BD’s deepening crisis

GIVEN our common history and other linkages, it is inevitable that the people of Pakistan should follow with interest the political developments in Bangladesh. For people like this writer who spent the first quarter century of his life in that land endowed with both natural beauty and human grace, Bangladesh is not a distant entity.

Bangladesh’s success in the fields of economic growth, education, health, population management and micro finance, has been a source of joy for millions of Pakistanis. It is, however, its political evolution that has been of special envy.

Unlike Pakistan, it appeared as if the people of Bangladesh had succeeded in finally exorcising the ghost of unelected, authoritarian regimes. When Bangladeshis would claim, with understandable pride, that theirs was one of the very few functioning democracies in the Islamic world, this was ungrudgingly acknowledged.

Alas, Bangladesh’s two most important leaders — the Bangladesh National Party’s Khaleda Zia and the Awami League’s Hasina Wajed — failed to realise where their mutual hatred and confrontation was leading the country. Taking advantage of their implacable hostility towards one another and the unsavoury record of their administrations, the Bangladesh army carried out in January 2007 what diplomatic observers refer to as a “soft coup”, much to the disquiet of liberals and democrats.

Generally, the people had become so tired of seeing their country become hostage to the two ladies’ hostility that the army’s “slow creep” into power was welcomed by many who ignored the well-known principle that bringing the army in is neither a remedy for maladministration, nor a cure for corruption. If anything, dictatorial regimes can be even more corrupt and insensitive to the people’s needs — and there’s no getting rid of them either.

It would be recalled that as soon as elections were announced late last year, the opposition led by Sheikh Hasina Wajed not only challenged the composition of the election commission, but even the motives of the Khaleda Zia government. This confrontation soon assumed alarming proportions that inevitably led to street violence and disruption of the country’s economic activities.

It was, therefore, not a surprise when increasing numbers of Bangladeshis, especially those who favoured stability and growth over democracy and human rights, started clamouring for the security forces to step in and take charge of the country’s destiny. This siren song was what the army was hoping for, but unlike other countries, the armed forces did not assume direct control, choosing instead to retain a façade of civilian rule by having President Iajuddin Ahmed declare a state of emergency.

This move suspended several political rights and also brought about a non-party caretaker government led by a retired civil servant Fakhruddin Ahmed as the chief adviser. At the same time, the caretaker government decided to postpone parliamentary elections which were to take place in the same month. Most Bangladeshis recognised that it was the army chief, General Moeen Ahmed, who had handpicked him.

Fakhruddin Ahmed gave a categorical assurance that he and his team would not “stay in power a day longer” than was necessary. His assurance allayed somewhat the apprehensions of the people, but they watched with growing trepidation the army-inspired selective crackdown on well-known politicians and political workers.

In April, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed was charged with the murder of four people in an incident of political violence in 2006. But instead of encouraging her to return and face these charges, Dhaka made it clear that it wanted her to continue staying abroad. When she tried to return, Bangladesh used its influence with the British to prevent her from boarding the aircraft that was to bring her home.

Not surprisingly, Hasina Wajed was exultant and claimed that the interim government had tried to keep her out of the country because they could not “tolerate my popularity”. She also accused the military rulers of “taking the Pakistan model as their ideology”, adding that the Bangladesh military had been encouraged by the manner in which the Pakistani military ousted and sidelined two former prime ministers.

Her political opponent Khaleda Zia who was prime minister till 2006 was placed under virtual house arrest while her son and close associates were taken into custody. Thereafter, intense pressure was applied on her to voluntarily go into exile and, in return, have all charges against her and her family and friends, dropped. After first appearing to buckle under the military’s pressure, she suddenly turned defiant and refused to seek salvation abroad.

The interim government’s ambitious plans to institute wide-ranging purges, ostensibly to root out corruption and punish those involved in major cases of illegal activities, was welcomed initially. But the people were disappointed to note that there was no enquiry against serving and retired military and paramilitary officers who enjoyed no better reputation. According to the London Economist, “defence deals were notoriously corrupt in Bangladesh”. Resultantly, the campaign against the politicians soon lost steam. The dominance of the military in the interim set-up has resulted in not only violations of human rights of politicians, but also in other illegal actions by security and intelligence agencies.

A report by a Bangladesh human rights organisation indicated that in the first three months since the imposition of the state of emergency, 74 people were killed by the law-enforcement agencies across the country. Nearly one-third of those killed were the so-called “left-wing extremists”.

The military-backed caretaker government by its recent moves, especially its effort to sideline BNP and AL leaders, has damaged its credibility. It is now trying to redeem itself by claiming that its primary aim is to rid the country of corruption and that thereafter it will hold “free and fair elections”.

The caretakers have, however, claimed that preparation of fresh electoral rolls will take at least 18 months, even though the constitution mandates the holding of elections within 90 days of the dissolution of parliament. In fact, with the expiry of the three-month period in April, the caretaker government no longer enjoys legitimacy.

Moreover, with the declaration of the emergency, the military has cracked down on political activity, the media has been censored and private channels can broadcast news supplied only by the state organs. Political and trade union activities are banned as well.

There have also been reports to the effect that the army chief may form a political front and enter politics. An effort has been made to convince Nobel laureate and head of the Grameen Bank Prof Muhammad Yunus to enter the electoral process at the head of a team of technocrats and professionals who would first be vetted by the intelligence agencies. These are all counterproductive moves that should be abandoned now, rather than after damage has been done to the democratic traditions of the country.

As well-wishers of Bangladesh, Pakistanis have watched with growing anxiety, first the mutually destructive rivalry between the two ladies and more recently, the efforts of the military-backed regime to play with the democratic institutions of the country.

It was a relief, however, to learn that the ban on the return of Ms Wajed had been lifted and the plans for Ms Zia to go into exile abandoned. The practice of sending political leaders into exile has been tried out by military juntas in many countries, including Pakistan where the tradition has been in vogue ever since President Iskander Mirza was packed off to London in October 1958.

In 1999, Gen Musharraf, too, used the good offices of the Saudis to get rid of elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while Benazir Bhutto was encouraged to stay away from the country on the threat of a long incarceration at home. Thereafter, Musharraf was seen as both strong and smart. But nearly eight years of unchallenged authority have failed to bestow legitimacy or credibility on his government. It has also failed to destroy the core support base of the leaders of the two mainstream political parties.

No government can claim to be either democratic or legitimate if it resorts to banishing political rivals. However corrupt or inefficient a politician may be, he or she cannot do as much damage to the state and its institutions as a military ruler whose regime functions outside the purview of the law. The deepening crisis in one of the world’s few Muslim democracies is a matter of alarm and deep disappointment.

The US attitude has been ambivalent, but it is hoped that Washington will make it clear that tampering with the democratic institutions will not be countenanced in Bangladesh.

The EU, however, has warned that “a failure of the current electoral process would be a major setback for democracy and for the international credibility of the country”. The International Crisis Group has said “mere hand-wringing” was not enough, adding that “improving democracy is the first guarantee against the growth of extremism”.

For those of us who are witnessing in our own country the damage that an authoritarian regime causes to the institutions of the state, one can only hope that given the glorious traditions of the people of Bangladesh, the military-backed set-up in Dhaka will soon realise the futility of denying to its people the rights that they obtained after untold suffering and sacrifices. Nor should they forget that a democracy by its very nature is messy, but it is as yet the only system where the people and not the rulers are the masters of their destiny.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Dilemma facing Benazir

I AM not surprised at Benazir Bhutto’s inclination for an understanding with President Musharraf. She has never rejected a working arrangement with him or, for that matter, with the military unequivocally. Even when she told me in London some months ago that she would have no truck with the military, she was not as emphatic as I found Nawaz Sharif to be when I met him later.

Still, the Charter of Democracy the two have signed leaves no room for doing business with Musharraf. The charter says: “Drawing history’s lesson that the military dictatorship and the nation cannot coexist,” the country requires “a new direction different from the militaristic and regimental approach of the Bonapartist regimes, as the current one.”

To argue that her main concern is to have cases of corruption against her and her husband dropped is not fair. This may be one of her considerations and it is yet to be decided whether she can retain all the mansions and villas she has acquired if the cases are withdrawn in Pakistan or compounded in Switzerland and Spain.

What is probably nearer the truth is the observation she made in one of her interviews: if democracy does not return to Pakistan, the Taliban would take over the country. Her inference may be correct but not her reasoning.

Since the days of General Ziaul Haq, fundamentalism has been encouraged by the government. The mullah has been injected into the military discipline to counter national awakening. Musharraf, until the other day, was plugging the same line. He changed — I do not know how far — when the Frankenstein of terrorism tried to eliminate him. The jihadis are indeed a real danger in Pakistan.

Assuming that Musharraf promises to have a joint front with Benazir Bhutto against the Taliban, will he (by then the re-elected president following the understanding) allow her (by then the prime minister) to eliminate a large number of military personnel having a jihadi outlook? The situation may demand action against religious elements throughout the country. Will she take action when the military appears partly contaminated and when Musharraf feels that it is time for him to sit back and get the support of religious elements on the rebound?

Politically, she will have the MMA against her, apart from Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League and her own party dissidents who would be unhappy over the prospect of working with Musharraf, even if he is no longer in uniform. True, Benazir Bhutto will have America on her side and, maybe, the State Department is burning the midnight oil to make the understanding possible. But this is precisely the reason why she will be all the more suspect. A touch of America, however remote, can spoil things in Pakistan.I do not doubt her sincerity to serve Pakistan at a time when the country is besieged with all types of problems. But the way she is seeking to solve them may not be the correct one. The military in Pakistan is unpopular and any tie-up or an equation with it will be a great liability for her. At times it looks as if she does not realise that Pakistan has changed after the lawyers’ agitation over the “separation” of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry from the Supreme Court. The protest has ignited the spark that can set fire to a haystack of grievances.

Civil society, that had always kept itself distant from political or other movements, is so worked up and determined to face the police or any other force that it is determined to have the dignity of the Supreme Court or, for that matter, the country, restored.

But Benazir does not seem to learn from the past. She had an agreement with the military in 1988. True, President Farooq Leghari, a civilian head, dismissed her. But behind the dismissal was the army chief. What is the guarantee that the military will not dislodge her again once there are better conditions?

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was at the helm after the only free and fair election in 1971, I asked him how he would ensure that the military did not return. He dismissed the question lightly with the observation that ‘my men will confront the tanks on the streets.’ This did not happen when Zia ousted and even hanged him. Fear stalked the land.

The military has come to be an integral part of Pakistan’s matrix. Maybe, Benazir Bhutto has realised this. After all, Turkey, the most liberal Muslim nation, has an arrangement whereby a Supreme Council, with the three military chiefs as members, supervises the country. The military takes over when it feels that the nation has gone off the constitutional track.

Yet, this is not that democracy which means rule by the people. Nawaz Sharif is correct in saying that the military has to be apolitical and stay in the barracks as is the case in India. But this requires strong institutions and long traditions which Pakistan does not have. When political rulers have had one foot in the military boat and the other in the civil apparatus, no institution can be consecrated, not even the Constitution.

Pakistan’s former foreign minister Assef Ali and cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan were in Delhi a few days ago. One question posed to them was why, even after the restoration of democracy, the military took over when it wanted to do so. Both blamed India, arguing that its hostility towards Pakistan made the country dependent on the armed forces for their safety and identity.

Probably, there is something in what they said. After all, Mahatma Gandhi had to fast unto death to make Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel, the top leaders of the then central government, release Rs64 crore. This was Pakistan’s due from the division of assets at the time of partition. New Delhi was determined not to return it because the two countries were fighting over Kashmir at that time.

Still, the main reason for Pakistani society caving in is that the country has not gone through the movement which India has during the freedom struggle. The NWFP and to some extent Sindh and Balochistan suffered the atrocities London committed. I do not have to emphasise that they are the ones which have borne the burnt of excesses in Pakistan. Punjab’s participation in the movement is a recent phenomenon.

People’s assertion to rule themselves is an integral part of democracy for its health. This is happening in Pakistan, even though belatedly. At this time any short cut or attempt to collect whatever benefits are available will snuff out that effort. What looks like the beginning of the end may turn out to be the end of the beginning.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Benchmarks for Iraq

AS President Bush and congressional leaders met on Wednesday to discuss possible compromise terms for funding the Iraq war, the Pentagon announced that the fourth of five additional US brigades had been deployed in a campaign to pacify Baghdad and nearby areas.

It was a reminder that nothing being talked about at the White House will affect the "surge" of troops to Iraq this spring and summer; even under the legislation that Mr Bush vetoed on Tuesday, US troop withdrawals would not begin until Oct. 1. What happens in Iraq between now and then is likely to be far more important than the terms of any settlement -- if there is to be one -- in Washington.

Mr Bush can hope that a successful surge will turn around public opinion and congressional votes on Iraq. So far, unfortunately, there's not much sign of such success. The deployment of additional American and Iraqi forces in the capital has improved conditions in some neighbourhoods and lowered the level of violence modestly, at the painful cost of higher US casualties. It has not produced the main result the administration hoped for -- steps by Iraqis toward a political settlement.

Despite occasional announcements about a new law on oil revenue or rehabilitation of former members of the Baath Party, there has been almost no concrete progress on these issues. There are even signs that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has allowed steps in the opposite direction, such as the purging of military commanders who were deemed too tough on Shia militias.

The most encouraging news from Iraq is not directly related to the Baghdad strategy: It is the decision by Sunni tribes in Anbar province to split with Al Qaeda and wage war against the foreign terrorists in their midst. Whether or not the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq was killed this week, as some reports had it, the split is a potential breakthrough in pacifying some of the most violent parts of the country. It's doubtful the Sunni realignment would have occurred without the presence of US forces or that it would continue without them. But the change of heart goes only so far. There's been no indication that Iraqi Sunni insurgents are ready to accept the US-backed political system or the Shias who lead it.

This mix of developments points to a reasonable compromise for Mr Bush and Congress. Democrats have agreed to remove from the war funding bill their ill-advised timetable for troop withdrawals. But Democrats and some Republicans want to press the Iraqi government to take the missing steps toward political conciliation by writing those steps into the legislation and providing for punishment -- in the form of cuts in nonmilitary aid to the Iraqi government -- if they are not taken. The White House so far has hinted that it might accept such benchmarks, but only if they are nonbinding.

Mr Bush ought to accept the tougher version. The sacrifices that US troops are making in Baghdad will be wasted unless there is political progress in coming months. It's unrealistic to think that all the political benchmarks under discussion will be met, and it may be that Shia, Sunni and Kurdish leaders are incapable of reaching an accord in the near future. If so, the United States will have to stop trying to force an early settlement and shift to a longer-term strategy with a lower military commitment. ––The Washington Post