| 14 February 2005 | Monday | 04 Muharram 1426 |
Are polls really necessary?
Need for an effective strategy: Reducing inequalities-II
Gwadar's strategic importance
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had a special place in his heart for Balochistan. He not only chose to spend the last days of his life in this province but was also mindful of the injustices of the colonial period that the people of Balochistan had suffered and inherited.
Addressing the first Sibi Darbar on February 14, 1948, he said: "Let me assure you that I have not for one moment allowed the affairs of Balochistan to slip out of my mind.
I have thought and thought, considered and pondered, over the ways and matters of improving the lot of our people in this province and of enabling them to secure for themselves the same position and the same political status within the polity of Pakistan, which are open to their brethren in other provinces...."
These words of the Quaid clearly show his farsightedness in grasping the underlying faults of the situation in Balochistan which he felt had to be repaired as a national priority.
He was fully conscious of the long-standing grievances of the people of Balochistan and of the need to redress them by giving them a direct say in the administration and governance of their province.
In fact, the Quaid did announce some provisional reform measures on the same occasion while also assuring them of a future package of reform to ensure their socio-economic and political well-being.
That package has yet to come. Unfortunately, his vision of the future of Balochistan also remains unfulfilled. Meanwhile, over the years, the situation in the province has been aggravating as a result of larger issues of governance and political instability that have plagued the history of Pakistan since its independence.
The reality is that our problems are not confined to Balochistan alone. Since our independence, the people of Pakistan in all provinces have had no role in determining the course of their history or the direction of their country's political, economic and social policies. They have been exploited in the name of ideology and external threats while the real domestic challenges facing the country have remained un addressed.
The successive governments, elected or non-elected, have been presiding over fateful, and in some cases, painful moments in our country's history without taking the people into confidence or accepting the responsibility for the tragic consequences of their actions or policies.
We have had no national agenda formulated by any government encompassing the political, economic and social well-being of our people. In effect, the original vision of the Quaid's Pakistan woefully remains blurred.
For more than half a century now, Pakistan has been wallowing in political and economic uncertainty and has had neither domestic peace and harmony nor stability on its borders. Its post-independence political history is replete with endemic crises and challenges that perhaps no other country in the world has experienced
Balochistan is an unending tale of our political and socio-economic lapses. Ironically, despite its abundance in the wealth of natural resources, it remains the most backward province of the country.
A deep-rooted sense of deprivation and frustration has made its people highly suspicious of the policy-makers in Islamabad, raising serious questions about the state of federalism in Pakistan.
The current atmosphere is so murky that even genuine development projects initiated by the federal government are suspected and resisted only because there are un addressed questions in terms of their actual utility and benefit to the people of Balochistan.
The development of Gwadar without significant stakes for the local populace and the troubled Sui situation, precipitated by gross mishandling of a case of crime have only deepened the crisis.
Fifty years ago, we tried to compromise on our federal structure by abolishing the provinces in West Pakistan and substituting them with highly manipulative and controversial One Unit which deepened the East-West polarization and eventually led to the break-up of the federation and the country.
One of the oldest federations of the world, the United States, took more than two hundred years of experimentation, and went through phases of flux, trial and tribulation, wars and depressions before it reached its maturation level.
Our neighbour, India has also had a tradition of problematic federalism with secessionist ethnic conflicts raging in East Punjab and some of its North Eastern states, not to speak of the liberation struggle in the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Historically, two methods have been identified to deal with the menace of faction: one by removing its causes and the other by controlling its effects. Then, there are two alternatives of removing the causes of faction: the first by destroying the liberty which sustains its existence, and the second, by giving to every citizen the same opinion, the same cause, the same rights and the same interests.
It is a difficult choice. The first remedy is worse than the disease; and the second one is impracticable. The only solution lies in recourse to debate and dialogue and mutual adherence to the agreed constitutional framework. Wherever a change or adjustment is warranted, it should be made through political and constitutional means.
Force is not a solution. Use of military power within a state and against its own people has never been an acceptable norm. Some people view it as a recipe for intra-state implosions, a familiar scene in Africa. In our own country, we have had very bitter and tragic experiences in the past and must not repeat the same mistakes. We cannot afford any more tragedies and national debacles.
The problems of Balochistan over the years perhaps are not exclusively rooted in our Constitution. We have a clear constitutional framework delineating the federal and the concurrent legislative lists with all residuary subjects being left to the provinces, including Balochistan.
In essence, the problems are in the non-implementation of the Constitution and in the patterns of governance and the centres of power that have kept the whole country in a state of flux for all these years of our independent statehood. The sharp ethnic tensions are the result of continued sense of political and economic neglect among the people of the smaller provinces.
There is a strong underlying resentment in Balochistan (and in other provinces also) against what is seen as continued "Punjabi dominance", inequitable distribution of power and resources, and exploitation of province's natural wealth.
In East Pakistan also, the problems started with similar deep-rooted sense of deprivation and a feeling of political and economic alienation which over time became a politico-constitutional crisis involving a demand for larger autonomy, and leading eventually to the break-up of the country.
These are exceptional times warranting exceptional responses to our problems. We must avoid reaching points of no return. No doubt, the central government's legitimate authority and writ within the constitutional framework, particularly in terms of its responsibility to maintain the territorial integrity of the federation and to ensure the security of the vital national installations, including gas and communication networks remains unexceptionable.
We must however, genuinely look for fair and permanent solutions. The problem in Balochistan will be resolved only through political and economic means, not by use of military force or through violence by militants.
The people of Pakistan have been following this crisis with anxiety and concern and expect the government to show sense of maturity and circumspection in dealing with the issues involved. In addressing the question of the basic rights of the people of Balochistan, ad hoc approaches and half-hearted measures will not do.
Irrespective of the questions about its role and performance, the parliament remains the competent body to address the issues of federalism in Pakistan. It was encouraging to know that a parliamentary committee with representation from all political components of the National Assembly and Senate, including the Opposition parties, had been engaged over the last few months in a process of political consultation to evolve consensus on a package of remedial political, economic and constitutional measures for redressing the legitimate grievances of the people of Balochistan.
Lately, there have been questions involving the bona fide competence of the committee prompting some of the Baluch members to resign from its membership. Immediate confidence-building is needed. We hope there will be sincerity of purpose on the part of all stakeholders in this process. All sides must understand the irreparable costs of unintended consequences.
The question of provincial autonomy remains the key to addressing the issues of federalism. If any changes are needed in our Constitution, they should be made. Our Constitution has been amended umpteen times for reasons of political power and expediency. It can be amended now to remove the underlying causes of injustice and socio-economic deprivation of the people of smaller provinces.
In implementing development projects, the government must ensure that the maximum benefit accrues to the province and its people in terms of improved infrastructure and better living facilities, including health and educational services, and access to the use of their natural resources. They must get what is owed to them.
Like elsewhere in the world, the people of Balochistan also need to be freed of the outdated and exploitative Darbari and Sardari tribal system which keeps them backward to sustain its own privilege and power.
If the universal principles of democracy and equality have any relevance in the context of Balochistan, the Sardars must understand the new realities of the world. Instead of obstructing genuine development and security related projects, they should welcome any public or private investments in their province which would ultimately bring direct or indirect socio-economic dividends to their people.
Balochistan needs economic development which will come only in an environment of peace and tranquillity, free of exploitation, blackmail or duress from any source. With greater share in political power and better economic opportunities, the people of Balochistan could chart for them a new and better place in the federation of Pakistan.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
Are polls really necessary?
There has been a sudden eruption of articles in the Pakistan press in which writers with different political persuasions have, with a touch of serendipity, made the startling discovery that the only way this country can be put right, is to hold national elections - the sooner the better. After all, if Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestine Authority can do it, why can't we?
It's not just the columnists and the letter writers who have been harping on this issue. Members of the bar, so tight and squally at the top, if reasonably resplendent in the middle, have also begun to nod sagely whenever the subject is discussed after office hours.
They have been joined by the latest entrant to the club, the retired politician who though over the hill, still clings to the slim hope that Musharraf will, in the not too distant future, do the Leghari or the Ghulam Ishaq on the graduates in the two assemblies, and after sending everybody packing, invite him to join a national government.
One of these old codgers, a retired bureaucrat, recently appeared on a television talk show where a trendy host, slumming it a bit, flaunted his intellect and asked questions he didn't care two hoots about.
After much pretentious rumbling of voice and wafting of gesture, the bureaucrat came to the inevitable conclusion that fresh elections should be held forthwith. It was the only way to save the country. Elections in fact, have become the off-putting toffee that gums up all but the most determinedly assured.
The bureaucrat, along with so many of the other members of the league of retired gentlemen, who appear on the idiot box from time to time, reminded me of the undisputed master of the King's gambit, Wilhelm Steinitz, one time world chess champion.
Years after he had lost his crown to Dr Emmanuel Lasker and was no longer a feared rival, he still managed to defeat one of the strongest players in the world in a competition held in Vienna.
After the applause had died down and the tournament secretary had ordered a round of schnapps, Steinitz said he might be an old lion, but if somebody were stupid enough to put a finger in his mouth, he would bite it off.
These old warriors on the talk shows are full of suggestions on what should and what should not be done, and who should do what and when to make Pakistan a better place. Like Steinitz, they are ready to bite off a lot of fingers. But one does at times wonder why they didn't assert themselves when they were in power and in a position to do some good.. If they had performed their duties with honesty and sincerity, and put the wagons back on the rails, surely things wouldn't have come to such a sorry pass.
However, the real issue is not how bad things have become, but the fact that there appears to be a collective proclivity to ensure that no elected Pakistani government should ever be allowed to complete its term.
Both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto have gone through the experience-twice. And people have already started to predict when the present government will be filing into the departure lounge.
This constant state of temporariness, of keeping things in flux, of not wanting to complete something that has been started, is part of the national psyche, like sycophancy, switching sides and freeloading at the taxpayer's expense.
Nobody in his right mind could possibly describe Pakistan as a democracy, especially after the 1973 Constitution has been given a mauling on a regular basis. Even the statements of the American policymakers when referring to the system prevailing in this country are guarded and loaded with innuendo. But the point is, even if another election was held, what guarantees are there that things would be any different?
If one is to believe the stories that are circulating about a rapprochement between the head of state and the two leaders languishing in exile, the King's party can't possibly have much of a future. There is a distinct possibility that the religious parties might be cut down to size.
Even though the holy warriors still have an abidingly powerful grip on the popular imagination in two of the four provinces, and are the third largest political grouping in the country, it is doubtful if the president will make the same mistake twice, and allow the clerics to win by default.
In the past, the Jamaat-e-Islami that provides much of the inspiration in the six-party religious alliance, couldn't muster enough support to win a seat in a national election, and candidates frequently had to forfeit their deposit.
Though a complete denouement is unlikely, a certain amount of attrition will take place, and it is doubtful if the alliance will ever be in the same dominant position in future, giving in to undemocratic overtures while maintaining the posture of an opposition party.
For the time being the men of the cloth needn't worry. The president had stated quite categorically that there wouldn't be any elections until 2007. But then, as Qazi Hussain Ahmed pointed out, didn't the president also say he would take off his uniform at the end of last year?
It is obvious that the people who are demanding fresh elections haven't asked themselves if the colossal expenditure that will be incurred in seeking the people's mandate is really justified, when it is almost certain that barring a few marginal changes the same assortment of retrogressive rightwing candidates will be returned.
The country went through this painful exercise six times between 1970 and 2002, and there hasn't really been any qualitative improvement in the candidates selected to guide the destiny of the nation.
In fact, the class of 2002, armed with graduate and post graduate certificates, while they didn't come up with a single progressive bill, did at times provide light relief to members of the public.
How often have television cameras captured the astonishing variety of actions employed by members of the opposition when engaged in protest? And how often have these same cameras focused on a debate which was as pointless as it was inane? One has been led to believe there were fewer rowdies in the assemblies during Benazir Bhutto's and Nawaz Sharif's tenure.
Nawaz Sharif did at least try to shift some of the spotlight away from the landed gentry to the businessman. But events conspired to ensure that his adventure was short lived.
People interested in learning more about the elections would be advised to read the comprehensive survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency carried out in January 2003, in association with two other agencies. This document provides an insight into the elements of continuity and change in electoral behaviour with special reference to the 2002 election.
An interesting broad observation was: in the 2002 election, most voters made their voting decision during the election campaign. This is in sharp contrast to past practice where a voter had already made up his mind long before the leaders started to beat the tin drum. For those who get a kick from wading through statistics, there are a number of interesting features that emerge from the research.
Nearly 60 per cent of eligible voters did not vote. Out of this apathetic lot, 53 per cent stated that they just weren't interested in politics and 53 per cent pointed out, with certain pride, that they never voted. Twenty-six per cent said they didn't like any of the candidates. 16 per cent didn't care for the candidate put up by the party. Eighteen per cent discovered that the polling station was too far from where they lived.
Forty per cent, who were obviously citizens of sterling character and reputation, had every intention of casting their vote but were prevented from doing so by "circumstances." Forty-eight per cent said they just didn't feel like voting and 14 per cent cold shouldered the whole thing because the party no longer stood for what they believed in.
It was, however, the 39 per cent which really knew what it was talking about. They were certainly on the same frequency as I was. They said that there was really no point in voting because their vote would not change anything in Pakistan. Could anything be clearer than that?
Need for an effective strategy: Reducing inequalities-II
While accelerated GDP growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, it is not sufficient, without a measure of equity in terms of income groups, regions and gender.
The results of recent research show that high inequality is an impediment not only to poverty reduction but also to growth through reduced aggregate demand and a shrinking economic base. A strategy to reduce inequalities can be evolved on the following main elements:
- Giving priority to poor households in the allotment of land in rural and urban areas. In Pakistan the land allotment policy in urban areas gives priority to influential and high income members of society who also have access to cheap credit for buying land or building houses.
The growing demand for urban land under such a policy has increased land prices to such an extent that even middle class families can no longer fulfil their dream of owning modest dwellings.
- Ownership of livestock through micro-credit on a substantial scale, together with access to marketing opportunities for milk and meat.
- Improved agricultural terms of trade to ensure that the prices that farmers pay for agricultural inputs do not rise faster than the prices which farmers receive for their output.
- Reasonable and stable food prices. In the past five years, food prices have increased by almost 60 per cent which in turn has had an adverse impact on the growth of real wages - a very important factor in poverty reduction.
- Enhanced real wages for workers in urban and rural areas. These in turn depend on the creation of new employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors.
Fiscal and other policies that can help reduce inequality must include the following:
- Expanding investment particularly in small and medium enterprises. A ratio of 20 per cent of the GDP or more is necessary, not only to achieve a sustained GDP growth of six per cent per annum but also to absorb the additions to the labour force by expanding employment opportunities.
- Increasing the ratio of development expenditure on social services (education and health) to at least six per cent of the GDP.- Improving the ratio of direct to indirect taxes.
The present tax regime in Pakistan is biased against the poor because the share of direct taxes in total tax revenues (without withholding taxes) is only 22 per cent, compared to 30 per cent in India and 40 per cent in Iran.
Since the lower income households carry a greater burden of regressive indirect taxes, the 10 per cent poor households contribute 16 per cent of their meagre incomes to the three indirect taxes and the richest 10 per cent contribute on the average only about 10 per cent of their incomes to the tax revenues. A decisive shift towards direct taxes in raising revenues is thus critical for poverty reduction.
Similarly, it is equally important to reduce non-development expenditures and divert the amount saved to development expenditures on social services i.e. education, health, rural roads, drinking water and sanitation. Since 2001-2002, Pakistan has additional fiscal space of Rs60 billion a year from debt rescheduling of $1 billion.
But only half of this unexpected addition to our resource pool has been diverted to the development programme. We must expand the public sector development programme by Rs60 to 80 billion a year to regain its eight per cent ratio to the GDP in the next five years.
Human development is the ultimate objective of any development process, but it also contributes to poverty reduction through strengthening skills in poor households, and improves their income earning opportunities. It also contributes to the social and economic empowerment of the poorer and under-privileged segments of the population.
The principal elements of human and social development are education, health care, social protection, and population control. These elements have direct linkages to growth, employment and poverty reduction.
In education, the overall expenditure has remained between 2.0 and 2.3 per cent of the GDP throughout the past 15 years, although as a result of the Social Action Programme, the highest growth in primary enrolment has been in 1990s (8.6 per cent per annum for females and 7.7 per cent for male students).
The period 2000-2003 stands out for record growth in the appointment of primary and secondary school teachers but hardly any growth in new enrolment (only 1 per cent for males and negative (-3.4 per cent) for female students.
In the health sector, the number of hospital beds over 30 years, from 1973 to 2002 has grown only at 3.6 per cent, or only slightly above the population growth, and that also mainly in urban areas. The growth of health services in rural areas has been much slower.
Any effective strategy for poverty reduction must ensure a quantum jump in education and health, not only in terms of raising total expenditures to four and two per cent of the GDP respectively, but also to ensure that poor households receive their due share in these services.
Recent research has shown that on the average, heads of poor households lose about one-sixth of their annual earnings due to sickness and in the absence of adequate health services, have to sell their animals or other assets to tend to their sickness, thus accentuating their chronic poverty.
In terms of social protection, Pakistan has three major schemes: employee's social security and old age benefits schemes for workers in the organized sector, Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal. But their coverage is relatively limited, as all the schemes together cover only 16 per cent of the labour force.
In other words 84 per cent of the total labour force, 73 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force and 86 per cent of the population below the poverty line, is not covered by any form of social protection. Apart from the lower coverage, average benefits per beneficiary are also meagre, ranging from Rs132 to Rs585 per month, well below the official poverty line of Rs844.
It should be clear from the foregoing analysis that even if Pakistan were to maintain an average GDP growth of six per cent per annum over the next few years, it would not be able to achieve the millennium development goal of halving poverty by the year 2015 because of growing inequality in the rural and urban economy.
In fact under the status quo scenario, the incidence of poverty over the next five years might increase further from 32 to 35 per cent of the population and the unemployment rate will remain constant at the socially-explosive rate of eight to nine per cent.
Now that Pakistan has said goodbye to the IMF Programme for Poverty Reduction, it is time to formulate its own 10-year strategy for halving poverty by 2015. Such a strategy to be effective will have to explore, inter alia, specific policies and programmes that can address the problem of inequality.
(Concluded)
Gwadar's strategic importance
Ever since the creation of Pakistan, China has been clearly Pakistan's strongest supporter in the military, economic and diplomatic fields. The relationship has transcended major changes in both governments.
The people of Pakistan have demonstrated a sustained pro-China sentiment that has further strengthened the bonds. China has been an invaluable external source of military equipment and technologies to Pakistan, especially during the period when the United States and other countries imposed sanctions on this country.
Over the years a large number of collaborative projects in the field of defence have been completed that include manufacture of tanks, guns, missiles, patrol boats, communication equipment's, trainer and fighter aircraft and construction of nuclear power plants.
The Karakoram Highway linking the Chinese Xinjiang province is another landmark project between the two countries. Islamabad considers China a strategic partner and the Chinese have characterized their relationship with Pakistan as constructive partnership.
Semantics aside, maintaining a close relationship with an ascending power and close neighbour has always appealed to Pakistan's policy-makers across the political spectrum.
On the other hand, China recognizes Pakistan's geo-strategic importance, its eminence among the Muslim countries and its usefulness as an ally at the international forums. With the two countries enjoying such good relations it is no surprise that they have engaged in the development of the Gwadar port project.
The new port of Gwadar will supplement Karachi port and its Port Qasim extension, which was constructed in the late eighties. Karachi port handles nearly 50 million tonnes of cargo annually and with Pakistan's economy expected to grow at a minimum of six per cent annually, the volume of trade is projected to be around 75 million tonnes in the year 2015. The government has undertaken expansion programmes at both ports to enable them meet the growing demand of trading and commercial activity.
Nonetheless, there is still need for an additional seaport to handle peak season overflow of incoming and outgoing sea cargo and to cater to the transit traffic flowing from Central Asian states and Afghanistan.
Equally significant is the defence requirement to repair and rebuild the redundant portion of the communication infrastructure. A single port complex is vulnerable during times of crisis or war.
The Gwadar project came about as a result of a Sino-Pakistan agreement in March 2002, under which China Harbour Construction Corporation will build the port. Beijing has provided $198 million for the first phase of the project and Islamabad's contribution has been $ 50 million. The scope of phase-1 includes construction of three multi-purpose berths each 200 meters long and capable of handling vessels up to 30,000 DWT.
As work is progressing satisfactorily, the first phase should be completed by early 2005. Phase two is planned for development by the private sector at an estimated cost of $600 million and envisages the development of ten more berths and a five kilometre approach channel and will take vessels up to 50,000 DWT.
By virtue of its excellent location, Gwadar port is also visualized to become a regional hub serving incoming and outgoing commercial traffic of the Middle Eastern and Gulf countries, the Xinjiang province of China, Iran in the west and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the south and east.
Its location at the mouth of the Gulf and at the opposite end of the strategic choke points of Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman enhances its strategic importance. Its development could favourably influence the geo strategic environment of the region and have an overall beneficial impact on Pakistan.
Additionally, the port should facilitate efficient exploitation of the exclusive economic zone of Pakistan, which so far has remained largely unexplored. The area is rich in fisheries and if the 600-kilometre long coastal line is fully exploited it could give a big boost to fish and crab exports and promote food-processing industries. Lying in the vicinity of oil-rich Gulf states, Gwadar could also be a potential source of offshore gas and oil exploration.
The existing highways on the Afghan border, connecting the border towns of Chaman and Torkham provide the shortest all-weather road and rail links to Gwadar. These will have to be brought up to international standards if the part's potential of becoming a major economic and commercial centre is to be realized. Pakistan is already developing the road and highway network connecting Gwadar with its own major cities and ports through the 700-mile Mekran Coastal Highway.
The development of a comprehensive network of roads and other communication infrastructure would call for a lot of investment and would take a few years to complete. Similarly, rail and air services will have to be developed between Gwadar and other important commercial centres in Pakistan.
The development of the Gwadar port should benefit the overall economy of Balochistan and unlock its potential. Regrettably, the people of the area, and more so the tribal leaders, are not enthusiastic about the project and in fact some are actively opposing it.
Their fears are that outsiders, whether foreign or domestic, will undertake development work and threaten the identity and livelihood of the local inhabitants. Tribal leaders, who have monopolized power in this backward province are apprehensive of losing their hold over the people when the project materializes.
This would entail building consensus through a sustained and well-coordinated political process and winning the confidence of the local people. It is unfortunate that the government had given a low priority to this important aspect in the past. Moreover, Islamabad should also ensure that the short-term interests of the land mafia and other vested groups do not damage the genuine interests of the Baloch people.
As of now, most of the infrastructural development is related to coastal roads and linking Gwadar with Karachi. The government should pay equal if not greater attention to developing road and rail links from Gwadar to the hinterland of Balochistan so that the Balochs equally share the benefits of development.
Benefit of the Gwadar port is also directly linked to the stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Another prerequisite would be the physical infra-structural development in these countries. Linking Torkhum-Jalalabad and Chaman-Kandahar roads with modern highways will be in the mutual long-term interests of both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
According to some sources, Beijing also intends to take advantage of Gwadar's accessible international trade routes to Central Asian republics and Xinjiang. The plan envisages extending China's east-west railway from the border city of Kashi to Peshawar.
The incoming and outgoing cargo from Gwadar can then be delivered to China through the shortest route from Karachi to Peshawar. The same road and rail network can also be used for the supply of oil from the Gulf to the western provinces of China.
Additionally, China could also gain rail and road access to Iran through Pakistan's internal road and rail network. Use of Gwadar port by China should accelerate the growth and development of the port and the hinterland and enhance its overall commercial and strategic value.
The Chinese have all along denied that the joint project of Gwadar has any military dimension and have stressed that it is a civilian port, but being a major importer of oil from the Gulf and mostly routed through this sea-lane it has a justifiable interest in having secure and uninterrupted flow of oil.
Occasional goodwill visits by its naval vessels and increased trade and commercial activity with Pakistan are likely to raise Chinese profile in the Arabian Sea.
As a matter of policy, China has always assisted Pakistan in strengthening its defence capability. Beijing's involvement in the Gwadar sea port is primarily motivated by commercial considerations, but it also perhaps sees the advantages accruing to Pakistan and its own navy for having a friendly port of call close to the Gulf region.
Together with this when a reliable network of road and rail links is established, it could benefit both Pakistan and China commercially as well as strategically.
From a defence perspective, Pakistan Navy would find it easier to operate closer to the Gulf. During times of crisis it could move its naval assets farther from any Indian naval and air threat.
In the event of an unfortunate war, the port of Gwadar would provide strategic depth to Pakistan's commercial and military vessels and be in a relatively advantageous position to operate against the Indian Navy. Gwadar is, however, well within the range of land-air and sea-based Indian missiles.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general.