THE recent news of the government’s decision to call up the Rangers for law and order duties in Islamabad is depressing. Rangers have in the past been called out in Islamabad in crunch times.

For example, they have been visible during the high-profile visits of foreign dignitaries, or in the face of the ‘threats’ such as Dr Tahirul Qadri’s march to Islamabad more than a year ago.

But, for the Rangers to be deployed without any specific reason, could mean that we are in for a Karachi-like situation. The Sindh Rangers were called up in Karachi about 25 years back and are still there.

They have become a permanent and parallel force alongside the police. So, in effect, while the government accepted the inability of the police to control Karachi, now, if the plan goes ahead, it could be Islamabad’s turn.

The significance of this development is that while the government has apparently been doing much of what it was advised to do to empower the police, it still feels insecure in their charge. The Police Order 2002, the tripling of financial allocation in the last five years and the doubling of salaries were all moves to empower the police, but to no avail.

It is this depletion of confidence in the police, and the absence of any quick fixes that lead us to predict that if deployed the Rangers would be a permanent presence in Islamabad. This will lead to further decline in the confidence of the police force as their command is undermined.

Had calling out the Rangers been the solution, Karachi would not be in the state it is in now. What is also dangerous in a move like this is the false sense of security it engenders, and that lessens the pressure on the police to improve. Besides, of course, it would lead to duality of command, and cost the Islamabad administration an arm and a leg.

This is the same perception that leads us to the concept of a rapid response force — flying in helicopters. Sounds impressive, but try imagining how such a force could prevent an incident such as the killings in the Islamabad district courts recently. Imagine helicopters chasing criminals on Islamabad streets, while the ground police melt away. Such strategies are stuff for the movies, and not real life.

What is the solution then? What we require is a paramilitary force, recruited young and retired young as in the army, with a stable command and control structure — unlike the police where the officer does not recognise the constable who is expected to retaliate against the hail of bullets fired by terrorists.

Security personnel will only risk their lives if led by someone they respect and bond with — someone who looks after them and their families like the army officers do in the case of their jawans.

Such a force should be adequately trained and equipped to handle state of the art weapons, possess radio contact equipment and perhaps night vision capability. Such a force should be housed and maintained properly and treated with respect.

It should be a permanent wing of the IG Islamabad’s force, but with a culture of its own and not transferable to the police. It would be tasked to guard all sensitive government buildings, embassies etc. and to secure authorised government functionaries.

Such a force was recommended by the federal interior ministry 10 years ago in 2004, under the name of the Islamabad Capital Guards and a draft law was presented to the then prime minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who approved it, but then the initiative lost its way.

The scheme and the draft laws are still available in the ministry. The powers that be have to simply find it and dust it off and implement it. It will take a year to train this new force, but it will provide a sustainable solution.

What also emerges from this picture is the need for overall, strong, counterterrorism efforts emanating from a cohesive policy whose implementation is monitored by capable, clear-headed individuals.

But despite these critical times, the government seems to be moving at its own pace. While the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) has been announced after deliberations of nine months, there is no urgency to select the national coordinator, or chief, of the National Counter Terrorism Authority.

The sane thing would have been to appoint the Nacta chief before formulating the policy, so that he could be on board, making it easier to implement it. Without ownership, the captain of Nacta, which is going to be the vehicle to conceive, formulate and implement security strategies, will in all probability flounder and waste time before he can gain momentum.

When the Indians wanted to control militancy during the Khalistan movement, they selected a bold police officer named K.P. Gill, who controlled acts of terrorism mainly through the police.

He was given space and supported by the politicians and he delivered at personal risk and cost. With this government’s record of procrastinating when it comes to selecting people to lead key institutions, it seems unlikely that anyone will be found soon for the relatively risky post of Nacta chief. So, no chief, no action.

We have no option but to act fast and locate such an officer to head Nacta, and to give him support and space, to lead the fight against a threat to our way of life. n

The writer is a former federal secretary interior.