Letting Kashmiris talk
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has put a damper on the ongoing search for options for a Kashmir settlement. When President Pervez Musharraf had made his speech about going beyond stated positions and outlined what he described as certain 'off-the-cuff' possibilities, he was accused by the opposition of reneging on Pakistan's position on a plebiscite in Kashmir. It was said that India would not respond in a similar spirit of give-and-take.
Unfortunately, Dr Manmohan Singh has proved the Cassandras right. After saying he was open to exploring all options in an interview with The Financial Times, he felt forced later to assert that India considered Kashmir an integral part. Also, in an oblique reference to Gen Musharraf's suggestion for demilitarization, he said that the deployment of troops "in our country" was not a subject matter for discussion.
The Pakistan foreign office, meanwhile, has again put paid to the idea of converting the Line of Control into a permanent border. Part of the problem is that Pakistani and Indian leaders and spokesmen are asked questions that they feel forced to answer, although they could easily fudge their replies if they so wished.
As a result, we continue to indulge in public posturing on sensitive issues which, as we have repeatedly urged in these columns, should fall in the domain of quiet, structured diplomacy. This only leads to unnecessary confusion, and political compulsions then come into play, making everyone retreat into shells.
Gen Musharraf too has shown a penchant for public diplomacy, throwing up random ideas into the air. But while he can be faulted for going into too many specifics in his Oct 25 speech - treating Kashmir on the basis of its ethnic and religious composition and in part resurrecting some of the ideas contained in the Owen Dixon plan - it had a purpose. Somebody had to cut through the thicket of emotion surrounding the issue, and throw it open to debate.
This actually has happened, and the opinion pages of Pakistani newspapers, and indeed in sections of the Indian press also, have seen a vigorous inflow of conflicting opinions. Why, then, should politicians like Dr Manmohan Singh seek to put the clock back and allow foreign office mandarins to again parrot the old mantras? A great effort is required on both sides to rise above entrenched positions and have the vision to put the past behind. The Indian prime minister's disappointing statement shows that his country is less willing to make the effort.
Why don't both sides agree to be quiet for a while and let the Kashmiris for a change do the talking? The Indian home minister during his just concluded visit to the held territory, said New Delhi would have no objection to Kashmiri leaders from the Indian part travelling to Pakistan to meet their counterparts here. This is the sort of initiative that has long been advocated by peace activists in both India and Pakistan - turning the LoC into a soft border and permitting greater inter-Kashmiri contacts.
If over time such contacts lead to a certain congruence of views among accredited Kashmiri leaders, neither Pakistan nor India would be able to easily disregard them. The two countries should help, not hinder, Kashmiris to decide on the best way to break the long-lasting deadlock on their future - a deadlock that statements such as those by Dr Singh and our own politicians ruling out a compromise can deepen, not dissipate.
Fallujah and beyond
The battle for Fallujah is raging again. The only difference this time is that the assault on the restive city in the so-called Sunni triangle was ordered by the Iraqi interim president, Iyad Allawi. This was done at whose behest is clear to all Iraqis living under occupation. The objective of taking Fallujah by force is as simple as it is hard to achieve: breaking the back of the resistance against occupation. Whether that will happen or not is an open question. More than 15,000 armed-to-the-teeth American and Iraqi troops are taking part in the offensive to cleanse Fallujah of insurgents, whose number the Americans estimate to be no more than 3,000.
Within 24 hours of the beginning of the operation to re-take Fallujah, a good number of them are believed to have fled from the city. This means that the all-out assault now under way will claim many civilian casualties. Reports of desertions within the Iraqi troops have also surfaced despite the Pentagon trying hard to play down the matter. How the unfolding situation could bring peace to Fallujah, and to Iraq as a whole, while occupation lasts is hard to tell.
The strategy at work behind the Fallujah offensive is faulty. The city has somewhat become a symbol of resistance to Iraq's occupation by the American-led forces. Now a full-fledged assault on it resulting in a high number of civilian casualties will reinforce the symbolic image of Fallujah. Had better sense prevailed, and had President Allawi's administration had a mind of its own, it would have offered a unilateral ceasefire to the insurgents during these last days of Ramazan.
The 'liberation' of Fallujah will be seen by many in Iraq as a celebration of President Bush's second term in office, and certainly not as an Eid gift for the people of Iraq. If the report that many armed insurgents had already left Fallujah before the offensive began on Monday is true, they will soon be ready to wage another battle elsewhere. Baghdad itself is far from safe from ambushes and bombings. More than 18 months into occupation, this stark failure on the part of the Americans, and now the interim Iraqi administration, inspires little confidence among ordinary Iraqis that all will be well come January 2005, when elections are promised to be held.
It is hard to see why the option of a negotiated settlement similar to that applied earlier in Najaf and Sadr City with regard to Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army was not explored in the case of Fallujah. The military action being undertaken there bears a striking resemblance with the incursions carried out by Israel in occupied Palestinian territories. This will have its own implications long after the military objectives have been achieved in Fallujah. Given the city's symbolic image, its fall could well radicalize Iraq's Sunni minority - especially if the civilian casualties are high.
If that happens, the interim administration and the occupation powers should know that it won't be smooth sailing for them in Iraq, come election time. Iraqis so far have refused to succumb to sectarian divisiveness, but the crushing of Sunni insurgents in Fallujah and the accommodation of Shia ones in Najaf and Sadr City earlier could sow the seeds of dissension among them. That is the last thing President Allawi should have bargained for.