President Musharraf's multi-front war
Even at the outset of his marathon expose of Pakistan's nuclear dilemma consequent on Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan's sins of omission and commission as a nuclear wheeler-dealer, President Musharraf identified four major problems overshadowing Pakistan's international image.
These were, one, Pakistan's alleged links with the Taliban/Al Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan, two, assistance to militants in IHK (Indian-held Kashmir), three, terrorism and extremism at home and, four, nuclear proliferation.
This is an altogether daunting portrayal of the varied challenges Pakistan faces and that must be resolved in our own national interest and to the satisfaction of the world community.
The grant of a presidential pardon to Dr Khan for his inexcusable transgressions in his capacity as the architect of Pakistan's nuclear programme might have been a strategically-disadvantaged general's calculated decision to cease fire to gain some tactical manoeuvrability.
It would hardly be the end, however, of General Musharraf's war on three conventional fronts and the fourth nuclear front compounded by the disclosure of Dr Khan's proliferation activities and his public admission of guilt.
Many of the activities, the doctor pleaded, did occur and invariably at his own behest. Quite a bombshell of shame and shock for a country priding itself in the fool-proof custodial security of its strategic (nuclear) assets.
Even if the handiwork of only a handful of unscrupulous individuals acting for personal gain, there would be no denying the chinks in our custodial armour. The fact that the keeper should have himself chosen to turn poacher has left a smear on our custodial soundness in spite of our best efforts.
Worse still would be the ghostly shadow stalking Pakistan as the hub of the international nuclear black market. Gen Musharraf's brave and impressive effort at damage control notwithstanding, the episode will continue to raise questions at the highest diplomatic bilateral and multi-lateral levels.
The nuclear threat surfaced just when Gen Musharraf had gained control of three conventional fronts concerning Afghanistan, Kashmir and home-grown terrorist activities.
His war on global terrorism in concert with America and the rest of the world community, eradication of jihadi militancy and sectarianism, and above all mending fences with India for regional peace and progress have earned him international acclaim.
Pakistan has tried to steer clear of the dark woods of sectarian medievalism and to march into the open spaces of modernity to take its place as a stable society that is in tune with the rest of the world.
Gen Musharraf's role through the landmark Saarc summit in Islamabad and the joint Musharraf-Vajpayee statement of January 6 promised a new era of Pakistan-India concord and amity within an agreed framework of composite dialogue on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.
This has been no mean achievement. Even before the Saarc summit, the resumption of air, road and rail links, ceasefire along the Line of Control and restoration of diplomatic missions to the pre-December 2001 levels had paved the way to a thaw between the arch rivals.
The disturbing Dr Qadeer Khan episode has brought Gen Musharraf face-to-face with the complex nuclear front almost as a lone warrior. It confronts him with two major tasks: First, to protect the army (his own principal constituency and the nation's security shield) from any suspicion of involvement in the nuclear leakages, and, second, to assure the nation and the world of the absolute safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets.
Two former army chiefs, Generals Mirza Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat, were absolved of any linkage after being duly de-briefed. This is not to deny the army's ultimate responsibility and role in protecting the nuclear arsenals and command and control structures.
The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), in place for several years, has been solely responsible for the job to the exclusion of the highest civilian authority (the prime minister/cabinet) except in the event of a national emergency and on a 'need to know' basis.
No matter how well one might argue for keeping the army out of it, it would nevertheless stay in the thick of the debate. International media have already focussed on the army, and the consensus is that Dr Khan could not have operated without support from senior military circles.
'Unorthodox financing' of Dr Khan's operations, plus the unquestioned authority he enjoyed over the Khan Research Laboratories, could not be without the army looking the other way.
Even Gen Musharraf admitted that he or the NCA would do nothing to interrupt Dr Khan's missile development programme even after their knowledge of his financial irregularities.
To save the army from any blame of irregularities in the nuclear programme (along with the programme itself) should be Gen Musharraf's first reasonability. The question now is whether we will be able to safeguard our nuclear assets from outside inspection - even one that is apparently innocuous and non-intrusive.
We have already agreed in principle to share with the IAEA all the information we have about the Qadeer affair. Gen Musharraf has also had detailed exchanges of notes with Colin Powell in order to put him in the picture before he visits Pakistan at a date yet to be specified.
This would entail a certain amount of re-classifying our nuclear R&D without exactly de-classifying the same.
In a contingency likely to stay with us for the foreseeable future, a fresh look at our nuclear strategy might only be prudent. Perhaps, an academic discussion on the merits and demerits of the NPT/CTBT will be in order.
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.
Ayatollahs and elections
Important elections are to take place in two Muslim countries, Iraq and Iran. In Iraq, the date for direct elections is yet to be fixed. In Iran, they are to be held on Friday, February 20. Both elections are dominated by ayatollahs. Both elections also have serious consequences for the United States, and to some extent, Pakistan.
In Iraq, a question mark still hangs over the date for the elections. The US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, wants to transfer power by June 30 to an interim government formed through a series of provincial caucuses. He insists that no direct elections can be held before then, and has so far not set any date for the elections.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Shia majority in Iraq, initially called for elections to be held before the formation of the interim government. It now appears that he is prepared to accept an interim government without elections, provided a definite date for the elections is fixed prior to June 30.
The Sunni population of Iraq is against early elections because it fears a government dominated by the Shias. The situation is further complicated by the fact that there has been no proper census for many years. It is now being seriously questioned whether the Sunnis are indeed a minority, particularly if the Kurdish population is taken into account.
The most likely outcome is for the Grand Ayatollah's compromise formula to be adopted. Clearly he does not want to be accused of allowing US rule to continue by sabotaging the process.
But he also seeks to ensure the rightful place for the Shia majority in the polity of the country. His role in determining the course of events in the year ahead is crucial.
Paul Bremer appears to have bowed to the wishes of the Grand Ayatollah. He has hinted that elections could be held before 2005: 'If we can do it sooner and have it be legitimate, and if the UN and we agree that can be done, then that's not a problem if [the elections are held] at the end of this year or early January'.
The UN is likely to endorse this view as indicated by its special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi. The important thing about these timetables is that the Iraqi elections are being determined by the US presidential elections in November.
With the heavy toll in body bags, President Bush wants to begin the process of disengagement and withdrawal of US troops to commence by the time the Democrat party has held its convention and nominated, as is likely, Senator John Kerry to be its candidate. Bush also wants the Iraqi elections to be held after his own in November.
There is concern in the US that the Iraqi elections may throw up a government of clerics like in Iran. However, so far it is fortunate that Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani has shown considerable flexibility on many issues. In particular, he has made it clear that he does not seek a government of clerics in Iraq.
He will need to show qualities similar to Nelson Mandela when and if the majority of the Shias form the next government of Iraq. He will have to curb those Shia elements who will seek to rehabilitate themselves rapidly after suffering for decades under Saddam Hussein.
In Iran, prior to the 1979 Revolution, the vast majority followed Ayatollah Khomeini. He led and reconciled a wide spectrum of political views from the left to the right wing - indeed all those opposed to the Shah and his main supporter, the US.
But this all-embracing feature of the Revolution did not last long. Like other revolutions, the Iranian Revolution also 'devoured' its children. Mehdi Bazargan lasted less than a year, President Bani Sadr fell from power and fled to Paris. Others went into exile or were executed. The Office for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Sin became an increasingly dominant force.
As with all revolutions, some of these developments were only natural. Indeed, it is to the credit of Ayatollah Khomeini and leaders like former President Rafsanjani that the situation soon stabilized, despite the war imposed by Iraq, and constant foreign pressure.
From the outset, even when consolidation was necessary and during the period of the Iraq war, Iran regularly conducted elections. These were largely free and fair by any standards, with a turn-out of 50-60 per cent.
The situation regarding the Iranian elections to be held on February 20 has, however, taken an opposite turn from that in Iraq. Whereas the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah has put his full weight behind the holding of transparent elections, the cleric-dominated Guardian Council in Iran has reduced theirs almost to a farce.
The Guardian Council has disqualified over 2000 candidates, and a further over 500 reformists have announced that they will not participate in the elections. They have denounced the move by the Guardian Council as a coup d'etat. About 80 members of parliament have staged a one-month sit-in.
Two vice-presidents and numerous provincial governors have submitted their resignations to President Khatami, who at one stage also appeared to threaten resignation.
But he has recently changed his position. He feels that allowing the conservative clerics a virtually unopposed run for parliament will irretrievably reverse the reformists' programme.
President Khatami has recently called for a massive turn-out at the polls to frustrate the moves of the reformists. However, his call is not likely to be heeded and a low turn-out is generally expected.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, had earlier appeared to be intervening when he asked the Guardian Council to reconsider the cases of the reformist candidates. But the Council only reinstated the candidature of a small percentage.
It would indeed be a tragedy that in the 25th year of the Revolution, Iran should proceed to overthrow much that it has achieved so far. The conservatives will undoubtedly capture the parliament they lost in 2000. While in Iraq the Grand Ayatollah sees the elections as a means to attain power, the clerics in Iran seek to retain it.
Governments that do not have legitimacy through elections seek it from some other source. In Iran, with conservative clerics in power, there can only be one such source, namely religion - following Allah's law is the only way to put things right.
Much now depends on how Ayatollah Ali Khamenei proceeds. So far he has been beholden to, and dependent on, the conservatives. If Iran is again to be placed on the right path, he will have to act independently.
Undoubtedly the question of the compatibility of democracy and Islam will arise again. As recently as 1989, in 'Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia', it was stated that 'the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa generally lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of transition even to semi-democracy'.
This is a peculiarly western dismissive view of the East. But let us not forget that Samuel P. Huntington, that great protagonist of the clash of civilizations, had as recently as 1984 expressed similar views about Eastern Europe: 'the likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil'.
No one nation or group of states can claim a monopoly of democracy. It is not a question of West versus East. Democracy and democratization are long and difficult roads full of ruts and potholes. It has been rightly said that it is best found through the development of 'latent tendencies' in contemporary political systems of each country.
This is an important lesson for the United States to learn because very serious consequences will follow if it intervenes in the name of democracy. Iraq and Iran are not comparable to Algeria, where, despite its seclusion in North Africa, the price for western intervention is still being paid.
Iran and Iraq are in the heartland of the Muslim world and the Middle East. Any eruption in those countries will have not only regional but international repercussions.
Whatever the process and outcome of the elections in Iran and Iraq, it should be left with their respective peoples to deal with the situation. The alternative to that, namely intervention, would in all likelihood result in civil war or fratricidal sectarian conflict. It would set back by decades the clock of democracy.