As we come to terms with the unfortunate Daniel Pearl's brutal and cold-blooded murder, we should be honest enough to accept that a major part of the blame must rest with our unstated but official policy of permitting terrorists the run of the land.
Sheikh Omar Saeed, the main suspect and the self-confessed organizer of the American journalist's kidnapping, was one of those released from an Indian jail as part of the deal to end the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines airliner. Having spent five years in prison on a kidnapping charge, surely he was not somebody to whom our government should have given sanctuary.
As a British citizen, he could simply have been deported to the country of his birth without any legal complications. Had this normal, civilized path been followed, Daniel Pearl might still have been alive.
Another Indian prisoner who was released as a result of that hijacking is Maulana Azhar Masood who, upon reaching Pakistan was soon seen at public rallies (at a time political activities were banned by the military government of General Musharraf), surrounded by armed guards, fulminating against India and the United States. Indeed, his strident threats soon drew a formal protest from Washington. When his Harkatul Mujahideen was declared a terrorist organization by the American State Department, he launched the Jaish-i-Mohammad, the jihadi outfit that initially claimed credit for the attack on the Kashmir assembly building in Srinagar last September.
Had it not been for the events of September 11, he would have still been running loose today, and the government would still have been covertly sponsoring the Maulana and his ilk. As it is, he and several hundred of his followers are in custody, but how long will they stay there is not clear. Several dozen extremists were released recently for 'lack of evidence', so it is entirely likely that Maulana Azhar will soon be free. It seems that preaching hatred is not enough to convict anybody. There is already talk about releasing most of the two thousand zealots arrested a few weeks ago in the wake of General Musharraf's 'historic' speech.
I have just finished reading "Holy War, Inc" by Peter Bergen, a fascinating account of Osama Bin Laden and his al Qaeda, as well as sundry Islamic terrorist organizations. As a Pakistani, I found it deeply troubling to read how much this country has become an integral part of the global terrorist nexus.
Although hardly surprising, given the events of the last couple of decades, the author details the comings and goings of dozens of Arab and other foreign terrorists to Afghanistan and Pakistan. On several visits to Afghanistan, he discovers that thousands of Pakistanis were fighting alongside the Taliban, and hundreds more were being trained in al Qaeda camps.
Surely none of this could have taken place without the full knowledge and connivance of successive Pakistani governments. Firstly, tourist visas were given to all kinds of shady characters who had been in and out of the country on many occasions. Most of these people travelled to Afghanistan from Peshawar without let or hindrance. Hundreds of young Pakistani men went across the border when it was common knowledge that they were going for training in camps operated by al Qaeda, as well as to fight against the Northern Alliance. If the present Afghan government feels aggrieved against Pakistan, it is with good reason for we helped prolong the civil war next door.
According to a brief paper on terrorism in Pakistan circulated by the American Information Resource Centre of the US Consulate-General in Karachi, "... Pakistan's intelligence services - known as the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI - have provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups fighting against India in the disputed territory of Kashmir..." The report goes on to say: "... The New York Times reported in October 2001 that ISI had an 'indirect but longstanding' relationship with al Qaeda and has used al Qaeda camps to train operatives for terrorist attacks against India..."
But we don't really need the American Consulate to tell us these unpleasant home truths: our media has been covering these realities for years. A year or so ago, the monthly Newsline ran a cover story giving details of training camps being run for jihadis in Punjab and the Frontier province. Outfits like the Lashkar-i-Tayaba and the Jaish-i-Mohammad, to name only two, have been openly collecting funds for the 'Kashmir jihad'.
When a state permits and encourages the training of its young men to take part in illegal military operations abroad, it should expect these terrorists to target its enemies within its borders as well. This is specially true when these groups accuse the state of not being sufficiently 'Islamic', and hence a legitimate target. The surge of sectarian and religious violence we have witnessed over the last decade is a direct result of the encouragement the militants have received from state institutions.
General Musharraf's U-turn in the government's attitude towards jihad and jihadis is more a declaration of intent than a call to arms against these organizations. So far, those militants who have been locked up have not been charged. Indeed, it is not clear what offence they can be charged with, other than being members of outfits that have now been banned. The recent slaughter of ten Shias in a mosque in Rawalpindi is a chilling reminder about the power of these sectarian groups and the weakness of the state in confronting them.
Terrorism flourishes where the writ of the state is neither enforced nor respected. It is no coincidence that countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen are considered as safe havens for groups like al Qaeda. When the laws of the land are ignored by both citizens and those charged with their enforcement, a vacuum of authority is created and quickly filled by criminals of every kind ranging from drug smugglers to a wide range of terrorists. Thus, there are around 1500 kidnappings in Yemen every year. Heroin and marijuana are an integral part of Pakistan's underground economy. And food convoys are being routinely looted in Afghanistan.
In order to restore the writ of the state, tough decisions have to be taken and implemented. Pious intentions are not enough. Although Pakistan's many holy warriors are currently subdued after the Taliban's abject surrender, it is only a matter of time before they reassert themselves. Their cause in Afghanistan is lost, and they will soon turn their attention to Kashmir, despite General Musharraf's reversal of policy about supporting the jihad.
The root cause of so many of our policies that haunt us today is the Kashmir conflict; the sooner we resolve it, the sooner we can return to a normal existence.