THE riot of recriminations in the wake of the Aug 8 Quetta carnage shows how we lack maturity and fortitude as a nation. Both the military high command and the civilian leadership immediately referred to the bombing as a foreign conspiracy against the country’s prosperity, especially associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The state machinery, instead of admitting mistakes, identifying weaknesses, and initiating accountability, discouraged any voices holding them responsible for the most violent incident in Balochistan this year. Only the Quetta police chief was transferred. No other heads rolled despite the fact that the province is virtually under military rule for the last decade and a half.

Shaken by the tragedy, the prime minister plunged into a series of high-level meetings with the military and civilian leaderships to identify the gaps and lack of implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP). In a striking breach of protocol, the army chief publicly criticised the elected government after the two-day civ-mil stakeholders’ huddle. It clearly indicated that all is not well between the two.

Having participated in meetings held immediately after promulgation of NAP in 2015, let me say that contrary to public perception, the prime minister does ask some tough questions about non-state actors and the actions required to be taken by security agencies. He got his answers in the military command’s public rebuke against their constitutional commander-in-chief.

The prime minister, in response to the military’s ire, constituted a new NAP monitoring and implementation committee under the national security adviser (NSA) retired Lt Gen Nasser Janjua and inducted DG military operations as a member along with heads of other civilian agencies and representatives of the provincial governments.

The implementation of NAP depends on a unified response from the military and civilian elites.

Only a day later, Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan responded in parliament that the NAP implementation committee was merely an administrative body (ie a toothless organ) and both the interior ministry and National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) will continue to have an oversight role in the plan’s implementation. This public statement, in my view, is a clear indicator of fissures within the government. Let us see how things started and went wrong along the way in this internal security paradigm.

NAP was conceived as a shared responsibility between the federal and provincial governments. The military is part of the federal government; its security and intelligence agencies actively participated in drafting the counterterrorism strategy in the wake of the Dec 16 APS Peshawar tragedy. They were required to work together with the civilian departments in implementing the 20-point plan. The prime minister designated the interior minister on Jan 1, 2015 to monitor and implement the plan on his behalf by coordinating with the relevant federal ministries, the military establishment and the provincial governments.

The following task forces were constituted under the relevant federal ministers: choking terrorism financing under the finance minister; religious seminaries’ registration and regulation under the religious affairs minister (interior ministry, intelligence agencies and provincial police departments were required to assist); ban on glorification of terrorists in the media under the information minister; measures against abuse of internet and social media for the purpose of terrorism under the IT minister; dismantling terrorists’ communications network under the communications ministry ie PTA; formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees under the Safron minister, with active assistance from the foreign affairs ministry.

NAP’s key agenda was against non-state actors, that is, not allowing emergence of banned organisations under new identities. This is where the military and its intelligence agencies were required to play a major role in assisting the interior ministry and provincial governments. Apex committees were formed in the provinces with chief ministers and military commanders for action against banned militant outfits. Why is implementation of this crucial point lukewarm? Who is responsible? Citizens have a right to ask this question and they deserve an honest reply from the state security apparatus.

The federal government’s major failure lies in not strengthening Nacta. Why has the interior minister kept Nacta under him despite the legal requirement that it be placed under the prime minister as in the case of the NSA and national security division? Why has the Nacta head not been given a seat on the cabinet’s National Security Committee? Who gains by clipping the wings of this civilian anti-terrorism authority? Less said the better as some elements in the political and security establishment would not like civilian police departments and agencies to play a lead role in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

Counterterrorism and countering violent extremism are essentially law-enforcement domains in which the police should play the lead role, with civil armed forces, intelligence agencies and military playing a support role. It is teamwork that wins wars. Turf battles and information silos do not strengthen the state and democratic institutions. In fact, since 2015 a federal civilian intelligence agency has been instrumental in giving great support to the provincial CTDs in identifying, locating and arresting terrorists. No one can perform a better job than the police at the grass roots in the state’s fight against militancy. The essential point of NAP regarding reforming the criminal justice system has been sadly ignored by the federal and provincial governments.

It is unfortunate that the Protection of Pakistan Act, especially promulgated to create special courts with empowered law-enforcement and investigative agencies has been allowed to lapse. This legislation was vital to fill the gap after the military courts cease to exist in February 2017. Who is responsible for this gross negligence? Will the government go for another constitutional amendment to continue with military courts?

These questions should be raised in parliament. I support the Senate chairman’s proposal that a parliamentary committee be constituted to review NAP’s implementation. I also support the Pakistan Bar Council’s demand that the Supreme Court chief justice hold to account all the federal and provincial security institutions for what went wrong in Quetta and how to improve the fight against terrorism within constitutional and legal means. He owes it to the families of the deceased lawyers of Quetta and citizens all over Pakistan.

Will the civilian and military elites stop the blame game and unite to root out the menace of militancy from our beloved land? I still remain an optimist.

The writer is a retired police officer.

Published in Dawn, August 22nd, 2016