137269            1/14/2008 16:13          08ANKARA74           Embassy Ankara          SECRET          08STATE3747            "VZCZCXYZ0000

OO RUEHWEB

 

DE RUEHAK #0074 0141613

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 141613Z JAN 08

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4925

INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 4271

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1011

RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0127

RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0049

RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0081

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0979

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

"           "S E C R E T ANKARA 000074

 

SIPDIS

 

SIPDIS

 

ISN/CPI FOR ZARTMAN; ISN/CPI FOR RUSSELL; EUR/PRA FOR

FRIEDT; EUR/SE FOR MALIK; NSC FOR HAYWARD

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2033

TAGS: PARM, PREL, EWWT, SN, GM, TU, PK

SUBJECT: TURKEY: CONSIDERING ACTION ON PAKISTAN SHIPMENT,

CONCERNED ABOUT SHORT LEAD TIME

 

REF: A. STATE 3747

 

B. STATE 772

C. ANKRA 0016

 

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, Reasons 1.4 B and D

 

1. (S) We delivered ref a demarche to MFA Deputy Director General for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Ahmet Gun on January 14.  Drawing on ref a points, we urged the GOT to contact the governments of Japan and Panama to request the shipment be diverted to another port and returned to the shipper.  Reiterating points raised in response to ref b demarche (reported in ref c), Gun said he did not believe the GOT had sufficient authority to take the requested action, but said he will report the request to MFA Undersecretary Apakan.  Highlighting his concern that both ref a and b requests provided very little time for the GOT to undertake the necessary interagency coordination, Gun stressed that more lead time was necessary to allow the GOT to take action in such cases.  Gun noted that the investigations related to the shipment's export license is still ongoing, and the GOT will take appropriate action against the company responsible for the shipment if it is determined that the license was not obtained through legitimate means.  We underscored that, given the proliferation concerns related to this shipment and the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is not under full-scope IAEA safeguards, the GOT should take all necessary action to prevent the shipment from arriving Pakistan.

2. (S) We further explained that once the 123 Agreement went to Congress, Turkey's nonproliferation record would come under additional scrutiny on the Hill.  It would be beneficial for us to be able to show that Turkey had taken vigorous action in this case, and for this reason we would be interested in the outcome of Turkey's investigation into the shipment's export license.  Gun acknowledged this and assured us that Turkey takes its committments to international nonproliferation agreements seriously.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey

WILSON

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