New PM, new challenges

One heard the day after polling in the two bye-elections, in Attock and Tharparkar in which the current finance minister and future prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, was a candidate, that all the florists and sweet-meat sellers in Islamabad were sold out on account of the rush of those wanting to congratulate him. He is assured of a solid majority in both houses.

Given the fact how difficult a country Pakistan has been to govern, patriotic Pakistanis would wish him to succeed and also entertain high hopes, considering his successes as a finance minister for nearly five years.

Pakistanis have become somewhat cynical about the evolution of the political system in the country that has witnessed interruptions in the democratic dispensation, caused by long interludes of military rule.

Since 1999, we are experiencing the third such interlude (if we treat the Ayub Khan-Yahya Khan period as one), and the current chief is facing perhaps a greater combination of challenges than any of his predecessors. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the US, the Islamic world, notably countries close to Pakistan, are being targeted.

More seriously, we are witnessing a homegrown variant of terrorism that is obstructing the implementation of vital economic programmes to rescue the country from poverty.

Mr. Shaukat Aziz will have to employ all his abilities and energies, together with a good measure of luck, to make a success of the task being entrusted to him. He will have to function as the executive head of a government that is effectively controlled by the armed forces headed by the president.

The events of the past few months, including the removal of Prime Minister Jamali, and the arrangements made for the succession, leave to doubt as to who is incharge.

Mr. Shaukat Aziz is not only seen as an ally of the president but also as a favourite of the US leadership, on account of his long association with one of America's leading banks.

Many would describe him as America's man. Some opposition politicians even accuse him of having an American passport. He has quashed that accusation by solemnly stating that he never even applied to change his nationality.

Instead of regarding his long association with US business circles as an asset, many see it as a liability, and political opponents keep describing him not as a Pakistani patriot, but as a person who might subordinate national interests to US dictates.

One can expect him to make a public declaration, after being sworn in, affirming his loyalty to the nation, and to the ideals of the founding fathers. He will be required to address a host of problems that constitute a daunting list. The basic tasks that have preoccupied him will remain. These are the primary concerns of all developing countries.

These essentially cover the whole gamut of challenges relating to economic development, including modernization of agriculture, water and energy, mobilizing resources for social action programmes, notably education and health.

It has become customary to cover this huge range of tasks under the rubric of "poverty alleviation" that is turning into a global campaign, as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened.

In the first five years Mr Shaukat Aziz has only laid the foundation of a vibrant economy at the macro-level, with a remarkable improvement in such indicators as foreign exchange reserves, external debt, exports and inflation.

Now he faces the more difficult task of ensuring that the benefits of the growth rate reach the common man and that problems of poverty and unemployment are tackled more effectively.

Considering that the BJP government in India lost the national elections earlier this year, because the fruits of prosperity did not reach the rural poor, Mr. Shaukat Aziz will have to do better. He has the additional problem of disaffection in the smaller provinces, all of which have grievances against what they consider to be Punjabi-dominated government in Islamabad.

The new prime minister faces his biggest challenge in how to convince the smaller provinces that if they are lagging behind, it is at least partly due to poor management and standards of integrity.

The real solution is to enlarge the size of the cake that is to be divided within a country that is still poor and backward. Foreign investment as well as cash flows from bilateral and multilateral donors has to be attracted. It is being realized that the desperation that drives various groups to terrorism is caused by political and economic injustice.

The UN, as well as the major powers (the sole superpower, above all) must realize that denial of justice whether political (as in Palestine and Kashmir) or economic (growing poverty in the developing countries) is the root cause of terrorism and instability.

Mr. Shaukat Aziz, who will probably remain in charge of economic policies, will have to use his additional clout as prime minister to create the internal coordination and external backing to accelerate the rate of growth in the country.

All indications are that the responsibility for foreign policy, security and defence will be retained by the president. He will count on the parliament to endorse and back up his policies, on which he will maintain consultation with both the elected representatives and the technocrats.

The support of the elected representatives will be managed, in the near future at least, by Ch Shujaat Husain, the interim Prime minister, who will retain the chairmanship of the ruling Muslim League, even after Mr. Shaukat Aziz takes over as prime minister. Given the complicated internal workings of the existing political set-up, he has established his credentials as the maker and shaker of political coalitions.

We are likely to see the country run by a troika, consisting of President Pervez Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, and Muslim League president Ch. Shujaat Hussain. Mr Shaukat Aziz will have the basic responsibility not only for the economy but also for assuaging provincial discontents that have assumed alarming proportions.

As veteran Pashtun leader Wali Khan put it, we are encountering the kind of provincial unease in the smaller provinces that is reminiscent of the extreme frustration in erstwhile East Pakistan prior to the tragedy of 1971.

Whether it is in apportionment of finances or river waters, the political leaders in the smaller provinces are using it fuel separatism. Mr Shaukat Aziz will have to give priority to both actions and public relations to overcome this lurking menace to national unity and cohesion.

Another challenge will be to maintain a cordial working relationship with the president, in our variant of democracy that is being increasingly described as presidential.

One hopes that the five years of teamwork have established the degree of mutual trust and confidence to ensure that Pakistan can marshal its energies and resources for real progress the benefits of which reach the masses. The president's major concerns are security-oriented, and those of Mr. Shaukat Aziz will be progress and development.

All patriotic Pakistanis will hope and pray that the new prime minister will prove equal to the challenges. His prospects for success will increase to the extent he remains focused on the national agenda, for which he is uniquely qualified.

With the president tackling security issues and Ch Shujaat taking some of the political front, one hopes the banker turned national leader will prove equal to the formidable challenges that confront him.

Listening to 'voice of the people'

"The Constitution of the country would be adhered to. There will be no amendment or modification in the Constitution, but I would like to listen to the voice of the people." This was President General Musharraf's answer to a question on the issue of his uniform during PTV's Rubaru programme telecast on August 16.

How do you listen to the voice of the people in the presence of an elected parliament? Of course, by listening to the voice of the parliamentarians who have been elected for this very purpose by the people at large - to voice their desires, aspirations and wishes and make laws and policies to achieve them.

And this voice, according to the interpretation of the MMA, had made it loud and clear on December 29, 2003 when the 17th Amendment was passed by the parliament laying down that Gen Musharraf will have to give up his uniform by December 31, 2004.

But this interpretation of the MMA was immediately challenged. And in a recent interview, President Musharraf had implied that the 17th Amendment did not bind him to take off his uniform by the due date.

According to Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan of the PPP, even if it is binding on him, the president can get the relevant clause out of the way by a simple parliamentary majority. So, before the due date, he could convene a special session in which nearly 200 of the 342-member house would stand up and demand with one voice the deletion of the relevant constitutional clause.

But then if the president is convinced that the 17th Amendment does not stop him from continuing to wear his uniform even after the due date, then perhaps he would simply ignore interpretations to the contrary and dare those who do not agree with his interpretation to go to court to seek a legal verdict on the issue.

Alternatively, he can go directly to the people "to listen to their voice" through a referendum. But referendums are potentially risky and certainly very messy, always. So he is most likely to go by Mr Aitzaz Ahsan's interpretation of the 17th Amendment and 'listen to the voice of the people' through his nearly 200 supporters in the National Assembly.

But why should he need the uniform even after having set up a ruling party of his choice, put in place a parliament of his liking, got elected a chief executive with what he thinks to be the right qualifications for the job, had the Constitution amended to enhance the powers of the president and finally established the NSC, an institution which he believes would pre-empt future military take-overs for all times to come?

It is a very difficult question. Perhaps even President Musharraf would have more than one answer to this question. But the most obvious appears to be that he still has more confidence in his uniform than the democratic institutions he has set up to deliver what he thinks is needed to be done in the national interest.

Like presidents Ayub, Yahya, and Zia, Gen Musharraf also appears to have convinced himself that since he is acting in 'the supreme national interest' and has kept, according to his own light, service to the nation above self and knows what is best for the nation, he has become indispensable.

And in this he seems to have forgotten that if he continues to sit in the 13-member NSC with his five votes (two of his own, that of the president and the COAS, and the remaining three of the chairman, joint chiefs of staff, and the naval and the air force chiefs), the very institution which he has set up to introduce what he calls checks and balances to protect the system from being hijacked by any power-hungry, ambitious individual, would be rendered impotent and he would become almost omnipotent, accountable to nobody.

Ayub too had acquired such omnipotence in his own eyes, making his 'subjects' to ask in uneasy whispers: "What after Ayub?". And sure enough, after Ayub came the deluge - a military take over without any justifiable reason, an abject surrender to the Indian army, break-up of the country, Zia's coup without rhyme or reason (according to those very people who were agitating against Mr Bhutto until July 4, 1977), the subsequent seepage of culture of corruption in high places and that of drugs and Kalashnikov among the have-nots, the rise of religious extremism, one more military takeover, again without justification, and now the current wave of terrorism.

The six per cent annual average growths rates which President Musharraf never fails to mention to justify the military takeovers of Ayub and Zia were nothing but a mirage.

During both periods, the high growth rates actually reflected generous US aid - as is the case today. Most of the development that took place in East Pakistan was initiated before Ayub Khan; even projects like the Karnaphuli paper mills and major jute mills were set up there long before the advent of Ayub Khan.

During his days, the Bengalis were gripped by an overwhelming sense of deprivation which was the major cause of the civil war of 1971 and which led to the war with India and an ignominious defeat in the battleground.

The Zia era's high growth fiction was less painful but still very bitter for the poor of this country as during this period the rich became richer and the poor poorer, notwithstanding the positive statistics which were obtained by dividing on paper the total income among the total population with no mention of how this income was distributed between the rich and the poor.

And when Zia died in August 1988, the then caretaker finance minister, the late Mahbubul Haq had to rush to the IMF for a paltry dole to pay the overdue bills of the Zia regime.

Indeed, the so-called Zia 'khazana' was totally empty when Benazir Bhutto's first elected government came to power. So, the question of the elected governments of the 1990s emptying the treasury which the present government is supposed to have filled does not even arise at all as it was already empty in August 1988.

Where had all the Afghan war related bonanza, estimated conservatively to be at least about $50 billion disappeared? Of course, in the pockets of most of the then rulers because when Zia died there was nothing on the ground to show what had happened to all these resources.

And then the chest had remained almost empty throughout the 1990s since all aid, including that of the multilateral donors, had stopped after the US had invoked the Pressler amendment in September 1990.

Indeed, during the 1990s, Pakistan was perhaps the most sanctioned country in the world. The aid has now started flowing in again. It is almost in a state of flood since 9/11.

But as witnessed in the past, such aid never lasts far long and the governments led by military generals tend to misuse such aid to widen the income gap in the name of development.

And the political culture military rulers have introduced in the country during their long periods in power have only produced either civilian dictators or complete turncoats who jump ship at the very first sign of trouble.

Z.A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif who learnt their politics in the laps of Ayub and Zia, respectively, notwithstanding their many positive qualities were out and out authoritarians and most of the Muslim Leaguers who were born in the times of the military dictatorship are endowed with very strong traits of fickle loyalties. They totally lack any ideological moorings, essential to lead and make nations.

Gen Musharraf needs to keep these aspects of our history in mind while charting out his future course of action. If the institution of the army has not learnt its lessons, nothing can stop the next general from making his own bid for power at the first opportunity. But if it had learnt its lessons, no general would dare take over the reins of the country again no matter what the temptation.

On the other hand, in the immediate run, the president has nothing to fear from the MMA or the PPP. The MMA in their own political interest and to safeguard their government in the NWFP would not try to upset Gen Musharraf's applecart.

And the PPP will be left with nothing to oppose President Musharraf after he takes off his uniform and transfers power to a civilian, even if it is a transfer from a uniformed Musharraf to a civilian Musharraf. And Shaukat Aziz would be able to sell a civilian Pakistan better to foreign investors than the one headed by a military dictator.

A polarized America

Thinking of the 2004 election as a matter of the old red states and blue states is a big mistake, and so is looking at the United States that at way. Because the 2000 election was so close, the idea of an America deeply divided by region seemed entirely natural.

Americans certainly are polarized politically. There are Americans who love George W. Bush and Americans who despise him. However this year's voting turns out, something close to half of us will be furious if not seditious come the morning after Election Day.

What's misleading is to assume that the dividing lines etched on the map of the United States in 2000 are permanent facts of American life. The states that the television networks coloured red for Bush are not destined to be Republican bastions any more than the states coloured blue for Al Gore are permanent Democratic strongholds.

That is especially true here in the Southwest and the rest of the Rocky Mountain region. New Mexico voted for Gore by a whisker, and Bush hasn't given up on the state this year.

Arizona went for Bush in 2000 but for Bill Clinton in 1996. At a rally near here last week, the state's Democratic governor, Janet Napolitano, vowed: "We're going to turn Arizona blue."

Napolitano's victory two years ago is one indication of why stereotyping states is foolish. Arizona was once viewed as a right-wing bastion, but the state's population is now a quarter Hispanic, and migrants from the rest of the country are making it very diverse.

The same is true in Colorado and Nevada, where both parties are advertising heavily. The campaigns understand the danger of assuming that the past dictates the future. Colorado is neither a red nor a blue state. Some parts are very blue - progressive Boulder, for example - and others, such as the Colorado Springs area, are quite red.

Colorado goes through phases. It was pretty conservative and Republican in the 1960s. But a progressive and Democratic insurgency emerged in the 1970s when environmentalism and the battle to slow growth produced politicians such as Gary Hart, Richard Lamm and Pat Schroeder.

"What these guys don't understand," a moderate Colorado Republican told me many years ago, speaking of his own party, "is that once people move here, they don't want a whole lot more development, they don't want the state to change."

Despite these Democratic victories at the state level, Colorado voters remained largely loyal to Republican presidential candidates (though Clinton carried the state in 1992).

The state's conservatism deepened in the '80s and '90s because new migrants tended to come from conservative parts of the country. Now it's evolving one more time, in part because of the Latino influence.

Nevada's politics are, if anything, even more subject to the whims of migration because so many people keep moving in. Clinton won beat Bob Dole by a single percentage point in 1996. If you are willing to put down a large bet on Nevada one way or the other, you probably like playing the slots.

What's true of the once-upon-a-time red Rockies is also true of a number of the blue states. Bush keeps visiting Pennsylvania even though the state has voted Democratic three times in a row.

There is enough Republican territory between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh to give the president a fighting chance. Similarly, states generally thought of as Democratic and rather liberal - Oregon, Minnesota and Iowa, for example - gave Al Gore very narrow margins in 2000. No wonder both Bush and Kerry are fighting hard to win them.

Okay, there are really red and really blue states. It's highly doubtful that Texas, Idaho, Utah, Mississippi, South Dakota or South Carolina will vote Democratic this year.

But you may be as surprised as I was to discover that Clinton lost Mississippi by only five percentage points in 1996, South Dakota by only three and South Carolina by just six.

We Americans revere our regional differences. As a Massachusetts guy by origin, I know my state will never vote for Bush, just as most Texans firmly believe the opposite of their state.

But the truth we avoid is that we are, if you'll forgive the phrase, a much more national nation than we like to admit. We move around a lot, we mix up the demographics of every state, we welcome immigrants. Despite ourselves, we will ultimately save our country from being divided too deeply between the red and the blue. -Dawn/ Washington Post Service

New American Raj

The recent announcement that 70,000 US troops would be withdrawn from Germany and South Korea in coming years is an event of major geopolitical importance. However, far from reducing the 257,000 US troops overseas in over 100 foreign bases, the Bush administration intends to intensify global military operations even though the undermanned, over-committed US armed forces are stretched to the breaking point.

The largest withdrawals will be from Germany. Two heavy divisions, the 1st Armoured and 1st Mechanized with 100,000 staff and civilians, will be repatriated to the US. The sharp decline of Russia's armed forces has removed any rational for maintaining the armour-heavy US divisions stationed in Germany since 1945.

This move makes military sense and is long overdue. The heavy divisions will be replace by a mobile, 3,500-man brigade and some new air units. America's smartest, most outspoken foreign policy thinker, former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, bluntly describes the US-Europe postwar relationship as a 'hegemon and its vassals,' with Nato as the principal instrument through which the US controls Western Europe. The US exercises similar control of Japan, "an American protectorate," in his words, through the US-Japanese Security Treaty.

American military power underpins both vital strategic relationships. Removal of US forces from Germany, with the inevitable reduction of power, and even the raison d'etre, of Nato, will mean declining US political influence over Europe.

This, in turn, will allow a united Europe to develop into a full-scale partner, or even eventual rival, of the United States - a most welcome geopolitical development in our unipolar, geopolitically unbalanced world. One wonders if the Bush administration's limited thinkers understand this vitally important point.

The planned withdrawal of 12,500 of the 37,500 US troops in South Korea (3,500 will go to Iraq), is also logical, though the announcement's timing is poor. The reduction of 20,000 Marines in Okinawa, a major irritant to Japanese public opinion, is also a wise move.

South Korea's powerful armed forces are well able to hold off North Korea's larger but obsolescent military. The US 2nd Division's deployment in static defences along the demilitarize zone makes it - as this writer has seen first hand - vulnerable and hostage to North Korea's massive artillery.

Pulling it back south of Seoul make good military sense, as does thinning US troops in the south. But not when the US and its allies are locked in vitally important nuclear negotiations with a hostile North Korea.

The 150,000 US troops currently stuck in the stalemated Iraq and Afghanistan wars - half of all US manoeuvre ground forces - appear fated to remain indefinitely.

Meanwhile, the US will open new bases in Bulgaria and Romania as part of America's new "imperial lifeline." They will link to new US bases being built across Central Asia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Gulf designed to cement Washington's hold on the Muslim world and its natural resources.

As a result, the entire US armed forces are being restructured for "expeditionary warfare," (the British used to call it, "the imperial mission".) This process began a decade ago, but accelerated under the Bush administration, which has relentlessly militarized foreign policy.

Army heavy tanks and artillery are being replaced by light, Canadian-made wheeled armoured vehicles. Troops are being trained in counter-insurgency operations and urban warfare. A "lilly-pad" concept of austere, rapidly created mini-bases will allow US forces to leapfrog around the globe.

The navy is developing "littoral warfare" ships for coastal operations that can project fire and troops deep inland. Fleets of prepositioned supply ships deployed around the globe will keep entire brigades in the field for months.

The US Air Force - the modern version of Britain's invincible Grand Fleet - has developed "bare base" operations allowing it to deploy "strike packages" of attack, bomber and recon aircraft across the globe on short notice that can deliver devastating firepower. New cargo transports are being built. Constellations of spy satellites, listening devices, and swarms of drones give Washington's eyes and ears everywhere.

These dramatic new deployments signal further expansion of military operations around the globe as America comes ever closer to resembling its forbearer, the British Empire.

Most Americans, however, remain unaware of both their government's new imperial plans to rule oil and the Muslim world, and of the unexpected conflicts that lie in wait for America's increasingly far-flung expeditionary forces. -Copyright

Why US intelligence has weakened

President George W. Bush has proposed a new post of national intelligence director. Not part of the Cabinet or located in the White House, the director would be charged with "coordinating" the intelligence budget and "working with" various intelligence agencies to set priorities.

Sen. John Kerry has supported a more activist role for an intelligence director recommended by the 9/11 commission. Both houses of Congress are holding hearings to expedite legislation to be voted on before it recesses in early October.

The sense of urgency for action in the middle of a presidential campaign is being justified on the grounds that the country is in imminent danger; the implication is that the existing intelligence system is not capable of dealing with the immediate threats.

This argument cuts both ways. Reorganization will bring with it months - and if drastic, years - of adjustment throughout the executive branch, and the more sweeping the change, the more this will be true.

Whatever happens, the short-term threats must be dealt with via the improvements of the existing structure, which were instituted after 9/11. As for longer-range threats, care must be taken lest a hasty transition to a new system generate unnecessary vulnerabilities. Thoughtfulness is more important than speed.

Terrorism, forthrightly described by the 9/11 commission as an attack from radical fundamentalist Islam, is spearheaded by technically private groups basing themselves on the territory of sovereign states and impelled by a fanaticism transcending traditional political loyalties.

Adapting the intelligence system to these new realities must start with an understanding of the problems requiring solution.

The current emphasis is on centralization; the principal disagreements concern the locus and authority of the proposed director of intelligence - whether he should have budgetary authority, be free standing or located in the executive office of the president.

The basic premise seems to be that the cause of most intelligence failures is inadequate collection and coordination. In my observation, the breakdown usually occurs in the assessment stage.

The four major intelligence failures of the past three decades illustrate the point: (1) the 1973 Middle East war, which caught both the United States and Israel by surprise; (2) the Indian nuclear test of 1998, which opened a new era of proliferation threats; (3) 9/11; and (4) the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

In each of these intelligence failures - except possibly 9/11 - the facts were at hand. The difficulties arose in interpreting what they meant. Even 9/11 was ascribed by the commission to a failure of imagination in connecting the dots of available knowledge.

Prior to the 1973 Middle East war, the United States and Israeli governments were aware of every detail of the Egyptian and Syrian buildup. What they misjudged was its purpose.

Nobody believed that the Arab armies would actually attack because every analyst at every level was convinced that they were certain to be defeated. Every event, no matter how ominous, was interpreted as confirming that premise. Even when the Soviet Union withdrew dependents from Syria and Egypt 48 hours before hostilities started, it was viewed as caused by Soviet-Arab tensions.

Similarly, with respect to the Indian nuclear test, public evidence was ignored because the intelligence community did not believe India was capable of concealing an actual test.

On the WMD issue - as the British Butler report on intelligence demonstrates - the assessment process broke down when the analysts jumped from incontrovertible evidence - a decade of Saddam's violations of the 1991 ceasefire agreement; building of, at a minimum, dual-purpose plants for chemical and biological agents; efforts to acquire nuclear material; elaborate measures of deception and hiding the programme - to the assumption that the demonstrated capacity to produce had been translated into stockpiles of weapons. (As early as 1998, President Bill Clinton, in an address explaining the bombing of Iraq, gave specific quantities for chemical and biological stockpiles.)

That assessment went one step too far. But what we know now would not necessarily have changed the calculus for pre-emption. Could the United States wait until weapons were actually produced by a country with the largest army in the region, the second largest potential oil income, a record of having used these weapons against its own population and neighbours, and - according to the 9/11 commission - intelligence contact with Al Qaeda?

The answer requires a primarily geopolitical, not an intelligence, judgment. This is why, in reorganizing the intelligence structure, care must be taken to keep the assessment process distinct from geopolitical and strategic advocacy.

Intelligence is most reliable about events that have happened or are about to happen. It grows less definitive about the future vision. Intelligence should be judged by its ability to collect information, to interpret it, to keep assumptions from determining conclusions and to understand underlying trends.

It is a fine line, but crucial, for effective policymaking. Most major strategic decisions involve judgments about consequences. Intelligence should supply the facts relevant to decision; the direction of policy and the ultimate choices depend on many additional factors and must be made by political leaders.

A national intelligence director in the executive office of the president would erode this distinction, give intelligence disproportionate influence in policymaking and skew intelligence away from analysis.

Similarly, the merging of foreign and domestic intelligence under a single official unchecked by any institution in the executive branch short of the chief executive gives cause for concern. This is not how most democracies handle the challenge.

Until recently, the policy was to raise a wall between the foreign and domestic intelligence services to prevent the emergence of a single, dominant, unchecked intelligence service.

Sept 11 showed that this effort had gone too far and impeded the coordination of evidence on terrorism. But it does not follow that eliminating the distinctions altogether is the best solution.

Reorganization needs to improve the quality of intelligence at least as much as its collection. Policy stands and falls on the ability to distil trends from information.

Does a free standing director of national intelligence, charged with coordinating (in the president's proposal) or running the entire intelligence community (as in the 9/11 report) solve this challenge? Or does an excessively centralized system magnify the inherent danger of intellectual conformity on which all reports agree? What structure is most likely to achieve a sense for the intangible?

In practice, most of the proposed reorganization schemes abolish the provision of the National Security Act of 1947 that makes the head of the CIA also the director of foreign intelligence for the entire government.

The CIA chief has not been able to implement his theoretical powers because of the insistence of other agencies or departments - especially the Pentagon - on autonomy for their share of the intelligence process.

Other alternatives deserve consideration. For example, the coordinating and budgetary roles over foreign intelligence of the CIA director could be enhanced and symbolized by changing the title to national intelligence director.

The coordination between domestic and foreign intelligence activities could be achieved by institutions like the national counter-terrorism centre proposed by the 9/11 commission and by a presidential assistant for national intelligence, charged in addition with making certain that significant competing intelligence assessments reach the president.

There is no shortage of schemes of reorganization: the 9/11 commission; the Senate report; the Scowcroft commission; the Hamre proposal to centralize collection but leave the analytical functions in existing institutions.

What is needed urgently is a pause for reflection to distil the various proposals into a coherent concept. A small group of men and women with high-level experience in government could be assigned this task with a short deadline, say six months, based on the following principles:

- Centralization must be balanced against diversity;

- Foreign and domestic intelligence should not be merged but coordinated by task forces depending on the subject;

- Special provisions must be made for the systematic enhancement of quality; it cannot be left to moving around boxes on an organizational chart.

The investigation of the 1980s, triggered by the Iran-Contra debacle, emphasized allegations of abuse of power, as did another purge in the 1990s. Inevitably, between the terms of directors William Colby through John Deutsch, the emphasis was to reduce the reliance on agents and to emphasize technical means of collection less subject to the allegations (and sometimes) the reality of abuse.

This was a major contributing factor to the shortfall in human intelligence regarding the terrorist threat remarked on by all commissions dealing with recent intelligence failures.

For all these reasons, intelligence reorganization needs to bring as well some stability for intelligence personnel. Their thousands of dedicated men and women participated, at the request of their government, in some of the most important battles of the cold war and are even now at the front lines of the war with radical, ideological Islam.

Their failures must be corrected. But they deserve recognition for their service even as the structures in which they function are being revised. -Dawn/Tribune Media Services