Do Pakistan's military commanders at all realize that the country is at war? A war which no one has declared and in which there is no discernible frontline, at least none readable on a map, but more serious than any of the wars Pakistan has fought in the past.
Pakistan is not the only country caught in this war. Its first frontline is Iraq, second Saudi Arabia, third Afghanistan and fourth Pakistan. By cosying up to America after 9/11, Pakistan's military commanders thought they were buying security. Little did they realize that their short sightedness would buy more danger and insecurity.
As opposed to warnings that jumping into America's lap so quickly and at such short notice was not a wise course of action, our commanders were adamant that their instincts were right and indeed that but for their quick thinking the cruise missiles and smart bombs raining down on Afghanistan would have fallen on Pakistan.
Acting like a talisman, this argument cowed into submission a nation not noted for too much standing up to America in the first place. Three years later it is possible to get some perspective on Pakistan's dramatic cave-in to America's imperial demands.
The 9/11 hearings in Washington - all the most important testimonies, those of Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld and Dick Clarke (the anti-terrorism czar turned Bush rebel) - make clear that far from anyone thinking of targeting Pakistan, the foremost worry in Washington was the absence of links with Pakistan, the world's most sanctioned country prior to 9/11.
To everyone concerned it was clear that for war on Afghanistan, Pakistan had to be on America's side, its ready cooperation not just important or crucial, but key. India's offer of military bases was a tribute to the BJP's lurking pro-Americanism.
From a military point of view it was laughable because what the US wanted were not strategic bases for long-distance bombing, of which it had plenty in the Gulf, but close-up bases capable of supporting ground missions. These only Pakistan could provide.
Far from appreciating Pakistan's strong bargaining position, and turning it to national advantage, our military commanders allowed a combination of self-interest and misplaced fears to dictate a decision for which the country is now paying a heavy price.
The mayhem in Karachi is no accident. It is the Pakistani equivalent of the Spanish train bombings, designed to bring home to Pakistan's rulers the folly of siding with America.
As for the attack on the Karachi corps commander, in broad daylight in the very heart of the city, it is the most striking metaphor thus far produced by this undeclared war - a signal after the twin attempts on General Musharraf's life that no target, however guarded or holy, is immune from attack.
The people of Pakistan are used to sectarian tragedy or violence ostensibly (if not really) carried out in the name of religion. But this attack on the corps commander has left them stunned.
If this could happen, what else is safe? It has also jolted Pakistani minds into realizing that this is no small-time terrorism the country is facing but something far bigger.
And is if this wasn't enough, trust our authorities to create an Iraq-like situation around Wana in South Waziristan. After the bombing of militant hideouts and the incursion into Shakai, the centre of militant resistance, the military authorities have declared combat over (much like Bush declared major combat in Iraq over last year).
And only a few days later we are reading of hit-and-run raids against the Frontier Corps and the army in the tribal areas. This is America's war not Pakistan's. But our army has been dragged into it needlessly.
We had our own time-tested methods of dealing with troublesome tribals - methods which have served Pakistan well for over 50 years. But here, under American pressure, we have rushed in with all guns blazing. The Americans are delighted but then what have they to worry about? We'll have to live with the consequences.
As for the president, he has been pushed into a bunker deeper than Adolf Hitler's in Berlin during the Second World War. He either stays put in his bunker in Rawalpindi amidst the tightest possible security or if he travels to the presidency in Islamabad, his bunker goes with him.
The point has been reached where any function the president feels like attending has to be held for security purposes in the presidency. Examples: the closing session of the Institute of Regional Studies seminar held recently in Islamabad; the "farmers' convention" at which the president announced an "agricultural package"; a glittering music function at which top artists performed.
Because of this undeclared war, the president does not go to the circus - the circus travels to him. Which is one better than the Romans for even in disturbed times, Caesar went to the arena, it did not come to him.
What's Pakistan's reward for destroying national peace and security? The award of non-Nato ally status by George Bush. Bush may be in deep trouble at home but TV channels and newspapers here have played this story as if this has been some kind of major accomplishment for Pakistan. Is there any cure for Pakistan's slavish mindset?
Have military commanders thought of the larger problem they face? Pakistani masses may not have much taste for Al Qaeda's methods but not many people here will quarrel with its aims.
What does Sheikh Osama bin Laden stand for? Not the destruction of the United States or the wanton killing of westerners. But America's eviction from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.
Not because America is intrinsically evil but because it supports Israel, the usurper of Palestinian rights. Terror is a tool and weapon to achieve the larger aim. It is not the aim itself.
While states in the region are American lackeys or helpless before American power, the Sheikh and his organization are the only challengers standing up to the American empire and, what's more, throwing it into turmoil. Osama has become a larger-than-life figure, larger even than the myths surrounding his person.
As for Bush, far from destroying Osama bin Laden he has become his best recruiter, his adventure in Iraq a costly diversion which has given Al Qaeda the kind of fillip and opening even its fiercest partisans could never have dreamed of.
It seemed so simple and straightforward three years ago, Pakistan's military commanders taking it for granted that they were joining the winning side. It looks a lot more complicated and tough today with "extremism" in Pakistan bolder and fiercer than ever, its tentacles spread from Waziristan to Karachi.
We should have fought our own wars, seen the light and done our own thinking, reversed bad policies - such as support for the Taliban or sending jihadis across the Line of Control - but on our own without seeking recruitment as blinkered foot soldiers in America's wars.
Remember that it is not so much the reversal of failed policies which has made Pakistan an Al Qaeda target as Pakistan playing the American game and becoming an American satellite. In Al Qaeda's book of good and bad deeds, neutrality is not a crime. The course adopted by Pakistan's commanders, very much is.
But as if to prove that when troubles come, they do not come alone, look at the other side of the hill. If an undeclared war rages outside, citadel Islamabad is in the grip of utter confusion and disarray, different factions vying for power and a host of pretenders pushing forward their suits for this or that position.
The regime's propagandists, those paid to spread good news, say all is well and Pakistan is on the road to stability and prosperity. To bystanders it very much looks like a scene from the last days of the Roman or Mughal empires.