Poll prospects in Iraq

American officials have been quite adamant in their statements that, not withstanding the current ground situation, they were confident that elections in Iraq would be held as per schedule in January.

Prime Minister Allawi has been just as categorical in the statements he has made during his visit to the UK and which he will probably repeat in his speech to the UN General Assembly and when he is feted by President Bush in Washington.

How much credence should one attach to these assertions? How should one assess, in terms of Iraq's future, the bland assertion in President Bush's campaign material, "Fifty million people have been liberated from despotic, totalitarian regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq," "the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein is gone, and an interim regime is leading the Iraqi people to freedom".

How should one view the future in case Kerry wins the elections when, so far, his plan, according to his campaign website, calls for "getting our boys home by 2008 without offering any details of how this could be achieved beyond stating that he would "plan Iraq's future by working with our allies" and would "launch a massive and accelerated training effort to build Iraqi security".

In assessing the prospect for elections being held as scheduled the following needs to be borne in mind: Attacks against American forces averaged 87 a day during the month of August and by all accounts the pace of these assaults has not diminished in September.

Since the hand over of power to the Iraqi interim regime led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi on June 28 Americans have suffered more casualties than they did in the occupation of Iraq.

So far 14000 Iraqis at a minimum and more than 1000 Americans have lost their lives. The exact figure of deaths among the other "coalition of the willing" forces is not known but probably exceeds 100.

Insurgency operations are not confined to the "Sunni triangle" alone. Of the 18 provincial capitals in Iraq at least two - Ramadi, in Al Anbar province, and Baquba, in Diyala province northeast of Baghdad - remain in the hands of the insurgents. Other large cities in the region, like Fallujah, Samarra, and the Baghdad suburb Sadr City are also not under American control.

Najaf, theoretically, is now being patrolled by Iraqi forces controlled by the Iraqi interim regime but there can be no doubt that the tenuous peace in that tortured city is the handiwork of Ayatollah Sistani and his relationship with Ayad Allawi must be considered as strained given the alleged effort Allawi made to prevent the Ayatollah's return from London to mediate the withdrawal of Sadr forces from the city.

If Sistani has suspicions about the intentions and ambitions of the Allawi regime, peace throughout the south must be considered tenuous. Reports suggest that the British forces in Basra are bracing themselves for a fresh outbreak on insurgent attacks in Basra city and province.

The Americans have claimed that Iran is financing the insurgents and providing other support. Secretary Powell has tried to put this perspective pointing out that the Iranian and Iraqi clergy are in a sense rivals and that the memories of the eight years of war between Iraq and Iran persist.

He has rightly stated that even if the Iranians are planning 'mischief' and even if there is an influx from across the Syrian border the real problem is "a self generating insurgency that's being fed by Zarqawi terrorist (sic). It also appears fairly clear that the insurgency in the Shia areas is drawing upon the expertise of ex-Baathist Sunni Iraqi army officers

A national intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA in July makes extremely pessimistic predictions about the short-term prospects in Iraq. Such portions of it as have been leaked suggest that in the best case scenario that Iraq at end '05 would have very tenuous stability in the economic, political and security fields while the worst case scenario would see Iraq involved in a civil war.

Admittedly the CIA, under fire from its critics for having been dead wrong about the WMD threat has reason to be wary of optimistic reports or reports that suit the current administration but developments on the ground since the report was prepared seem to suggest that if anything the report was not pessimistic enough.

Much of the planning for the elections depends on the assumption that Iraqi security forces will be available to provide security for the election itself and more importantly for the registration offices, that the UN is planning to open at 600 locations throughout Iraq on November 1. The situation on the ground, however, does not support such an assumption.

As regards new training, the recruiters are having to contend with insurgent attacks on recruiting centres and on any Iraqi working for the Americans even if the task they perform is as innocuous as laundry or food supply services.

Even if the recruits do become available it will take years before a force large enough to provide the level of security required can be created. Currently the US army headquarter set up for the training of the new Iraqi army has a strength of 230 officers as against the requirement of 600.

The State Department, in a recent briefing had explained that of the 18 billion committed by the United States for Iraqi reconstruction, only 1.1 billion had been spent so far.

Of the remaining amount, 3.5 billion was being reallocated and through this reallocation the amount for the training of Iraqi security personnel was being increased by 1.8 billion.

Since the re-allocation of the money has yet to be approved by the Congress and since the expansion of any educational institution takes time, it seems doubtful that the Iraqi police force will reach a strength of the planned 45000 even by the end of 2005. More to the point, there will be few new officers in November '04 to protect the registration offices or January '05 to provide security for the elections.

Ayad Allawi is apparently at daggers drawn with the American commander, General Petraeus, because the latter refuses to yield to entreaties that the Iraqi forces should be put on the ground with limited rather than the extensive training that Petraeus believes is required.

Kofi Annan's now famous statement that the war in Iraq was illegal attracted a great deal of attention but equal attention needed to be paid to his assertion that in the present conditions national elections could not be held in January. This is a view shared by many analysts including Republican senators who are otherwise supportive of President Bush.

Powell maintains that the ground situation in the Sunni Triangle will improve by December as a result of a combination of military and political moves such as brought peace to Najaf.

With regard to the rest of the country he recalled that municipal elections have been peacefully held in the south and there was no reason why national elections would not be equally successful. The fact however is that, as in Afghanistan, the insurgents will try and sabotage the elections by attacking election workers and elections offices.

Ayad Allawi has of course been critical of Annan's statement and apart from emphasizing his determination has been calling upon the UN "to help us in providing whatever it takes to make the elections a success in Iraq". His foreign minister Hoshayr Zubeyri maintains, "They (United Nations) are not doing enough to help us... they have only about 30 international staffers in Baghdad" so far.

What both seem to ignore are the problems the United Nations has encountered. On the one hand the UN's original plan of inducting a government of technocrats who would renounce any future political ambitions was torpedoed by the Americans because of Allawi and his colleagues.

This made it clear to the UN officials that they could not play any meaningful role in the political restructuring in Iraq and if thereafter the secretary-general decided to do no more than go through the motions he can hardly be blamed.

This insistence on retaining a government dominated by those who had been in exile and who had dubious CIA connections was probably responsible, at least in part for the impetus the insurgency gained after the hand over.

This was, a mistake on par with the decision early on in the occupation to disband the Iraqi army and by so doing to remove what could have been an effective tool for maintaining law and order.

While depending on local security the United Nations suffered an attack on its Baghdad headquarters in which 23 people including the UN secretary-general's representative and 14 other UN people died.

They need a protection force but no nation is willing to provide troops for the protection of the UN personnel and they would have to rely on the coalition forces for security.

Given the other responsibilities of these forces the UN probably cannot ask for the required security for more than a limited number of UN staffers. Some reports suggest that the coalition forces have made it clear that they cannot provide security for more than 35 UN personnel.

At the moment the UN is supposed to exercise only a supervisory role with the main task of registration being performed by the interim government. Theoretically the task will be facilitated by the fact that 60 per cent of the population, which received rations during the sanctions regime, can be considered as registered. For supervising the registration of the rest 30 member of the international staff along with locally recruited assistants may suffice.

Another important question for the UN may relate to doubts and misgivings about the intentions of the interim regime. These are people with no standing among the Iraqi populace since they have spent many years in exile and most of them have had or are suspected of having had dubious connections with the CIA or British intelligence.

It was perhaps their hope that they would be able to take credit for the reconstruction and thus win popular support. This seems now unlikely. Only a manipulation of the election can ensure the fulfilment of their political ambitions if elections can in fact be held.

The UN has had a bad experience already in Afghanistan, where multiple registrations have acquired monstrous proportions in the north and a large number of people have remained unregistered in the south and south-east.

The total number of people registered has exceeded the original estimated voter population even while a good 8 per cent of the women voters have not been registered and when at least 1/3rd of the estimated voters have not been registered.

In Afghanistan these tactics have no immediate impact since only presidential elections are being held and the entire country is one constituency. There the impact will come in April when the parliamentary elections are to he held.

In Iraq where there are parliamentary elections, the registration process will impact on the demarcation the of constituencies and on the ethnic mix in the new parliament. Would the UN want to be a party to and be held responsible for the errors in voter registration or other problems that are bound to arise if the interim government has its way?

The writer is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Making the OIC more cohesive

Participants at the 10th OIC summit held in Malaysia decided to set up a commission of eminent persons to prepare a strategy and plan of action to enable the Islamic ummah to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

They also decided to prepare recommendations for restructuring the OIC and for promoting enlightened moderation within Islamic societies. As a sequel, an international seminar was convened in Islamabad by the Pakistan government on June 1 and 2 to provide an intellectual input for the deliberations of the commission.

As an independent contribution towards the same end, the widely respected Hamdard Foundation sponsored an international conference in Karachi from September 4 to 6 to highlight not only the challenges facing the Islamic world but also to pinpoint the opportunities and the potential for meeting these challenges.

Nearly all long-running political disputes involve the Muslim people and that most of the peoples under foreign occupation also happen to be the Muslims, particularly from Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq.

The strong feelings against foreign domination, that existed before 9/11 have been reinforced by the way the West has capitalized on the horrendous attacks to implement its neo- imperialist agenda.

Never in recent history has an act attributed to a Muslim militant group, led to such disastrous consequences for the Islamic world as has done the 9/11. It provided a much-sought opportunity for implementing Washington's neo-con policies in a unipolar world.

But for this attack, the US administration could never have rallied the American nation to acquiesce in to a pre- emptive, unilateral attack on Iraq and its horrendous consequences.

In spite of adverse circumstances arising in the aftermath of 9/11, the Islamic world with 57 independent states, strategic importance and economic resources continues to have its own leverage.

Leading Islamic states such as Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the GCC states, Indonesia and others are in a position to exercise diplomatic or economic leverage in important regions, where vital western interests are involved, such as the Middle East, the Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia.

And yet, the OIC is seen as merely a talking shop and has not been taken seriously. At this juncture when Islamic states are being targeted one after another, it is only by bringing into play the combined diplomatic, economic and political leverage of the Islamic world that further aggression can be discouraged.

The OIC should consider adopting a credible policy under which its members must oppose by diplomatic, economic and political means any pre-emptive, unprovoked threat or attack against any of their members and pledge mutual political and economic help to enable the OIC to maintain this unified opposition. The OIC must establish a standing mechanism at the summit/foreign ministers level to deal with crisis situations affecting the security of OIC states.

The declarations adopted by the OIC in the past are mostly expression of consensus of the ummah on issues of interest. If it has to exercise a leverage on developments of concern, Islamic states would have to strengthen their security interests in the current threatening situation. They should also work towards creating greater cohesion in economic interests, an essential building block for meaningful cooperation in the modern world.

More important than passing new resolutions is the need for the implementation of past decisions. A high-powered OIC mechanism should be set up to monitor follow up.

A collective mechanism and close coordination should be devised amongst Islamic states in media-related matters to counteract the wide disinformation portraying the freedom movements of Muslim peoples (such as the Palestinian and Kashmiri struggles) as terrorism and Islam as a creed of violence.

Leading world powers should also be persuaded through collective, coordinated efforts to play a more positive role in the solution of long running disputes, affecting Islamic peoples and states such as the Palestinian and Kashmiri struggles.

The restructuring of the OIC must be taken in hand. Even the eminent persons group mooted at the last Islamic summit has yet to become functional. Numerous other proposals for restructuring have to be examined and integrated into a viable whole.

President Musharaff recommended some time ago that the OIC secretariat must have professionally staffed departments capable of dealing with modern challenges and issues of economic, scientific and technological cooperation, higher education, social reforms, etc. This should be pursued.

With a reduction in the strategic importance of Third World states generally, following the end of the cold war, their significance for the developed West is now linked more to their economic strength and playing a role in global issues such as terrorism, nuclear and arms control, population, drugs, environment and the refugee problem.

In order to assess prospects and opportunities in the changed world scenario the OIC states should make a reappraisal of the convergence or divergence of their interests with the developed world.

Islamic states should recognize and strengthen their common interests as developing states economically, vulnerable states militarily and mistrusted peoples politically and ideologically.

It is time therefore that the Islamic states in general and the affluent ones in particular, shed their reservations towards greater financial contribution in strengthening OIC institutions.

Except for the Islamic Development Bank, there is no other instance of successful institutional economic cooperation in the OIC framework. The intra-OIC trade is a fraction of the total trade of Islamic states.

Plans for joint defence production between selected OIC member states have not got off the ground, with OIC member states preferring to maintain their dependence on western military hardware rather than investing in regional defence industries.

For lack of financial resources, the OIC standing committee on scientific and technological cooperation, headed by Pakistan, has so far not achieved the desired goals and targets.

Linked with the requirement of justice and human welfare, peace occupies a central place in the Islamic creed which postulates a principle-based order. In the western approach, however, peace is considered separately from justice and is equated with absence of war and with stability and order guaranteed on occasions by hegemonic influence.

In the spirit of true moderation, the Holy Quran warns against the committing of excesses even in the pursuit of rights or in combating injustice, which should be borne in mind by those engaged in freedom struggles of Muslim people.

The writer is a former ambassador.

The 'Bara' way of life

Bara is a way of life based on smuggling, and its appeal has overpowered Pakistanis. Most of us would feel horrified at the thought of smuggling anything into the country or out of it, but we are content with living with smuggling if it is practised by others.

We see nothing wrong in contraband goods and honestly feel there is something lacking in a government that forbids their trade. Most of us have convinced ourselves that the government is against smuggling since it loses precious revenue because of it, otherwise per se there is nothing immoral about the business.

When we indulge in it we only transgress the law of the land, whereas religion teaches us that a law which we honestly believe to be against good conscience, need not be followed.

As for conscience itself, it is not difficult to mould it to suit our pleasure and our material needs. Hence the popularity of Bara markets all over the country.

The Bara market in Rawalpindi must be the biggest concentration of shops of smuggled goods in Pakistan. It has to be seen to be believed. Not surprisingly it is very much a part of life in this region, particularly for the denizens of Islamabad, and especially for its well-to-do women - wives and daughters of bureaucrats. But then, what is so surprisingly about these ladies being attracted by hundreds of shops selling all kinds of delectable foreign goods?

I liked the comment of the wife of a very senior CBR officer that I heard some time ago. She condescended to inform her friends - wives of equally senior officers in the ministries - that they were able to enjoy the pleasures of Pindi's Bara Bazaar "because of us."

For the uninitiated, "us" meant her husband and the CBR. It is common for bureaucrats' wives in Pakistan to associate themselves vicariously with the posts held by their husbands.

Now of course these markets are to be found all over the country and form an integral part of Pakistani culture. But I think it is only in Rawalpindi that we have this sprawling complex of such shops in one place, and that too in the heart of the city.

It is smaller only than the original Bara township just outside Peshawar, though even that is gradually being replaced by Hayatabad, the satellite town. To visit Pindi's Bara is a memorable experience.

The noise and hustle and bustle, the large crowd at all times of the day, the shops in the narrow lanes and the infinite variety of foreign-made wares are simply unbelievable.

Now and then the rumour is set afloat that the government is planning to close down all Bara markets in the country. I've heard this so many times during the past thirty years, but it has never come about.

Maybe it was the CBR officer's wife I have talked about who always had the plan reversed! You never know. In this country decisions of national importance are known to have been taken by the top man in power at the prodding of a near relation or an old family servant, or even a girl friend.

Once an interior minister told the National Assembly that the government had no intention to close down the Bara markets because it would create a law and order problem. His second reason was very interesting from the point of view of economics.

He said that so long as better quality goods were not produced within the country and made available to people at reasonable prices, such markets would keep on mushrooming.

Of course, by "people" he didn't really mean the people or the masses, but people like him whose families cannot exist without expensive foreign-made things. For what is sold in the Bara markets are luxury items that go to the homes of the rich who will continue to buy them, whatever the price.

It is also a fact that those without such means, "trying to keep up with the Joneses," will go on chasing smuggled luxury goods and pawn their grandmothers to raise the money.

We have to admit that a class has gradually built up in Pakistan during the last 25 to 30 years which insists on buying foreign stuff, whatever the cost. Nothing else has influenced our culture so much as this class which has unlimited wealth at its disposal (don't ask me where it came from) and you can't blame it if its members want the best of everything. Shopkeepers fleece this class to the fullest.

I have a theory. If there are two shops side by side, stocking the same goods, absolutely identical in make and quality, one selling them at reasonable rates and the other at fancy prices, members of the class I am talking about will always buy the more expensive goods. It is considered infra dig to even go into a shop that does not over-charge.

A kind of excitement is also involved in making purchases from smugglers' markets, especially if they are located in the Frontier Province and the shops have thatched roofs, like the extensive "jhuggian" near Risalpur. I was posted in that province twice.

The first time was in 1957-59 when there was no Bara and I had to take every visitor from Punjab to picturesque Landi Kotal for buying smuggled things. It was a lovely drive through the Khyber Pass.

My second posting was in 1966-67, by which time Bara had come up with all its prodigal thrills. And one no longer had to go to Landi Kotal. But I missed that beautiful drive about which I used to say that it looks totally different on the way back, which is not unusual with mountain scenery. Nowadays of course the whole of Peshawar city is one big Bara, with cloth and electronic items as the biggest draw.

Meantime, Pindi's Bara market continues to thrive and cater to high taste of the privileged female population of Islamabad. It would be both cruel and unsporting to deprive this not-so silent minority of this great cultural pleasure.

At least one visit to Bara every fortnight is a must, the opportunity (or excuse) being provided by guests from other cities. It is a fact of life that women must shop even if they travel to a God-forsaken place like Toba Tek Singh. As for transport, if the husband is a reasonably senior officer, staff cars are no problem.

Let's dispense with the suspense

Perhaps the most irritating aspect of the renewed debate over whether General Pervez Musharraf will or won't step down as army chief before the end of the year is the element of charade introduced into the proceedings.

The intent, evidently, is to create the impression that the president will retain his uniform on account of popular pressure, not because he would effectively be bereft of a constituency were he to relinquish his army post.

Earlier this month, General Musharraf made the extraordinary claim that 96 per cent of Pakistanis want him to keep both jobs. By the time of last week's Washington Post interview, it had been adjusted downwards to "a vast majority". But that vague claim is equally unsubstantiated.

Then there was the Punjab Assembly resolution. Was that a spontaneous demonstration of unflinching faith and undying devotion, or was it the consequence of a hint from on high? It is possible, of course, that the bright idea came to Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi without too much provocation, given that he makes no bones about being profoundly beholden to General Musharraf.

The counter-resolution from the NWFP Assembly must have been less welcome, and presumably wasn't a planned part of efforts to build up an atmosphere in which breaking a promise can be made to look like the ultimate act of patriotism. It is less clear, however, exactly where Sheikh Rashid Ahmed enters into the equation.

Granted, the information minister has a penchant for saying the wrong thing at the wrong time. One frequently gets the impression that he is poorly briefed as a matter of policy.

If not, it may have been wise to offer him a less demanding post in the new cabinet. After all, it must be deeply embarrassing for the government's official spokesman to be officially contradicted with such regularity.

His shambolic performance, however, served a purpose: it let the cat out of the bag. Unless General Musharraf is peculiarly indecisive, he must by now know very well what he intends to do with his uniform three months hence.

In fact, chances are he has known it all along. Neither the cabinet nor the parliament has anything to do with the army chief's decision, beyond rubber- stamping it and then pretending that democratic criteria have somehow been met.

So, notwithstanding his denials the following day, Sheikh Rashid let it be known a week ago what lies in store. And unless he is a lot smarter than he seems, it is unlikely that his intentions were in any way subversive.

Shaukat Aziz, meanwhile, managed to broach the subject without tripping up, expressing the hope that Musharraf would, as "expected", retain both his posts beyond December 31 in the national interest.

That is what the new prime minister must have been expected to say. After all, one of the reasons Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali's tenure was truncated was his repeated insistence that the president could be relied upon to keep his promise.

We are unlikely to hear any such tall claims from Mr Aziz. Nor would it be fair to expect from him any deep attachment to democracy. He allowed the state machinery to take care of his election from Tharparkar and Attock, and if he was in any way disconcerted by the methods reportedly employed to guarantee him overwhelming majorities in both constituencies, he showed no sign of it in public.

Nor does he appear to have been alarmed by the size of the cabinet thrust upon him - the largest in the nation's history. That's saying quite a lot, given that Pakistan's governments traditionally tend to be top-heavy.

According to Sheikh Rashid, General Musharraf considers broad cabinets a good training ground for young legislators. Given the source, the statement ought to be taken with a pinch of salt.

But if the president did offer such a comment, it was a disingenuous thing to say. He knows as well as anyone else that bloated ministries are invariably a symptom of weakness; they arise from the need to balance rival factional interests and are almost never a recipe for good governance.

On the other hand, President Musharraf also knows that in Pakistan under the present conditions, the cabinet - big, small or medium - doesn't have all that much to do with governance - good, bad or indifferent. For it is the men in uniform who make all the important decisions.

Mr Aziz couldn't conceivably be unaware of that reality. But given his reputation as a sensible economic manager, he might have been expected to take some sort of stand against profligacy right under his nose. Economists of his ilk are often incredibly keen on downsizing. If that's true of the prime minister, he could start with his cabinet.

General Musharraf's still growing sense of indispensability - a character flaw common to all military rulers and many of their civilian counterparts - is another viable candidate for downsizing. But no one seriously expects Mr Aziz to do anything about it.

For one, he would be up against enormous odds: after all, the president's ego is constantly being massaged by none other than Uncle Sam. And for another, the PM is also constrained by the size of his constituency, which does not appear to extend far beyond two key personalities: General Musharraf and his chief power broker, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain.

In all fairness, one should also mention a vital external factor. In an unremarkably condescending comment earlier this month, Colin Powell certified that Pakistan is "moving in the right direction", now that it has "an empowered prime minister".

Empowered? Perhaps the US secretary of state knows more than the rest of us. But the key part of his statement was his description of the PM as someone "we know very, very well".

That may have been intended as a compliment, although it won't do much for Mr Aziz's reputation among those who already perceive him as a stalking horse for the forces of international capitalism. But there are, potentially, further layers of meaning in that "very, very well", and each one of them provides considerable cause for alarm.

Not surprisingly, the US has been fairly reticent about offering any comment on President Musharraf's apparent determination to renege on his commitment to the people of Pakistan.

Beyond the usual homilies about support for "fully functioning democracy" (something Pakistan has never experienced and, furthermore, a concept that the US itself is increasingly unfamiliar with), State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli tied himself up in knots last week while trying to avoid saying anything meaningful about Musharraf's Washington Post comment.

It is unlikely the general will be under any great pressure to strip down to civvies during his US visit this week, which includes an audience with George Bush. It is, however, not just the Bush administration that has little objection to men in uniform maintaining order in what the US president once described as dark corners of the world.

The US has traditionally been indulgent towards military rulers, finding them easier to deal with than political leaders, whose possible obligations to their electorates tend to be viewed as a weakness.

Of course, uniformed heads of state or government who refuse to take their cues from Washington are dealt with far more harshly. But then, that applies to democratically elected leaders, too - Venezuela's Hugo Chavez being a prime example.

General Musharraf's behaviour post-9/11 has given the US little cause for dismay, and the American refusal to say anything that might in any way undermine his authority is only one of the rewards that has come his way.

Reciprocally, Islamabad, too, is disinclined to raise any awkward questions. For instance, the return of nearly three dozen Pakistanis from Guantanamo Bay does not lead anyone at the official level to wonder out loud why they were incarcerated on occupied Cuban territory for more than two years, given that they are obviously not guilty of very much.

Such questions would, of course, detract from Pakistan's status as a "valued ally" in the so-called war on terror. And although there can be little question that terrorism - chiefly but not exclusively of the Islamic variety - poses a serious threat to Pakistan, it is far from clear that the military operations in Wana are an ideal means of dealing with it.

By employing heavy handed tactics our armed forces may well be sowing the seeds of terror for generations to come. It hardly comes as a surprise that official statements on the operations in South Waziristan carry about as much credibility as the average pronouncement from Sheikh Rashid.

This seems to be but another part of the grand charade mentioned at the outset. It's high time it was halted. Why persist with a complicated scheme that doesn't fool too many people anyway? Why bother at all with constitutional amendments? Why not simply decree that henceforth, until further notice, the chief of the army staff will also be the nation's head of state, with the right to pick all his subordinates, civilian and military?

No more fuss about uniforms. No need to bother with referendums, elections or votes of confidence. Accountability? We won't miss it (how could we, when we don't know what it looks like?).

The supreme ruler will be answerable only to the White House. Simple as that. If anyone doesn't like it, they can be offered an alternative: one-way tickets to Camp X-Ray. Love Pakistan or leave it, as the bumper stickers said in the good old days of General Zia.

Email: mahirali2@netscape.net.