URBAN governance and local governments (LGs) are the new buzzwords in policy circles. Indeed, devolution of power has long been ignored as a constitutional principle, and this conversation is long overdue.

Any discussion on LGs must include several components. Critical elements include structure and powers of various agencies and the role of the civil service. A third, albeit ancillary, component is property taxes to finance LGs. It is important to remember that these are not separate problems. They are intricately connected to one another, and success can only be achieved by reforming LG and governance in the same vein.

An insistence on treating LG, civil service, and property tax together is easy to conceptualise. We have seen at least two separate committees on LG and civil service reform. Both are heavily staffed by civil servants — and, indeed, bureaucrats will be instrumental in the performance of new systems that may be formulated. The third component — taxes — is a little trickier. For now, think of it like this: if elected LGs have to rely on local property taxes for most of their expenses, long-standing problems of underreported property values can be solved politically.

If done well, LGs can help improve governance, transform the civil service and solve lacunae with property valuations.

LGs must truly localise governance through the following basic principles: maximum devolution, public representation, continuous technical capacity building and reasonable financial independence. The debate today largely concerns the levels at which these governments will operate and the responsibilities they will bear. Neighbourhood councils, smaller even than urban union councils, represent a good start by devolving political decision making to the smallest possible scale.

This brings us to the second principle, which requires more thought. Where final decisions are made will directly determine the political culture of our cities. Executive bodies that are too small-scale run the risk of never accomplishing anything of national or regional significance. At the same time, centralised decision-making at the city or provincial level can tarnish the democratic character of these governments by drowning out local voices and introducing inefficiencies.

In our context, then, we should look at localities in addition to neighbourhoods as more reasonable units for governance. Consider Chicago, for example. The contiguous metropolitan area extends over at least two dozen cities and towns, each with a population greater than 50,000 and its own elected government. An overarching body — the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning — plans for the whole metropolitan area. Executive decision-making power, however, stays with individual cities or towns, and CMAP encourages compliance by extending financial, technical and other incentives to individual LGs. All of these bodies operate within a larger framework formulated by the state of Illinois.

Chicago is the largest contiguous metropolitan area in North America, but it is not an exception. Boston is in reality more than 50 individual cities and towns, each with its own government, all coordinating with the Metropolitan Area Planning Council and operating within a framework developed by the state of Massachusetts. The broader mechanism has useful lessons for us.

The most important takeaway is this: a metropolitan area does not have to be a centrally managed, monolithic entity. Such sprawls are impossible to manage centrally and cause our cities to miss out on the advantages of large, connected markets even as challenges of megacities continue to mount. Lahore’s and Karachi’s tehsils, for example, can be independent town governments. Regional planning bodies can coordinate between and incentivise individual governments to adopt plans and projects that benefit the whole region, and also manage common services like urban transit (note that these tehsils are just an example and can be redrawn).

The third principle — that of technical capacity building — ties back to the original proposition of looking at LG and civil service reform together. Decision-making power must rest with elected representatives. The job of bureaucrats should be to advise these representatives with technical knowledge, not to make executive decisions. This shift in role would necessarily require constant training and updating of technical knowledge, alongside in-depth knowledge of the locality and region that they are assigned to serve. When tied with performance-based incentives and constant oversight by governments locally or at the centre, bureaucracy can transform from a colonial extractive project to one of democratic service provision.

Property and local taxes form the last link in this chain of reforms. LGs around the world rely on a mix of property tax, local sales tax and directed funding from the centre to function. Once taxes become a determinant of performance, local bodies would be heavily incentivised to reassess property values. Increase assessed values to collect more revenue and perform for the average voter, or risk annoying the rich voter — this would be the political question that local bodies would face and sort out on their own.

Any suggestion for reform must be contextualised, and its exact parameters determined before it can be enforced. Rural areas may present unique challenges, for example, and thus require completely different strategies. We are in no hurry to revamp the system in half-baked ways — any political government would do well to think long and hard before committing to specific measures. If done well, LGs can help improve governance, transform the civil service and solve lacunae with property valuations. Such reforms will also lead us away from MPA-/MNA-led development models that contribute to patronage, bribery, and political point-scoring across the country.

We can discuss and thrash out exact operational details as we move forward. But, in the meantime, one thing is certain: our people have been deprived of the power to decide for themselves for too long, and they deserve better.

The writer is a PhD student in urban/regional planning at the University of Illinois.
faizaanq@gmail.com
Twitter: @faizaanq

Published in Dawn, October 29th, 2018

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