DURING the recently concluded visit of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to South Asia, attention focused largely on his discussions in Islamabad and New Delhi with regard to the role the US could play in promoting the prospects for the resumption of an Indo-Pak dialogue.

This was perhaps as it should have been, given the danger confrontation between these two countries poses to regional and global peace and given the role such confrontation and rivalry play in exacerbating tensions in other trouble spots in the region. It would be unfortunate, however, if this prevented us from giving Afghanistan the attention it needs or acknowledging the degree to which developments in Afghanistan or on the Pak- Afghan border impinge upon US-Pakistan relations.

In fact, we should bear in mind that, given the involvement of American troops in active combat in Afghanistan, the Afghan facet of the US-Pakistan relationship has, in many ways, a higher salience in Washington than the Indian facet. Admittedly, Armitage spent only a few hours in Kabul but what he had to say was important. His mission was to reassure the Afghans that the US’s involvement in Iraq did not mean it would set aside its responsibilities in Afghanistan and that no immediate withdrawal of American forces was envisaged.

“The United States”, he said, “will withdraw forces once we are sure that the government of Afghanistan feels perfectly secure and the people of Afghanistan have found the necessary stability,”. This statement was important since some 10 days earlier Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld had announced in Kabul that major combat operations had ended in Afghanistan and that the focus would now shift to reconstruction activities for which military teams would be assigned to various provinces in Afghanistan.

The outgoing commander of the US and coalition forces had also spoken of the withdrawal of American forces commencing in 2004 by which time it was optimistically assumed that there would be a sufficiently large and trained Afghan army to take over security duties.

He made clear American opposition to the proposal by the UN’s Lakhdar Brahimi that the International Security Assistance Force should expand its mandate to provide security outside Kabul. He referred instead to the American military’s plans for military-civilian teams to spread out across the country to undertake reconstruction activity. Such teams which have some $12 million at their disposal are currently working in the provinces of Gardez, Bamian, and Kunduz and, if American plans work out, five more teams will be established in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and Parwan.

Whether such teams can provide the security cover aid workers from international organizations or local Afghans need remains questionable. In fairness, however, it must be said that at an earlier stage when the United States did swallow its misgivings and signalled its willingness to go along with an expanded International Security Assistance Force, no country came forward with an offer of additional troops for duty in Afghanistan.

He did not, as far as one can judge from the information made public so far, offer any new assistance beyond what has already been promised. In short it seemed that beyond a reassurance about continued American interest in Afghanistan there was little that Armitage brought with him for the Karzai government or for the reconstruction effort.

Afghanistan of course is in an unholy mess. The writ of the central government does not run beyond Kabul. Warlords, even those appointed governors by the central government, collect the customs duties and other taxes on behalf of the government but keep the money for themselves. The government’s poor financial plight was highlighted by the demonstration held in Kabul a few days ago by government employees to protest against the non-payment of their salaries for the last three months.

Warlords have successfully frustrated the UN and Japan-financed project to disarm regional armies. Many of these warlords are on the payroll of the American-led coalition forces and are required to maintain their forces to fight the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Others claim that until they see a greater ethnic balance in the currently Tajik-dominated government they will not submit to its writ or give up their arms.

Foreign aid provided for reconstruction in Afghanistan runs at about $40-50 per capita as against the $200-300 per capita provided in Kosovo and East Timor. To make matters worse in the last year, more than 50 per cent of the assistance provided went to humanitarian aid making the provision for reconstruction about $20-25 per capita in a country that was far more devastated than either Kosovo or East Timor. Afghans, in Kabul, watch bitterly as UN workers whiz by in expensive Land cruisers and push up rents in Kabul to meteoric heights.

For the ordinary Afghan there is nothing to show for the so-called development effort. This is particularly so in the Pushtun heartland, where, according to one correspondent, “some people’s only contact with the international community comes when American soldiers kick down doors in a seemingly indiscriminate search for weapons”.

Perhaps reflecting this newly heightened resentment, aid workers in their traditional white vehicles are being targeted. The demining operations undertaken by the UN agency concerned and by private NGOs have been suspended following three attacks on vehicles and personnel engaged in de-mining. Without the successful completion of mine clearance the only large project undertaken in Afghanistan — the reconstruction of the Kabul-Kandahar road — a project already plagued by financial and other difficulties, will be further delayed. President Bush has apparently instructed whatever the bureaucratic hurdles, this road should be completed by the end of this year. Given the current insecurity, it seems unlikely that this target will be met.

On another plane the international financed campaign to destroy the poppy crop in Northern Afghanistan and in the rest of the country has ground to a halt because local governors have refused to allow the officials to proceed until adequate compensation is paid to the farmers. As a result it seems an estimated 4,500 tons of opium and other drugs will be harvested and make its way to markets in the West but more importantly to the 2.5 million opium and heroin users that we now have in our country. Our success in eliminating opium production in our own country is not therefore going to make much of a difference to easy availability of the drug to our youth.

A fundamental factor promoting instability and political uncertainty is the dominance exercised by the Tajik faction — or, more accurately, the Panjsheri section of the Tajik faction — over the government and the security apparatus in Kabul. Karzai’s position as president gives him little real authority. This rests in the hands of the vice-president and defence minister, Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, whose Tajik nominees fill the ranks of the bureaucracy and the new army. Most observers are agreed that Fahim’s stranglehold over the defence ministry and intelligence agencies has to be loosened if the pacification process is to advance. They argue that other factions and commanders are unlikely to take part in a UN-organized disarmament process this year unless power is shared more evenly at the centre.

Similarly, the Afghan national army, being put together at a painfully slow pace, is unlikely to be accepted around the country unless its command structures, as much as its foot soldier reflect a more equitable ethnic balance. These are facts that the Americans are aware of. Gen McNeill, the outgoing US commander, said that he was optimistic about the success of the disarmament plan but only if an on-going effort to reform and reconstitute the leadership of the Afghan ministry of defence is successful and if the Pushtuns are given greater representation before they are asked to give up their arms.

So far however there are no reports to indicate that any substantial moves towards reform have been made. Perhaps there is a glimmer of hope if, as Gen. McNeill has claimed, more Pushtuns have now been recruited in the new army, but then again the question arises whether this increased recruitment is also replicated in the officer corps.

While this ethnic imbalance may be, in our eyes and the eyes of discerning observers, what lies at the root of Afghanistan’s continuing strife, the general perception unfortunately is that a large part of Afghanistan’s problems are caused by the Taliban operating from hideouts in Pakistan. Pakistan, it is said, is aggrieved by the ill-treatment meted out to the Pushtun in Afghanistan, incensed by the Northern Alliance’s entente with the Indians, frustrated by its loss of influence in a country which was to provide it “strategic depth” and coerced by provincial governments that are pro-Taliban, and has, therefore, at the very least, turned a blind eye to the disruptive activities undertaken by the Taliban and their ally Hekmatyar.

How valid is this perception? What impact does it have on our relations with the current government in Afghanistan? What effect does it have on our relations with the US? How far does it drive the international community, desirous of peace and stability, to look towards India as the regional power that can help bring such peace and stability to Afghanistan? This will be the subject of my next article.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

AS India-Pakistan relations, which move in a cyclic pattern, enter one of their friendlier phases, it is heartening to hear voices of sanity in support of peace and normalization between the two countries. It seems that war fatigue has set in and the “voices of sanity” are getting louder.

The futility of attempting a military solution is now dawning on an increasing number of Pakistanis. This is important to sustain the momentum which began when the Indian prime minister extended the olive branch to Islamabad last month, and the peace overtures followed in quick succession from both sides.

It is too early to expect relations between India and Pakistan to be normalized in the immediate future, all the hype notwithstanding. Neither will the disputes, especially the “core issue” of Kashmir — Pakistan’s pet term in dialogue parlance — be resolved right away. The buzz words today are “the long haul”. There are too many hawks on both sides who have been expressing their reservations — if not hostility — about the peace process.

Needless to say, the vested interests, which have benefited from an impasse between the two subcontinental neighbours, will not welcome peace so easily. They have been raising their concern on issues, which for the time being can be set aside. That is because in recent months some powerful compulsions for an India-Pakistan detente have emerged. Islamabad should understand their significance and not attempt to swim against the tide of history.

A sea change has taken place in this part of the world brought on by what has been happening elsewhere. This has made it no longer possible for India and Pakistan to stick to their guns on the issues, which have divided them since 1947. The US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s visit to the region last week came as a significant reminder of the transformation that has taken place in inter-state relations in South Asia.

Why should America now find a renewed vigour to nudge India towards opening its lines of communication with Pakistan in a bid to normalize its ties with it? Why should Mr Vajpayee change the BJP’s tack to project his party’s image as one of peace (if Shekhar Gupta, the editor of the Indian Express is to be believed)? The fact is that there has been a noticeable shift in policy. India which has suddenly dropped its condition of “cross-border terrorism” being stopped before a dialogue with Pakistan can be opened. Mr Vajpayee has also indicated a willingness to discuss the Kashmir issue.

This will undoubtedly be better than having their armies locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, as they were a few months ago. If they cannot enter into a relationship of cooperation and detente, let them talk. Thus they will not have their fingers on the trigger — a nuclear one in this case.

It is plain that America’s geopolitical goal in South Asia today is more clearly defined and the Bush administration is ready to act to translate this goal into reality. America feels threatened by the violence that is becoming endemic in the South Asian region. As it wages its war against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban remnants hiding in Pakistan, there is nothing to stop the US from extending its reach to the militants in Kashmir. Why should it want to tolerate Kashmir as another hotspot in the region?

Arguably, the insurgency in the valley is directed against India. But can the violence unleashed by non-state actors be contained in one area alone? The Afghan crisis since 1979 has amply demonstrated that terrorism assumes a ubiquitous form in the globalized world of today. Hence America obviously feels that it can only root out the Al Qaeda network if the militants fighting in Kashmir are also eliminated. Pakistan can no longer hope to get away by running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.

The Pakistan government must be very clear on this count. It should also understand that its protestations and denials do not change the perception of other parties that continue to link the insurgency in the valley with Pakistan. Hence Islamabad will have to not only denounce terrorism in the valley. It will also have to adopt measures to curb the militants who have found sanctuary on our soil. That the US also means business this time is palpable. This signal was sent across to Islamabad when recently Washington declared the Hizbul Mujahideen a ‘foreign terrorist organization’, which carries grave implications — the most significant being that the US now considers the HM to be a threat to American national security.

By adopting this approach vis-a-vis the militants, Washington is killing two birds with one stone. It is furthering its war aims in the context of the global fight against terror. It is also enlisting India’s support in the wider game of international politics, which it badly needs to counter the growing power of China. Since there is no love lost between China and the Islamist militants, Pakistan will find itself isolated if it does not distance itself from a pro-jihad policy.

Closely linked to this thrust towards the isolation of the Islamists is the emerging political situation in occupied Kashmir. This is working against Pakistan and is bound to leave it without any political leverage in Kashmir. Quite unnoticed in this country, some key developments have been taking place on the Indian side of Kashmir.

The elections held in the state in September-October last year are deemed to have been the first reasonably fair and free elections in the territory since 1947. If there were any constraints, they came from the militants who threatened violence against the voters who would come out to cast their ballot or the candidates who would contest. The party, which came into office in coalition with the Congress Party, is again an independent one, namely the People’s Democratic Party of Mufti Muhammad Sayeed. Although Mufti Sayeed was at one time the Union Home Minister, he can hardly be termed a stooge of the BJP. There is new blood in the seat of power in Srinagar and the chief minister has been playing his cards very deftly.

Since August, a dialogue has been in progress in the Indian held Kashmir between an unofficial seven-member committee headed by Ram Jethmalani, a former Union Law Minister, and the All Party Hurriyat Conference. Although the process is being conducted very discreetly, it has made some headway. Encouraged by its success, in February New Delhi appointed an official interlocutor on Kashmir, N.N. Vohra. In a radical move, the Indian government has even offered to talk to the resistance groups in Kashmir.

With war fatigue making its impact on the Kashmiris, the negotiations stand quite a good chance of reaching some understanding on the political future of the valley. If the militants abandon their politics of violence, the chances of an arrangement being tentatively arrived at are better than they have ever been in the past.

The internal dialogue in India gives the APHC a role in the political process, which it has been demanding all along. It is not assured of a part in the India-Pakistan dialogue. It is most unlikely that the Kashmiris would want to fade out of the picture and let their future be decided by the two governments.

Understandably they want to have a say even in the talks about the talks. They would want to be consulted on the question of modalities to be adopted to settle the future of the Kashmiri people. One knows very well that procedural issues can make a vital difference to the substantive part of negotiations.

In this changing scenario, Pakistan will only put itself at a terrible disadvantage if it persists with its present Kashmir policy. By continuing to support the use of force, Islamabad will alienate the Americans. Insisting on the “core dispute” being resolved before any other issue can be taken up will place it on a weak wicket since the political forces in the valley are now inclined to talk to India directly.

The pragmatic and sensible approach would be to discreetly put Kashmir on the backburner. Let Islamabad concentrate on normalizing its ties with New Delhi. Kashmir can wait. A solution will emerge in due course, though it may not be exactly as we visualize it at the moment.