OVER the past decade, a hostile consensus has emerged in Washington against Pakistan. The main reasons for this adverse evolution are: growing Islamophobia after 9/11; visceral opposition to a Muslim nuclear weapon state; the divergence on Afghanistan; and, most importantly, Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China.

This hostile trend was first signalled by the 2006 ‘de-hyphenation’ of US relations with India and Pakistan; exacerbated by the ‘blame game’ for US failure in Afghanistan; confirmed by the 2011 US military interventions against Pakistan; and consolidated by America’s overt strategic alignment with India.

The hostile perception of Pakistan has been magnified by the incessant and sophisticated Indian political and propaganda campaign against Pakistan. Islamabad’s incoherent and timorous response to US policies, and to India’s campaign, has reinforced the anti-Pakistan ‘consensus’.

The hostile perception of Pakistan has been magnified by an Indian propaganda campaign.

Under America’s strategic cover, India has pursued its hegemonic aims in South Asia; a massive arms build-up; an aggressive posture towards Pakistan; and a brutal campaign of repression in India-held Kashmir. Modi now seeks to ‘isolate’ Pakistan on the presumption of US support.

In the circumstances, Pakistan is obliged to further strengthen its strategic relationship with China, build countervailing relationships with other powers and reduce its vulnerability to US political and economic pressure.

However, the US is still the most powerful country in the world. Like alcohol, it has the capacity to do some good and much harm. Thus, despite its grievances, Pakistan cannot afford an open confrontation with the US.

The impending inauguration of a new US administration may be an appropriate moment to explore if Pakistan can change, or at least soften, the negative Washington consensus. To do so, Pakistan will need to adopt a clear agenda, develop a coherent narrative, exercise diplomatic patience and display the political resilience required to defend its national interests.

Islamabad should first identify those core interests on which it cannot compromise: Indian hegemony; conventional and nuclear deterrence; Kashmiri self-determination; strategic relations with China.

Second, Pakistan should identify those US ‘demands’ which can be accommodated without compromising Pakistan’s vital interests, such as action against terrorism; a negotiated peace in Afghanistan; avoidance of war with India; nuclear non-proliferation.

Third, Pakistan should press for acceptance of its own objectives. The US can accommodate at least some of these without compromising its strategic interests: protection of Kashmiri human rights; elimination of Indian-Afghan sponsored terrorism in Pakistan; equal treatment on civil nuclear cooperation; access to advanced technologies; economic development.

The potential compromises should be reciprocal, negotiated in a ‘package deal’ by the two sides. Terrorism and nuclear deterrence remain central to a Pakistan-US relationship. Pakistan needs to fully explain and articulate its position on the various facets of terrorism.

One, Pakistan’s extensive internal counterterrorism campaign deserves global support which it has not received so far.

Two, after 9/11, designating the Afghan Taliban as ‘terrorists’ along with Al Qaeda was a mistake. It made the Afghan insurgency inevitable. Peace in Afghanistan can be restored only through negotiations between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban. Instead of being threatened, Pakistan should be encouraged to revive its contacts and influence with the Afghan Taliban to facilitate a negotiated peace.

Three, Pakistan has expelled the Haqqanis from almost all of Pakistan’s territory. The evidence is available, if the US wants to see it. However, peace will not be possible without the Haqqanis. Ways will have to be found to bring them into the negotiating process.

Four, the components of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are not really ‘Taliban’, and many are not Pakistanis but Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs and Arabs. The TTP is closely linked to Al Qaeda and parts of it with the so-called Islamic State. The Indian-Afghan support to the TTP threatens not only Pakistan but the global fight against terrorism.

Five, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaishe-e-Mohammad participated in the legitimate post-1989 Kashmiri freedom struggle. They were placed on the Security Council’s ‘terrorist’ list once they went ‘rogue’. However, unlike the TTP, they are not attacking Pakistan and enjoy a degree of popular support. Confronting them militarily could exacerbate terrorist violence within Pakistan. It will become easier to shut them down once there is progress in addressing the plight of the Kashmiris and the TTP threat has been eliminated.

Six, while seeking an internal political accommodation with the Baloch, Pakistan has every right to respond to Indian-sponsored terrorism in Balochistan from Afghan territory.

On nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan has adopted state-of-the-art measures to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear assets and prevent proliferation. The recent US demands that Pakistan halt its deterrence-driven deployment of theatre nuclear weapons, development of long-range missiles and production of fissile material are clearly one-sided. Pakistan could, however, consider restraint if the reason for these programmes — India’s military and missile deployments — is removed.

However, the possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is real and must be urgently addressed. This danger arises from: India’s threat to resort to a ‘limited’ war in response to a terrorist attack (which Pakistan may not be able to prevent) and the growing asymmetry in conventional weapons (which has increased Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons to ensure deterrence). In the absence of an India-Pakistan dialogue, the US can help to promote reciprocal restraint by the two countries to avoid a conflict and promote strategic stability.

Apart from a clear and imaginative approach to a dialogue on policy issues, Pakistan needs to undertake a concerted public relations campaign in the US, explaining Pakistan’s positions and perspectives, highlighting its vital role in addressing regional and global issues and responding to India’s vilification campaign.

Due to the current Sino-US strategic rivalry, the Washington consensus may not change dramatically despite Pakistan’s best efforts. Yet, if the Sino-US equation changes; if India does not adhere to US strategic goals; if Pakistan contributes to regional stability and offers new economic opportunities, the consensus in Washington may swing into greater balance between India and Pakistan.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, October 30th, 2016