ON September 11 the whole world was horrified at the attack on America, condemned it, sympathized with and supported the US. Today, three weeks after the start of the bombing of Afghanistan, the US no longer monopolizes sympathy and support, but is increasingly losing it to those suffering in Afghanistan. This naturally has both immediate and long-term consequences for Pakistan.

Pakistan recently took a 180-degree turn by supporting the US attack against the Taliban and Afghanistan. Few Pakistanis wholeheartedly welcomed the decision, a vociferous minority vehemently opposes it, and large numbers who accepted it are fast growing alarmed.

The clash with the Taliban, or certainly with the Pakistani version of it, had been anticipated by most analysts as almost inevitable in the next few years. For Pakistan, the events of September 11 merely crystallized the issue and gave it an international dimension. While we now have the might of the sole superpower on our side, which is a substantial asset, we also carry the liability of backing the US strikes against our Muslim neighbour. The ramifications of the international aspects,including their impact on relations with India vis-a-vis Kashmir, as well as the domestic and related economic situation merit examination.

The Indian dimension was highlighted in the very first statement of President Pervez Musharraf to justify Pakistan’s support for the offensive against terrorism. He touched on the possibility of our nuclear capability being wiped out, and the Kashmir question being compromised if Pakistan’s support was not immediately forthcoming.

We are not privy to what threat was held out by the US, but it would appear far-fetched to accept that our nuclear installations could be so readily attacked. Similarly, it is unlikely that India, with US support, would have struck at all Mujahideen camps and sorted out the Kashmir issue. Considering that it took almost one month to mount the air attack on a virtually defenceless Afghanistan, there seems little justification for having accepted the US ultimatum so hurriedly, allowing no time for proper consultation in advance with our Muslim friends and China, and leaders at home. At best, our hasty acceptance of the ultimatum can be explained as an attempt to pre-empt any Indian effort to further isolate us. But having avoided one isolation, Pakistan should not end up in the wrong camp again. We have already distanced ourselves further from China and friendly Muslim countries. China has delayed the proposed infrastructural projects related to Gwadar port. Iran opposes virtually all moves by Pakistan. Other Muslim countries like Malaysia have refused to support US air strikes, and even Saudi Arabia and Egypt have denied the US the use of their facilities. Indonesia has resiled from its earlier support. Russia, too, while backing the anti-Taliban coalition, is opposed to Pakistan’s post-Taliban aspirations.

Another source of concern to many countries, particularly in the Muslim world, is the threat the US made on October 7 to the UN security Council: ‘We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states.’ Will Pakistan automatically get drawn into these actions?

Within Afghanistan, the US-led coalition is now, on its own admission, finding the resistance much greater than anticipated. If the air war lasts much longer, and the ground war gets bloody, the fall-out on Pakistan and the Muslim world will be very dangerous. Even if the war is short, the post-war problems will mainly affect Pakistan.

The nature of any future government in Afghanistan is critically important. The anti-Taliban forces, led by the Northern Alliance, are unfriendly towards Pakistan because of its past backing for the Taliban; so too are Russia, India and Iran. If the Taliban are incorporated in the new government, as Pakistan desires, the result will be an unstable and feuding coalition. If the Taliban are totally ousted, they will re-emerge in Pakistan, adding to uncertainty, lawlessness and sectarian strife. The earlier influx of refugees was at least the result of struggle in which Pakistan shared. This time, Pakistan will be seen as part of the enemy coalition.

Although India may appear a little out of step with the US-led coalition by constantly referring to ‘cross-border terrorism’ and diverting attention from the main goal of current US policy, its propaganda purpose is being fully served. At a time when the world, especially the West, is obsessed with terrorism, India’s persistent association of Pakistan with terror may ultimately be rewarded once the immediate importance of Pakistan diminishes.

As for the hope that US recognition of the Kashmir dispute being the ‘central’ issue between India and Pakistan will in due course help secure a suitable settlement, this is far more unlikely now than in 1962 when India was weakened by the Sino-Indian border conflict. Today, the US has little or no leverage with India. As the war on terrorism concludes its first phase, there may indeed be forced restrictions or reductions in Pakistan’s active support for the freedom fighters in Kashmir. On the domestic front, the new stream of refugees will greatly add to our instability and insecurity. Our home-grown religious extremists will receive encouragement. The economic impact of the war is also significant. Factories are closing, both exports and imports are down, and unemployment is rampant. The present flow of dollars may help at the macro level of debt obligations and balance of payments, but will not mitigate the other pressing problems either in the immediate or mid-term future. Worse still, the talk of aid flowing in raises people’s expectations, which will remain largely unfulfilled.

Far from the massive flow of aid that is being talked about in some quarters, Pakistan has barely been compensated for the loss and cost to the country, estimated at between $1.5 to $2.5 billion since the beginning of the crisis. So far only $800 million has been committed, and nothing beyond the current financial year. Notwithstanding assurances that this time western commitment is for the long term, Pakistan should not forget previous bitter experiences when such promises have failed to materialize. Once the need of the moment is over, Pakistan can again be chastised for its lack of democracy, nuclear proliferation, and support for freedom fighters in Kashmir. Having overnight changed from being a pariah state to a front-line democracy in the fight for freedom, there is no guarantee against an equally rapid reversal.

Pakistan is now committed to the US-led coalition, and should have no qualms about requiring the donor states to spell out as soon as possible what long-term assistance they will provide — what we can rightly and legitimately expect. It is not a question of demanding a price for support, but of seeking compensation for the present loss and the cost of previous commitments. Just as Pakistan was told ‘you are either with us or against us’, our government should in turn address the West in the same terms — only politely.

In very difficult circumstances, President Pervez Musharraf has on the whole provided calm and steady leadership. However, he should now seize the opportunity to redeem some of our national esteem and integrity. The 180-degree turn was accompanied by a public admission of expediency and lack of conviction. It has been stated loud and clear that Pakistan had no alternative but to back the US. After the NATO allies were shown the alleged evidence against Osama bin Laden, our president said he knew no more than the ordinary TV viewer. Similarly, we have been forced into the role of a front-line state with our air bases in use while at the same time admitting we have no knowledge of the US war plans.

It is time for the leaders of Pakistan to pause, deliberate and then decide how to proceed further. At the least, we should without delay press for full economic compensation beyond the current financial year. We can also call for some restraint by the US. The whole world is aghast at the impending refugee and food crisis in Afghanistan, from which Pakistan will also greatly suffer. Pakistan should use its front-line status to rally the Muslim world in demanding restraint. Military requirements must give way to humanitarian needs, and, in any case, US bombing so far has achieved very little.

If geography has placed Pakistan in a position to affect history, then let not history record that we have acted merely expediently. One may disagree totally with the Taliban’s methods and policies, but no one can doubt their conviction. Some conviction should now return to Pakistan. We should think long and hard about our national identity and the sort of society we want to be, and unequivocally pursue the Quaid-i-Azam’s goal of a democratic, economically vibrant and modern Muslim state. Only then will we rise in our own esteem, and gain some real respect in the world outside.

The writer is a former federal minister.

WHILE briefing the media in New Delhi last week, the Indian foreign office spokesperson, in somewhat picturesque language, injected a note of sanity in the strident exchanges lately taking place between India and Pakistan. She said that the “caravan of peace” which began at Agra had only “stalled, not over-turned.” She believed that with some timely peace overtures from the Pakistani side “the procession should be on the move again.”

Indeed, there have to be meaningful and abiding peace overtures from both sides. The tone of comments on Pakistan’s bilateral and regional roles heard on satellite channels from the other side has lately been very shrill and hostile. There was a time when the Indian media would not talk of Pakistan as an “enemy.” This is no longer so.

However, striking a differing note, some Indiana reports have spoken of a “personal equation” between the top leaders of India and Pakistan, suggesting that even their mutual recriminations are “cushioned by a measure of trust” which they developed at Agra. A “symmetry of tone” was also noted by some Indian commentators in the post-Agra press briefings by Pakistan’s Abdul Sattar and India’s Jaswant Singh. According to one, both seemed to tilt towards a positive prognosis as far as future summit-level engagements were concerned. That does not, however, include a Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting in the immediate future. In fact, noted India-Pakistan affairs specialists Praful Bidwai, believes that the Vajpayee government is under pressure (from its hardline allies affiliated to the RSS and Vishwa Hindu Parishad) to negate and reverse the gains of Agra.

With India blowing hot and cold on the question of peace with Pakistan, the prospects of a meeting between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf on the sidelines of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York are not too bright. The Indian prime minister has scheduled his visit to New York for November, while General Musharraf has yet to decide whether or not to attend the UN session, the major factor of uncertainty being the pulls and pressures of the Afghan crisis and Pakistan’s critical involvement in that context.

The US secretary of state’s initiative during his recent visit to Islamabad and New Delhi in restarting the long stalled peace process between India and Pakistan became a casualty of the brittleness of the two countries’ relations. Mr Colin Powell’s statement in Islamabad calling the Kashmir issue as being central to relations between the two countries drew an angry reaction from India.

Another damper was the redeployment of some Indian security forces on the eve of Mr Powell’s visit. In response Pakistan put its own armed forces on high alert and warned India that it should not try to exploit the situation along the Line of Control (LoC) or the international border to its strategic advantage while the world attention was focused on the happenings in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military establishment made it quite clear that India would not be allowed to get away with any misadventure threatening Pakistan’s security.

Even if a Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting in New York does not take place, there are chances of a meeting between the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan, who would be in New York at the time. The Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, gave a positive signal the other day when he said that the present government in New Delhi had demonstrated despite difficulties a commitment to improving relations with Pakistan “as perhaps no other Indian government had done in the last fifty years.” He said: You can change friends but you cannot change neighbours; we certainly cannot alter geography and Pakistan and India have to learn to live together as good neighbours... We have to learn together to fight what is our real enemy — poverty.”

In his latest comments about his impressions of his meetings in Islamabad and New Delhi, Mr Colin Powell seemed cautiously optimistic. He said that both India and Pakistan realized that they had a crucial stake in the peace and stability of the region, and that they could not let tensions get out of hand.

Other foreign leaders who have visited Pakistan in the recent days have similarly stressed the importance of peace in the region and the need for India and Pakistan to resume their peace dialogue. They include Turkish President Necdet Sezer, the British secretary of state for development, Ms Clare Short, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer and the German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder. In most cases, the focal point of interest is international solidarity in fighting terrorism and peace and stability in the subcontinent as a concomitant of that process.

India has remained reticent about making a common cause with Pakistan on the question of supporting the international campaign against terrorism. Paradoxically, it wholeheartedly endorses the US action against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. It appears frustrated at the international community not responding to its demand for a similar operation against Pakistan which it holds responsible for sponsoring “cross-border terrorism” in occupied Kashmir. It is obvious that the world community makes a distinction between the situation involving the Taliban and bin Laden and the one in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Of late, a certain softening is to be seen in India’s accusatory tone.

Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Munir Akram, while addressing the UN General Assembly in New York the other day, warned India against any misadventure or blackmail tactics against Pakistan while the world community is pre-occupied with the terrorism concerning Afghanistan. Any move to the contrary is bound to have unforeseeable consequences for the region.

Hopefully, India has taken note of Ambassador Akram’s offer of “strategic restraint” in the prevailing security environment in the subcontinent. The “strategic concept” outlined by him for stability in the region stresses nuclear restraint since it seems Pakistan’s nuclear capability continues to be a matter of particular concern to the Indian government. The concept envisages not only nuclear restraint on the part of the two countries but also a substantial conventional arms balance as well as a mechanism for the resolution of bilateral disputes and conflicts, including Kashmir.

A significant feature of Mr Akram’s offer was a reference to the “new realities” in the world order which should aim at resolving tensions between states through economic and political cooperation rather than by military means. He has suggested a number of specific steps not only to steer away from nuclear proliferation but also for restoring calm in relations between India and Pakistan.

India should be expected to give a positive response to Pakistan’s latest proposal embodying at least eight specific steps. These are in the nature of a concrete undertaking to India of Pakistan’s determination not to resort to any clandestine means to outmanoeuvre its neighbour in the defence or political sphere. It is meant to reduce tensions in the region and work towards durable peace between the two countries.

I WONDER why nobody ever tells us how many billions the ten richest men in Pakistan possess. You will read in newspapers a list of the ten richest men in America published regularly by Forbes Magazine and Fortune.

The latest was picked up from Fortune some days ago. Reports are also published about the most moneyed persons in Britain, Germany and Japan, even Australia, but never about anyone from Pakistan or India. Why?

There is a reason why our Croesuses never disclose to anyone how much wealth they have accumulated. It is understandable since most of the them do not pay the taxes they should be paying. People make guesses about their financial worth, but if these billionaires were to admit the veracity of these figures they would be hard put to it to explain where it all came from.

Before I proceed further I am tempted to tell you that Malcolm Forbes was a US billionaire and the magazine was just a small item in his varied business interests. You may recall his visit to Pakistan in 1982 when he promoted the release of hot air balloons in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, and surprised local millionaires by traversing the country on a motorbike from south to north along with four companions similarly mounted. In Lahore I took my daughters early one morning to see him float a balloon shaped as Minar-e-Pakistan. A unique personality, he died a few years ago.

Talking of the ten richest men, since no one can make much money in Pakistan (and India) by fair and legal means, these gold-plated billionaires would at once be collared by the Central Revenue hounds if they admitted the true extent of their wealth and made to account for every penny they had gathered. It is common knowledge that wealth these days is either white or black. It is the ambition of every businessman, industrialist, defence contractor and drug dealer to collect as much black money as he can since it is neither traceable nor taxable.

Nowadays we have a new type in Pakistan. This is the chap ostensibly doing nothing but possessing millions, paying no taxes, and, socially, trying to climb to the top in order to be counted among the “nobility.” Such people are always suspected to be making money from drug traffic, but only they know the truth. But we are very broadminded in these matters. We are not bothered where a man’s gold comes from, whether from smuggling or the white slave trade. As long he has the shekels he can count on us for our respect and on our daughters for a wife. Actually the disinclination to reveal how much money one has is a national trait in the subcontinent. For all I know it may be a trait common to the whole of the East, though I can’t be sure, never having travelled beyond Karachi. And there are good reasons for maintaining secrecy in the matter. We are essentially a society of joint families, howsoever our families may have become westernized or dispersed. We feel responsible for our relatives, even distant relations, and if we are not able to help them on their distress we feel guilty. Being Muslim also has something to do with this feeling.

The reality is also there that the moment it becomes known that we have struck gold, we are likely to be besieged by a host of nephews and brothers-in-law and friends who, it seems, had been waiting in the slips to make a catch. That is why we may be rolling in what it takes but we never admit it.

You can check this secrecy business. Ask anyone whom you trust and who trusts you. It may be a bosom friend or business partner or an office colleague, or your own brother. Ask him how much he is worth and he’ll be evasive or tell a white lie but never the truth. In fact, more often than not, he will start complaining about his lack of means and even his downright poverty. “It is sufficient, thank God, that we have two meals a day,” is the most you will get out of him.

Generally people in the West are not secretive about their financial position. Maybe because they know that no indigent friend or greedy relation is going to ask them for a loan or a gift as a matter of social right. On the other hand in our part of the world if my brother happens to have a lakh I assume it as a matter of course that I am entitled to half of it.

Come to think of it, we are inclined to be close and secretive about most family matters. If we have suffered a financial reverse we’ll never take friends and relatives into confidence. If there has been a serious illness in the family like cancer or a heart attack the fact will be kept from outsiders. If there is talk about a match for our daughter it must be kept hush hush. And if the match is broken then of course it assumes the proportions of a defence secret. Strained relations between our daughter and her husband, which may lead to divorce, can only be talked about over our dead bodies. If there is lunacy in the family it is treated duly like a skeleton in the cupboard. Some people go so far as to hide the pregnancy of a newly married daughter as if a mere whisper about it will cause a miscarriage.

I have never been able to understand why we are obsessed by secrecy in personal and family information. At the same time we can never keep a secret. Whether this secret pertains to the state or to individuals — our friends, our relations, our enemies — it is impossible for it to remain confined to the circle from where it is not supposed to leak out.

Our government leaders and ruling regimes derive full advantage from this national propensity. While their own secrets also become known to all and sundry they succeed in ferreting the innermost and closely guarded decisions of the opposition parties through the ever-obliging “mole” placed within every political party. This insider is ready to betray his friends either for money or just to please the powers-that-be. Apparently mutual trustworthiness is not our strong point.

PRESIDENT Bush is sending out several messages. One is that we have to spend money to defeat the terrorists, whose main purpose is to destroy our economy. In order to do this, he said, we should take vacations, buy things and fly on the airlines.

In past wars, we were always asked to tighten our belts. This time we are told to spend, spend, spend.

If we don’t, we may reach the point where the FBI starts doing spot checks on who is spending and who isn’t.

Two agents go to the home of Martin Blitz. One says, “Blitz, our records say you haven’t spent any money this week. How do you think that’s going to look in Afghanistan?”

“I was going to buy a new car as soon as the crisis was over.”

“You are part of the crisis. If you don’t buy a car now, then the American flag means nothing to you.”

“I don’t have enough money to buy a car,” Blitz says.

“Then go out and borrow some. Use everything on your credit card. This is no time to save. Look fellow, every day you don’t spend money, Osama bin Laden will laugh at you. He knows what the gross national product is. What about buying new golf clubs?”

Blitz says, “I don’t play golf.”

“How about a ski trip?”

Blitz says, “I don’t ski.”

“It’s as good a time as any to learn.”

“I thought in wartime you were supposed to tighten your belt and even save the silver from your cigarette packages.”

“This is a different kind of war. Now when are you going to take your next flight?”

“I’m afraid to fly.”

“Man, you’ve got to fly to prove we’re the greatest country in the world. This is what we want you to do. We want you to book a flight and take your family to Disneyland. Then take a cruise to the Caribbean. If you do this, we’ll remove you from our list of suspected tightwads.”

Blitz says, “I’ll do it. This country needs me now more than ever. God bless our department stores.”

This is only one scenario of what could happen. I don’t think that our leaders are going to call in the FBI at this time, but they may have started profiling people who refuse to spread the wealth.

I looked out the window yesterday and Blitz was out there discussing plans for a swimming pool.

He told me modestly, “It’s the least I can do for my country.”—Dawn/ Tribune Media Services

WHEN one looks back at the situation in Afghanistan over last 22 years, one comes to a strange conclusion: throwing the Soviets out of Afghanistan was the easy part of the whole exercise; the real nightmare started after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

The withdrawal took place under the 1988 Geneva accords, and left the country in a terrifying political void leading to chaos, anarchy, divisions, factions, dislocation, starvation, and finally the Taliban. The worst part of the story is that ‘modern’ Afghanistan, so carefully crafted by Amir Abdur Rahman through a mix of diplomacy and strong-arm tactics, has started falling apart. All the structural faults which so far remained hidden under the veneer of Afghan nationalism came to the surface in their ugliest forms.

Today we have the Pakhtoons (and their tribes), Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others speaking aggressively about their rights, interests and representation in a future power set-up in Afghanistan. Sadly, to add to the complications, some neighbouring countries are supportive of various ethnic group’s claims and ambitions. The external states are using the ethnic and geographic fault lines of Afghanistan to mirror and advance their own geostrategic interests. As if that were not enough, certain hegemonic powers outside the region, such as India, have made a successful outflanking manoeuvre and have gained influence over some Central Asian Republics. This makes the search for a sensible and speedy solution more problematic.

Though it is not fashionable to speak well of Ziaul Haq, it is a fact that he was fully conscious of the impending chaos once the Soviets withdrew leaving behind the difficult problem of an orderly transition of power in Kabul. When the Soviets announced the timetable, of their withdrawal in early 1988, he personally begged them “to be my guests for another six weeks” so that a the shape and composition of the future government could be waked out to avoid a dangerous power vacuum.

This raised eyebrows at home and abroad. The Soviets refused to oblige and wanted an immediate and clean exit, leaving Najeebullah in control of Kabul and well supplied with weapons to fight for another decade, if needed. Mr. Junejo also declared that Pakistan’s objective would be fully served by Soviet withdrawal. As a corollary, Najeebullah’s government, minus Soviet props, would fall and the alliance of Islamic group should be able to manage things without any serious difficulty. Americans wanted the Soviets to withdraw as peacefully and quickly as possible, ‘without having their nose rubbed in dust anymore’. The UN secretary-general’s special representative, Diego Cordovez, was working on his own initiative on the ‘second track’, but did not receive any encouragement from anyone. He then came up with the formula of a ‘transitional government of technocrats’ consisting of well educated Afghan expatriates living abroad. Many laughed at it as a naive idea.

It is rather amusing to read in newspapers these days that a formula of a “transitional government of technocrats, under the benign leadership of ex-king, with the support of a Loya Jirga” (the myth of Loya Jirga is alive, though reality died 25 years ago). The whole construct is laughable.

The greatest proponent of Zahir Shah option was late Dr Hammer, who created Occidental Petroleum at the age of sixty and ventured into the labyrinthic diplomacy of Afghanistan at the age of ninety. Like a shrewd politician, President Ziaul Haq never dampened the enthusiasm of Dr Hammer whose personal contacts with top leadership on either side of the ‘Iron Curtain’ were unmatchable, nor did he ceased to humour the king living in exile in Rome. Most others, within the decision-making circles, looked at this option with serious scepticism. Even twelve years ago the ex-king was judged as too old, too ineffectual and too out of touch with contemporary generation of freedom fighters.

Somehow, a new generation had matured under the ‘shadow of swords’ during the eighties, and had had exhilarating experience of fighting with abandon while at the same time basking in the sunshine of international publicity and admiration. They had become republican by temperament, and could not adjust to the idea of replacement of communism with a God-fearing monarchy, even as a transitional arrangement.

To further complicate an already muddled situation, the Iran factor started to emerge as important at the end of the decade of the 1980s. Though Iran was kept fully and faithfully informed by Pakistan of all battlefield developments in Afghanistan and peace negotiations at Geneva, Iran thought it prudent to remain strictly non-committal. It had its own reasons for that. Until the UN-imposed cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in August 1988, Tehran’s total attention was focused on its western front. Iranians failed to recognize any other ‘jihad’ (such as the one going on in Afghanistan) except the one they had launched against Saddam Hussein. While in the state of war with Iraq, they did not want to annoy, much less provoke, the Soviet Union with whom they shared a very long border. Over and above that, they even considered the Afghan jihad as a divisive effort sponsored by America to distract the attention of the ummah from the ‘one authentic jihad’ that Iran was waging at that time.

Lastly, it was inconceivable that Iran would be in a supportive mode in a grand military and political manoeuvre in which US was a major player. However, once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and ceasefire was established on its western front, Iran entered the tricky and treacherous arena of the Great Game with full vigour, greater interest and evangelistic zeal characteristic of the regime. It was most unfortunate that because of the insufficiency of statesmanship existing at that critical juncture, perceptions of Iran and Pakistan started to diverge and become conflicting. This was one of the tragic developments that led from one complication to another.

However, by that time the phraseology of a ‘broad-based government’ had been introduced to define the ultimate architecture. Engineer Hikmatyar, who started to cut himself off the umbilical chord of Pakistan and assert his own position and ambitions, was most logical in his approach. He insisted on ‘a representative and elected Shura’, with the conviction that this was the best method of solving the exaggerated claims of various ethnic, tribal and sectarian groups regarding their ‘share in the government and the Shura’. Sensible, but impractical.

It may be purely transitional with the limited objective of essential reconstruction of infrastructure, to establish law and order, arrange the return of the refugees, and hold some form of election appropriate to the genius of the Afghan people. Or it may be of a quasi-permanent nature with more ambitious goals as part of its mandate.

But there are two major problems. Firstly, a quick collapse of the Taliban, as anticipated by US three weeks ago, is not in sight. With every passing day, the US military is coming to accept the grim reality that the Taliban will not disappear from the scene any time soon. Besides, (mercifully for Pakistan) the Northern Alliance has not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the US and the CAR supporters of the Alliance. Its military capability, quality of leadership, and motivation of troops are doubtful assets.

Secondly, as far as the formation of a transitional or quasi-permanent government is concerned, there are too many cooks in the kitchen to ensure spoilt broth. All nations having borders with Afghanistan have a legitimate right to seek protection of their interests. Unfortunately, some extra-regional and hegemonic powers, to the discomfort of Pakistan, have been trying to outflank Pakistan by making inroads into the Northern Alliance, even beyond.

The important thing is that whatever its complexion, the new set-up should be friendly to its neighbours. In any case, for two hundred years Afghans perfected the art of neutrality and non-alignment, until the Soviet invasion destroyed that well-nourished position. Hence, being neutral and non-aligned does not conflict with any interpretation of Afghan ‘honour’. Therefore, re-emergence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, with its Islamic moorings is still well within the realm of possibility.

Further, no bordering state has any real reason to be, perpetually antagonistic towards any other. In fact, peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan shall bring in lucrative and integrative economic and political advantages to every neighbouring state. Thus, all the bordering states become, stake-holders in Afghanistan’s stability and prosperity. Bound by history, culture and ideology, they can forge unity out of the current display of mindless rivalry.

It is here that Turkey can play a critical role. It enjoys the benefit of strong cultural, ethnic and linguistic relations with most of the CARs, and has established over the past decade strong diplomatic and cultural links with them. At the same time, its relations with Pakistan are exemplary. It is a member of NATO, and thus militarily well plugged in with US and Europe. It is in a position to act as a strong bridge between the east and the West of Afghanistan. Current display of initiative by the President of Turkey is a welcome development.

While we are discussing the post-Taliban scenario, are we sure the Taliban’s days are numbered? Or, while sinking, will they take some others with them? Probable answer: No and Yes.

The writer is a retired Lt Gen of Pakistan Army and former Chief of Staff to the President of Pakistan