Some sobering thoughts

LET us suppose that the Taliban succeed in Afghanistan and the US and Nato troops decide to quit that country. Judging by what some of our writers and analysts have been saying in the Pakistani news media, that outcome should be a moment of triumph and rejoicing. According to their reasoning, the hated Americans would have been defeated and the Afghan people would have won, and that would usher in an era of peace and freedom, not only in the region but also in the world beyond.

But would this really be the case? Let us try to visualise the scenario in the event of a victory for the Taliban starting with the internal dimension. The first victim of Taliban rule would be the Afghan women. In effect, they would all be ‘imprisoned’. They would be confined to their homes for most of the time and if they have to venture outside their homes, they would be required to wear the shuttlecock burqas. Girls’ schools would be shut down and there would be a ban on women holding any job. Since the last 30 years of warfare in Afghanistan have produced a large number of widows, and many households have no male breadwinners, such families would be faced with great hardship, including the possibility of starvation. During Taliban rule (1994-2001), many women had been left with no option but to turn to the oldest profession — prostitution.

Apart from the fate that awaits Afghan women, the other features of Taliban rule would be a ban on television, films, music, entertainment and even sports. Newspapers would not have any photographs and, indeed, there would be no freedom of expression.

The news media would be required to print only what the regime would want to be published. All adult males would have to keep the prescribed size of beards and attend prayers five times a day in mosques, and wear the traditional dress, or else they would be punished, including being lashed in public.

Of course, unIslamic activities like drinking alcohol or gambling would result in much more severe punishments, including public executions.

Since the Taliban are strict Sunni Muslims, other Muslim sects would be subjected to severe discrimination. As in the previous Taliban era, the Hazara Shias would probably be singled out for the worst treatment. The non-Muslims might be required to put on a prescribed dress so as not to be confused with the believers. In short, Taliban rule would be marked by gross violations of human rights, and life would be conformist, regimented, dull and bereft of all kinds of pleasure and merriment.

Let us now turn to the external dimension of any kind of return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The world in general would be alarmed by the upsurge of Islamic extremism and fanaticism as represented by the Taliban. The Al Qaeda and diverse terrorist groups would find a sanctuary in Afghanistan. The West would see this as a direct threat to its security and, probably, Russia, India, Israel and even China would look at the Taliban as a danger. Iran is the principal Shia Muslim state and would be unhappy to see a strident Sunni regime as its neighbour: it had very strained relations with the previous Taliban regime. The Central Asian republics are Sunni but secular-minded: they would be very uncomfortable with the fanatical Taliban regime in their neighbourhood.

How about Pakistan? A victory for the Taliban in Afghanistan would give a boost to the religious extremists in Pakistan. The internal tensions in Pakistan would grow further. In the Pakhtun tribal areas, unilateral attempts would be made to impose the Taliban model. There would an increase in Shia-Sunni tensions, and sectarian violence in Pakistan might reach alarming proportions. In the event that the religious parties increase their strength in Pakistan and manage to come to power at the centre, the Talibanisation of Pakistan would have devastating consequences. Pakistani women would be the greatest sufferers: they would be denied education, jobs and, in sum, would lose their freedom. Women would not any more be sitting in legislatures or public bodies. There would be no free press. Indeed, there would be no freedom of expression of any kind.

Entertainment would be severely curtailed, television would be banned, and films would be outlawed. Of course, the seizure of power in Pakistan by Islamic extremists would send alarm bells ringing all over the world because Pakistan happens to be a nuclear state. The US, Europe, Russia, India and Israel would probably join hands in a bid to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear assets. At the minimum, Pakistan would be ostracised and would be denied aid and access to markets.

The Kashmiri freedom fighters would be dubbed Islamic terrorists and India would be encouraged to take on Pakistan in whatever way possible. In fact, India would be the biggest gainer if the Islamic extremists come to power in Pakistan. Though smaller than India, Pakistan has, over the last 50 years, managed to find equalisers against India through its friendship and alliances with the West and China. In the event, Pakistan loses the friendship and support of these countries, its ability to resist Indian encroachments would diminish significantly. This would suit India entirely. Faced with a hostile external environment, Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities would be exposed. In such circumstances, Pakistan’s viability as a state might be open to question.

Matters involving survival of the state and its economic welfare need cool-headed thinking and sound evaluation. It is no use pandering to emotions, giving vent to biases and prejudices and living in a world of make-believe. Just now, it seems that anti-Americanism has clouded the judgment of a great many people in Pakistan. This is paradoxical since, over the years, Pakistan has received more economic aid from the US (approximately $15 billion) than from any other country.

The US has also been a major supplier of arms to Pakistan and is, at present, the largest export market of Pakistan. Pakistani policymakers cannot afford to ignore these hard realities.

Even putting that aside, it should be clear that Pakistan’s national interests would be seriously impaired in the event of victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan would lose internally as well as externally. The Taliban had been grudgingly tolerated in 1996 but, after 9/11, world realities have changed.

Pakistan is a leading Islamic country that has, from its very inception, chosen the liberal path in politics, education and human values. We cannot afford to allow the religious fanatics of the Taliban model to turn our back on all that.

The writer is a former ambassador

How long can the government rule?

GOVERNMENTS, like human beings and organic matter, have a natural lifespan of their own. At its longest it could be eight years. Beyond that, governments do last but more because of constraints than by consent.

This is an axiomatic truth for all governments whether democratic, autocratic or a blend of both — as is Pakistan’s now and has been in the past, barring the first few years after independence. By this yardstick, President Musharraf’s government has less than a year to go.

The element of constraint in Pakistan comes into play much earlier than a period of eight years. The elected governments of the first decade of independence and in the period 1988 to 1999 fell, or were dismissed, when they lost the people’s sympathy. They could not manipulate power to stay on. Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq, using their coercive power, stretched their terms beyond eight years only to meet a sad end.

It was not for nothing that the Americans amended their constitution, which they rarely do, to limit their president to two terms, each one comprising four years, even if the people were inclined to elect an incumbent president for the third.

The hazards of a long stay in office are not confined to self-perpetuating individuals or governments. Elected leaders, too, suffer them as George Bush is now doing. He will trundle on in his remaining two years in office only because his term is protected by the constitution. Tony Blair, who led the Labour to three successive victories (which no one had before him) and is rated as one of the best prime ministers Britain ever had, is now hanging on to office waiting for an opportune moment to quit.

General Musharraf would be hitting the crucial eight-year outer limit of power in October next year just about the time elections to the national and provincial assemblies are due. It is obvious by now that he would be seeking another five-year term from the electoral college (comprising members of the Senate, the National Assembly and four provincial assemblies) unless he succumbs earlier to a determined Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s threatened long march and siege of Islamabad.

Tempting but destructive suggestions are already being made to Musharraf to get himself elected by the current assemblies in which he commands a majority. His election would thus be assured and may also be held legal by a helpful judiciary; but being devoid of representative or moral character it would make him an ineffective head of state for as long as he lasts.

If President Musharraf must transgress the eight-year limit ignoring lessons from the past, general elections should be held before his current term expires. If elected by the new parliament and provincial assemblies, he would have credibility — yet the fatigue caused by time would be evident and the people’s irrepressible urge for change will dog his footsteps.

The real point to ponder, however, is not the exit or continuation of Musharraf as president but the survival of Pakistan’s honour and security which is gravely threatened.

Such a calamity can be averted only through free and fair elections. Viewing the political forces as they are arraigned behind or against Musharraf, there is little likelihood of his getting overall majority in parliament or the provincial assemblies. Hence the apprehension that the elections will not be fair.

In the 2002 elections, the PML-Q, which is the mainstay of Musharraf’s government, polled 26.63 per cent of the votes cast to win 118 seats in the National Assembly. Among the other parties supporting him, the MQM polled 3.55 per cent votes and won 17 seats, Sherpao’s PPP polled less than half a per cent votes but got two seats. The Muslim League’s J and F factions combined to poll 2.16 per cent of the votes to secure eight seats.

Among the opposing parties, Benazir Bhutto’s PPP polled two per cent more votes than the Q League but got only 80 seats against Q League’s 118. It was the MMA that showed true electoral skill by bagging 59 seats though it polled only 12.28 per cent of the votes. To the contrary, Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League polled more votes than the MMA did but got only 18 seats.

Even if the polling pattern of 2002 is repeated in the elections of 2007 (which is unlikely because the party in power tends to lose popularity irrespective of its performance), the coalition backing Musharraf shall have to enlist the support of some other parties to form a majority in the National Assembly. With the Jamaat-i-Islami already set on a course of confrontation, the MMA is unlikely to stay together or vote for Musharraf even if it does.

Putting aside the issue of personal rancour and legality, the PPP and PML(N) apparently have no ideological reservations in going along with Musharraf’s domestic and foreign policies which the MMA always had, and that have now culminated in bitter hostility. The MMA supported Musharraf primarily to save its own government in the NWFP and to get the position of the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly which in fairness should have gone to the PPP being the largest party. Musharraf’s alliance with the MMA was thus based on mutual self-interest; with the PPP/PML(N) it would be based on the identity of views.

The voting pattern of the 2002 elections has been recalled only to emphasise the point that if General Musharraf must put himself up as a candidate for the presidency (which it seems he will, notwithstanding the lessons of domestic and world politics) he must arrive at an electoral adjustment, or as is more common now to say, strike a deal with Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The ruling coalition should draw no satisfaction from past defections and the results of by-elections held since 2002. The elections of 2007 will have their own dynamics.

General Musharraf should not let himself be persuaded by the Q League leaders to rely on them alone for procuring a majority for him. It wouldn’t be possible without massive rigging. Pakistan’s hope for survival and stability lies neither in long marches nor in ballot rigging but in the alignment of like-minded parties to contest elections that are fairly conducted by an impartial authority.

Chinese loans for the US

WHILE American voters were finally giving President George Bush and his southern-fried Republican Party a richly-deserved, long-overdue drubbing, I was off in China observing a nation that while rigidly authoritarian, is at least governed by capable, intelligent people. The same, alas, could not be said of the Bush administration that has saddled America with two lost wars, costing over eight billion dollars monthly, soaring budget deficits, and the intense dislike, if not downright hostility, of many people around the world.

Here in Beijing for my umpteenth visit since 1975, I’ve seen the future, and it still says, ‘Made in China’. This gigantic metropolis of 25 million seems destined to become the world’s new capitol city — provided China’s economy, still surging at over 10 per cent per annum, remains strong, and political stability continues.

Beijing’s massive new skyscrapers, huge government blocks, broad, traffic-clogged avenues and miasma of smog and dust give it the look of an imperial capital in a science fiction film.

Recently, China staged a grandiose summit for 48 African leaders summoned to Beijing to receive $10 billion in aid from President Hu Jintao.

Energy voracious China now gets 30 per cent of its oil from Africa. Angola just passed Saudi Arabia as China’s leading oil supplier. China is bent on securing the lion’s share of Africa’s supplies of oil and other strategic resources. China-Africa trade has surged 30 per cent to $50 billion in 2003. Interestingly, during the height of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the Soviet Union tried the same strategy, but was thwarted by the CIA and South Africa.

China’s non-interference policy in foreign affairs means its trade and aid come without strings, a major plus for authoritarian or boycotted African regimes. But at least China is not hypocritical. While Washington boycotts Sudan and Zimbabwe over human rights, it cosies up to other African nations like Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia that are routinely accused of serious violations by international rights groups.

The summit was a lavish spectacle, with convoys of bigwigs in armoured limousines racing down the avenues, dancers, drummers, acrobats, small armies of tough security details, and regiments of China’s feared, ramrod-straight paramilitary police, the Wujing, scowling at everyone.

This week, China announced a third quarter trade surplus of US $102 billion. Beijing’s monetary reserves have finally topped one trillion dollars, surpassing the former cash king, Japan. Much of China’s reserves remain in US dollars. Beijing continues to finance America’s spending binge by lending it billions, and keeping its reserves in dollars, though their value is under increasing pressure. Communist China, in effect, continues to prop up the capitalist dollar in the face of growing pressure for its devaluation.

China’s mammoth trade surplus, and a rising flood of foreign investment, has swamped the nation’s banks with cash. This, in turn, has fuelled indiscriminate speculative investments, particularly in real estate and factories, and ignited a gold rush frenzy that often obscures China’s solid economic achievements.

This flood of hot money poses a serious danger. Indiscriminate investment leads to overproduction, which then causes a deflationary crisis that could end in financial meltdown.

China’s government has been struggling without much success to restrain this investment dragon. Beijing refuses, however, to allow its controlled, seriously undervalued currency, the yuan, to float, as its trade partners keep demanding.

The undervalued yuan has given China its huge surplus, the motor of growth that has pulled the nation out of poverty. China still needs to deal with hundreds of millions of struggling farmers, state industry workers, and unemployed.

So it refuses to allow the yuan to inch up by more than five per cent. If the yuan were allowed to float, say Chinese bankers, people would rush to convert to dollars, causing a dire financial crisis.

Who would have ever imagined that it would take Chinese loans to keep the US financial system from imploding?

US Republicans would do well to take pointers on capitalism from China’s communists who have beaten the western devils at their own game. — Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2006