ISLAMABAD: As President General Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh met in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Panos South Asia hosted an Indo- Pakistan retreat for the media in Sri Lanka to discuss prospects of the ongoing 'composite dialogue' and the challenges that lie ahead.

Held in the stimulating environs of Sri Lanka's Bentota resort, the retreat generated animated discussions on various aspects of Indo-Pakistan relations, ranging from the historical perspective to the current nuances to the relevance of confidence-building measures to ways of carrying the peace process forward.

During the two-day interaction between senior Indian and Pakistani media representatives, pointed questions were raised and frankly debated, particularly on the issue of Kashmir and the "folly" of nuclear deterrence.

The dominant view was that never in history had there been such a groundswell for a desire for friendship between the two countries. There was acknowledgement of the fact that increased people-to-people interaction had become a factor powerful enough to enable the leaderships of the two countries to pursue resolution of bilateral issues.

Thinking 'out of the box' and continuing to engage at all levels was advocated by all. A general perception was that to move ahead on Kashmir, the leaderships of the two countries required a strong domestic base, political will and determination.

The emphasis remained on a "new approach" for tackling the issue of Kashmir. In seeking a solution to this dispute, it was repeatedly argued that the two "extremist positions" of holding a plebiscite and converting the Line of Control (LoC) into a permanent border ought to be eliminated.

Most participants agreed that neither of the two could be a viable solution. Also, that the Kashmiris were the key to a resolution and therefore their views would have to be taken into account by both sides. It was obvious that Indian circles recognized that Kashmiris would not accept a solution that was not acceptable to Pakistanis.

The two-nation theory is no longer valid was the loud and clear message from our Indian counterparts who forewarned of dire consequences in case such a formula was pursued for a settlement of Kashmir.

The Indian Muslims were most vocal in putting across this point. Any solution with a communal basis is likely to open the floodgates of violence, they warned, drawing attention to fear grounded in realities as opposed to the notion of constitutional protection.

They asserted that if any move was made in this direction then the Muslims in India would suffer enormously. "If you talk of division on the basis of religion then you will have to also take along the 12 crore Muslims living in India," said one Indian Muslim, who argued that all constitutional guarantees for Indian Muslims would go flying out of the window if it came to this.

Mr A.G. Noorani, the noted Indian columnist and legal expert who described himself as a "cold realist", insisted that the Kashmiris' sense of history was different and they yearned for unity. "Give them special status, give them greater autonomy," he advocated.

His point was to let Kashmir be a bridge rather than a gulf and look for a political framework. References were made to various models including Quebec and Turkish Cyprus for a case of devolution of power in the AJK and the IHK.

Although some Indians still have questions about President Musharraf's sincerity, they believe that on Kashmir and the jihadis, he is the man best poised to deliver.

Somehow they seem convinced that prospects of a settlement on Kashmir are better with a military government in Pakistan headed by a strong military man like Gen Musharraf.

The September 25 joint statement issued by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan at the end of their one- hour meeting in New York was seen as significant in more than one way.

President Musharraf's calling the joint statement "a great breakthrough" was read as an assurance to him by the Indian prime minister of his commitment to the dialogue process and to resolving all issues including Kashmir.

The most notable aspect of the statement was that there was no reference in it to the cross-border infiltration. While perceived as a major concession from India, it was also seen by some as an acknowledgement of Pakistan's sincere efforts to curtail cross- border movement by Kashmiris or their supporters.

Pakistan also appeared to have made a concession on timeframe and the word "dispute". Significantly in the latest joint statement Kashmir has been referred to as an 'issue' and not a 'dispute'.

One Indian journalist recalled how disagreement over the use of these words in reference to Jammu and Kashmir had led to the breakdown of Agra summit. India reportedly wanted to use 'issue' and Pakistan insisted on 'dispute'.

Both Indian and Pakistani journalists at the Panos retreat saw the reference to the gas pipeline in the joint statement as a positive development that promised economic and political dividends for both countries.

There was also mention of the 'third guest', namely, Iran, which has been pushing both Pakistan and India at every level on this pipeline project. It was felt that such a project would ease tensions and increase the pace of normalization and dispute settlement between India and Pakistan.

Another view was that it would also help in tackling the terrorism, as both countries would have a big stake in the project. One participant aptly observed that Pakistan was now positioning itself as a major transit point.

It was felt that the two governments should also focus on demilitarization and let it be part of the dialogue while the political climate was good. One participant advocated that journalists needed to challenge the policy of nuclear deterrence and focus more on its downside, that instead of dwelling in the comfort zone of deterrence, we ought to initiate a debate on the huge cost of protracted conflict and the billions of dollars spent on the so-called 'weapons of peace'.

A differing view was that deterrence essentially relates to the security equation and had created space for dialogue, that after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, there was a breakout of top-level diplomatic engagement between the political leaderships of the two countries.

Nuclear tests brought us to Lahore. Mutually assured deterrence had prevented one side from having its way and using threat of force as a means of settling disputes, it was emphasized. However, all participants supported in principle the view that moving away from the notion of deterrence, now deeply ingrained in the nuclear policy of both countries, was needed. It would be significant for the progress and prosperity of people and the region.

Perhaps the reason why deterrence dominates the security discourse between the two countries is that journalists like us do not clearly and regularly elaborate on the huge cost of protracted conflict and the cost of unsettled disputes between the two countries.

Perhaps we do not talk about this because we get so tied to our governments' position on issues of national security. Often we do not ask the hard and more fundamental questions of how countries live side by side and how we define our interaction.

The Indian journalists agreed that Pakistani journalists were far more critical of their government's foreign policy while in India journalists remained apologetic.

An explanation given by the Indians was that if journalists covering the ministry of external affairs were too critical, their news sources dried up. "If you have a big dissent then you have a hard time," remarked one journalist who regularly covers the beat.

There was general consensus that Track-II diplomacy had not taken the two countries a long distance in removing irritants. One view was that think-tanks, scholars and academics who have been part of Track-II often echoed the views of their governments. However, some participants acknowledged its merit and pointed out that it was reflected in the January 6 joint statement between India and Pakistan: it was clearly the Aziz-Mishra political track that had made it possible.

TAILPIECE: According to an Indian claim, President Musharraf wanted to incorporate in the September 25 joint statement a timeframe on Kashmir and a reference to a solution acceptable to Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. However, the Indian prime minister did not agree, apparently because by not mentioning cross-LoC infiltration, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was removing a major dialogue disagreement.