Negroponte comes visiting

SPEAKING to reporters in Bomako, Mali, before arriving in Islamabad, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte described the political process in Pakistan as having been derailed.

He had gone on to say, “Our message is that we want to work with the government and people of Pakistan and the political actors in Pakistan to put the political process back on track as soon as possible.”

In the televised coverage one noted that Negroponte paused before saying the word ‘government’ creating the impression that he chose this word rather than the word ‘President’ after careful deliberation. I thought this deliberate pause and careful choice of words was meant to reinforce the message already delivered by some of Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s recent pronouncements that Musharraf was no longer to be heralded as the ‘indispensable ally’ and that the US was prepared to look at other intermediaries in their effort to work with the people of Pakistan to achieve the goal of retaining Pakistan as a partner in the ‘war against terrorism’ and in eliminating the growing threat of extremism in Pakistan itself.

This, however, was not the message that came across from Negroponte’s statement before his departure from Pakistan after a hectic night and day of activity in Islamabad. He spoke instead of the valued partnership with the government of Pakistan ‘under the leadership of President Musharraf’.

He criticised the continuance of the emergency and the detention of political and civil society activists but the key recommendation to the politicians was to seek ‘engagement and dialogue, not brinksmanship and confrontation’. In other words President Musharraf was still the leader that the USA wanted to work with in Pakistan and while the US advocated the development of a ‘moderate political centre’ as the best way to counter violent extremism, this had to be done by seeking reconciliation with Musharraf and on his terms.

How and why did this happen?

The Americans were aware that President Musharraf’s popularity had been on a downward trend since March and as the IRI poll in September has shown only 17 per cent of Pakistanis believed that President Musharraf was the best leader to tackle Pakistan’s problems. They would also have noted that Nawaz Sharif’s popularity shot up from 21 per cent in June to 32 per cent in September when the only quality of leadership he had shown was his defiance of President Musharraf and that Bhutto’s popularity had gone down from 32 per cent to 28 per cent presumably because she was making a deal with Musharraf.

But alongside this they also would have noted that by and large the masses were not prepared to stage massive demonstrations of support for political leaders. If a political party could muster all its resources to get a sizable crowd out on the streets the present climate allowed for disruption, as the Oct 18 tragedy showed, by elements labelled as extremists. The impact of the tremendous effort mounted by the courageous lawyers in support of the former CJ and the ongoing boycott of courts and small daily demonstrations to protest the imposition of the emergency and the PCO was diluted in the American assessment by the fact that even the urban Pakistanis, as one Washington Post correspondent noted, stood around and watched but did not join the demonstrations mounted by the lawyers.

The apathy of the masses notwithstanding, American analysts share the conventional wisdom of Pakistani analysts that if free and fair elections were to be held the mainstream political parties rather than the ‘king’s party’ or the religious parties would win the overwhelming majority of the votes. Free and fair elections would however hardly be possible even in the presence of a large corps of foreign observers if the caretaker government was, with the exception of a couple of technocrats, composed of loyalists of President Musharraf and the ruling party.

Fair polls would hardly be possible if the continuance of the emergency enabled the government to inhibit Pakistan style political campaigning and to muzzle the media. If the independence of the judiciary and of the election commission was in question, the electoral exercise would lose its credibility.

These were the facts that were known to Negroponte when he arrived in Pakistan. He knew that the mainstream political forces, largely divided by astute government manoeuvring, could not overthrow the president. The legal route had been effectively closed. The United States could threaten to cut aid but that would jeopardise Musharraf’s effort, no matter how limited, to fight extremism and to support the war on terrorism and probably have no decisive influence on the course of events.

The assessment he had to make after his meetings was whether the army felt that it was time for President Musharraf to go. I believe that in the meetings that Negroponte had in Islamabad it was brought home to him that this institution was, at least at this time, firmly in Musharraf’s corner and that even if there were misgivings in their ranks about the continued involvement of the army in politics these were being kept firmly under control.

I think he also discovered that even the threat that the American Congress would cut aid did not cut much ice with the Musharraf loyalists. The principal focus then of his discussions with army officials became the measures that could be taken with American assistance to increase the capacity of the military and paramilitary forces now doing battle with the extremists in Swat and the Tribal Agencies.

On the political plane, Negroponte had no choice but to revert to the original game plan of brokering an agreement between Musharraf and Bhutto while acknowledging at least for the time being Musharraf’s primacy in any such deal. While most believe that Negroponte got no concessions from Musharraf on the issues that need to be addressed to make such a deal possible I am of the view that Musharraf has promised that he will shed his uniform and will lift the emergency as soon as the Supreme Court validates his election and permits the notification of the election. Immediately thereafter will be the release of the arrested activists and a lifting of some if not all of the restrictions on the media.

The question is whether the mainstream political parties will be prepared to accept this as sufficient to participate in elections when the odds will still be so heavily stacked against them. It seems unlikely. The question then is will they be able to unite and mount the sort of mass protest that could force Musharraf to reconstitute the interim government and to dissolve, as the PPP has demanded the local bodies which will have a key role to play in the elections. I have no doubt that such an effort will be mounted. I doubt that it will succeed.

Turbulent times lie ahead. For the Americans, in this period of instability, the fate of the war on terror will vie in terrifying importance with the horrific prospect of ‘loose nukes’ — a prospect that for many nervous Americans has not been obviated by the $100mn they have spent in helping Pakistan devise fool proof security for its nuclear weapons and material.

Post-martial law regimes

A CLOSER look at the prevalent national crisis in Pakistan reveals that behind socio-political and judicial upheavals and struggles for power, there is a cobweb of competing economics of accumulation, allocation, and, to be exact, ‘structural transformation’.

The current crisis also reveals that the economics of capital ‘appropriation’ and ‘distribution’ working behind public policy-making and performance-correction is so sticky a force that it does not undergo a process of change despite change in regime through whatever way — martial law or constitutional/extra-constitutional emergency.

It is important to mention that in mainstream political analysis it is often portrayed that martial law once lifted is replaced by ‘democratic regimes’. This is a skewed analysis. The argument in this article is that military regimes, owing to perpetuating ‘systemic and structural rigidities’ do not give way to democratic regimes. They give rise to a unique and distinct phenomenon called ‘post’ martial law regime deeply entangled in the past without being able to make substantial changes in the character of the structure of the economy. This leads to ever-present social-political discontent paving the way for another dose of martial law. This cycle is repeated without letting the country into a phase of democratic economic governance.

The current rulers claim that owing to their economic wizards, the country has made progress in multiple directions especially in terms of a record high growth in GDP. They further claim that poverty has fallen and neo-liberal economics has translated into a boom in the real estate, telecom, stock market capitalisation, and trade-to-GDP ratio. However, some people call such claims a condition of ‘macroeconomic obscurity’ hidden behind aggregates and averages.

This condition is best summarised with an example of a man standing with one foot in a bucket of very hot water and the other in very cold water. While putting his foot in two absolutely different levels of temperatures, he claims that he is standing on an averagely normal temperature and it is a pleasure to keep standing like this. The reality, more than what economic managers of Islamabad speak, is that the economic growth has been sensed as following a ‘divergent’ not ‘convergent’ pattern.

This means Pakistan is going through persistent and increasing ‘inequality’ amongst sub-national economies in terms of their stages of development and industrialisation, factor endowments, and the resultant divergent competitive-capability.

Ironically, none of the coups or martial laws have been able to generate any ‘socially embedded’ yet ‘autonomous’ institutional response to manage economy for national cohesion and harmony. The military regimes have, in fact, distorted the systems of capital accumulation, allocation, and structural transformation in favour of groups who align themselves with military rule. Is there any economic explanation of repeated military coups in Pakistan? Yes, there can be many.

Recently, some economic experts started theorising about the possible linkage between ‘stages of industrialisation’ in a country and the ‘probability of military coups’. It appears from their propositions that the countries which implemented ‘sterile versions’ of import substitution industrialisation and remained trapped in manufacturing of ‘consumer goods’ (stage-I) catering to the needs of a small affluent class show predilection for repeated military coups. Examples can found in Latin America (Chile, Brazil), South Asia (Pakistan), and South East Asia (Thailand).

The proposition is vindicated in another way: those countries which have, at some point in history, escaped the trap (stage-I) and moved onto exploring the frontiers of intermediate (stage-II) and capital goods (stage-III), have actually shut the floodgates of repeated military coups and reduced possibilities of avoidable social upheavals in their countries.

Examples can be found in the ‘developmental states’ of East Asia including the Gang of Four.

The stage–I trap in the process of industrialisation has the potential to explain economic underpinnings of a path-dependent continuity in military coups and takeovers in Pakistan on two accounts. Firstly, the production-exchange of consumer goods needs a class of people who can consume local and imported items with financial ease. For this purpose, capital (financial, human, and infrastructural) has to be concentrated in the hands of few — especially those few who do not politically challenge the military regime. So growth has to be there but need not to be equitable.

Secondly, stage–I trap likewise does not necessitate intense diversity in products and processes of manufacturing. So push for industrial-upgrading and use of capital in high-end industrialisation for intermediate and capital goods manufacturing (stage–II and III) is not required. Ultimately, industrialisation remains trapped with abundance of low-skilled, less-educated, less-healthy, relatively poor workers who remain under the control of a small number of ‘elite managers’.

The trap brings ‘political relief’ for military regimes from frequent gear-shifting for ‘systemic structural transformations’. However, on the other hand, the stage-I trap, along with half-hearted attempts by regimes for high-end manufacturing allows an economy to boost about respectable ‘average rate of economic growth’ without creating a semblance of advances in nation-wide ‘technological capability – both industrial and agricultural’. Therefore, inequality despite (divergent) growth perpetuates and becomes a latent source of social and political upheavals starting a process of ‘post’-martial law regime and then again martial law.

A good example of persistence of economic and political reality can be found in an analysis which was undertaken by Wayne Wilcox (1969) in his article “Pakistan: A decade of Ayub” published in Asian Survey, an academic journal. Wilcox said, “……. Pakistan at the end of Ayub’s first decade remains what it was at the beginning: a politically divided, economically poor, and militarily vulnerable state’.

While looking at the text for another quote, one reads, ‘……. first time in a decade Pakistanis began asking not only ‘After Ayub, Who? But After Ayub, What?’ Could the writer predict dismemberment of Pakistan in the wake of ‘divergent growth’ between the then East and West Pakistan?

Under the current turmoil, London and Washington are concerned about ‘war on terror’ and to some extent about civil liberties and rightly so because they know that martial law and ‘predatory-state’ breeds extremism in many forms. However, Pakistanis are worried that none of the ‘patriotic coups’ despite sacrificing the ‘Bhuttos’ and the ‘Sharifs’ on the altar of ‘democracy’ have brought ‘systemic structural transformations’ in national economic life.

However, the struggle launched by lawyers, civil society, media, political workers suggests that the journey of transformation will eventually start with the primacy of ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ spearheaded by democratic leadership not by dictatorships — militarised systems of economic-interest-articulation cannot prescribe their own annihilation.

Of people’s army

GONE are the days when the duties of a population at war were clearly divided. It was the soldiers that fought while the ordinary citizens either prayed and hoped for the best or ran away elsewhere to escape the effects of the battle.

Nowadays it is the whole nation that gears itself up in self-protection and assists its army, navy and air force to enable them give their best, as distinct from the functions of the Civil Defence Department.

Perhaps the most outstanding example of such a contribution during the last century was provided by the historic Battle of Britain when the people of London bore the brunt of almost daily air raids by the German air force with memorable courage and determination. We too saw something of this kind of civilian contribution during the war with India in September 1965.

Although the prospects of another war with India are remote, many public leaders in Pakistan stress the need for being prepared for any contingency, and we hear now and then warnings from various quarters not to be complacent but be ready to face an emergency requiring a courageous response. One such call is to have a people’s army, whatever that means.

We have a penchant for belittling great ideas, noble concepts and inspiring events. We give the sacred name of jihad to any national campaign, even to a campaign for eliminating wasteful expenditure or promoting cleanliness.

Politicians travelling by bus or train from Lahore to Islamabad to protest against something are described as being on a Long March, and going without food and drink for three hours before the National Assembly again as a mark of protest is called a hunger strike.In the case of a people’s army, nobody knows what that signifies. In fact, some years ago, when a member suggested its formation in a session of the National Assembly, he did not care to elaborate on it, so no one knows about it.

If someone were to ask me what it means I would say it must be something akin to universal military training of which I am a keen votary. I remember a national newspaper once editorially demanded its enforcement in the country, but unfortunately no other paper picked up the idea to follow it up.

Since the MNA talked about imparting military training in schools and colleges and about hiring retired army officers for the purpose, one is justified in asking why the excellent scheme of National Cadet Corps, in force in boys’ and girls’ colleges in the country, was being reportedly wound up. There was a report to this effect in the press. To tell you the truth I don’t know anything about the matter and would like to be enlightened about it.

As I have said, I am in favour of universal military training for young men of a particular age group. I know it will not be universal, and while your sons and my sons will be drafted, those of persons with influence and clout will be sent out by their parents to London on medical grounds to escape the imposition. But even after making allowance for rich malingerers and VIPs’ sons with “weak constitutions” it would build up an effective back-up force which could be called upon to supplement the defence forces in times of emergency. That would really be a people’s army.

We are at pains to remind the world (and especially India) of our great martial traditions, but I would like to see how most of us with sons react to the scheme. As it is, the army, the navy and the air force are not very high on the priority list of careers for young men or their parents, otherwise why should a prime minister’s ADC and the captain son of a federal minister (himself a retired lieutenant general) successfully wangle absorption in the DMG and become the envy of their brother officers in the army? This has actually happened.

Universal military training would not only be an asset for the three defence services, but would also inculcate a measure of discipline in young men who are called up, and accustom them to regulating their lives in the light of a national contingency.

Nothing could be better for them, especially for the sons of the well-to-do who, before having their desire fulfilled to join one of the superior civil services or a foreign firm, roam about aimlessly firing their fathers’ weapons in the air and pinching other people’s motor cars for fun, with mobile phones glued to their ears all the time. What they sorely need is a military parade in a winter dawn in shorts and singlets to teach them at least some hard facts of life.

Whether the concept of a people’s army materialises through conscription or military service for everyone or through some other method, the armed forces are the best judge because in the final analysis it is they who have to implement any such scheme. Even if the plan adopted is not ambitious and only involves military training in schools and colleges it is the army that has to draw up the blueprint and not the education authorities.

Let me add that, though vague, the MNA’s proposal is basically good. I have a feeling that people inside occupied Kashmir may one day again intensify their freedom campaign. In that case India is sure to lay the blame at Pakistan’s door and threaten reprisals. Then, a people’s army, or whatever you may like to call it, will be helpful in making the people of Pakistan defence conscious and play a useful role in defending the country.

The unrecognised role of women

“We should no longer focus on women and peace, but on men and war.”

—Felicity Hill, vice-president of WILPF

THE seventh anniversary of Resolution 1325 was recently celebrated by the UN Security Council in New York. The women of the world, however, question the need to celebrate this resolution after seven years of its adoption in Oct 2000.

(The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution on women, peace and security, which was the first time the council addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women, recognised the under-valued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building, and stressed the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.)

What is the use of celebrating the law that for the first time expressed concern over women adversely affected by armed conflicts, and did not act to protect women from the suffering they face in these wars and conflicts? What is the use of “reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-building” when the Security Council members do not abide by this resolution? What is the use of “reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts” when we still witness repetitive violations to women and girls’ rights in areas of conflicts?

Women across the world hoped well in the adoption of Resolution 1325 that calls for protecting women in areas of conflict by securing effective measures when it “urges member states to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict”; and “Encourages the secretary-general to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes.”

In fact, the occasion prompts us to look for what could be more beneficial to do on the anniversary of the resolution. Should we not pursue aggressively the implementation of the resolution?

Or praise women’s achievements while no progress has been achieved in their vital problems in areas of conflict? What would the women of the world benefit from all the speeches and nice talk and official celebrations? Is it another summit of hypocrisies as described by one woman activist?

Shall we join forces with the words of Felicity Hill, vice-president of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) stating: “We should no longer focus on women and peace, but on men and war. We should formulate another resolution on men, peace and security. The 10th anniversary in 2010 could be an occasion for that.”

The German Women’s Security Council declared at the 7th anniversary of the UN resolution under the heading: “It is time to implement resolution 1325”:

“The German Women’s Security Council reminds that there is a great deficiency in implementing the UN resolution 1325 that calls for full support of women to participate in the peace-making process adopted by the UN Security Council on Oct 31. At this seventh year of deception, the government did less than what has been done during the past years to implement the resolution as witnessed by the Women’s Security Council.

The council also finds that one of the reasons for the set back is the declaration of the president of the European Defence Agency, better called the European Death Agency that has been published in German newspapers on Oct 24, announcing that the year 2008 will be the year for armament.

In addition, Alexander Fays, the ex-executive manager of the German ministry of defence, plans to have two major arms projects, launching a new model of helicopters and launching satellites, a plan that lacks the democratic legality and leadership. The Women’s Security Council demands to transfer the budget set for such projects into projects that prevent disputes and guarantee equal rights between men and women for the implementation of Resolution 1325, within the European continent as well. It is the duty of all political European activists from all political parties to support this decision.”

During a noticeable women celebration, the German Women Security Council presented a small gift to those who did not implement the Resolution 1325: a nod, then 1325 in a handkerchief meaning: Do not forget something important!

I wonder what gift would be given by women in areas of conflict to those who did not implement the Resolution. What would be the present given by those women suffering from occupation, suppression without any protection or care? What would be the present given by those women demanding their right to exist in Iraq and Palestine, by achieving their right to decide on matters related to peace making and disputes resolution?

Where can we find compliance with the Geneva Convention 1945, and its subsequent protocol of 1977? Or to the Refugees Convention of 1951 and subsequent protocol of 1967? Or even the Convention to end all forms of discrimination against women of 1977 and its subsequent protocol of 1999? They all call for abiding with the international law that applies and protects women rights.

Doesn’t the occasion require the Arab women organisations in general and the Palestinian women organisations in particular to have a critical stand to the implementation of the Resolution 1325? Doesn’t this occasion require forming women pressure groups that stand against deception and demand to look seriously into the implementation of the resolution especially that a number of women societies base their daily operations on this resolution?

How about having serious efforts to prepare a file on women authenticated testimonies to be presented at the 8th anniversary of the resolution? This will represent an honest response to the resolution implementation “that stresses on the responsibility of all countries to end evading punishment”. The testimonies will be addressed to the countries that did not enforce the resolution, demanding to “put to justice those responsible for mass murders, crimes against humanity and war crimes”?

The writer, an author, poet, researcher and lecturer, is a member of the Palestinian National Council.

faihaab@gmail.com