WATER is taking centre stage in the changing geo-strategic equation of South Asia. The latest move in this direction is India’s support to Afghanistan in water-sector development and dam-building. Hydro-politics appears set to influence the foreign policy of three major players of the region, namely Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.

The Indian investment is focused on northwestern Afghanistan indicating India’s interest in the Central Asian region and support for the northern forces. Pakistan fears that India could, at a later stage, develop sufficient influence to start interfering with the flow of water from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Intense water diplomacy is now needed to rationalise water-based relationships in this area. Moreover, Iran’s aquatic ecosystems including the Sistan Delta, Lake Hamoun and some Ramsar sites are threatened by the construction of dams on the Hari Rud river in northwest Afghanistan.

India has never underestimated the significance of river waters to strengthen its geostrategic interests in the region. The recent visit of the Indian prime minister to Afghanistan and his pledge of $1.5bn in development assistance, with special interest in dam-building on the Kabul river, are significant. This commitment, apart from other heads, is meant for building 14 small and medium dams with a total water storage capacity of 7.4MAF. International financial institutions including the World Bank have agreed to provide $7.079bn for these projects.

While such a development has been taking place in Afghanistan, Indian delegations have been negotiating with their Pakistani counterparts on the Wullar barrage and the Sir Creek dispute. On Wullar, the Indians maintain that they have the right to build the barrage under all conditions, while on Sir Creek the Indians have been talking about ‘an amicable settlement’.

Pakistan and Afghanistan currently share the waters of nine rivers and their tributaries with annual flows of about 18.7MAF.

The Kabul river, a tributary of the Indus, accounts for 16.8MAF, while the Chitral river, which basically originates from Pakistan, contributes less. This river is called Kunar when it enters Afghanistan. It joins the Kabul river near Jalalabad before re-entering Pakistan.

So intertwined are the waterways and deltas and so dependent are the people on them that the development of a water resource in one country is bound to irritate the other. For example, the construction of the Salma dam on the Hari Rud river basin in northwest Afghanistan is annoying Iran because the river flows into Iran and forms the Sistan Delta. Although the dam is small and costs little, Iran fears that restrictions in the flow of water will render the delta barren, causing economic harm to 400,000 people who depend on agriculture and the goods and services provided by the wetlands.

Apart from the Tangi Wadag, Haijana, Kajab and Gat projects on the Logur Upper Kabul sub-basin on the Kabul river and the Totumdara, Panjshir, Barak and Baghdara projects on the Hari Rud-Murghab, Helmand, Panj-Amu Darya and the northern river basins, the dams that are likely to affect Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan are planned for the Lower Kabul sub-basin, including the $442m Sarobi project with the capacity to store 324,400 acre feet of water, the $1.434bn Laghman project with a water storage capacity of 233,568 acre feet and the $1.094bn Konar and Kama projects.

However, Afghanistan is a poor country with a small resource base. There is a general need to support this country and its people to overcome the enormous misfortune it has fallen into. It must be allowed full benefit of its own water resources. A recent study released by the EastWest Institute and titled Enhancing Security in Afghanistan and Central Asia through Regional Cooperation on Water: Amu Darya Basin Consultation Report also recommends an integrated basin approach to resolve water conflicts in Southwest Asia. Some US-led international organisations are currently engaged in Afghanistan under a donor-funded programme, which includes development for short- and long-term water-sector projects in the war-torn state.

Pakistan must also avail the offer of the US to facilitate Pakistan-Afghanistan talks on a bilateral water treaty as part of its efforts for trilateral water cooperation. There is a need to establish a multi-disciplinary and scientific fact-finding working group to build a mutually agreed upon hydrological knowledge base relating to the Kabul river basin and to review and negotiate hydropower and agricultural development plans that affect both countries.

Also Pakistan and Iran must help develop a mechanism to resolve water-related disputes of the present time as well as those that are likely to crop up at a future date so they can build up a strategy for joint action and an integrated basin approach for the long-term benefit of the entire region.

India’s obsession with building dams and hydro-electric plants on the western rivers of Pakistan, its dispute with Bangladesh over the Farakka Barrage and conflict with Nepal over the Mahakali may harm confidence-building measures in the region.

Some hawkish elements suggest an anti-development thesis to counter the Indian influence but the only workable formula is cooperation and partnership with Afghanistan.

In the end, it is the welfare of the people around which all policies and strategies should be formulated. Pakistan and India, Iran and Afghanistan would do well to seriously debate the advantages of working together as a region on available water resources to bring their people and governments together. This move will minimise what would otherwise be decades of wasted time.

The writer is doing doctoral research on transboundary water conflicts and river diplomacy.

zhalepoto@yahoo.com