AN outsider watching Pakistan Television or the plethora of Indian channels now crowding the airwaves can be excused for thinking that war between the two countries is imminent.
Those of us who are used to this sabre-rattling have been to the brink - and beyond - before. This is not to say that the war hysteria being fanned on both sides makes it easy to go to sleep: terms like "limited war" and "hot pursuit" are gaining currency even with respected columnists. And to give explosive substance to this war of words, the Indian government has announced the intention of jacking up its defence budget by a staggering 28 per cent.
Not a day passes without a bellicose statement by leaders at the highest level in both capitals. The Indian defence minister has gone so far as to claim that India would win both a conventional war and a nuclear exchange. Such irresponsible statements do nothing to calm jangled nerves. The fact that politicians and generals in power are even contemplating nuclear war is the stuff nightmares are made of. One frightening problem is that most of our leaders are too unsophisticated to comprehend the chilling implications of using nuclear weapons in densely populated areas: for them, atomic bombs are just bigger conventional explosives. They have neither the technical information nor the imagination to grasp the horrors of nuclear fallout on a vast scale.
People on both sides of the great divide talk glibly of nuclear deterrence as a viable and even desirable doctrine, pointing to nearly half a century of cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union that finally ended in defeat for the latter without a shot being fired. They forget that there were elaborate fail-safe devices and systems in place on both sides to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons. Also, the vast distances that separated their territories gave leaders an opportunity to abort an attack that had been erroneously launched. India and Pakistan do not, alas, enjoy the luxury of geographical separation.
The 28 per cent increase in India's defence budget works out to around three billion dollars, or the approximate size of Pakistan's entire annual military expenditure. Fortunately, General Pervez Musharraf has publicly stated that Pakistan will not attempt to match India's budget rise and will not be drawn into an arms race with our neighbour. One hopes this refreshing sanity will not be dissipated by the time the new budget is presented in the next couple of months.
By any standard, the amounts being spent on armaments in South Asia are enormous, but set against the abject poverty that is rampant here, they assume obscene proportions. Year after year, both India and Pakistan sink billions of dollars into the black hole of defence expenditure. At the same time, both countries are at the very bottom of the international ranking for education, nutrition, health, housing and sanitation. Despite the obvious contradiction between widespread destitution in both countries on the one hand, and the vast unproductive defence expenditure on the other, successive governments in New Delhi and Islamabad have consistently shown a lack of will to settle their outstanding differences through negotiations.
Both are so completely fixated on Kashmir that it would seem they have no other problems to deal with. Although leaders on both sides pay lip-service to the wellbeing of the unfortunate people of the valley, the truth is that they only covet the land and are willing to fight to the last Kashmiri to get it. Along the way, if a few hundred thousand Indians and Pakistanis are nuked to cinders, too bad.
The mule-like obstinacy and unbending rigidity on both sides makes a peaceful resolution of the problem virtually impossible. Our stand can be reduced to an unshakable resolve to talk about Kashmir, and only Kashmir. India, on the other hand, repeats the mantra of "everything but Kashmir." After the October military take-over in Pakistan, the BJP has seized upon the unconstitutional nature of the present government as an excuse to refuse negotiations. Neither side has shown any imagination or vision in approaching this Gordian knot. And while this deadlock continues, the likelihood of both sides stumbling into war increases.
Under these circumstances, both countries should welcome President Clinton's visit to South Asia as an opportunity to break the logjam in their relations. So far, India has been implacable in refusing to accept a third party playing a role on Kashmir on the grounds that problems with Pakistan must be resolved on a bilateral basis. But as it is now rejecting direct talks with General Musharraf's military regime, it makes sense to speak to Islamabad through an intermediary.
Given the current thaw between Washington and New Delhi as well as our previously cordial relations with the US President Clinton is ideally placed to mediate between India and Pakistan. His nation has the clout and the credibility, and he has the personal charisma and the diplomatic skills required to make a breakthrough. This visit is the best chance South Asia has for peace in the foreseeable future. Even though Clinton's term of office is drawing to a close, his personal involvement in initiating a peace process will be crucial to kick-starting a dialogue between these obdurate and prickly foes.
To create a conducive atmosphere for peace, it is important that both sides take some initial steps. Pakistan can use its influence with the freedom fighters in Kashmir to halt their attacks until Clinton's visit while India can stop its bellicose anti-Pakistan rhetoric and temporarily cease offensive military measures in the valley. While even such relatively minor initiatives may be too much to expect from our immature leaders, it is time they realized that far more than their frail egos is involved here. It is time, in short, to get real. This fleeting opportunity must not be wasted.
Indeed, public sentiment has been whipped up to such an extent in both countries that it is difficult to discuss a rational solution to the problem that all three parties can live with. It is clear that none of them will get what they want, but then that's what negotiations are about. The Indians will not get all of Kashmir, and nor will Pakistan, short of an all-out war in which one side emerges as the undisputed victor. But in a nuclear war, there can be no winners. The Kashmiris will not gain complete freedom as most of them seem to want, although in an ideal world this would be the optimum solution.
If all three parties grasp the fact that in the real world, you make compromises and gain a part of what you want, then we can start talking about solving this problem once and for all. But above all, they have to realize that posturing is no substitute for realistic, hard-headed policies.