IT was almost inevitable — the massive and most successful, relatively speaking, counter-insurgency operation in Pakistan is to be crowned off with a permanent military cantonment. Is it a good idea to establish a permanent new cantonment in the Swat/Malakand region, and what does that say about Pakistan’s approach to counter-insurgency? The latter question may be easier to answer: the Pakistani state has not truly been able to move from the ‘hold’ phase of counter-insurgency to ‘build’ and ‘transfer’. The need for a long-term military presence is precisely because failure to capture or eliminate the TTP Swat leadership early on meant that it was able to reappear with new guerrilla, hit-and-run tactics that have kept the overall security situation in the region less than stable. And now, of course, Mullah Fazlullah is also the TTP’s national head. Secondly, the failure of the civilian arm of the state — whether because the military arm had displaced it or because of an inherent lack of capacity on the part of the civilians, or perhaps both — to take meaningful charge of civil administration and the lead on rebuilding Swat has meant that the region has not been able to capitalise on military gains.

Still, what may make sense from a narrow military perspective may not be the best idea from a state perspective. If Swat/Malakand is the model for other counter-insurgency campaigns, then does that mean a permanent military presence will be established in the other insurgency-hit areas of KP and Fata — and what about the now-rejected idea of cantonments in Balochistan? While local resentment in Swat isn’t very high, other regions may not be similarly amenable to a military operation leading to a permanent military presence. Better counterterroism measures, a stronger police, a more invested civil administration and a local political leadership willing to lead — that route is preferred to the one the Pakistani state is set to embark on in Swat.