LONDON: The past two decades of the violent history of Afghanistan shows that the mix of religion and ethnicity has played a major role in determining the course of events in that country. These two factors have played a crucial role in the creation and growth of the Taliban movement.

Many Pakhtoons supported the Taliban movement only because they belonged to their own ethnic group. At that time this dominant ethnic group of the country suffered from a leadership crisis following the overthrow of the government of Dr. Najibullah in April 1992 and which ended the centuries old Pakhtoon domination of Afghanistan.

Several thousand Pakhtoons perished in the ensuing ethnic war in Kabul, in which finally the Tajik dominated faction of the Jamiate Islami was successful in ruling Afghanistan, until overthrown by Taliban forces in 1996.

Even though the Jamiate Islami government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani established an Islamic government, this government was not acceptable to the Pakhtoons because the rulers in Kabul were not from their own ethnic group. They wanted an Islamic government dominated by Pakhtoons, who in the past have always ruled Afghanistan.

The success of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan was based around these two factors of ethnicity and religion. The Taliban leaders were fully aware of this and tried their best to capitalise on these two trends as much as possible. At the peak of the Taliban rule on Afghanistan I travelled to Kabul and other parts of the country and spent some time, trying to find out what in general people of that country desired? During that visit I talked to a large number of people, mostly Pakhtoons from Kabul and other surrounding provinces.

The question I put to them was whether they liked the rule of the Taliban?

Most of them initially avoided answering the question, until I assured them that I wouldn’t tell anything regarding this conversation to the Taliban. About 98 per cent of them gave a very simple answer.

“They (the Taliban) are ignorant but we don’t have any choice as the alternative would bring the return of non-Pakhtoons to the government in Afghanistan”.

When we look at the situation in post-Taliban Afghanistan, there again seems to be a similar leadership crisis in the Pakhtoon heartland of the country.

Mr Hamid Karzai, a Pakhtoon, was expected to fill the gap but the hopes of many Pakhtoons have been dashed after he couldn’t break the hold of the Tajik faction on the government that effectively runs the important ministries in the newly appointed government, while Mr Karzai himself seems to be merely a rubberstamp leader.

Mr Karzai’s is becoming more isolated and vulnerable by incidents like the recent killing of civilians in the US bombing in the central Oruzgan province. Only last week Mr Karzai lost one of his vice presidents, Abdul Qadir, a prominent Pakhtoon tribal leader. The assassination of Qadir has left Karzai with no prominent Pakhtoons in his government. Many Pakhtoons now have the feeling that they are being sidelined and ruled by Tajiks, a minority ethnic group.

Pakhtoons of Afghanistan are desperate for a powerful leader who could guarantee a major role for members of their ethnic group in the government.

Another dangerous new trend is the involvement of the border Pakhtoon areas of Pakistan where Pakistani troops are fighting al Qaeda fighters. This makes the situation even worse and much more dangerous for the International Coalition.

In Afghanistan, the US should not depend merely on the air power which some times could be detrimental to its own national interests as in the case of the recent air attack in the Oruzgan province. The Americans will have to do more to convince the Pakhtoons of Afghanistan that they are not an occupying force but are there only to combat terrorism.

Many Pakhtoons are suspicious that the US is still supporting the Tajik faction that is holding several key ministries with them and has appointed many Tajiks on important positions in the government ministries. If the US-led coalition fails to alley the fears of Pakhtoons, the goal of defeating al Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban would become even more illusive.

If a general uprising take place in the Pakhtoon heartland of Afghanistan against the Americans, it would be impossible for the coalition to operate as easily as today. This situation could be detrimental to the stability of Pakistan and the goals of the coalition.

Whatever is going in Afghanistan right now, the popularity for the US is declining particularly in the Pakhtoon heartland of the country.

It is indeed is a bad news for the international coalition and a good one for the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.