President Zardari`s visit to the UN was a nebulous affair, eliciting promises though without producing tangible results. However, two fairly important things came to light during this period.

The US was not going to budge on its policy on the war on terror in this region, Pakistan`s precious sovereignty notwithstanding. Yet, at the same time, it was more than ready with a show of paternalistic indulgence towards our fledgling democracy.

But that was all. If our president had gone to the US with high hopes, these were destined to be dashed. What he encountered there was a display of strangely hollow tokenism rather than anything else.

Given that the time was out of joint and the US administration was itself reeling from the effects of an ongoing recession, even the launch of the Friends of Pakistan Group by the G-8 and oil-rich countries in New York with its attendant prospects would seem to have come across as something of a rainbow.

Zardari had doubtless planned to bring the house down by drawing an analogy between the `Bhutto doctrine` and the Marshall Plan in his maiden address to the General Assembly but, partly because of the comparison being just slightly far-fetched and the Bhutto magic being — ironically — conspicuous by its absence, that did not happen.

The president should be content with the fact that the World Bank is considering giving Pakistan an economic package of $1.3777bn. Raw as he is, besides being a trifle unconvincing in what still look like `borrowed` clothes, he could hardly have expected better.

In any case, it must be understood that the west will be looking to prop up democracy in Pakistan primarily to enable it to combat militancy. So there will necessarily be strings attached to any economic support it might think fit to give which, it is reasonable to surmise, will also be of the `breadline` variety.

It would additionally help to keep an ear cocked to what the presidential hopefuls of the US are saying. In the recent televised debate with McCain, Obama, for one, did not hesitate to trot out the figures per year in terms of aid extended to Pakistan over the last seven years on account of `counter-terrorism`. By his reckoning, we have so far received a total of $10bn. And it certainly seems that, at least on the ground, there is little to show for it.

Clearly, despite the somewhat overzealous operation currently being carried out in the tribal belt, there is no denying the fact that we have so far failed to contain terror in the country. The apocalyptic bomb blast at the Islamabad Marriott alone affords ample testimony to this. Other things aside, on the basis of volume alone, it would seem — not unlike the blast at Karachi on October 18 of last year or the Liaquat Bagh episode that took away Benazir Bhutto — to have had a distinctive signature. Not at all routine, all of these seemed, in their own macabre way, to have both an especially defiant and curiously orgiastic dimension.

However, the public at large can at last claim to be wise to what is happening in this context. It does not need historiographers to explain that the war on terror is, at some level, merely a cynical racket. At the same time, it is unfortunate that certain political parties tend to add fuel to the fire by blackmailing governments of the day into going into pacifist mode where they might be inclined to act otherwise.

Tired debates on the subject of the `ownership` of the war do not help either. The truth is that war has a dynamic of its own. It cannot, properly, be `owned` by anybody. On the contrary, it assumes `ownership` of those who engage in it. The destructive process peremptorily brushes human volition aside and simply takes over.

So we in Pakistan are really `owned` by the war on terror. This applies equally to the US, Britain and other countries involved in it. Sinister though the fact is, this is something we all have to live with. When he signed on the dotted line in response to the call on the hotline from the US in 2001, Musharraf had already acquiesced to this logic. He had been duly co-opted and there was no turning back. If he squandered various opportunities to set things right, it was partly because he was a hostage of the establishment and Pakistan`s bizarre, obscurantist history.

There can be no further compromises over this issue. The `friendly fire` recently exchanged between Pakistani and Nato forces, followed by General Petraeus`s ominous forecast about the `existential threat` to Pakistan, suggest that drastic measures need to be taken to remedy a fast deteriorating situation. The US general`s observation, which was neither coded nor guarded, indicates that much more than Pakistan`s sovereignty is presently in jeopardy.

It is all very well for the president to be true to his word and consult with parliament on the war on terror but, in point of fact, time is running out in this regard for Pakistan. We had been labouring under the delusion that Iran was being singled out by the west for punitive action but it has since come to light that, at least for the time being, our neighbour has proven just a convenient decoy.

Critical decisions have to be taken and, as supreme commander of the armed forces, it is the president`s responsibility to see to it that they are. Popular sentiment or, for that matter, blackmail should not be allowed to come in the way. The US is not asking for the moon in demanding that we make common cause with Isaf and the Afghanistan government to overcome the menace in the region.

It does not befit the president of the country either to seem to be dithering or be raising the alarm about the threat to his life at the hands of terrorists. Benazir Bhutto had returned to the country as the nemesis of the enemy within and consequently met the fate she did. She had both courage and charisma and her own incomparable standing among the world`s leaders. Zardari doubtless has his own merits. But he must not be bemoaning the hazards of a job that was never actually forced on him.