THE recent killing of two brothers by policemen deployed at a nakabandi (road block or barricade) point in Rawalpindi once again puts a question mark over the efficacy of our inhuman, colonial and outdated policing model.

The incident has once more raised numerous questions often debated by civil society. Such occurrences badly damage the initiatives of the state to reform the police. The situation warrants the adoption of a diagnostic approach.

It is imperative to unearth answers to questions like: were the deceased terrorists or criminals; were they armed? If yes, did they open fire upon the police party? If they did not stop, who authorised the policemen to open fire? Do we have standard operating procedures regarding the use of firearms? Were the deployed policemen equipped with wireless communication sets? If yes, why did they not communicate the information to the next police barrier where the violators could have been arrested? Also, what was the role of the supervisory officers?

The opening of fire at unarmed youths shows the sheer incompetence of the policemen, who either did not know about the legal requirements in such situations or opened fire in panic.

The event also exposed the limitations of our police in understanding the meaning and value of citizens’ human rights. Article 15 of the Constitution promises freedom of movement, but an increased number of police barricades hinders the free movement of citizens. The question arises: has anyone ever analysed the effectiveness of the nakabandi system?

The supervisory tiers should keep themselves updated regarding the number of criminals and terrorists arrested and the recovery of arms, ammunition and narcotics from such points. The police management should weigh different aspects of such barricades. They should decide whether the colonial recipe is still effective, or if it is a waste of manpower. The effect these barriers have on the police’s public image must also be considered.

Has the ‘nakabandi’ system been analysed?

Though technology provides solutions, we seem to be in love with obsolete methods. In the absence of technological support and technical capacity of the police personnel, how can law enforcers standing at road blocks identify a terrorist or criminal or intercept a stolen vehicle? Upon interception, innocent citizens are often confronted with odd questions. Further, has anyone in this country ever made an effort to find out if those in custody actually used such passages, or did they opt for other routes? Terrorists are quite smart and always do their homework, hence there is less likelihood that militants would intentionally pass through nakabandis.

Though the Police Rules 1934 clearly give the mandate to senior police officers to carry out formal and informal inspections of each police station and police post, such an important obligation is often neglected, which affects the quality of policing.

To have police personnel adapt to changed crime patterns and challenges, the Police Rules also provide the concept of ‘lines schools’ to be established in every district. But in the majority of districts such schools are dysfunctional.

Policing and fundamental human rights complement each other. Though the Code of Criminal Procedure, Police Rules and Police Order 2002 provide procedures for stop, search, detention and questioning of persons, in practice such essentials are often violated. At nakabandis body searches are often carried out publicly, which compromise human dignity.

The internal accountability apparatus of the police faces a credibility deficit. However, public oversight bodies can bridge such a deficit. The Police Order 2002 provided tiers of public safety commissions at the federal, provincial and district levels, but it fell victim to vested interests. The inclusion of public representatives in safety commissions would safeguard the public interest.

To regulate the conduct of police officers under Article 114 of Police Order 2002, the issuance of a code of conduct is binding upon the inspectors general and heads of the capital city police. But rules for code of conduct are yet to be drafted. However, the mere drafting of such a code may not serve the purpose. The gap can be bridged by conducting regular training sessions and thorough accountability and public oversight.

Indisputably, the use of force is one of the essentials of policing but to avoid Rawalpindi-like incidents police units need to draft a firearms policy. Police chiefs should decide the percentage of armed and unarmed personnel and the type of weapons to be carried by different ranks in certain situations.

The situation warrants the following. In the New York police department, after an official weapon is fired it is binding upon every police officer to submit a report, and a unit independently investigates the justification of the use of the firearm.

Had the nakabandi system been successful, major incidents of terrorism would have been averted. If terrorists are innovative and open to change, why are we reluctant and rigid?

The writer is a police officer.

Published in Dawn, June 24th, 2015

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