KARACHI, Dec 21: The period during which court remains closed on account of vacation has to be excluded from computation for the purpose of limitation, a Sindh High Court division bench comprising Justices Shabbir Ahmed and M. Mujibullah Siddiqui held on Friday.

Dealing separately with the limitation issue in two customs appeals against the customs and excise appellate tribunal, dismissed as incompetently filed by the department’s intelligence and investigation director, the bench noted that the impugned order was passed by the tribunal on March 19,2002, a copy of the order was dispatched on the following May 10 and received by the appellant on May 13. The appeal was filed on August 5, 2002.

The respondents raised the objection that the appeals were time-barred as under Section 196 of the Customs Act, they were to be filed within 30 days, that is, by June 13,2002. Though the high court notified its closure for the summer vacation from June 3 to August 3, 2002, the relevant notification made it clear that ‘during the said period of vacation, petitions will be received daily on working days as usual’, they maintained. Accordingly, they said, Section 4 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked by the appellant to claim extension in the period of limitation.

The section provides that where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day the court reopens.

Relying on the provision, the appellant rejoined that the period of limitation expired on June 13 while the summer vacation had commenced on June 3. The appeals were filed on the first day the court reopened after the vacation, that is, August 5, 2002, and were not, therefore, hit by the law of limitation.

The SHC bench observed in its ruling: “We are of the view that Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that the period during which the court remains closed on account of vacation has to be excluded from the computation of limitation and the vacation notification issued by this court, which allowed ‘petitions to be received daily on working days as usual during the vacation’, cannot take precedence over the statutory provision, particularly when the relevant rules of this court pertaining to long vacations and holidays only require that ‘suitable arrangements’ shall be made for ‘urgent work’ during court holidays and a long vacation.

“We are of the view that an appeal is not a work of urgent nature. The mere fact that an appeal is about to become time-barred will not itself make its presentation or filing a work of urgent nature. It is also doubtful whether the term ‘petition’ as used in the vacation notification covers appeal as well.

“Therefore, we are of the view that the principle underlying the section (Section 4 of the Limitation Act) is that a party should not be prejudiced by an act of the court, namely its closure on the day when the period of limitation expires. It provides a device to overcome the closure by allowing filing of appeals on the opening day after a vacation.”