Men who made the joint statement possible
Islamabad: It was two confidants of the top leaders in India and Pakistan who led and coordinated rounds of negotiations to break ground for an understanding between President Gen Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and its proclamation in a joint statement.
They were, Prime Minister Vajpayee's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and the secretary-general of the yet to be set up National Security Council, Tariq Aziz.
Finalized after several rounds of behind-the-scene negotiations and issued hours before Prime Minister Vajpayee boarded his flight to New Delhi, the statement was received as a major breakthrough with the potential of becoming another turning point in the history of Pakistan-India relations. The finalization of the joint statement and its subsequent announcement was owed in no small measure to the efforts of the two trusted men.
Mr Mishra and Mr Aziz have more than a bureaucratic background in common. Mr Mishra was an officer of the Indian foreign service and Mr Aziz a member of the Central Board of Revenue.
Mr Aziz is an old friend of President Musharraf and Mr Mishra an old associate of Prime Minister Vajpayee. Mr Mishra, who arrived here on Jan 1, made his first public appearance on Tuesday at the press conference of Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha. Mr Mishra's pronouncement that he had come to "tie some loose ends" of the joint statement made it clear that it had been in the works for some time.
He 'quietly' arrived here with Mr Sinha, ahead of the Indian delegation, with which he was supposed to come according to the initial plan. Even the Indian media team here was taken by surprise. What astonished them the most was that no announcement of his visit to Pakistan was made in New Delhi prior to his departure.
His early arrival was widely perceived as an attempt at negotiating the Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting and what was to follow. Significantly, Mr Mishra met Indian deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani on the eve of his departure for Pakistan. Pakistan-India relations dominated the meeting, it was learnt.
Some Indians believe there is a change in Mr Advani's stance towards Gen Musharraf, from hawkish to sympathetic, following the attempt on the latter's life last month.
The fact that there was no word from the Pakistani or the Indian side about Mr Mishra's engagements in Islamabad and Rawalpindi was a clear signal of something on the bilateral track brewing - courtesy back-channel diplomacy.
This was, perhaps, to ensure that the process was not derailed by the public reaction in both the countries. That explained why India and Pakistan kept referring to top-level meetings preceding the joint statement as "courtesy calls". They probably had in mind that it was barely two years back that Pakistan was accused of sponsoring an armed attack on Indian parliament and that their armies were eyeball-to-eyeball in a nearly 10-month long standoff.
It was on Tuesday morning that the statement was finally firmed up and it got the approval from President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee. Later, both the leaders congratulated each other for concluding a 'win-win' agreement, hoping it would mark a new beginning towards the normalization of bilateral ties.
The spirit of reciprocity was retained with both sides agreeing to address the issues of concern to each other, Jammu and Kashmir for Pakistan and terrorism for India. Both sides moved beyond the stated positions, showing a good measure of flexibility and accommodation.
Mr Aziz and President Musharraf went to the same college and have been good friends since then. Mr Mishra, an old friend of Mr Vajpayee, has been his 'eyes and ears'. Their association goes back to almost a decade-and-a-half.
In 1980, Mr Mishra was appointed India's permanent representative to the United Nations in New York. Disillusioned by India's changed stance on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he took premature retirement from the foreign service.
He found a UN assignment before joining the Bharatiya Janata Party in early 1990s to lead the BJP's foreign affairs cell. It was there that Mr Vajpayee and Mr Mishra got close, the bonding factor being their shared passion for foreign affairs.
When the BJP came to power in March 1998, Mr Vajpayee appointed Mr Mishra as his principal secretary and national security advisor. He is perceived as a powerful man because of his proximity to the prime minister, just as Mr Aziz is in Pakistan because of his friendship with the president.
According to an Indian analyst, Mr Mishra is not taken well by the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh but Mr Advani now realizes that India is bigger than the BJP. Meanwhile, there are signals that the composite dialogue is likely to begin at the political level. If for some reason it is at the bureaucratic level, political involvement at the highest level would remain to see the peace process move forward and ensure that the momentum created by the step taken here towards lasting peace between Pakistan and India is sustained.
A tangled web
'O what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to deceive.' Sir Walter Scott's words are as appropriate to 'democracy' in Pakistan today as they were when he wrote Marmion in 1808. Scott's web alluded to the way in which lies spawn more lies; in Pakistan, however, the web can be taken more literally. So tangled is it, that it becomes difficult (nay, impossible) to discern the original truth.
What we see today is a president 'democratically' elected through a national referendum, with the result endorsed first by the Supreme Court and now by votes of confidence in all the legislative assemblies. This rosy picture of democracy is, in fact, the culmination of a very tangled web that has been woven since the coup of October 1999. For the 'original truth' (which the web is masking) is that Pervez Musharraf seized power in a military coup: his current position as president stems not from a democratic process, but from that military coup.
Consider how the web was carefully woven, stitch by stitch: First came the Provisional Constitution Order of October 1999, which partially suspended the Constitution (and the parliament) and allowed Musharraf to rule.
Then came the order in January 2000 to all Supreme Court, Provincial High Court and Shari'a Court judges to swear an oath to uphold the PCO. The Chief Justice, five other Supreme Court judges and nine Provincial High Court judges resigned in protest. But the 85 per cent of justices who swore the oath were considered sufficient. Their allegiance rendered all government ordinances and directives under the PCO immune from judicial review.
Four months later the Supreme Court endorsed military rule for a period of three years (with national elections to be held by October 2002) and gave Musharraf the authority to make necessary constitutional amendments. The basis for the Supreme Court ruling was Justice Munir's original ruling invoking the 'doctrine of necessity' to justify a military coup.
In October 1999 Musharraf had been careful not to declare Martial Law,nominating himself as Chief Executive. In June 2001, however, he used the Supreme Court's authorisation to give himself a promotion. An amendment to the PCO was issued which allowed him to become president, and to formally dissolve the National Assembly, Senate and Provincial Assemblies.
That unilateral promotion was extended by five years (to 2007) by a national referendum in April 2002. The farcical nature of the referendum was painfully - nay, embarrassingly - obvious. Yet much of the country went along with Pakistan's enactment of 'The Emperor's New Clothes', praising the leader and lauding the supposedly 97.5 per cent vote cast in favour of his remaining president until 2007. In June the Supreme Court effectively passed the buck on ruling on the referendum to an elected parliament.
Then in August 2002 came the Legal Framework Order - some 29 amendments to the Constitution. These included giving the president the authority to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the National Assembly; setting up a national security council (headed by the president) to oversee the government; setting minimum qualification requirements for parliamentary candidates; and extending the retirement age of the judges by three years.
Elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies in October 2002 were overseen by Justice (retd) Irshad Hassan Khan. As Chief Justice, Irshad Khan presided over the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the legality of the coup. As chief election commissioner, he endorsed the referendum.
The elections to the national and provincial assemblies showed a degree of sophistication in electoral manipulation that many a crude ballot-box-stuffing dictator could learn from. No need to stuff ballot boxes, or intimidate voters on the day - just prepare the ground beforehand to ensure polls yield the desired results.
Define the 'TORs' of the elections in such a way that a large slice of the political elite (including the two biggest political leaders) cannot participate; use state resources to boost the campaign of the so-called 'King's party'; wield the NAB stick to 'persuade' waverers to join that party; and so on. There was no surprise at the PML-Q's victory, or at the relatively poor showing of the PML-N and PPP - though possibly some at the MMA's success.
At this point Musharraf rule hit a snag, because many in the newly elected assemblies refused to accept the legality of the LFO. Their opposition rendered the assemblies totally ineffective. But at the end of 2003, after more than a year of political deadlock, President Musharraf reached an agreement with the MMA.
In return for modifying some LFO provisions - the NSC has to be created by an act of parliament, presidential decisions to dissolve the assemblies must be referred to the Supreme Court, the extension of judges' retirement age is scrapped - and agreeing to give up his army uniform by December 2004, the MMA agreed to drop its opposition to the LFO.
The 17th Constitutional Amendment Bill was duly rushed through the National Assembly and Senate, closely followed by votes of confidence in the presidency of Pervez Musharraf. The unseemly haste with which all this was carried out was to enable Pakistan to present a picture of rosy democracy during the closely watched Saarc summit.
Reading through the above sequence of events since October 1999, it is clear that the president's rise to power had little to do with democracy. Musharraf is president today because of three factors: one, he heads the army; two, the Supreme Court is not functioning as an independent institution; and three, the weaknesses and flaws of Pakistan's politicians. These factors allowed Musharraf to weave the web of democratic deceit around what is arguably still military rule.
These are the facts, but there are three possible interpretations of Musharraf's actions. The first is that everything he has done was technically legal and therefore beyond question. Note, for example, that all the opposition MNAs and MPAs objecting to the LFO, contested elections on the basis of that very same LFO.
The second is that there were some 'irregularities', most notably the referendum and Musharraf's dual position as Chief of Army Staff and president - a clear violation of the Constitution. But these can be overlooked in the national interest. Musharraf is by far the best person to lead Pakistan in these difficult times - infinitely preferable to the MMA, Bhutto and Sharif alternatives. Any manoeuvring he has to do to stay in power is therefore acceptable.
The third interpretation is that - like other army chiefs before him - he has engaged in an exercise of constitutional and other manipulation to cloak his military rule in the garb of democracy. The coup in October 1999 might have been a good thing for the country, but since then the 'national interest' has become blurred (indeed, overtaken) by the personal/military interest of holding onto power.
There are elements of truth in all three interpretations. This is the moral dilemma for Pakistanis. Is it sufficient to conform to the technicalities of democracy, even if its spirit and essence are being ignored? Does the fact that Musharraf is generally doing a good job compensate for his subversion of political and civil rights? Can the promotion of personal interest be condoned if it coincides with national interest?
Note that in answering these questions one has to look beyond today's Pakistan under Musharraf - in which context the answers are probably 'yes' - to tomorrow's Pakistan. Musharraf is using his powers and authority to do good (generally), but tomorrow's dictator could abuse the same authority to the detriment of Pakistan. Think long-term, and there are no easy answers.
Commercializing the city
The karachi city council's adoption of a resolution to approve a new commercialization policy and bye-laws relating to use of land will only increase the city's traffic mess, increase pollution and make commuting to and from work for most city residents an even more harrowing experience than it already is.
One would have to question the lack of wisdom and foresight shown by the city council in hurriedly passing this resolution, which we are told "comes into effect immediately". Six major roads - Sharea Faisal all the way to Malir (a distance some 20 kilometres), Tariq Road, Rashid Minhas Road, University Road, Shahrah-i-Pakistan (all the way up to Sohrab Goth) and the main Nazimabad road - have been commercialized as a result of the move by the city council.
These are, other than M.A. Jinnah and Abdullah Haroon roads, perhaps the city's busiest roads already with many commercial establishments already situated on them. All of them are infamous for bottlenecks and traffic jams and the city council's decision will only make matters worse. Sharea Faisal, for instance, already has many commercial buildings on it and imagine driving on it home from work with five or ten times as many high-rise buildings as now.
The traffic mess and accompanying delays will be magnified by an equal proportion. Besides, won't the passage of the resolution provide respite to those who have already constructed buildings in violation of the old policy, which was in effect till January 6, 2004? Why should those who violated the building bye-laws with such impunity be given this opportunity to be let off without any penalty?
While approving the resolution, the city council did make the provision that roads that are less than 100 feet wide will not be commercialized and that no construction will be allowed on land that is set aside for extending a road. It also says that no amenity plots will be used for "other purposes" and that residential plots will be converted into land for commercial use only after approval of the "competent authority".
However, given the inability of local government, and the so- called competent authority in particular, to enforce any of the construction bye-laws, rules and regulations devised so far, it would be unrealistic and naove to expect any change after the passage of this commercialization resolution. For example, many buildings situated on some of Karachi's busiest roads - Zainab Market and the Gulfway Shopping Mall immediately come to mind - have underground parking but for some reason it is not open to shoppers. The shop-owners usually use part of the parking lot for their cars and the rest as a kind of common warehouse. In some shopping centres, the area is used at occasions like Eid to set up extra stalls.
Now, why can't the city council pass resolutions to improve the quality of life of ordinary Karachiites instead of saddling their city's roads with more traffic and lengthier delays? Why not pass a resolution asking the government to devise a long-term plan to reduce the traffic load on the city's roads, to save the slowly dying out parks and open public spaces, increasing the number of large billboards all over Karachi's roads (which normally are more of an eye-sore than anything else).