LONDON: If the second resolution under discussion in New York fails to get the votes, what happens to Prime Minister Blair’s public commitment to a “world ruled by law” with “the UN as its central pillar”? Upholding UN authority would then seem to require that Britain at least try to influence the White House to pause for reflection. If President Bush decided to move to military action regardless, could Britain argue, in joining him, that we have a better interpretation of UN authority than has the security council itself?

Either case seems likely to reawaken interest in the saga of reform and enlargement of the UN Security Council. Should war follow no resolution, Washington will claim that the UN has ducked its earlier decisions and shown it no longer counts. Many other member states will then argue that the original 1945 bargain, which conceded privileges of permanent membership plus veto powers in return for “great power” commitment to the UN, has broken down and should be revisited.

The case for reforming the Security Council is, in essence, that its composition no longer represents UN membership effectively; that it gives permanent advantage to certain second world war allies, at the expense of prime contributors such as Japan and Germany, and of major powers like India, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt or Nigeria; and that it is out of key with the charter’s requirement that membership reflect “equitable geographical distribution” of seats.

Britain has defended what some see as our outdated privilege of permanent council membership by pointing to our exemplary record of financial support, political commitment, peace-keeping participation and other assistance to the UN cause, which, few can match. This has included vigorously upholding the council’s authority, at least since Suez in 1956. But going it alone with the US against Iraq (especially if such action or its aftermath were to prove messy), in apparent disregard of majority opinion or a veto in the council, could deal this consistent British stance a serious blow.

Already in recent years Italy (jealous of German pretensions) has informally suggested that the permanent seats occupied by France and Britain should be ceded to Japan and (in some form) to the EU. The EU’s foreign policy tsar, Javier Solana, has also lately argued for EU representation in any change to the council’s membership or working practices. Despite the dent to EU common foreign policy pretensions from the split over Iraq (or perhaps even because of it), there is a danger that this kind of EU thinking could be reinforced behind closed doors in Brussels, or become a factor in some hidden trade-off to push a new European “constitution” through.

It would be unwise, in my view, to assume that France would be immune to temptation on this score, if the subject were to become part of a wider Franco-German or EU agenda and Britain was seen as too much the US pawn. We could find ourselves uncomfortably isolated, since the rest of the UN membership already thinks western Europe has too many seats in the council.

This may turn out to be academic, if President Bush gives up on the UN because of a perceived failure of nerve by the security council. Without the US, the UN would sink into irrelevance like the League of Nations, at least as a forum for handling matters of international peace and security.

Our two priorities should therefore be to ensure that UN authority over Iraq is upheld, not flouted; and that the US remains committed to the UN. If the second resolution passes, both seem possible. If the votes are not there, the prime minister should test Britain’s special relationship in Washington to the limits, in order to avoid a US/UN rupture. Our attitude could also turn out to have lasting implications for Britain’s overall standing in the UN and for our influence in shaping debate on the Security Council’s future. The stakes are high: we should look hard before we leap. —Dawn/The Guardian News Service.

(The writer was UK ambassador to the United Nations from 1995 to 1998)