SUPPOSE between now and June, before we slide into the thick of the American elections, Israel attacks Iran and starts a mutually bruising war. It matters not one whit to us if a Republican or Democrat would benefit from the possible catastrophe.
Rather, what should worry us is how it would play out in Afghanistan and Pakistan, two of Iran’s neighbours aligned with the United States. And what would it mean for India, the most compliant of America’s allies in the Iran standoff that the Bush administration has conjured out of thin air?
A range of ethnic and economic issues are involved. The scenario may sound alarmist and hopefully it is just that. However, assuming, and not conceding, that there is an attack by Israel nevertheless, where do we all stand?
Often the tectonic effects of a seemingly distant conflict are closer to us than we imagine. Sometimes, on the other hand, we imagine these effects when there were none. In this regard, it’s safe to say that it was in all probability a coincidence. But what a coincidence in 1990 that the first American-led assault on Iraq came with the exit of Benazir Bhutto’s first popular government in Pakistan together with the fall of V.P. Singh’s communist-backed minority coalition rule in India.
In Pakistan, the stopgap Jatoi government paved the way for troops to Saudi Arabia and for a more western-friendly Nawaz Sharif’s first accession. In India, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar used his very brief stint of a few months to permit US planes to refuel en route to the Philippines and from there to the Gulf. Rajiv Gandhi, the man who resisted the refuelling facilities on several occasions in parliament, was never allowed to return to the Lok Sabha. He was killed allegedly by the LTTE on his electoral comeback trail in 1991.
We are familiar with the usual causes such as political intrigue and corruption ascribed to Ms Bhutto’s ouster. Mr V.P. Singh’s fall too has been widely blamed on the flaming caste row and the BJP’s Ayodhya temple movement. But the coincidence of their departure, both looking cornered by their anti-imperialist ideological support base, is interesting.
Mr Jatoi’s massive tasks, observed Barbara Crossette in her dispatch in The New York Times of Aug 15, 1990, included pressing of corruption charges against Ms Bhutto and grappling with ‘rising prices and demoralised financial institutions’. Also, the Jatoi cabinet froze prices of petroleum products, wheat and onions, a staple vegetable. A significant issue was a new foreign policy.
“In the light of the worsening crisis in the Persian Gulf, tension with India over Kashmir and a continuing war in Afghanistan, the government has begun a comprehensive review of foreign policy. On Monday, it agreed to send troops to Saudi Arabia.” Committing troops to Saudi Arabia after Ms Bhutto’s overthrow raised eyebrows and brought its own problems.
“Though most Pakistanis support the investigations (against Ms Bhutto), the new government has not escaped controversy,” wrote the Time magazine. “Its decision last week to send troops to Saudi Arabia to support the international action against Iraq met with a wary popular response.” Of course, today the war on terrorism has added a qualitatively new element from Aug 1990 and it may have somewhat shifted Pakistan’s focus from Kashmir to Afghanistan.
But the army at that time deflected the criticism with a familiar ploy. The Time report said: “To temper criticism and rally some nationalistic fervour (following the Saudi Arabia deal), the army announced that it had repelled an Indian attack. Islamabad (claimed) it crushed an Indian attempt to capture an outpost in the Kel sector of Azad Kashmir … while the Indians denied the attack.”
The June deadline for a possible Israeli assault on Iran has come from diplomats who watch the Middle East closely, some of them having been interacting with Israeli officials, others with Iran and its neighbours in the region. Their hunch, for want of a better word, matches the circumstantial evidence, not excluding, of course, the increased chatter within the alternative media community about Mr Dick Cheney’s recent visit to the Gulf.
The swing tour included Oman and Israel where he is thought to have given the proverbial green light to Prime Minister Olmert to take the course that best suited him vis-à-vis Iran and its proxies in Syria and Lebanon.
Oman, on the other hand, offers the best view of the perennially vulnerable Hormuz Straits from where much of the world gets its oil. June offers the last clear-weather military opportunity to Israel to pick targets in Iran before rains arrive there in July, followed by the excitement of US elections.
Apart from frequent recent alerts about Israel distributing gas masks to its citizens, there was this wire agency story during the week from Jerusalem. It quoted Israel’s National Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer as warning in remarks of ‘rare virulence’ that Israel would respond to any Iranian attack by destroying that country.
“An Iranian attack against Israel would trigger a tough reaction that would lead to the destruction of the Iranian nation,” Mr Ben-Eliezer said in remarks carried on Israel’s public radio. He also claimed that an ongoing five-day home front defence exercise was not meant to threaten Israel’s neighbours, but “the scenarios considered in the exercise could be reality tomorrow”.
Last month, Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak told the visiting Mr Cheney that ‘no option’ would be ruled out in Israel’s bid to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Everyone accepts that the consequences of an Israeli attack on Tehran’s nuclear targets could be different from the 1981 destruction of Iraq’s Osirak facility. Iran’s response can be seriously debilitating for the entire Gulf region and beyond. The question less discussed is what impact it would have on South Asia that would be different from 1990 when the fall of the Soviet Union and the steep increase in the price of oil forced India to pawn its gold reserves to the Bank of England.
That episode prompted the advent of Dr Manmohan Singh as the economic messiah for corporate and middle class India, which he still remains. Removed from the equation this time around are Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, both outspoken critics of imperialism that worried the US-led coalition greatly. With their parties no longer evidently keen to challenge the US game plan even if it brings them rack and ruin, the coast should be clear for any strategic help that might be needed.
The only flaw in the scenario is that the ongoing war on terror has not quite accomplished anything that resembles a victory for its mainly pro-western advocates. And that has the potential of disturbing all calculations, including the ones favoured by India and Pakistan in recent days of their rare thaw.
The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.
jawednaqvi@gmail.com