Time for policy shifts

The brazen guerilla-style attack on the Karachi Corps Commander's motorcade represents a major escalation of violence against the state. The attack is more serious than the ones on General Musharraf, given that General Hayat does not hold any political position, and can be construed as the first direct assault on the Pakistan army.

Fortunately, all attempts have been abortive in their primary objective. Tragically though, a number of innocent lives - military and civilian - have been lost collaterally.

A disturbing aspect of the attack on General Musharraf is the involvement of members of the defence forces themselves. Any such involvement in the latest attack is too early to fathom.

Either way, serious questions arise. Do the attacks represent a dangerous polarization within the defence forces? And is the domestic and foreign relations political framework the military leadership has crafted beginning to fall apart?

The military leadership is not oblivious of the challenges it and the country is facing domestically and internationally. Some serious thinking has been underway, as is evident from the recent enunciation of the concept of 'enlightened moderation' by General Musharraf.

He has outlined a two-pronged approach, one originating within Muslim societies and the other in the West. The concept, however, needs to be elaborated and the concrete steps identified, particularly with respect to the Muslim prong. The western prong is relatively straightforward.

The West enjoys an overwhelming superiority in cultural, economic and military fields. Given that altruism has never been and will never be a part of the equation of the political balance of power, the West cannot be expected to treat Muslim countries any differently from what it does at present.

This is more so the case when almost all Muslim countries are ruled by pliant monarchial or military dictatorships, open to manipulation by even western corporate interests, let alone governments.

The West can, of course, display the same enlightened self-interest that it did post-1917, when it created egalitarian social orders across the western world in order to ward off the communist threat from Moscow.

But that is a measure of the effective threat it feels it is facing from Muslim countries. To date, it has not felt much of a threat, since it has been able to "buy off" the elite in these countries.

Almost all Muslim countries are unequal, unjust societies and the monarchial-military dictatorships therein represent the self-serving interests of the feudal, tribal, religious, business, bureaucratic, and military elite. These regimes are generally at war with their own people and cannot survive without props from the West.

As such, the anger of the Muslim people - the fuel for militancy and extremism - is directed as much at their own ruling class as at the West. Ironically, the traditional religious elite that is attempting to harness this anger has itself been aligned with the West.

Known as the 'B team' of military regimes in Pakistan, their most serious challenge to western interests in the region has been limited to thunderous rhetoric.

It was not amusing to see convent school children trying to picket US fast food restaurants and upper class religious families - evident from their appearance and dress - trying to break the picket lines.

Ironically, it is the elite in Muslim countries that has now emerged as the internal impediment to the social, cultural, economic and political growth of their own societies. General Musharraf is thus correct when he states that it is in the Muslim prong that main actions are called for.

General Musharraf's personal credentials in propounding the cause of enlightened moderation can be accepted at face value. However, the military order that he heads does have a credibility problem.

Essentially, it is the same military that organized, financed, trained and nurtured the different bands of terrorist organizations through the last quarter of the last century - albeit, with full political, financial, military and even logistics support from the United States.

A whole generation of Islamist fundamentalist militants has been created and they span society at large, as well as the military and its intelligence agencies. Thousands among them consider committing murder and shedding blood in the name of religion a pious act and some among them are actually prepared to act on their beliefs.

It will, thus, take more than an appeal to moderation to restore society to the norms of enlightenment and tolerance that Islam professes. The elements that give rise to militancy and extremism will have to be countered with sincerity and conviction. The cleaning of the proverbial Augean stables will have to begin from deep within the power structures that gave birth to these menaces.

That the political frame of reference for national political discourse continues to be dictated by Islamist fundamentalist quarters is evident at every turn. General Musharraf began by trying to portray himself in the image of the liberal reformer, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey.

Within weeks, fundamentalist disapproval had forced him to backtrack and all officially inspired references to Ataturk or Turkey ceased. Subsequently, the Musharraf regime attempted to change the procedure for registration of FIRs under the Blasphemy Act.

This too had to be abandoned under fundamentalist pressure. More recently, the federal education minister admitted on the electronic media that Pakistan's history textbooks were distorted and were in the process of being reformed. Fundamentalist uproar has since forced her to make a U-turn on the subject of school syllabi.

It is thus not surprising that, despite liberal pretensions, the Musharraf regime has to date failed to reverse any of the retrogressive legislation introduced by the Ziaul Haq regime in the 1980's.

This contradiction has deep roots. Post-1977, there emerged a tripartite military-Islamist-US alliance. Bereft of constitutional and political legitimacy, General Ziaul Haq harnessed the most retrogressive elements in society for propping up his regime.

This alliance was convenient to the US, which used the same elements to mobilize resistance to the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the US abandoned its Islamist allies and, in fact, turned against them.

This was reflected by the redesignation of their loyalists in Afghanistan from "mujahideen" to "terrorists"! The domestic impact for Pakistan was the creation of a whole edifice of a military-Islamist dominated governance structure in the country.

The Islamists infiltrated and gained control of all aspects of society, from the military to education to the media. The rupturing of the tripartite alliance and its convenient complementarity of interests has caught the Pakistan military leadership in a bind.

On the one hand, it has developed a half century-long structural relationship with the US military, which it can jettison at its own peril. On the other hand, it has developed a quarter century-long integral relationship with the religious fundamentalist elements, without the support of which its political edifice cannot survive.

The military leadership has responded by adopting a policy of "strategic contradiction", whereby it is trying to perform two contradictory acts: maintain its bridges with the two conflicting elements of the erstwhile tripartite alliance, now locked in a mortal combat with each other.

The military leadership is trying to perform this balancing act by, on the one hand, waging an active war on terror against the religious extremists and, on the other, by forming political alliances with the supposedly moderate religious political parties.

As part of this policy, the military leadership has extended full cooperation to US intelligence agencies operating in Pakistan. It has also launched military operations, as in Waziristan.

Simultaneously, it has been operating on the domestic political front in strategic alliance with the MMA, with a view to keeping the liberal parties, particularly the PPP and the Nawaz Sharif faction of the Muslim League, out of the political arena.

Unfortunately, the military leadership does not and cannot have the luxury of living with this contradiction. It cannot hunt with the hounds and run with the hares.

The policy of 'strategic contradiction' is inherently unsustainable. After all, the religious political parties and the extremists drink from the same ideological well.

It is profoundly meaningful that three senior Al Qaeda leaders, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, were arrested in Rawalpindi and Karachi from the residences of senior Jamaat-i-Islami office-bearers.

The attacks on Generals Musharraf and Hayat are the bitter fruit that the military leadership has to contend with for its policy of "strategic contradiction".

If the military leadership is earnest about establishing a social order based on enlightened moderation, it will have to initiate a series of fundamental policy shifts. It will have to end its alliance with both, the religious fundamentalists as well as the US.

This, of course, does not mean that it has to oppose either of the parties. The former are part of society, albeit in a minority. Their views have to be respected as well and allowed due space in the political arena in accordance with the wishes of the electorate.

However, the privileged leverage that has been provided to them, particularly over the last quarter century, must certainly end. The US is the world superpower and it will not be prudent to challenge its interests. Of course, it is not at all necessary to adopt a position of abject servility, as has been the case to date, particularly under military regimes.

The military leadership will also have to allow free play to democracy and, to this end, it will have to begin by withdrawing all politically motivated cases against all the leaders currently in voluntary or forced exile.

It will also have to completely cease all interference in political affairs, particularly in terms of creating and supporting surrogate political parties and subverting political parties that it deems undesirable to its interests. It will have to review its own interests, particularly its corporate interests.

It is not appropriate for military officers, dedicated to the lofty objective of the defence and territorial integrity of the country, to act the roles of industrial managers, bankers, real estate developers, construction contractors, highway toll tax collectors, or water tanker supervisors. When Rashid Minhas, Tufail Abbasi and Aziz Bhatti enrolled in the defence forces, they were fired with the zeal of defending their country.

When they embraced shahadat, they did not do so to enable their surviving and succeeding officers to man corporate offices and tend corporate bank balances.

Why split up the Punjab police?

About a month ago, a news report stated that the Punjab police were in the process of seeking the provincial government's permission to create three police regions in the province each to be headed by an Additional Inspector-General of Police.

On the face of things the rationale for such a proposal being floated at this point in time is just another step towards 'the full implementation' of the Police Order 2002 in pursuance of decisions taken at the highest levels.

The same report goes on to clarify that Punjab had hitherto confined itself to the implementation of the Police Order 2002 only to the extent of giving the status of ex-officio secretary to government to the IGP.

As a consequence, the IGP Punjab now enjoys full administrative and financial powers as any other provincial secretary in respect of the department he is in charge of i.e. the police department in the Punjab.

The report goes on to elaborate that this basic change made it possible for the introduction of the Lahore Capital City Police, the creation of a City Police, the creation of district safety commissions in each district and the separation of investigation from the general law and order functions of police in Lahore.

According to the report it is understood that a committee has been constituted under the law minister of Punjab. It will ensure what is described as the full implementation of the law (i.e. Police Order 2002) by this coming October in the light of decisions taken by the highest authorities for allowing provincial governments and zila nazims control over the police by withdrawing the provincial safety commissions.

From the proposal it appears that the Police Order 2002 is a fairly flexible and rather easy-to-amend document even though it claims to be enjoying a sacrosanct statutory position.

It also appears to be well within the purview of the provincial jurisdiction in that provincial governments have from time to time been amending and adjusting its provisions to suit the exigencies that have arisen from the malfunctioning of a half-baked devolution system that was introduced some two years ago.

But in short it is and it remains a provincial law for all practical purposes because it deals primarily with the provincial subject of law and order which is entirely dependent for its implementation on provincial finances.

The aforesaid scheme goes on to elaborate the three police regions to be created: 1) the southern region which would comprise districts of the defunct Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Bahawalpur Divisions with headquarters in Multan, 2) the northern region which would comprise the districts of the defunct Rawalpindi and Sargodha divisions with its headquarters in Rawalpindi, and 3) the central region would comprise the districts of the defunct Faisalabad, Sheikhupura and Gujranwala divisions inclusive of the districts of Kasur and Okara with its headquarters in Sheikhupura.

Furthermore the present Range DIGs are proposed to be retained at the various erstwhile divisional headquarters i.e. Lahore, Sargodha, Multan, Bahawalpur, DG Khan and Rawalpindi.

In short, the Punjab Police will experience no loss of posts whatsoever. In effect there will accrue a net gain to the police cadre of three posts of additional IGs ostensibly each one in Grade 21 plus a fourth additional IG as there is a proposal to upgrade the present DIG at the Central Police Office(CPO) at Lahore.

On the surface, this may appear to be a neat arrangement that should please almost everybody who matters in the line of police promotions. But where are the funds for this sudden expansion going to come from? And what are the other implications of the scheme? The funds for the unfolding scheme contained in Police Order 2002 have to be found by the provincial government.

This appears difficult under the present circumstances when the acceptance of a new formula emanating from the deliberations of the National Finance Commission has met obstacles. Surely expenditure-wise this is not such an urgent issue that the heavens would fall if the additional proposed expenditure is not incurred in the foreseeable future.

And even so in real terms what does the three police regions' scheme entail for the Punjab as a province that is part of a constitutional federation? There is no gain saying that the province of Punjab is extremely starved of funds for its social sectors and other development plans.

Only the other day the chief minister made a public appeal for people to donate liberally to the Punjab Development Fund so that several of the financially starved sectors of the government could be taken care of.

If that be so then what is the great urgency of incurring more expenditure on the outlay of the Punjab police at this point in time. In any case, the law and order situation in the Punjab is relatively speaking not half as bad as that in the other provinces.

The proposal, therefore, clearly smacks of a desire for extended departmental empire-building that is not really justified by any truly objective considerations as exist on the ground.

It is interesting to note that the Police Order 2002 took its first step by weakening the institutional hold of the provincial governments on their police hierarchy serving in the provinces.

So the first objective was quite naturally breaking loose from the supervision and control of the provincial home departments. That objective having been achieved, the next one now inevitably seems to be the desire to slip out altogether of the control of the provincial governments and thus move in the direction of becoming a police corporation (like Wapda) that will be in-charge of law and order in the entire country.

It is extremely hard to draw any other meaning from such expansionist urges of just one specific department and at the cost of a myriad sectors like health and education. Already the performance of the police in the province of Sindh is the talk of the country.

In an atmosphere where resources are thin and extremely scarce there have to be very sound reasons for warranting any further administrative expansions that entail new and recurring expenditures.

The three regions' police scheme for the Punjab is not only an expensive scheme to implement but also politically loaded in that it may just see the laying of the initial infrastructure for creating three future provinces out of one.

It will indeed knock the very bottom out of Punjab and be accompanied by the lavishness of creating a number of grade 21 posts without any real justification and without explaining to the Punjab cabinet and the Punjab assembly as to what it can lead the province into.

Surely the bureaucracy should not be jumping the gun on law-making bodies and taking them for a ride. There was a time when Lahore was the provincial capital to territories stretching from Attock to the outskirts of New Delhi and the law and order situation used to be a lot more tranquil than today.

In those earlier times, bureaucracy was a lot thinner on the ground and infinitely more efficient in delivering the goods. In present times, we seem to be woefully oblivious of the tax payers' concern for the optimum utilization of resources for public good.

The police like any other department naturally want better working conditions. But this does not mean that they should be allowed a lion's share at a time when fighting poverty is the number one consideration.

It does not stand to reason that the police are oblivious of the stark financial difficulties facing our country and will stop seeking expansions at the cost of the public exchequer.

With the threat of a three-way split in the province, would it not be pertinent for the Punjab cabinet and assembly to debate issues involved and desist from plunging headlong into a policy whose consequences they may not even be aware of.

Needless to say there is a lingering impression that the police scheme would only be another attempt at political engineering. Also because the districts shown in the police paper as proposed regions of Multan and Rawalpindi are exactly those that are being demanded by the protagonists of the Seraiki and Potohari provinces respectively.

Darfur tragedy

The world must see beyond the peace agreement between north and south in Sudan to the terrible tragedy unfolding in the country's western Darfur region, says the International Crisis Group's Africa specialist.

The signing of a peace agreement between contending forces in a neglected conflict is often the prelude to a brief spasm of attention from the world's rulers and media, followed by a quick flight to the next story.

The pattern should be broken in Sudan, where after the recent peace deal the world needs now to pay more attention, not less, to what is happening in Africa's largest country.

In the western Darfur region since February 2003, armed assaults and the systematic destruction of villages by Janjaweed militias supported by the government in Khartoum have caused around 30,000 deaths and large-scale displacements.

Now, hundreds of thousands of people are at imminent risk of starvation. Many of those in flight from their destroyed villages are being pursued over Sudan's border to Chad. If even more devastating suffering is to be averted, the international community simply cannot afford to look away.

The recent headlines announce a long-awaited peace deal in Sudan. The three protocols signed by Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Naivasha, Kenya, on May 26, 2004, certainly mark a milestone in ending the decades-long civil war between north and south that claimed the lives of some two million people.

But further negotiations are still required to provide all the necessary detail for a final, comprehensive peace agreement. Sudan is still some way from internal peace and stability.

More importantly, the process does not cover Darfur, where the government's response to a separate insurgency has been extremely brutal. There, the Janjaweed militias have slaughtered tens of thousands of civilians, burned their villages, committed systematic rape, and left 1.5 million people homeless.

Of these, 1.2 million are internally displaced within Sudan, most slowly starving or dying from illness in concentration camps surrounded by Janjaweed guards. The remainder have fled to Chad; even there they are not safe from attack by the militias.

Current estimates are that at least 350,000 people could die by December this year. If Khartoum's barriers to aid are not fully removed and if cross-border Janjaweed raids into Chad spark a regional war, the toll will be even higher.

No agreement signed in Naivasha will avert any of that. What will stop the impending humanitarian catastrophe is swift action by the international community. Along with preparing a massive humanitarian aid effort, the world must ensure that the killing stops.

The UN Security Council must pass a resolution threatening international military intervention if the government of Khartoum does not act soon to disarm and disband the Janjaweed and end their rampage.

Moreover, if Khartoum continues to prevent humanitarian aid access to those internally displaced within Sudan, then the UN must authorize a force to deliver that aid. In short, if the government of Sudan cannot or will not protect its own people from murder, ethnic cleansing and starvation, the outside world must take on that responsibility.

There is a link here between Naivasha and Darfur - for the progress towards a final agreement between the government and the SPLA, while it does not address the Darfur crisis, at least removes one excuse for international inaction on the issue.

For months, many at the UN, in Washington and in European capitals were reluctant to pressure Khartoum over its killing fields in Darfur for fear of upsetting the delicate talks in Naivasha.

The United States and Britain in particular sought to promote the Khartoum-SPLA talks as a foreign policy success, and they prioritized the Naivasha deal while not responding robustly enough to Darfur.

The government in Khartoum knew this was the calculation, and it strung out the talks as long as it could. But even though the Sudanese government will still have countless opportunities over the coming months to stall and delay the final stage of talks, the signing of the protocols with the SPLA provides a watershed opportunity for Security Council members to reflect and redirect their attention towards Darfur.

It is time for the UN Security Council to assume the world's responsibilities in the face of impending catastrophe. For the sake of the 1.5 million people facing starvation and deadly disease in the government-controlled camps in Sudan and the refugee camps in Chad, a Security Council decision to take resolute action must come quickly.

The writer is director of the Africa programme at the International Crisis Group.

Bush's view of Iraq's sovereignty

Say what you like, President Bush has a great sense of humour. "Freedom," he said not long ago, "is worth fighting for, dying for and standing for." Later, he called for a, "forward strategy of freedom to promote democracy in the occupied countries and throughout the Middle East.

It isn't often you get to see a charade, a live political science experiment, but that is what we are about to witness in Iraq. It is enough to make one "die laughing".

On June 30, 2004, Bush plans to convert a US-nominated interim government headed by Ilyad Allawi - a CIA and MI6 protege - into a fully "sovereign" and independent authority. He said recently that he would transfer complete and full sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government in less than a month.

But nothing like that is going to happen. What he is offering is a puppet government totally devoid of substance. In Bush's world, America can create an exciting Iraqi democracy as long as it doesn't control its own military, pass any laws or have any power. To apply the adjective sovereign to the interim government in Iraq would be a cruel joke.

What is sovereignty? The term sovereignty, first used in the 15th century, has had a long history. Taking off from Aristotle's notion of the 'supreme power', the idea has travelled through the 16th century to Jean Bodin's definition as the 'absolute and perpetual power", Austin's theory of the sovereign power, commanding general obedience but itself owing obedience to none and Dicey's concept of sovereignty being absolute, comprehensive and indivisible.

The latest to join this galaxy is George W. Bush. How can a country regain its sovereignty if foreign troops continue to remain on its soil against the will of the people and if aggression continues unabated? How can the US or even the UN convince the Iraqis that Iraq will regain any meaningful sovereignty after June 30, if it remains under American military occupation and all real decisions on security and reconstruction are still made by the Americans?

As long as US forces and bases are present in Iraq, no Iraqi regime, elected or nominated, can portray itself as truly sovereign and not an American puppet. Iraqi freedom fighters will go on attacking American bases wherever these are. US troops will be repeatedly drawn out of their bases and into direct involvement with Iraqi freedom fighters.

Iraqi armed forces will continue to operate under US command although the Americans have said they will consult the new government on deployment and other matters. It will be seen by the Iraqis as simply an American tool.

Other subjects that remain unclear include the extent to which Iraq will have a say in the practices of US - run prisons that hold Iraqi suspects and over the Iraqi criminal justice system that might prosecute Americans for crimes against Iraqis.

Who will be incharge of the Abu Ghraib prison? Nor is it clear to what extent the World Bank and other international agencies will continue to have auditing authority over the spending of huge sums derived from Iraqi assets and oil.

The new government will be explicitly directed by the United States and the UN not to enact major new laws or make any commitments that would bind its elected successors next year.

"Majestas est Summa in civas ac subditoes legibeusque soluta Potestas", i.e. De facto sovereignty or the highest power over citizens unrestricted by law in Iraq will reside not in the nominated Iraqi government or the prime minister but where the American coercive power resides.

The American-sponsored Security Council resolution adopted on June 8, 2004, does not change anything. It cannot confer sovereignty on the American-nominated interim government, nor can it change the character of the American forces engaged in the war of aggression against the people of Iraq.

The US has no intention of handing over sovereignty to the Iraqis. It wants to keep control of all armed forces in the country; make use of that force at its own discretion, with American forces enjoying extraterritorial status and legal immunities; and to exercise a veto over the legislative decisions of whatever Iraqi government takes office.

The transfer of nominal sovereignty to a few chosen Iraqis in a country that is still occupied will brand any so-called "sovereign" Iraqi authority as treasonous and will lack any political legitimacy. The transfer of "sovereignty" will not fundamentally alter the continued and overt supremacy of the United States in Iraq.

Between 110 and 160 American advisors will be layered through Iraqi ministries on contracts signed by the occupation authority. The new government would have no authority to stop American forces from attacking any Iraqi target.

It would only have a theoretical right to request a full American withdrawal which will leave it virtually defenceless. How can this government establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the people of Iraq when it lacks an electoral mandate and would be totally dependent on a huge American - dominated military force? How can Allawi, an American appointee, speak for the people of Iraq? How can he symbolize a sovereign, independent Iraq?

In the eyes of the people of Iraq, Allawi can never be Iraq. Iraq will always be distinct from the quisling Ilyad Allawi and the administration he will be heading after June 30. Wasn't

"La France" distinct from its quisling Vichy government? Was France under Marshall Henri Philippe Petain, the hero of Verdun "sovereign and independent"? Did Petain, the head of the Vichy government, represent France - the eternal France of the revolution? Wasn't this France incarnated in the resistance leader Jean Moulin or in Charles de Gaulle himself? Wasn't Petain condemned as a collaborator and sentenced to death after liberation?

Americans want to treat Iraq as a conquered and occupied nation instead of a free and sovereign state. This is how they wanted to treat France after the Normandy landings on June 4, 1944.

But de Gaulle stood his ground and would not yield any form of civil and political authority to foreigners, even those who were fighting and dying for France. "But this country is ours, not yours and we decide what will be done here," Francois Coulet, representing the French provincial government headed by de Gaulle told General Lewis, the chief of civil affairs on Montgomery's staff.

"My presence here has nothing to do with you", Coulet banged his fist on his desk and said, "I have received the order to be here from General de Gaulle's government and I shall leave only upon his orders and act only upon his orders".

It is inconceivable that Allawi, head of the so-called sovereign Iraqi government, will ever confront an American general and challenge him in such a defiant manner.

Karl Marx once wrote, "all great historical events happen twice, the first time as a tragedy, and the second time as farce". This is what is happening in Iraq today. The 20th century began with western powers seeking to impose a new order on the Middle East.

The 21st century has begun in a similar fashion. In a leading article on August 7, 1920, the London Times demanded to know, "how much longer are valuable lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavour to impose upon Iraq an elaborate and expensive administration which the Arabs never asked for and do not want."

History is repeating itself in the 21st century. The engine of history is moving Iraq back to 1920. How long is it going to take for America to recognize that the war it so foolishly started in Iraq is a fiasco - tragic, deeply dehumanizing and ultimately unwinnable? How much more time, how much more money and how many more wasted lives is it going to take? One thing is clear.

Peace and stability will never resume as long as aggression continues and American soldiers remain on Iraqi soil. America should turn the country over to a genuine international coalition headed by the United Nations and get out. It has dug itself into a deep, deep hole.

The least it can do in its own national interest is to follow the first rule of holes and stop digging. I am reminded in this context of one of "Rumsfeld's rules", the Pentagon chief's guide for wise public policy. "It is easier to get into something than to get out of it."

Americans are paying a terribly high price For what? Instead of democracy flourishing in the desert, bloodshed and killings continue - the payoff of a policy spun from lies and falsehood. This is the most foolish conflict since the war of Jenkin's ear in the 18th century.

Recently, Paul Bremer, was asked by the journalist Tim Russert to whom he would turn over the keys in Iraq on June 30. His answer: "Well, that's a good question. We don't have a clue and in part that's because we have no memory."

The biggest headache for the United States stems not from the invasion and conquest of Iraq, but from the aftermath - the old conundrum of military history - what to do with the loser?

Now that the country has been conquered and Saddam's regime driven from power, the US is left "owning" an ethnically divided country of 22 million people ravaged by more than two decades of war. It wants the dirty job to be done by the interim government.