains in the last eight years or more. The time for taking roads not treaded for fear of upsetting the status quo has come.

The writer is the author of “The Unravelling of the 9/11 U-Turn”.

syed.naseem@aya.yale.edu