Four years of local govt — a perspective
THE second round of local body elections is over — without many surprises and amidst allegations of massive poll rigging. The elections also mark the lacklustre end of the first four years of the ‘devolution plan’ drafted by General (retd.) Naqvi’s National Reconstruction Bureau that gave birth to the Local Government Ordinance, 2001.
The scheme may have been based on the fundamental principles of devolution of political power, decentralization of administrative authority, de-construction of management functions, diffusion of the power-authority nexus, and distribution of resources to the district level. Yet, the Local Government Plan 2000, announced on March 23 in Islamabad, clearly indicated the establishment’s motive of usurping the little provincial autonomy that existed.
‘Devolution’ is defined as the most profound form of decentralization — ‘statutory transfer of authority and responsibilities from a higher level of governance to a lower level’. It is also a fact that without financial autonomy there can be no devolution. General Naqvi’s plan attempted to transfer political authority by devolving all but six provincial government departments but none from the federal level to the provinces. It also failed to devolve or provide any mechanism for internal generation of financial resources following abolition of the octroi and zila tax — once a major source of municipal revenues.
The direct election of nazims was given as the reason for giving extraordinary powers to these individuals. The district administration and police were supposed to report to the nazims. The village council was to be the primary political body for the people to participate at the grassroots level. The council could even appoint policemen from its own village. But several changes were made in the plan while enacting the ordinance, giving rise to further accusations that it was merely an attempt to transform Pakistan’s federal political system into another One Unit. Initially the nazims were also believed to be the future electoral college for General Musharraf’s presidential election similar to General Burki’s BD members. Yet it appears that in the end the establishment lost its nerve, unable to trust the political loyalties of the nazims that it had selected on a non-party basis. Unrelenting compromise has further distorted the establishment’s original plan and the amendments signed by General Musharraf in 2005 also show a drastic change in the blueprint, especially in Sindh.
The objective of the whole exercise was evident from the word ‘go’ with the formation of army monitoring cells based on the Indonesian model. Military rulers strengthen local bodies not to empower the people but to create a buffer for public dealings and to produce new political leadership under their patronage. In Pakistan, the establishment’s objectives also required the elimination of whatever provincial autonomy that was available. The change in the original plan for indirect elections of district nazims was made to further consolidate the political power of the traditional feudal families and ‘biradris’. The use of members of local councils to obtain desirable results in the presidential referendum further eroded the credibility of the new system.
Since 1999, the establishment has time and again demonstrated its resolve to thwart any further attempt to amend or adulterate the Local Government Ordinance. Its architects have embedded the LGO in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution which is also protected by the Legal Framework Order. Any change in the text or spirit of the Local Government Ordinance needs General Musharraf’s approval.
The process to seek this approval is extremely arduous and uncertain. The province is first required to approach the federal ministry of law and parliamentary affairs, which in turn is required to send the suggested amendments to the National Reconstruction Bureau, which will evaluate these suggested amendments, including seeking observations from the other provincial governments and then forward these to the prime minister who, if he agrees, will send the provincial legislation to the presidency, which may or may not accord approval. This is clearly a case of centralization and not devolution.
A careful reading of LGO 2001 will demonstrate that it has been drafted with little thought about its possible effects on legal issues or possible future tussles between various tiers of government in the provinces. It is an open secret that the last time around, the MQM agreed to settle for a large share in the affairs of Sindh and federal affairs in lieu of staying away from local government, paving the way for the Jamaat-i-Islami-led city district government in Karachi. But that resulted in constant friction between the two tiers and massive corruption in the system.
SLGO Section 14 requires administrative devolution but in all these four years it has yet to take place. We are still getting interim awards by the provincial finance commission.
The first (2002-03) budget announced by Mr Naimatullah Khan as the Jamaat’s nazim for City District Government, Karachi, estimated the total outlay at Rs20.546 billion. Unfortunately, the actual receipts totalled Rs13.650 billion. Again, the 2003-04 budget was estimated at Rs27.704 billion but the actual receipts failed to exceed Rs14.187 billion. For 2004-05, Mr Khan announced a budget for Rs32.67791 billion, knowing very well that the actual receipts might not exceed Rs16.61189 billion. This suited everyone, including the Jamaat dominated council. Though the ordinance really did not provide any authority to the government of Sindh, they played along with their political opponents in expectation of a future inflated budget. Thus, Mr Khan was allowed to mislead the people of Karachi by announcing the budget for 2005-06 at more than Rs42 billion.
Unfortunately, the loser in all this remains, like always, the common people of Pakistan. The sad story of the Local Government Ordinance, with minor variations, is the same all over the country.
The writer is a former administrator of the defunct Karachi Municipal Corporation.
Baba-i-Urdu remembered
An evening on the life and work of Baba-i-Urdu Dr Molvi Abdul Haq was held at Bahadur Yar Jung Academy with noted poet and writer Jamiluddin Aali in the chair. The speakers and writers who enlightened the audience by their deliberations included Prof Hasnain Kazmi, Prof Saher Ansari, Prof Matinur Rahman Murtaza and Prof Khawaja Qutbuddin, honorary secretary of the academy.
Mr Aali narrated how Molvi Saheb followed the teachings of his mentor Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who tutored and encouraged the youth to work for Urdu, part of Sir Syed’s nation-building plan.
Baba-i-Urdu loved and patronised young students about whom he thought that they would be the founders of Urdu University.
Mr Aali sadly narrated the last four or five years of Molvi Saheb’s life spent in miserable conditions, because of the maltreatment of powerful people sitting over the Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu.
Describing the background of the founding of Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu and later the present Urdu University, Mr Aali said the former was passing through troubled times, and he badly needed the support of talented men, who could volunteer their support to save the Anjuman from total collapse.
Prof Matinur Rahman Murtaza in his paper recalled the anti-Muslim policies of the All India Congress, the rise of Hindi, and the slow-poisoning of Urdu.
He recounted the role of Baba-i-Urdu in making Urdu an inherent part of the Pakistan movement and successfully running affairs of the Anjuman.
Prof Saher Ansari dilated upon the academic work of Molvi Saheb spread in many directions – his role as a researcher, introducing ‘Dakni’ poets and bringing them in the mainstream of Urdu poetry, his managerial skill at the Anjuman, his moqaddamas (prefaces) on valuable literary books, and the art of sketch writing, introducing some uncommon, yet men of great merit.
Prof Hasnain Kazmi admired Molvi Abdul Haq for his lifelong commitment to literature, research, but above all for his love for Urdu.
Earlier, Prof Mir Hamid Ali, President Bahadur Yar Jung Academy welcomed the speakers and the audience.—HA