WE are caught in the whirl of events over which we have no control. We are not calling the shots in the war raging in Afghanistan. Yet such is our intrepidity, or wishfulness, that we think we'll call the shots when it comes to imposing peace in that country.
However much we inveigh against the so-called Northern Alliance, if it suits the Americans they'll use it, and tell us in private not to worry. The American approach to war is distant and sanitized. Bombing from the skies is one thing, risking casualties on the ground quite another. If the Northern Alliance is prepared to do the messy groundwork, no one is going to ask Pakistan if it has any objections.
As for the shape of things to come, it is delusion on our part to suppose our wishes will be heeded when the shooting stops. A broad-based government, yes, for it takes no extraordinary wisdom to see that anything less will only invite more strife and mayhem in that war-torn country. But for our detailed prescriptions there will not be much patience.
When the Americans decided to call it quits in Afghanistan back in the eighties they did not spend much time consulting General Zia about the modalities even though in the prosecution of that particular jihad he had been their most critical ally.
Forget Zia. Even the great Churchill found himself losing importance as the Second World War drew to a close. Reflecting the respective power of their countries, the key players were Roosevelt and Stalin and it is their voices which counted when it came to drawing up the contours of the post-war world.
Here we have had to change course literally overnight and give up on an Afghan policy of almost 20 years' standing - because we could not face the heat and pressure coming from Washington. Yet we think that once the firing stops our concerns, expressed so eloquently by the thrice-empowered Generalissimo, will be kept in mind when it comes to government-forming in Afghanistan.
It is no business of ours to talk of a 'friendly' government there. For by doing so we sound patronizing and interfering and thereby cause offence to Afghan ears. That we have to live with Afghanistan, and Afghanistan with us, is a compulsion of geography. We should be satisfied with that and leave other notions of strategy to the largest rubbish bin in GHQ.
During the Soviet occupation we played our part in keeping the Afghan resistance fragmented because a united leadership was not suited to the ISI's ambitions. We played favourites and propped up Hekmatyar, thereby earning the enmity of other leaders. Only when Hikmetyar proved a military failure, but not before destroying much of Kabul through ferocious rocket attacks, did we shift our focus to the Taliban. Where did all this frenzied interference get us? Even so, twenty years down the line we are still chanting the mantra of a friendly regime in Afghanistan.
For our cooperation extracted under pressure we have already received our price. From the fringes of the international community General Musharraf has been transported to centre-stage, receiving telephone calls from Bush and Powell and a certificate of approval from Tony Blair. Most American sanctions have been lifted, although what this means in practical terms remains unclear, while the IMF looks set to cast an indulgent eye on Pakistan's economic woes.
Furthermore, a few loans have been rescheduled. President Bush has gifted Pakistan 50 million dollars, which roughly would be the cost of bombing Afghanistan for three or four days. That's about it. No debt write-offs, none of the financial bonanza some of our keen-eyed enthusiasts were expecting. Even the Americans, who are not averse to buying their way out of trouble, would be surprised at this cheap bargain: the cooperation of a vital country for a few crumbs of comfort.
But Pakistan is not complaining. Having lived for years as a near-international outcast we are grateful for the attention we are getting. The refrain on the lips of the liberati is that we have rejoined the international mainstream. Even if Britain is irrelevant to our circumstances, and has been so for the last forty years, we were happy about Blair's visit. Among the sops he threw our way was the declaration that military cooperation with Pakistan stood revived. For the Army School of Music in Abbottabad we were probably getting bagpipes and other instruments from Britain. About anything else it is hard to say although Blair, when he referred to military cooperation, almost sounded as if he was giving us half the British fleet.
We are happy, above all, that we are not the target of American anger. How the notion of destruction entered our minds is a mystery but the fact remains that when Bush and Powell were drawing the line between friend and foe - either you are with us or with the enemy - Pakistani resolve collapsed. We thought that if we did not make haste American cruise missiles would rain down on us.
Granted there was the factor of India. With a dignity and sense of self-respect which can only be compared to ours, India was offering everything to the US (in Arundhati Roy's evocative words "furiously gyrating her hips" in order to catch American attention). Still, should we have panicked so quickly? Or convinced ourselves that the slightest hesitation would invite swift and terrible American retribution? This is no exaggeration. In the immediate aftermath of September 11 the one plaintive question on the lips of the chattering classes was, 'what choice do we have'?
But all this is water under the bridge. We have signed up for loyal service and have received our wages, there being room now neither for complaining nor second thoughts. Our brave cries about the desirability of a 'friendly government' in Afghanistan are more in the nature of self-assurance than a clear message to the US, the wish clearly passing muster for the deed.
To explain all this General Musharraf has brandished the stick of (sic)'national interest' (making do without the definite article when intoning these words). Everything has been done in 'national interest'. As if the national interest is a sacred scroll whose text only the general can read. Or a hallowed collection of bones locked in a deep chest to which only he has the key.
It is a moot point, however, whether military leaders aspiring to legitimacy or longevity (often interchangeable concepts) are the best keepers of the national flame. The short-cut they have taken to power makes legitimacy and acceptance prime if not overriding necessities. Afghanistan in the eighties transformed Zia from pariah to respected statesman. Twenty odd years on a different set of events in Afghanistan has brought much the same reward for General Musharraf. Which is not to say he has sacrificed the national interest for personal gain. Far from it. But in a situation as confused and uncertain as ours, it is often hard to figure out where personal advantage ends and the larger good begins.
The timing of two events has certainly worked to General Musharraf's advantage. Under the cover of the Agra summit he quietly made himself president. His elevation was good for him. It has meant little for the nation whose affairs remain as confused as before. Now under the cover of the war clouds over Afghanistan he has given himself an open-ended extension as army chief and also reshuffled the army command.
All the coup-makers who stood by him on October 12 two years ago are out. Lt General Aziz has exchanged his seat round the power table for four-star pomp and irrelevance. Mahmood and Usmani have once again proved the dictum that power brooks neither rivals nor a sense of obligation. No ruler, much less an authoritarian figure, likes living under a shadow of gratitude. Moreover, collaborators (those who have been helpful in the acquisition of power) make for uneasy subordinates because they claim too much for themselves. From Ayub to Musharraf, with Bhutto and Zia in between, this has been one of the defining themes of Pakistani politics.
No doubt policy differences over Afghanistan have also played their part in this reshuffle. The theocrats of the army command, those who believed in the virtues of jihad, are out. The army is now set on a different course, which is the one benefit to the nation from the present roll of events.