THE prime minister’s meeting with President Obama in Seoul had more than one kind of outcome. There was the positive symbolism of the most high-profile meeting between the two countries since Salala, important for lowering the temperature and serving as a backdrop for more operational discussions, including the high-level military talks in Pakistan yesterday. But one substantive point also became clear: between Pakistan’s emphasis on its sovereignty and America’s emphasis on its security, upcoming negotiations on the future shape of Pakistan-US ties will not be straightforward. Given Mr Obama’s prioritisation on Tuesday of the need to protect the US from terrorist attacks, several recommendations made by the national security committee could become roadblocks if approved by parliament, including an end to drone strikes, no boots on the ground even in hot pursuit, no covert operations and increased transparency about American spies in Pakistan.

What makes all of this trickier is, of course, the ongoing debate in parliament over these and other recommendations. On balance it is a good thing that foreign policy is being hashed out by elected representatives, even if the military ends up shaping ties to a greater extent than is publicly apparent. And such a process inevitably means disagreement and debate. But the opposition’s approach in the joint sitting so far suggests that the process of defining ties will be even more complicated than the Gilani-Obama meeting indicates. There is the PML-N flavour of resistance, which insists on safeguarding national sovereignty and will make it tougher to tone down some of the recommendations. And then there is the more extreme and unhelpful opposition of the JUI-F variety, which outright opposes the resumption of Nato supplies. The politics of these parties in an election year means that a nuanced and realistic parliamentary resolution will not pass smoothly.

What all of this implies is that both countries will have to get less stubborn and more pragmatic. Pakistan will have to conduct a realistic cost-benefit analysis of its demands, keeping in mind its need to run the economy, prevent cross-border infiltration from Afghanistan, have input into the process of shaping Afghanistan’s future, and sincerely combat terrorism and militancy. The US, too, needs Pakistan’s help with the difficult Afghan reconciliation process and in combating terrorists that could use Pakistani territory for attacks against it. That would mean, for instance, Pakistan permitting selec-ted drone strikes carried out with its input and approval, and the US trusting Pakistan enough to plan strikes jointly. That is just one example, but a clear-eyed view of the relationship makes it plain that such compromises will be necessary.