The native countries of immigrant communities hold an important role in the Western CVE models.
Muhammad Amir Rana
The confrontation between liberals and pragmatists is not new in Pakistan.
The self-styled Islamic State’s foothold and influence are stronger in Afghanistan than in Pakistan.
Pakistan must continue disrupting the terror network and not allow the groups the space and time to reorganise.
Western countries are confused about how to accommodate religion in their counterextremism strategies.
The Haqqanis are considered Afghanistan’s most potent insurgent group.
Many militant groups resurfaced as charity organisations to boost their image.
Many new threats have emerged since the launch of the operation.
Extremist tendencies are common in all segments of society, irrespective of their socio-economic status.
A failure to join a ‘proper’ terrorist group can encourage them to launch attacks by defining targets themselves.
There is hope that the CPEC will change the regional economic and strategic environment.
Fear keeps growing largely because of a lack of trust between Pakistan’s intelligentsia and the state.
The pro-Saudi groups may realise they cannot change public perceptions through demonstrations.
The Middle East situation will compound the problems on Pakistan’s internal security front.
A rational choice for Pakistan could be to stay away from the Yemeni conflict. But is this option available?
A sense of insecurity encourages non-Muslims to live in ghettos.
In Pakistan, the power elite are scared to touch religious issues.
The state has no vision, policy or strategy to deal with the madressah sector.
There are two major factors of sectarian violence (which complement each other) that should not go ignored.
The Islamic State factor has provided a lifeline to militant groups in the region.