Whose agenda is it, anyway?

Published June 9, 2000

This is no seven or fourteen point agenda to stop the rot and take the nation out of the woods. This is more like a wholesale recipe for disaster. Who will have the last laugh? Perhaps the IMF. Perhaps the babus of the Central Board of Revenue. Shaukat Aziz of course will have no problems. He has a place to go back to. But what about the other architects of the disorder spreading across the land?

Does no one in the inner sanctums of authority have eyes to see, ears to hear, as to what is happening in the rest of the country? Public frustration is at its height, even anger is mounting, because far from solving anything the present dispensation is making life more difficult both for itself and its hapless subjects. Is it simply a matter of bad advice or is the problem more serious and reflects a fundamental inadequacy? Whatever the case, one thing is for sure. From whatever angle you look at it, the government seems to be out of its depth.

Is India interested in spreading confusion in our ranks? It need not bother, or lift a little finger in this regard, because what we are doing to ourselves can be done by no one else.

The traders' shutdown and the other strikes being threatened by transporters, oil tankers, etc, are only the most visible symptoms of a wider discontent. At its source lies the disenchantment which has replaced the euphoria set off by the events of October 12. This government was expected to set everything right. There was even talk of working miracles. Nothing of the kind of course has happened but what makes matters worse is that instead of realising its failings the government is awash with a sense of its infallibility and, despite all the evidence to the contrary, thinks it has the key to every problem. Failure is easy to understand and even sympathise with. But smugness and complacency in the midst of failure tests human forbearance.

For all their faults politicians are trained to listen and to show sympathy even where none is intended. Not so the man in uniform who is taught to obey and to elicit obedience. This approach may be indispensable on the parade ground but, as the face-off with the traders is showing, it does not work in the outside world.

There is no shortage of people who have good things to say about individual members of this regime. There is no reason to quarrel with such assessments. The best in the army have to run a grueling race before they make it to the highest positions. Many are good at their craft, some even brilliant. But that precisely is the point. Good at their own calling they are proving less than good at the calling whose functions they have taken upon themselves.

A military government can take tough decisions. So at least the myth goes. What tough decisions have been taken since October 12? Nabbing people and throwing them into jail is not a sign of toughness. Pakistan's foremost problem is the disarray of its administrative apparatus. Tax evasion is a reflection of this problem. When the state cannot enforce its writ, how can it ensure internal peace and how can it collect taxes?

The first item of any reform program therefore must be the reform of the state so that it is able to carry out its functions better. Everything else, from conquering the moon to defeating our enemies, comes afterwards. In seven months not a single step has been taken to reform the administration. But instead of concentrating on first things first needless fronts have been opened left and right fostering the impression of a government not sure of what it wants to achieve.

The tussle with the traders is the most striking example of this tendency. Carrying out a nation-wide tax survey is not a small undertaking. For a dysfunctional state it is a daunting task. Yet it has been initiated without homework, without a build-up of necessary resources and in a way almost calculated to arouse the most resistance. Anyone wishing to undermine the military government could not have gone about it in a better manner.

The consequences should not have been hard to foresee. People are being turned off by the sight of men in uniform. Is this what we want? Most Pakistanis believe the army to be the last remaining bastion of discipline and integrity, the one institution capable of rescuing the country from its predicament. This may be a mistaken view but it is strongly held. Why destroy this last illusion? Rawalpindi and its environs must have the highest concentration of serving and retired generals anywhere in the world. Even these people who can hardly be accused of subversive tendencies will tell anyone who asks them that all is not well on the internal front.

The world may have become a smaller place and wars may no longer be in fashion but a certain aura still surrounds the fighting soldier. Nowhere in the world can this aura be preserved if the soldier is put to reading electricity meters or turned into a municipal or tax inspector. It is not a pretty sight seeing army officers surrounded by angry shopkeepers because apart from anything else it takes away something from the mystique which is an essential part of the officer's uniform.

But credit should be given where it is due. The person who in recent times started this process of embroiling soldiers in civilian affairs was that latter-day Nawab of Kalabagh, Shahbaz Sharif.

Any problem, real or imagined, and Shahbaz Sharif's stock answer was that he would ask the army to fix it. Discovering so-called ghost schools, building roads, training the police: for all these things he sought the army's help and the army command, instead of reading the dangers in this approach, went along happily with him.

The Elite Police (a waste of money if ever there was one) was one of Shahbaz's pet projects and for its training he discovered a tough-looking retired colonel from the SSG. At meetings it was a treat watching the colonel's super-patriotism. This same tough-looking guy, along with two DIGs of police, now stands accused of embezzling 40 million rupees.

When General Musharraf was elevated as army chief he carried the process of army involvement in civilian affairs a step further and announced that wherever the army was needed it would be sent, his stated rationale being that if a boat (in this case the Islamic Republic of Pakistan) was leaking it was the duty of everyone on board to help plug the leak. In pursuance of this strategy (if so it can be designated) the army was sent to manage WAPDA and KESC, two battlegrounds where it is bogged down till today. Amazing as it sounds, it was even said at the time that should it be necessary the army would look into ways of reviving the economy.

Small wonder then if a cosy relationship burgeoned between the Sharif government and the army command. The high command was ready to perform every civilian duty at the government's bidding. With what face could the government refuse what the high command wanted? Kargil, may its ghosts be laid to rest, was a product of this almost incestuous atmosphere, the go-ahead given to it in almost a casual manner. The rest is history.

Shahbaz Sharif has reason to be pleased with himself. If he chafes at his incarceration he should be able to draw some comfort from the fact that the strategic line he advanced-- of seeing the army involved in civilian affairs--is holding up well even after his exit from the political stage.

Pakistan needs a respite from these comedies. Of course it is too much to expect that anytime soon the people of Pakistan will not be taken for granted. But at least they might be spared further attempts at national renewal. If this is national renewal, what would a disaster look like?