The 'uniform' debate

The Constitution (17th amendment) requires General Musharraf to give up his army post by December 31, 2004. At the time this amendment was adopted, he gave the nation his word that he would "shed" his uniform by the appointed day. His loyalists have, of late, been urging him to abandon all thought of doing so. As of September 15, they have begun to advance the curious view that the Constitution does not stop him from being president and the army chief at the same time. They claim that his retention of his uniform is a vital national interest.

The general said the other day that he would make his decision at the appropriate time, keeping in view the national interest, wishes of the people, and requirements of the Constitution. He professes to know what the people want: he has recently made the astounding, and also the incredibly disingenuous, claim that 96 per cent of them want him to keep his military uniform. Whoever suggested this figure (96 per cent) is clearly no friend of his.

The reason for the general's apparent intention to stay on as the army chief is clear. He wishes to be the country's effective ruler, which he cannot be if he takes off his uniform, for then he will have no support base. The politicians as well as the generals will feel free to go their own way; they will have no compelling reason to listen to him.

One must ask how he can keep his uniform when the Constitution, as it now stands, says he must take it off by December 31. If he does not comply with this requirement, the issue will most likely reach the Supreme Court. His spokesmen may ask the court to invoke its favourite "doctrine of necessity" and find ways of suppressing the troublesome clauses in the Constitution. That would not be too heavy a burden for the court to bear: at several critical junctures in our history, it has seen fit to go with the shifting gales of power politics.

Another possibility may be to hold, and win, still another "referendum," and declare that the voice of the people, being the voice of God ("vox populi vox dei"/ or "sada-i-khalq ko naqqara-i-khuda samjho"), overrides the Constitution.

The general has told us all along that in making his decisions he places the national interest above all else. Let us then see how this matter of his uniform relates to the national interest. It should be understood that his retention of his army post will, in essence, mean continuance of military rule in Pakistan. Even if it allows a democratic facade to remain in place, the nation's aspiration for democratic governance, and its quest for political maturity, will remain defeated for many long years. The key question would then seem to be whether democracy is a national interest and, if it is, how highly it is to be valued.

We wanted independence, and attained it, because we wanted to be self-governing. That did not mean that thenceforth dictators who placed us under their rule would have Muslim names and brown skin. It meant that dictators would rule no longer, that we would be governed by our consent, and that we would be subject not to anyone's whim but to the rule of law. Seen in this context, military rule is a negation of our raison d'etre. Fulfilment of the reason for our existence as an independent state is thus a national interest of the highest order.

It is alleged in certain quarters, including the military, that our aspiration for democracy is extravagant and frivolous, for we are not capable of governing ourselves - at least not now or in the foreseeable future. The proponents of this view tell us also that military rule suits us better, and in support of their claim they point to the longer strides in economic development made during Ayub Khan's rule and the larger amounts of spending money some of us (particularly traffickers in drugs and weapons) had during Ziaul Haq's regime. They do concede, however, that the prosperity they speak of did not filter down to the ordinary folks. It follows then that military rule was no better than any other so far as the masses were concerned.

It is alleged also that the masses are not all that worked up about the availability or absence of democratic rights and freedoms, and that burdened as they are with the toil of earning a living, they have no time for politics. This is, at best, a half-truth. They are unconcerned with an existing system of government so long as the politicians to whom they listen do not denounce it. But our experience shows that when the same politicians tell them that military rule is responsible for their deprivations, they will come out on the streets to demand its termination and the restoration of democracy.

Let us now ask where our politicians stand. Of the 342 members of the National Assembly 191 voted to support General Pervez Musharraf's nominee (Mr Shaukat Aziz) for the post of prime minister on August 27. In other words, 151 members did not support him. This is a substantial number. It is possible that some of the 191 who did vote for Mr Aziz will withdraw their support of the general if he keeps his uniform beyond December 31.

What will the disaffected politicians do? It goes without saying that their opposition to the general's regime will intensify. It may simmer for a time as they test the waters, so to speak, but it may turn into a general uprising if they find the time to be right for it. In this connection, it should be noted that the present government is not popular to any significant degree. Claims of its popularity advanced by General Musharraf and Mr Shaukat Aziz are either poetic exaggeration or delusions; the latter being the more likely since neither of them is known to be poetic.

General Musharraf's spokesmen caution that political destabilization and chaos will ensue if he takes off his uniform. Instability does not signify only frequent changes in the prime minister's office and the resulting uncertainty in the realm of public policy. Destabilization and chaos have other manifestations as well: masses of people coming out on the streets, day after day, shouting anti-establishment slogans, blocking traffic, burning buses and private vehicles, forcing stores to close, breaking shop windows and plundering the merchandize, organizing and enforcing strikes, turning investors and tourists away, bringing the national economy to a standstill, clashing with the security forces, killing and getting killed, and paralysing the government.

Who, in his right mind, will deny that all of this is chaos, and that it constitutes the gravest of threats to the national interest? While we hope that this kind of an upheaval will not occur, it would be foolish to dismiss the possibility that it may, if the general does not "shed" his uniform.

The general may be aware that these developments can ensue. But it may be that he thinks he will ride the storm and come out unscathed, even beaming. That is possible, but not probable. He would do well to take a look at the books of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Ayub Khan. Even Ziaul Haq's experience will make an instructive study.

Musharraf's walk through the "storm" will be made ever more hazardous by the fact that parts of the country (especially Sindh and Balochistan) are already in turmoil. Many of the politically aware people in these provinces, and others whom they can carry along, keep reminding us of the tragic events of 1971. They refer to the possibility of secession and civil war.

They speak in this mode not because they are disloyal to Pakistan but because they despise General Musharraf's rule and the political system they think he wants to impose on us. If he continues to insist that his personal interest in retaining supremacy in our government is of vital interest to Pakistan, the opposition to him may become deeply alienated. That is what happened in East Pakistan.

The general has other opponents whose grievances may not be precisely the same but they are just as strong as those of the Sindhi and Baloch "nationalists." Gathered in the MMA, ARD (especially PPP and PML-N), ANP and a few other organizations, they are likely to join hands with the "nationalists" in the smaller provinces in a general uprising in case he decides to keep his uniform.

If the above interpretations are valid, it should be clear that a decision on General Musharraf's part to keep his uniform beyond the appointed day will be a menace to the national interest inasmuch as it will not only threaten the country's good order but its very survival. We must all hope that God will guide him to moderate his ambition and, in addition, save him from the self-seeking opportunists who pose as his friends.

His decision is bound to have some impact abroad. Mr Bush may not care one way or the other so long as Musharraf is going after, and killing, the anti-American extremists, real and presumed. But many in the United States Congress, media, and academia will think less of Pakistan if they see that it continues to be ruled by a general in uniform.

So will the governments and opinion-makers in the Commonwealth, Europe, and Japan. Our international standing, and our bargaining position (all around but more specifically in negotiations with India) will weaken. Thus General Musharraf's decision to keep his uniform beyond December 31 will be prejudicial to our national interest not only at home but also in the outside world.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.

E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

Cynicism in politics

A week or two after the military crackdown on Mujibur Rehman's Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan in March 1971, General Tikka Khan, who had directed the operation, landed in Karachi from Dhaka. As he came down the gangway with a swagger stick tucked under his arm and a triumphant smile on his face, a gaggle of anxious news correspondents surrounded him.

They were perturbed by reports, as were the people at large, that the insurgency had not been quelled fully and that bombs were still exploding. Tikka Khan's comment was curt: a firecracker let off here and there on a distant border did not make exploding bombs; it was all peaceful and life had returned to normal. Nine months later East Pakistan became Bangladesh amid contrasting scenes of jubilation and carnage.

Now, General Musharraf, dismissing the rocket-fire and exploding gas pipelines in Balochistan as "pinpricks", may not bear full comparison with General Tikka's bravado of 33 years ago but at least to Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the military crackdown in South Waziristan appears to be heading towards an East Pakistan - like civil war with similar consequences.

The Maulana's reading of the situation may be tendentious but there should be no doubt about where his sympathies lie. But for the position of privilege and profit he occupies in Pakistan's power structure, he and his fellow seminarians would have been siding with the foreign fighters and their local hosts for, to him, by resisting the army they were waging jihad.

The sentiments of the government of the NWFP, headed by an acolyte of the Maulana, could be no different. Though policy decisions for South Waziristan, as for the rest of the tribal areas, are made by the federal government, the provincial government exercises enormous influence over the tribes and appoints the political officers who administer them. It is thus a dicey situation in which the national government is pitched against the armed men it considers mercenaries or terrorists and the provincial government provides succour to them as if they were holy warriors resisting the onslaught of infidels.

Regular battles in South Waziristan and occasional punitive expeditions in Balochistan are the chief but not the only cause of political instability and uncertainty that hangs in the air. An unending but needless debate on the president's military uniform is another.

The resolutions of the assemblies, statements by the ministers (now joined by the prime minister) and threats by the opposition indeed provide a lot of grist to the mills of the columnists and cartoonists but are bringing national politics and army both to disrepute. Says one columnist, it is not the president nor the people supporting or opposing him but George W Bush who will decide when Musharraf takes off his uniform.

The decision that President Musharraf will remain the army chief into 2005 and beyond seems to have already been made. Whether it is viewed as the need of the moment or the breaking of a pledge, it should now be formally announced leaving it to the dissenters to acquiesce in it or to challenge it in the court or on the streets. The time and energy of the cabinet and assemblies should find a better use.

People are left baffled by the government's ambivalent attitude towards the religious groups and the madressahs they run. Columnist Ayaz Amir is not alone in believing that whether it is the uniform of the president or reform of the madressahs the military and the maulvis will ultimately act in concert as they have in the past - in the elections, in the referendum and in amending the Constitution.

This impression - right or wrong - casts yet another shadow on the reality of "enlightened moderation". The president only reinforces it by alternately describing the madressahs as the bastions of militancy and then as the largest NGO that imparts knowledge and also provides free meals and lodging to a million youth. Ejazul Haq, the minister for religious affairs, all the time assures the madressah controllers of his help without interfering in their lessons and management. It leaves the moderates wondering what was then all the rumpus about and where is the money that Bush pledged to sanitize the seminaries.

If President Musharraf ever intended to curb fanaticism by reforming the madressahs and by promoting tolerance in dissent, the ministry of religious affairs would hinder, not help. After all, it has come through inheritance. That is why sectarianism continues to take its toll. The targeted killing of individuals has resumed once again. Professor Naqvi, a Shia, was shot dead in Quetta (as was his son a year ago) and a Sunni scholar, Ibrahim Salfi, was killed in Lahore.

In between went unreported and unlamented the murder of advocate Barkatullah Mangla, an Ahmadi, at Sargodha. Musharraf's efforts to check religious violence were doomed to fail because he sought political support from the very elements who perpetrate it. Those who could have helped him he drove against the wall or out of the country.

The president insists that the democratic institutions are in place and working, yet he must continue to command the army to nurture them to maturity. Truly speaking he knows that the institutions do not represent the will of the majority, hence without the prop of the army they will crumble.The cynicism bred by it all is striking down even life-long practitioners of the people's politics.

Sardar Ataullah Mangal of Balochistan would rather deal with the intelligence agencies than with the ministers of state or religion. Sardar Mumtaz Ali Bhutto of Sindh thinks the worry haunting the people is their next meal and not Musharraf's additional charge. When crime is rampant, the right to life comes before the right of the military, or of the clerics, to rule. The burden is thus shifted from the politicians to the planners to take care of the basic needs and safety of the people till the next elections - whenever fairly held.

Dalit-Muslim dialogue

The Gujarat carnage of 2002 once again showed that Dalits and other scheduled castes are widely used by the Sangh Parivar to carry out target killings of the Muslims. In several localities especially in Ahmedabad such as Kalupurand Darapur, Muslims and Dalits live side by side and whenever communal violence breaks out, they attack each other.

It is unfortunate that the strategists of Sangh Parivar are able to easily persuade the Dalits to attack the Muslims. However, it will be wrong to assume that all Dalits succumb to the Sangh Parivar's bully tactics. Dalit and Muslim leaders at the same time talk of Dalit-Muslim unity to counter the Sangh strategies. However, the ground realities are very different.

In all major communal riots it has been observed that the Dalits, especially the youth, participate in Hindu-Muslim riots on behalf of the Hindus. In north India, the Valmikis are invariably used against Muslims. In Maharashtra, of course, Mahars who follow Ambedkar's ideology, by and large, resist the Shiv Sena attempt to assume anti-Muslim posture.

However, in Mumbai riots of 1992-93 though followers of Ambedkar kept away from supporting the Shiv Sena engineered riots, the Dalits from Gujarat in Tardeo and other areas attacked Muslims. This clearly shows that ideology can play a major role. In Gujarat, the Dalits have repeatedly taken part in anti-Muslim violence. When anti-Dalit riots had taken place in Ahmedabad in 1981 on the question of reservation, Walji Patel, one of the Dalit leaders had told the Muslims that Dalits have now understood the Sangh game and they will not become a tool in their hands to kill Muslims.

However, in the 1985 riots in Ahmedabad, the Dalit youth were again used by the Sangh Parivar against the Muslims. When this writer questioned Waljibhai about how it happened despite his earlier commitmentit, he expressed his helplessness and said that the youth did not listen to them and that they were unable to influence them. This situation continued during the subsequent riots in Ahmedabad and in the 2002 Gujarat carnage Dalits were used in large numbers to attack the Muslims. Many of the Dalits said during investigations that the their youth were paid for the crimes and even provided liquor to drink before the attacks.

It was because of this disturbing happenings that the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism decided to organize Dalit-Muslim dialogue to find out as to why the Sangh Parivar every time succeeds in using the poorest of the poor to kill the poorest of the poor from among the Muslims. It was quite heartening to note that a large number of Dalit intellectuals and Muslims responded and attending the meeting. For some reasons, however, the Muslim presence was rather not very encouraging.

The organizers explained the purpose of the dialogue and also stressed the importance of Dalit-Muslim unity and discussed some of the possible causes of Dalit-Muslim hostility. One major cause, it was pointed out, is poverty, backwardness and large-scale unemployment among both the Dalits and the Muslims. Another cause is mutual rivalries. These rivalries get accentuated during the outbreak of communal violence.

Mr. Chanderbhai Meheria, a Dalit writer, said that such dialogues were highly desired to enhance understanding between the two communities. It was mainly the RSS and the BJP which have created serious misunderstandings between the two communities. He felt that the Muslims were somewhat better placed in economic and educational terms and they should take initiative for the education of the Dalits. Some Muslim communities in Gujarat like the Bohras, Khojas and Memons were quite well off and run many educational institutions and they could reserve some seats for Dalits there. It would have a very mollifying effect on relations between two communities.

The Dalits are too poor to have such institutions. But the problem is that some Muslim communities in India are too inward-looking and identity-conscious and do not even accommodate other Muslims in their institutions.

Mr. P.K.Valera, a retired bureaucrat, was of the view that the Muslims, like upper caste Hindus, have never accepted the Dalits. The Muslims have been rulers in India and do not consider them as their equals. He also felt that the Dalits did not feel secure while being among the Muslims. But unless the Muslims give them some job opportunities, the latter cannot be won over.

However, again much of this is based on misconception. Muslims themselves are split into different biradaris, if not castes. The social hierarchy very much exists among the Muslims too. Though it may not be as intense as it is among the Hindus, it nevertheless does exist among the Muslims. It may be true that upper caste or upper class Muslims may not accept Dalits, but the low caste poor Muslims have no such attitude.

And, by and large, the Muslims in India have accepted the idea of the Dalit-Muslim unity and it is gaining support even among upper class Muslims. Like upper caste Hindus, the Muslims would not treat Dalits as untouchables. But a few Muslims have means to offer jobs or educational opportunities to the Dalits. Most of the Muslims in India today, one cay say, are almost on par with the Dalits in termsof financial status, according to statistics available.At the Dalit-Muslim meeting, Mr. J.V. Momin, a Muslim leader, said it was strange that the Muslims in general were being considered as jihadis by the Hindus.

Even in the Congress there are people with RSS mentality. They treat the Muslims with hostility. Mr. Afzal Memon of Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust who did a lot of work during the riots for the re-habilitation of the Muslims agreed that many Muslims did not accept the Dalits. He felt that the Congress in Gujarat was also to be blamed for communal situation. He even felt that the Dalit elites who achieve high status also neglected the poor Dalit, and hardly did anything for them.

One of the speakers pointed out that in a way the Muslims were also Dalits. Both of them were equally suppressed. A section of the Dalits had converted to Islam because they were harassed by the upper caste Hindus. He felt that communal propaganda by the Sangh Parivar affects the Dalits too. The anti-Muslim propaganda among the Dalits by the Sangh Parivar was also designed to prevent Dalits from courting Islam. The Sangh wanted to keep the hostility alive between the Dalits and the Muslims for a variety of reasons.

The RSS was creating hostility between the Dalits and the Muslims on one hand, and between Muslims and other scheduled castes, on the other. All those who attacked Gulbarga society in which 40 Muslims were killed were OBCs and not Dalits. In fact, the OBCs (other backward caste) Hindus are far more hostile to Muslims. It is true that the OBC Hindus committed far more atrocities against Muslims than the Dalits. The RSS is systematically working among the both communities and is trying to give them a sense of being Hindu.

It was revealed at the meeting that the administration and judiciary both do injustice to Dalits and Muslims. The Dalits were warned, when they were handed over weapons by the upper caste Hindus to kill the Muslims that if they did not do so they (Dalits) will be the next target. Many Dalits killed Muslims out of fear for their own safety. Hence, there is need for joint committees and training of the youth to counter Hindu communalism.

In fact, the Dalits and Muslims remain divided since independence and several Muslims themselves fall in the category of Dalits. It is quite a complex situation and Dalit-Muslim unity is imperative to fight out communal forces. Another problem is that a few instances of demolition of temples are generalized by the Sangh Parivar in order to create Hindu-Muslim hostility and the instances of Hindu-Muslim cooperation are deliberately ignored. In Shivaji's army 35 per cent soldiers were Muslims but this has never been projected.

Raju Solanki, a young Dalit activist and a poet, pointed out that in 20 mohallas where Dalits and Muslims lived together, no Dalit is found there today. They migrated to other places as they felt insecure in those mohallahs. They feared attack by Muslims. The Dalit leadership, it must be admitted, failed to stop Dalit youth from going to RSS and VHP. It is Ambedkar's ideology alone which can forge unity between Dalits and Muslims and this unity is needed to stop communal violence.

In order to counter Sangh Parivar propaganda among Dalits it is necessary to constitute Dalit-Muslim Council on Gujarat state level to be followed by such councils in every district. There is great need to continue this dialogue to remove various misunderstandings from each other's mind. And, if possible, a resource centre needs to be established in Ahmedabad to provide research facilities on this sensitive question.

It is pity that the Dalit youth are getting attracted to the RSS-VHP ideology and it seems that older Dalit leadership has lost all its influence on the youth. They need to be made aware of Ambedkar's ideology. In Gujarat there is no Ambedkarite movement. The Shiv Sena failed to attract Mahars because of Ambedkar's influence and Gujarat needs such a movement. A decision was taken at the meeting to constitute a Dalit-Muslim Council and work for spreading the Ambedkar's ideology in Gujarat.

The writer is chairman of the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai.

A broken system

Every day editorial writers accuse the world or the United States of indifference to the suffering in Darfur. Television, after long averting its gaze, now rounds up desperate Darfurians to tell their stories.

Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have documented the horrors, exposed the lies and pushed the world to respond. Kofi Annan, Colin Powell, Jack Straw and other luminaries have visited Darfur to see for themselves and to urge the Sudanese government to behave.

Each month brings a congressional delegation - Frank Wolf, Sam Brownback, Bill Frist, Jon Corzine - and the returning lawmakers do what they can to generate action. Meanwhile in New York the U.N. Security Council meets regularly to wrangle over whether sanctions should be applied or the G-word used.

And what has all this strenuous activity achieved? It has helped persuade governments to feed the starving, but it has not improved the security of the people of Darfur. Indeed, the advocacy has stimulated government responses that have had the perverse effect of defusing the political pressure to stop the killings and return the refugees home.

When the flurry of interest was aroused four months ago, some 100,000 people were refugees in Chad and more than a million were displaced inside Darfur, unable to escape Sudan and confined to wretched camps. Today those numbers are thought to have increased to 200,000 and 1.5 million, respectively. The estimate of 30,000 dead has risen to 50,000. Villages in Darfur are still being attacked by Sudanese planes and Janjaweed forces, and women in camps who fetch firewood are still assaulted daily. The uprooted are destined to remain wards of the international community.

Why has the world, with all its outpourings and Security Council deliberations, failed to tackle the Darfur problem? The main answer is straightforward enough: Major and minor powers alike are committed only to stopping killing that harms their national interests. Why take political, financial and potential military risks when there is no strategic or domestic cost to remaining on the sidelines?

But why is there no such cost? First, because not enough people are dying. The estimated 50,000 deaths are far fewer than the predictions, which ranged from 300,000 to 500,000. Recent history has set the bar extremely high for concern in Africa.

In Congo, where an estimated 3 million people have died over the past six years, the media and US Congress have largely stayed home, and governments have gladly taken their cue of indifference. Although the previous civil war in Sudan took some 2 million lives, it was allowed to continue for almost 20 years. And in Rwanda of course, where about 800,000 were murdered, nothing was done.

Second, the delivery of humanitarian aid lets us off the hook. After an unpardonable delay, the world overcame Sudan's obstructionism to get food, medicine and plastic sheeting into Darfur. This has helped reduce the death toll, but it is a stopgap solution that keeps the media at bay and allows lawmakers and policymakers to do good deeds while avoiding the political problem at the heart of Darfur's destruction: Khartoum's sins and, to a lesser degree, a rebel movement emboldened by the belief that the United States is on its side.

Now that we can all point to tens of millions of dollars in food aid, and can thankfully keep a million people alive indefinitely, the crisis has come to seem far less pressing.

Third, the existence of the U.N. Security Council hides the crux of the problem: Countries do not want to do what is necessary to prevent large-scale loss of life in messy, complex Africa. Crises such as Darfur require urgent action, and states are well aware that the Security Council cannot act urgently.-Dawn/Washington Post Service

Morton Abramowitz is a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Samantha Power, a writer, recently travelled to Darfur.