Looking at Indian proposals

INDIA’S latest peace proposals consist of 12 points for normalizing relations between the two countries. Pakistan, after some hesitation, agreed to some of the proposals and put across some points of its own.

India’s first item is to resume talks to restore civil aviation links, including overflight rights. This is of some significance to India as all her westbound and northbound flights barring a few, have to skirt around Pakistan air space. This is costing her millions of dollars in extra fuel and it takes a longer time. It is also in urgent need of quick air access to Afghanistan and Iran.

In any case it was India that unilaterally without giving any notice stopped overflights. This time Pakistan wants a system in place which will prevent India from abruptly stopping civil aviation flights at its will and pleasure. This is why the previous negotiations at Rawalpindi failed.

India’s second item is the resumption of rail links, following the aviation talks. If the object is to help the people of both countries why hold the resumption of rail link hostage to the success to that of air links. India had stopped the trains from running across the international border between Lahore and Amritsar. India should have announced the restoration of the Samjhota Express

The next item is to resume bilateral sports competitions including cricket. This is a good idea and had already been suggested by Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali.

The fourth item is to issue visas in cities outside the two country’s national capitals to shorten travel. This will entail opening an Indian office in Karachi and a Pakistani one in Bombay. It will certainly help the people of Sindh who have now to travel to Islamabad to obtain a visa for India. It may however be recalled that the Indian deputy high commission’s office was closed in Karachi as it was alleged to have become a controlling hub of anti-state activities.

The fifth item is to permit individuals aged 65 and above to cross into India on foot. Previously only groups could walk across, while individuals had to be on a bus. This could be of help to some elderly individuals wishing to travel to India urgently. Why not those below 65 also’.

The sixth item is to run more buses on the New Delhi-Lahore route. This is a good idea as the number of people wishing to visit across the border is on the increase.

The seventh item is to establish links between the coast guards of both countries. Following from this is the next item, which would prevent India and Pakistan from arresting each other’s fishermen in certain sea areas. Some method could be evolved to stop illegal fishing in Pakistani waters and early repatriation of detained fishermen.

Item nine provides free medical treatment to another 20 Pakistani children. It is a humanitarian gesture, which should be lauded.

Item 10 is about increase of staff at each other’s high commission. In fact, India had recalled its high commissioner from Islamabad and later sidelined our high commissioner in New Delhi and started dealing with his No.2, eventually requesting for his return. Increase in the number of staff would be a natural step while relations are being normalized between the two countries.

Item 11 is about a ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi. This is a cheaper way of travelling and would help the people of Sindh. Ferry service was discontinued after the 1965 Indo-Pak war.

Item 12 suggests starting of new bus services, one between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. The other would be a bus or rail link between Khokrapar in Sindh and Munabo in India’s Rajasthan state. The reopening of the Khokrapar-Munabo link would help the people of Sindh. They would avoid travelling to Lahore to enter India.

As for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, Pakistan feels this may well be India’s effort to convert the line of control into an international border. In any case very few Kashmiris would wish to travel by road to Srinagar as the entire Kashmir valley is infested with Indian troops and other paramilitary forces. They have been vested with extra powers to stop, search, detain or shoot any body they suspect of being a “terrorist”. They are trigger-happy and shoot to kill without any compunction or fear.

Most of the Indian suggestions are not of such importance which may help to reduce tension between the two countries or act as confidence-building measures. To ease tension India should have agreed to a ceasefire along the Line of Control to avoid civilian deaths. The ceasefire could have been effectively monitored by extra UN observers along both sides of the line of control. At present they are only on the Pakistan side.

Above all, if India is serious about improving relations with Pakistan it should have withdrawn a 100,000 or more troops and other para-military forces from the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir where over 700,000 troops are acting as an army of occupation and are inflicting untold suffering on the hapless civilian population. Pakistan has given a positive response by accepting most of the measures suggested by India — like the proposals pertaining to the resumption of the Samjhota Express sporting ties, visa camps with provision of necessary infrastructure and staff, land border crossing by people in the age-group of 65 and above, and setting up of a hotline between Pakistan’s Maritime Agency and Indian Coast Guard to ensure humanitarian and expeditious assistance to arrested fishermen of either country.

About the Indian suggestions for Mumbai-Karachi ferry service and opening a land route between Munabo and Khokhrapar, Pakistan was of the view that these issues should better be left for consideration during the negotiations.

About the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service Pakistan was of the view that the checkpoints should be manned by the United Nations and Kashmiri passengers should carry UN travel papers. An alternative would be to allow travel on identity papers issued by the governments at Muzaffarabad and Srinagar.

Pakistan offered medical aid and assistance to the Kashmiris (of Indian-held territory) victims of violence and rape and to the widows from the Valley. Pakistan felt that international humanitarian bodies could be associated with the implementation of this proposal. Pakistan also offered scholarships for 100 Kashmiri students for studies in graduate and post-graduate courses in professional institutions. These fresh items will certainly help the people of Indian-occupied Kashmir.

It could of course be argued that some of the suggestions put forward by India and Pakistan have political overtones verging more towards public relations at home and abroad. Some have called them tactical moves for positions of importance in the larger game. Whatever be the aims and objectives of the various suggestions, they should be accepted on their projected face value. Even a minor confidence building-measure may in the long run help in reducing some tension between the two countries.

The writer is a retired lieutenant-general of the Pakistan army.

The muscle of diplomacy

EUROPE’S “big three” split on war with Iraq but recognize that the threat of nuclear proliferation requires unity and deft diplomacy. Both were on display last week when the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany won Iran’s agreement to allow more international inspections of its nuclear facilities and to suspend enrichment of uranium, a step needed for nuclear weapon production.

Britain backed the United States on war in Iraq and sent troops; France and Germany opposed the invasion. But they put those differences aside to persuade Tehran to exchange its nuclear weapons ambitions for good relations with Europe and potential technical assistance on nuclear power.

Iran understood that the alternative could be a US “bad cop” pushing the United Nations to impose sanctions and isolate it from nations that it wants to keep as trading partners. Washington did not orchestrate a four-power approach to Tehran, but it coordinated its own strategy to match the Europeans’.

There are reasons for scepticism about Iran’s intentions. With so much oil, natural gas and hydroelectric power, its claim to need nuclear power for energy is laughable. It is unfortunate that Tehran agreed Tuesday only to suspend, not end, its uranium-enrichment programme and insisted that the suspension could last for “a day or a year,” solely at its own discretion. It did not say when the suspension would start but said parliament must approve it first.

Nor is Iran’s record encouraging. In June it claimed not to have experimented with converting uranium, then said it had. It denied importing nuclear equipment, then admitted doing so. The U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency stepped up its inspections of Iran and criticized the government for stonewalling. The agency also set an Oct. 31 deadline for Iran to agree to more inspections, suspend uranium enrichment and provide more information about its nuclear programme.

Russia has resisted US pressure to stop building Iran’s first nuclear power plant but has opposed the spread of nuclear weapons. Last week, Russia said the plant start-up would be delayed a year, until 2005, for technical, not political, reasons. When the plant opens, Russia should insist on controlling spent fuel to prevent its conversion to weapons-grade material.

—Los Angeles Times

Israel: a threat to Europe

EVER since its foundation, Israel has been troubled by the thought that it might have as much to fear from supposed friends as from avowed enemies. That is one reason why Israelis are often anxious monitors of public opinion in North America and Europe. Their anxiety, and perhaps their anger, showed a peak last week when the European Union’s polling organization released figures showing that Europeans reckoned Israel was a greater threat to world peace than any other country.

The results reinforced the Israeli sense that the distance between them and the Europeans continues to grow and that the United States is their only reliable partner. Most of the protests about the poll were disingenuous, since they were couched in terms suggesting that a sampling of public opinion somehow represents an act of European policy.

But the poll itself was certainly suspect. The question 7,500 Europeans answered was too general. In particular, it left open whether the countries on the list were threats through grave fault of their own or, if they were, whether they shared that fault with another state or society with which they were in conflict. An EU spokesman this week confirmed that the poll unit had no plans to ask that particular question again in the near future.

Flawed as the question was, and misdirected as some of the protests were, the poll results, nevertheless, do suggest — along with other evidence — that there has been a critical change in European perceptions of Israel. Europeans have, of course, always seen the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as a moral issue.

They have also been conscious of it as springing, in part, from European acts in the past and, therefore, as being in some way a European responsibility. And they long ago grasped that it is a problem that affects European interests, whether those be good relations with Muslim governments, the loyalty of Europe’s own Muslim minorities, or the availability of oil at acceptable prices.

What is new since September 11 is that Europeans sense a threat to their existence, and not just to their interests. In the past, there were times at which it seemed possible that a nuclear exchange between the two cold-war blocs might be ignited by Middle Eastern events. But apart from those one or two bad moments when the cold war could have become hot, Europeans felt that, although their lives could be damaged as a result of what happened between Israelis and Palestinians, they could not be devastated.

Now, because there could be terrorist acts on a new scale, they sense that devastation is indeed a possibility. Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli minister and peace negotiator, sees that “Europeans fear a backlash from what happens between us and the Palestinians”, though he cautions against a view of the crisis that ignores its roots and the responsibility of the other party.

European fears may be overdone. There is also the complicated question of whether it is a correct reading of the terror threat to calculate that it would be either greatly or swiftly diminished by a settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. But, viscerally, Europeans believe they would be much safer if there were such a settlement, and a majority probably believe that Israel is much more to blame for the lack of it than the Palestinians. Since European opinion was already running against Israel on other grounds, a coincidence of moral critique and self-defence emerges.

This, it may be speculated, was what was really measured by the poll. Europe’s feeling of vulnerability and its alienation from Israel have been deepened by the difficult situation in Iraq; by the durability of the Sharon government; by the judgment that the Israeli right is likely to stay in power beyond Sharon; and by the American government’s feebleness and complicity in Israeli policies.

If a slice was cut to show what might be called the archaeology of European attitudes to Israel, the bottom layer, the furthest in the past, could be called “Saving Israel from the Arabs”, recalling a time when most sympathy lay with a newly independent state surrounded by enemies and when the plight of the Palestinians was hardly grasped.

A second layer could be entitled “Saving Israel from Itself”, representing the period when a victorious nation rejected advice to avoid expansion into the territories conquered in 1967.

A third would be “Saving the Palestinians from the Israelis”, as the Palestinians forced themselves into western visibility, first by terror and then by popular resistance. The title of a fourth era, the one we have now entered, has not yet been written by history. But it is characterized by a large magnification of the potential effect on the wider world of how the conflict works out. The French thinker Dominique Moisi, for example, argued recently that “Israelis and Palestinians are endangering much more than their lives and the lives of their children”.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, there was a condemnation of the action as “universal as any I can recall”, and perhaps greater than that directed at Israel today, says Professor Howard Sachar, an expert on European attitudes toward Israel at George Washington University. But it was unaccompanied then by any serious fear of what might happen on European soil. Sachar argues that Europe’s greater concern now should lead to a recognition that it “has a moral duty to impose a kind of template on the Middle East”, because “it is folly to depend on nudging two small entities toward an agreement. They have to be pushed.”

Moisi, too, believes in European pushing, suggesting a Nato presence in Jerusalem to force the pace, and at the same time bring Americans and Europeans back into a common project.

The Jerusalem Post ludicrously described the poll as indicative of Europe’s “profound intellectual and ideological malaise”. This assumes that because Europeans are more frightened about the possible consequences for themselves of events in the Middle East, they are unfairly and unthinkingly putting more of the blame on Israel. This is the appeasement of terror argument that Sharon deployed soon after September 11 when he said Israel had no intention of becoming another Czechoslovakia.

But if fear can sometimes lead to cowardly behaviour, it can equally sharpen the sense of what is just and what is sensible. Israel, in any case, will have to accept that it is properly subject to the rigorous scrutiny of those who may suffer, as much as Israelis themselves, the bad consequences of their decisions. —Dawn/Guardian Service.

Confrontation in Lanka

NEW Delhi has the knack of waking up after the event. It does not come as a surprise that it did not know what was happening in its own backyard, Colombo. At least our foreign office spokesman was candid enough to say: “W are surprised at the sudden political development in Sri Lanka.” Once again the failure of RAW, which is supposed to keep an eye on such things, comes to light.

It was clear for some time that President Chandrika Kumaratunge was contemplating action. She was feeling uneasy over the talks that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe’s government was conducting with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). She had made her annoyance public more than once. Her understanding was that while the government had made all concessions, the LTTE had not retreated a bit.

That was true. Still the decision to suspend the parliament when the prime minister was away to America was an indiscreet and rash step. The imposition of the emergency was worse. The president could have waited for Wickremasinghe’s return. His annoyance was justified. I wonder whether she talked to him on the phone before taking the step.

She was, no doubt, within her constitutional authority to do what she did. But she went against the wishes of the people who had given Wickremasinghe a majority in the parliament on the plank of peace. However, those who are talking in terms of the president’s impeachment are only aggravating the situation when all of them should be united.

That Chandrika wanted India to play a role was clear from her two visits to Delhi in the last few months. Apparently, New Delhi was not willing to come to the fore. It was probably scared to entangle itself with yet another terrorist organization. Sensing India’s reluctance, Chandrika talked to the opposition leaders, experts and journalists in Delhi to seek their support.

I was present at one of the sittings where she complained that the LTTE was making a fool of Wickremasinghe’s government. She made no bones about her unhappiness about the unilateral concessions given to the LTTE. She accused the prime minister of giving it time to consolidate its position, train new cadres and procure weapons. She did not like the LTTE’s complete control over the north-east where its supporters lived and from where their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran operated.

When I visited Colombo earlier this year I could detect the hiatus between the president and the prime minister. She felt he had gone too far. The prime minister’s predicament was that the people had developed a vested interest in peace and had no heart in resuming hostilities. As his minister and chief negotiator GL Pieris told me then, “it takes time for a militant organization to change itself in a political party.” I wonder if his assessment about the LTTE has turned out to be correct.

I wish India had taken more active part. The LTTE could dupe Norway which brokered peace, but not New Delhi which was familiar with Prabhakaran’s ways. Not long ago, when I asked foreign minister Yashwant Sinha why India was not taking more interest than it should, he said: “We know what is happening. Norway consults us all the time. We shall come into the picture when we think it is appropriate.”

India’s high commissioner to Sri Lanka was more realistic. He had no doubts about the LTTE’s intention to gain time and build its military prowess. Obviously, his voice was not heard in the mindset of foreign office at Delhi.

That New Delhi waited for too long is obvious. The Sri Lankan prime minister went to Washington and got an assurance for support on his peace process. Why New Delhi did not come out openly on his side is sheer misunderstanding of the situation. Wickremasinghe came to Delhi before he travelled to America. Whatever this means, the proposals made by the LTTE are disappointing. They are Eelam in content, if not in name. The demand for an “interim self-governing authority for the north-east of the island of Sri Lanka” covers all aspects of governance. Chandrika’s fears have been proved right.

In the proposals made by the LTTE, there is not even a remote reference to federalism which alone can be the basis for any solution in Sri Lanka and which the LTTE seems to have accepted at one time. If the proposals were accepted in toto, they would amount to creating a separate, independent state. The proposals give everything to the LTTE, including law and order and powers to raise tax and revenue. The Sri Lankan government does not come into the picture anywhere.

Nor does Colombo have any overall authority in the north-east. I fail to understand why the Wickremasinghe government is still not coming out vehemently against the proposals. Its reaction that the LTTE document “differs in fundamental aspect” is too mild and suggests a state of mind which wants to buy peace at any cost. The prime minister’s remark from America that peace process will not be allowed to be thwarted is not realistic. Where is the process? It is only the LTTE which dictates. Any sign of surrender can have a bad effect on the army which can prove dangerous in the circumstances. India’s comment that it hoped there would be no adverse impact on the ongoing peace process in Sri Lanka is far from facing the facts. The talks can have little meaning if the LTTE is not willing to recognize Colombo as the authority superior to it. Sri Lanka’s unity is at stake. New Delhi also forgets the repercussions which the LTTE’s independent territory in the north-east can have. Tamil Nadu is only next-door and there is a lot of population on this side which is either afraid of the LTTE or sympathetic to it.

Still there is time for New Delhi to take a bolder stand. It must reiterate that India seeks a solution “within the framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.” Since New Delhi is to blame for having trained the LTTE cadre to begin with, it cannot escape its responsibility. It must use all levers of power to see that the LTTE accepts autonomy within the country. Military assistance rendered in the shape of the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) during the Rajiv Gandhi government was a disaster. Had the IPKF defeated the LTTE, even if it could not eliminate it, New Delhi’s credibility would have been higher and Colombo’s problems fewer.

India is still not conscious of the dangers the LTTE may spell. It may be willing to strike but is afraid to wound. New Delhi should at least see that the LTTE does not get any succour from the Indian soil. With Jayalalitha as the Tamil Nadu chief minister, who is dead set against the LTTE, it should be possible for both the state and the central governments to plug the avenues used for carrying goods to Jaffna. M Karunanidhi, the Tamil Nadu opposition leader, is also categorical on this matter. When I met him last at Chennai, he spared no words in condemning the LTTE.

This should make Jayalalitha’s task easier.

Whatever New Delhi’s justification to stay distant in the past, it is of no relevance to the situation prevailing in Sri Lanka today. India should realize that the LTTE’s proposals for a separate state have come at a time when even the ink on the defence pact it has signed with Sri Lanka has not gone dry.

The writer is a freelance columnist based in New Delhi.

Iraqi quagmire and the US election

SIXTEEN US soldiers killed by the Iraqi resistance in September, thirty-three killed in October — and eighteen killed in the first two days of November. More and more American casualties in the north of Iraq around Mosul, an area that was relatively free of anti-US attacks until last month. And as the situation in Iraq spins out of control, the disarray in the occupying forces grows more acute.

“Certainly these attacks seem to have been the operations of foreign fighters,” said Brigadier-General Mark Hertling, deputy commander of the 1st Armoured Division, after four suicide bombs in one day in Baghdad left dozens dead and hundreds injured. Not at all, said Major-General Raymond Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division: “My initial feeling is, this is former regime loyalists doing this with maybe minor coordination with a few people that might not be from Iraq originally.”

Meanwhile, back in Washington, US President George W. Bush explains why Iraqis and/or foreign fighters are resisting the US occupation of Iraq in terms that any child could understand: “[They] can’t stand the thought of a free society. They hate freedom. They love terror. They love to try to create fear and chaos.” Trouble is, grown-ups find this sort of explanation...well, childish. Does Mr Bush really believe that people (weird Muslim people) go around thinking to themselves: “I hate freedom. I love terror”?

It’s a mess that’s going from bad to worse — and yet, we are constantly told, it would be even worse if the United States pulled out of Iraq now. All the American and British pundits say so, even the relatively sensible ones like John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org: “The problem at the moment is that if they turn the country over to the Iraqi Governing Council...some guy with a moustache is going to come in and shoot them and say he’s in charge.”

The message is clear. Whatever we may have thought about the idea of invading Iraq in the first place, we must now support the US occupation for two or three or five years or however long it takes, because the only alternative is the return of Saddam Hussein or somebody very like him.

But is that really true? Imagine that George W. Bush and his chief political strategist Karl Rove called in some independent advisers - not the current policy-makers, who are shackled to the commitments and strategies they advocated in the past, but genuine outsiders — and asked them how to manage policy and perceptions in the twelve months left until next year’s presidential election. It’s a safe bet that they would identify the Iraq quagmire as the biggest obstacle to Mr Bush’s re-election.

If they were worth their salt, they would then recommend that he pull US forces out of Iraq now: announce that America’s mission in Iraq has been accomplished with the destruction of the Baathist regime, and ask United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to take over the task of building a civil society and a decent government in the country. ‘Declare a victory and leave,’ as they used to say in the Vietnam era.

The United Nations would still need troops to maintain order in Iraq, of course, but large numbers of blue-helmeted soldiers from other countries — mostly Muslim countries that have no direct border with Iraq, like Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Algeria — would almost certainly become available if US troops were all pulled out. It is suspicion about US motives and unwillingness to work under US command that currently keeps those countries away.

Would that stop all the bombs and ambushes? Probably not, but it would eliminate the mistrust of American motives among ordinary Iraqis that currently gives the resistance fighters a friendly and supportive environment to operate it. It would get US troops out of the firing line. And it would NOT necessarily end with some ‘guy in a moustache’ walking in and taking over.

To argue that this is the only alternative to a continued American occupation reveals a deep contempt for the aspirations and abilities of Iraqis. The Iraqi Governing Council, purged of obvious Pentagon carpet-baggers like Ahmed Chalabi, would represent most of the more powerful groups in Iraqi society. If it got real power and credibility under a UN administration, it might well succeed in holding free national elections within six months or so. Iraqis are not fools, and most want to see their country reach a safe, democratic harbour.—Copyright