DOES poverty have anything to do with militancy in Pakistan's Pakhtun belt? This question attracted much focus a few years ago when the insurgency inflicted the Malakand division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Ostensibly, followers of the firebrand cleric Mullah Fazlullah rose up to implement the Sharia in Swat. But, their main target was the land-owning local elites khans many of whom were killed and whose property was destroyed.

Subsequently, scores of NGOs and think tanks initiated surveys and distributed questionnaires to help seek an answer to this puzzle. Political observers were eager to establish the link between the killing spree and poverty in the troubled swaths of Swat and Fata. A vocal section of analysts abandoned the argument that declared militancy a byproduct of jihadi ideology and nothing else.

One cannot contradict their findingsand at the same time it would not be fair to blame the analysts for connecting the wrong dots. Every such argument has its own context and research objective.

Nevertheless, the trend a profitableone of oversimplifying complex phenomena has become so common in Pakistan thatit has confused theissue of militancy altogether.

Most importantly, this trend does not hold any agency responsible for the ongoing violence in the region. Nor does it help to address the symbiotic relationship between religious extremism and factors such as organised crime, a pervading sense of deprivation among the youth, the role of institutions in promoting radicalism and the state's willingness to outsource its monopoly on violence etc.

More misleading of all has been the dominant official narrative, which holds militancy as an imported phenomenon with its roots across the border in Afghanistan. Of late, however, political observers have linked radical extremism to more pragmatic concepts such as poverty.

In a recently concluded international conference in Islamabad 'Securing a Frontline State', some researchers were of the opinion that poverty in the restive Pakhtun belt provides a reason for militancy to grow. 'The most food-insecure districts are the worst militancy-hit areas,' said Dr Abid Suleri, an expert on sustainable development.

Other scholars are cautious about accepting this argument, but they do not reject it outright. 'Yes, poverty has animportant role to play, but it is not the engine of militancy; it is the fodder,' says Faizullah Jan, a PhD fellow in the US.

Amidst both these arguments lies the fact that radical ideologues at the top may not necessarily be representing the poor, but thousands of youth constituting the rank and file of militant groups usually come from a poor background. The given context makes it vital for researchers to avoid a top-to-bottom approach in studying the increasingly political role of commanders and, instead, focus more on youngsters, who are used as tools to keep militancy thriving in the troubled parts of the country.

Militancy draws its foot soldiers mainly from the marginalised rural areas, where growing disparity has virtually paralysed the lower strata of society.

Those who failed to identify themselves with their respective social system have lost their sense of ownership as well.

When militancy was at its peak in Swat, a teacher serving in a roadside school talked of his ex-students not beingable to continue their education because of poverty, and then upon joining Fazlullah, looking upon teachers as their arch enemy. Later on, the Swat Taliban with their poor rural background blew up over 700 schools, partly, because such schools did not help them change their social status in any way.

Can we separate the issue of human development from growing insecurity? Not any more. Both are interlinked where one is causing the other. This issue has serious dimensions in Fata where no mechanism is in place even to measure the indicators of development.

Violence has become perennial, causing widespread displacements. This deplorable situation has left few options to the tribal youth other than choose between starvation and a life in IDP camps and militancy.

Awareness about the role of various state agencies in aiding and abetting a violent culture is another important issue crucial to the understanding of religious militancy. Such agencies have always set the mood for disruptive tendencies to grow. But this supportive role is usually ignored, which has helped extremist elements give a radical underpinning to the public discourse.

The role of the state agencies is combined with that of non-state religious ele-ments, including certain madressahs and religious groups, producing a mechanism that is so well-knit that nonsensical ideas often end up as the dominant discourse.

Resultantly, people start seeing a US hand behind the gas shortage, the soaring petrol prices and the general inflation in the country. This trend has resulted in an atmosphere in which emotions have superseded reason. This reactionary culture provides a fertile ground for radicalism to grow and prosper.

Of all the contributing factors, ideology at least has less to do with militancy in Fata and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Interestingly, this factor has long been associated with extremism. Had the perception been correct, young militants hailing from the Mehsud, Waziri and Afridi tribes in South Waziristan, North Waziristan and Khyber Agency would not have rallied around their respective tribal commanders. Interaction with the militants can help understand this observation, where one can find their limited worldview coloured by tribal factors andrevenge motives.

To defeat militancy, it has become indispensable to understand the culture honing extremism. The latter exists because our institutions are supportive of it, our public dis-course does not discourage it, our sense of deprivation fuels it, our intellectuals misinterpret it and our media romanticises it. More so, our researchers study militancy in a top-to-bottom context.

They are more interested in understanding what militant commanders are doing and what is on their minds. It is least important to them to find out how young foot soldiers are influencing their leadership and how a reactionary culture rooted in their sense of deprivation is influencing them at the bottom.

Strident militancy has already turned the social and administrative system upside down in Fata. The presence of a large constituency of disoriented youth makes future prospects grim. Now is the time to reconsider official priorities.

No reform agenda can serve its purpose in Fata until and unless policymakers stop thinking about tribesmen in their typical colonial way. Incorporating practical measures aimed at reforming tribal youth has become inevitable for defeating the culture of militancy.

Otherwise militancy, while it might change form, will stay institutionalised for a long time to come.

The writer teaches at the University of Peshawar.

syedirfanashraf@gmail.com