THE Cold War showed that an increased number of arms can also help in stabilising relations. So can Pakistan reduce the possibility of war and increase crisis stability with India if it builds an assured second-strike capability?

Second-strike capability — absorbing a pre-emptive or decapitating strike — also means credible deterrence. Continued production of fissile material, especially plutonium, is necessary till enough bombs are made for a credible deterrence.

Once Pakistan has developed assured second-strike capability — which may not be too far away — the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) may possibly be negotiated. Thereafter, it’s irrelevant if India has a triad — air, land and sea-based nuclear capability — of 400 or 4,000 weapons.

If these assertions are too strong, consider why the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union built nuclear forces leading to mutually assured destruction (MAD). Their perilous relations lasted for several decades and eased only after 1991. Yet Russia and the US are still a few thousand nuclear warheads and a lifetime away from disarmament.

The lesson is that states build trust but verify. Hence, South Asians will need to go through a cycle of learning and growth before arms control or disarmament. Taking heed from the Cold War, South Asians could first sit for confidence-building measures. However CBMs don’t always achieve anything tangible because many conflicts remain unresolved. Also, there is a less talked-about issue. Realpolitik breeds selective western policies in South Asia and thus less patience with Pakistan. The bitterness over the FMCT is a case in point.

The US may take up the matter at the UN General Assembly’s session because it secured the permanent five’s (P5) support in July, especially China. It wants to jumpstart negotiations on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Other P5 members may not support setting up a ‘new kitchen’ outside the CD.

The FMCT has been in limbo for a long time. Pakistan has taken a principled position for the last three years because of differences on the scope of the treaty; it also wants regional security issues addressed. Prevention of the arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament also remain unresolved at the CD. The FMCT gained focus because it is high on President Obama’s Prague Agenda, which seeks a nuclear weapons-free world. A breakthrough may help re-election. Frustrated, the US sees using the UNGA platform as an alternative to break the impasse. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a precedent.

The CTBT was introduced after the big powers tested thousands of weapons. The US conveniently became a strong proponent of the CTBT after testing 1,054 weapons and launching two nuclear attacks. It still mulls over ratifying the treaty. Similarly, the big powers wanted an FMCT only after building large stockpiles of fissile material and negotiating a treaty that takes their reserves into account is not in their interest.

South Asians may appear to be caught in an arms race but they are building credible power. Islamabad aims to deter India, while New Delhi calls both Islamabad and Beijing adversaries and has ambitions beyond the Indian Ocean. With a smaller wallet, Pakistan offers no market for conventional arms or big-buck nuclear energy commerce. Conversely, India has a $100bn budget for conventional arms acquisition alone and is quickly building up a nuclear force triad.

Since New Delhi can pay its bills, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) gravitates towards it. The NSG was created following the ‘peaceful’ explosion in 1974 by a state that misused technology transferred for peaceful purposes. Now the NSG considers that state’s proliferation record excellent.

Pakistan is not allowed that dispensation for a poor proliferation record. Islamabad has taken measures to prevent proliferation by non-state actors, yet there is no deal. Interestingly, inter-state proliferation continues in defiance of the NPT and domestic laws of proliferating states.

The fundamental question is how much fissile material would Pakistan need before negotiating the FMCT? A comparative assessment of current plutonium stocks and production capacities will be helpful. Fourteen Indian reactors are under the IAEA’s watch. After the Indo-US nuclear deal, eight Indian reactors were free for fissile material production.

India currently holds over 1,000 warheads’ worth of plutonium stocks approximately. It can potentially make 500 warheads a year. Conversely, Pakistan reportedly has plutonium stocks for 30 warheads and can produce up to five plutonium warheads per year.

Uranium ore needed for fissile material is not inexhaustible and Pakistan may halt fissile material production sooner than India. Even then, the combined South Asian arsenals will be a very small fraction compared to those of the Russians or the US. Hence, the haste to begin FMCT negotiations has other motives.

Jumpstarting FMCT negotiations without Pakistan will be meaningless. If the purpose is to see a stable South Asia, Pakistan’s efforts to avoid war with India and enhance crisis stability by building assured second-strike capability should be appreciated.

The sooner it is done the better.

India will be deterred once it perceives that Pakistan has a credible second-strike capability. A fully operational Indian nuclear triad and gigantic conventional military capability will deter Pakistan too. MAD will provide an incentive for CBMs instead of dillydallying.

The writer is a research scholar at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad.

zahir.kazmi@gmail.com