THE US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, undertakes another mission to South Asia to counsel India and Pakistan to de-escalate tensions on their borders where more than two million troops on both sides stand eyeball-to-eyeball.

It has become abundantly clear that any coherent policy or thinking as to how to defuse the explosive standoff has not evolved in Washington. At best Washington’s efforts seem to endorse a continuation of status quo so long as the threat of a war is minimized.

But before scrutinizing the American position as interlocutor in the dispute one must examine New Delhi’s strategy to mollify Kashmir imbroglio and keep it from becoming fixed on the international community’s agenda and Islamabad’s position in the emerging scenario.

NEW DELHI: The Indian government’s strategy can be summed up as follows:

— Stop help for Kashmiri freedom-fighters or militants from all quarters. Apply pressure on Pakistan to stop helping the Kashmiris.

— Political coercion on the Kashmiri leadership, intensify harassment and incarceration of independent-minded leaders.

— Elections to be held from Sept 16 — in three stages despite recommendation from the BJP-formed Kashmir Committee to postpone them.

— Open talks with the elected representatives of Kashmiris who would be elected on devolution or autonomy for Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

But New Delhi’s strategy could backfire on many counts. The elections could be seen as futile effort if there is low voter turnout and the elections are not verified or monitored by the international monitors. The insurgency could gain momentum.

And, above all, the BJP hardliners could torpedo any agreement with the Kashmiris if they envisage a degree of autonomy for the state government in Kashmir.

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has promised that it would not help the insurgents and there will be no cross-border infiltration. Pakistan says that the infiltration has stopped completely while the Indian government contends it is down by 40 per cent. The United States says it is down considerably without assigning a percentage.

But the fact remains that the Line of Control between Indian-occupied Kashmir and Azad Kashmir is 850km where some 700,000 Indian troops are massed and some 300,000 Pakistan troops eyeballing them.

Pakistan, it is clear, cannot accept to be dealt out of the end-game in Kashmir. Indian efforts to hold elections in order to preclude Pakistan from any future role in Kashmir without a dialogue could be spurned by Islamabad which could call for plebiscite in the valley, based on the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions which India regards as dead.

India sees a dialogue with Pakistan following its October election. The Indians and the Americans are hoping that following elections either one of the major political parties, the Pakistan People’s Party or the Pakistan Muslim League (N), could emerge as the majority party who could be more amenable to accepting a status quo as a solution to the Kashmir dispute.

WASHINGTON: As far as Washington is concerned, its top priority is to ensure that India and Pakistan do not go to war in which the nuclear armed rivals could use nuclear weapons and, thereby, throw a spanner in the greater US plan on waging war against terrorism worldwide and developing a long-term partnership with India, designed ultimately to neutralize rising Chinese power in Asia. Besides, the US has several thousand troops massed in the region and they would be in the harms way in case of an Indo-Pakistan war.

In the short term, the American diplomacy may have succeeded in stopping India from going to war with Pakistan, but Washington has been unable to evolve any viable diplomatic or political strategy to bring about sustainable and durable peace in the region.

Some American experts and policy advisers believe that Indian elections in Kashmir could form a basis of some sort of future settlement of the problem, wherein following pacification of independent-minded Kashmiri leaders a status quo type of agreement could become durable.

This could largely be wishful thinking. So far the Bush administration officials have been unable to think through or arrive at a viable diplomatic and political process which could prove to be both durable and acceptable to all three parties — the Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis.

The intangibles are manifold.

The Kashmir elections touted by the Indian could well prove to be sham and unacceptable to the majority of the Kashmiris. Even if the Kashmir’s major political parties participate in the elections and if they are reasonably fair and endorsed by international monitors, the BJP hardliners could still say no for many in the extremist party want the festering dispute to continue to bolster the their chance in future Indian elections. The Kashmir bogey, it seems, has helped sustain the BJP government in the time of political crisis in Gujarat and elsewhere.

Then the extremists or the insurgents who have been sidelined and thus out of the process could again embark on acts of violence which would provide India yet another opportunity to charge Pakistan with continuing aid to them.

In any event, President Musharraf is likely to face fresh demands from Washington to dismantle alleged training camps, not to disrupt the elections in occupied Kashmir and to acquiesce in a status quo solution.

These demands will be very difficult for President Musharraf to accept. They may be even more difficult for the new prime minister who may emerge after the October election in Pakistan.

The winter of 2002 could be a hot one in the subcontinent.