IT's good that the guns have fallen silent along the LoC. Good too if there is less aimless shelling on the Siachen Glacier which surely must be the most foolish battlefield in the world.
It will be a good sign if Hurriyat leaders come to Pakistan and hold talks with officials here and with the leaders of the so-called jihadi organizations. But this flurry of activity should fool no one. None of it will or can lead to a Camp David on Kashmir.
The choice in Kashmir is not between peace and war. Never was except when impulsiveness drove Pakistan into unwinnable wars. The choice is between no-peace and no-war. This was the situation obtaining till 1989 when the Kashmiri people rose in revolt against India. If the current moves lead anywhere the best that can be hoped for is a return to the pre-1989 situation, with the Kashmir problem as unresolved as it is today but with a modicum of calm returning to the Kashmir Valley. India clearly stands to gain from this process. What its army in Kashmir has been unable to win its diplomatic overtures will achieve.
The question is: will the end of militancy be to Pakistan's advantage? In other words, what is Pakistan hoping to achieve from the current illusion of progress? Surely not a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. There is no shortage of fools in what passes for the Pakistani establishment - otherwise we would not be in the mess we are - but no one can be so foolish as to think that given goodwill and whatnot (the usual claptrap of weak or confused diplomacy), a final settlement of Kashmir is around the corner or is even a realistic proposition. India will never accept that and Pakistan is not in a position to change this.
So the next question is should Pakistan still be interested in the current moves knowing that, apart from clearing the atmosphere (a good enough thing in itself) and dampening the spirit of jihad, these can bear no other fruit? The answer to this question is a harsh one: even if Pakistan knows that India is beating about the bush and has no interest in a just solution of the Kashmir dispute, it should still go for the illusion of peace because no other choice lies before it.
The stark truth is that jihad (a term being used loosely here) has no future in Kashmir. This is a harsh thing to say given the blood spilt and the sacrifices rendered but, unfortunately, all too true. A continuation of the insurgency can bleed India, as it has done with creditable results over the past decade, damage Indian prestige and keep the Valley unsettled. But it cannot secure the liberation of the state. This much should be clear from the history of the last 53 years. What the Pakistan army has failed to secure in full-fledged battle the jihadis cannot hope to achieve with their hit-and-run tactics.
The jihadi organizations have their strengths - otherwise the Indian army would have crushed them a long time ago - but they also have their weaknesses. Much like the Afghan resistance they lack unity and have no central political organization. But this is not the point. Even if these weaknesses were overcome there would still be no military solution to the Kashmir problem.
It is also facile to think that jihad in Kashmir will bring India to the negotiating table. India has always been prepared for talks on peripheral issues, talks lacking substance and skirting the Kashmir issue. From the current moves what we are likely to get at the most is more of the same - another round of inconsequential talks, whether at the level of foreign secretaries or, given luck, at a higher level. Surely the purpose of jihad cannot be to secure such exercises in futility.
Pakistan's predicament, however, is altogether different. Far from achieving anything, the jihadi line is creating problems for Pakistan at home. Look, what we reaped in Afghanistan. Unwittingly and for small gains, we entered that conflict holding on to the coattails of the United States. For the US Afghanistan is a distant memory while for us it is a damaging reality casting long shadows on our national existence.
Was it for drugs, guns and unwanted refugees that we fought that jihad? What is more, involvement in that conflict nurtured the seeds of religious militancy. The creed propounded in the seminaries which now dot the land, and whose growth is one consequence of that jihad, may not lead to the green banner of Islam flying over Chechnya or the Central Asian republics but it has contributed to the spread of intolerance and bigotry within Pakistan. Democracy already was a weak sapling. Now it must compete for survival with more noxious weeds.
Much the same fallout can be detected with regard to Kashmir. The jihadi organizations, exemplars of great sacrifice (let us never forget this), cannot wrest Kashmir from Indian hands but their growing presence is colouring the political waters in Pakistan. The political parties stand discredited. The army is in the process of discrediting itself. The religious parties think they alone remain to be tested and that their hour has arrived. In elections, it is true, they stand no chance. But elections will be of consequence if democracy returns, not as long as it is banished and treated as a soiled commodity. Besides, the consciousness of armed strength (for many of the religious parties have their armed cadres) lends added strength and confidence to their voices. Is there anything more dangerous than soldiers returning from a war, especially a lost war? On whom will they turn their guns and anger?
Looking carefully we might just see that it is not India which is making any concessions but Pakistan which is trying to wash away the stigma of "cross-border terrorism" and undo the larger damage wrought by the folly of Kargil. Because of Kargil we painted ourselves as irresponsible. Now we are trying extra hard to prove our peaceful intentions. This has been the history of Pakistan: plunging into adventures and then trying to recover from the consequences. One step forward, several back.
As long as the Kashmir insurgency was largely a home-grown affair the advantage was ours and the odium India's. But then in a replay of Afghanistan we had to bring the Kashmiri resistance under the wings of the ISI, which meant that the Pakistan-based jihadi organizations began overshadowing the Kashmiri element. Added to this was the national inability to keep a low profile when circumstances so dictated. Just as Dr A. Q. Khan has never been able to resist the spotlights, none of the jihadi organizations has been able to stop itself from proclaiming its deep involvement in Kashmir.
Thus what should have remained a Kashmiri affair became a Pakistani headache, with the international community less willing to put faith in Pakistan's protestations of innocence. Other countries handle these things with greater discretion. Syria never made a tamasha out of its support for the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Somehow such subtlety has always seemed beyond us. Then, of course, came the brilliance of Kargil which overnight transformed the oppressor (India) into the aggrieved party.
Anyhow, the damage having been done what remains is to salvage something from the debris. But to repeat the earlier point, the shadow-boxing now on display will lead to nothing. After all, since when did losers in every sphere win victories at the negotiating table? Even so, Pakistan must grasp the only thing on offer, the illusion of peace, and pretend that a great diplomatic opportunity awaits it if only to turn its gaze inwards and fight the jihads within that are clamouring to be fought.
Shouldn't we first put our house in order? We cannot make ends meet and yet must play with lordly ambitions - nuclear status, missiles and a lot of pretentious stuff which passes for foreign policy. Our ambitions are not grandiose but foolish, with no connection to reality. Let us manage our own affairs better. Let us strive to achieve political stability. Let us invest a bit more in education and address the causes of our backwardness. Then with what remains let us fight more distant battles.
This does not mean we give up on Kashmir. Nor does it mean we kowtow to anyone. May the mountains come to the sea before we do that. Did China give up its claim to Hong Kong? Has it changed its policy towards Taiwan? We too must stick to what we believe in while at the same time keeping our feet on the ground and recognizing that being aware of one's limitations is no weakness and being driven by false pretensions no sign of strength.
But for this to happen the redoubts of the old thinking - the thinking born of the Afghan involvement - must be assaulted. Within the Pakistani establishment there are powerful elements which still subscribe to the Hamid Gul and Maulana Samiul Haq schools of foreign policy nonsense. Unless these elements are reduced to their proper places not much hope can be entertained of the scales falling from our eyes.