ASSUMING national leadership in quick succession in 2013, Prime Minister Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif moved swiftly toward a common vision of deepening bilateral strategic and economic relations.

Nawaz Sharif made it a point to visit Beijing on his first overseas trip. The interactions that followed culminated in the finalisation of a landmark agreement on $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), thus linking the two nations into an economic and regional bond to ‘unleash enormous potential for regional economic development’.

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to pursue people-centric policies that could mitigate poverty, promote social and economic development and diminish the roots of conflict. This fits with Beijing’s vision to develop its western region through Pakistan and Islamabad’s desire to lift its macroeconomic fundamentals from the ebb while taking advantage of Chinese blueprint.

It is an across the board anti-corruption campaign; in Pakistan, it is clearly selective

Both wanted an environment conducive to private investment that can prosper only on transparency, equity, and respect for fair business principles.

Before this but immediately after President Xi Jinping’s elevation to the General Secretary of Communist Party of China in the 18th National Congress in 2012, China had already embarked upon an unprecedented crackdown against corrupt state officials — what President Xi termed as ‘tigers and flies’ meaning high officials and lower-level civil servants.

The campaign was led by Xu Aisheng, Director of the Communist Party Disciplinary Inspection Office (equivalent of NAB in Pakistan) who reports directly to Wang Qishan, one of the seven members of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee.

The anti-corruption drive has so far investigated officials at all levels, irrespective of party affiliations and/or ranks — governors, mayors,ministers, security officials, bureaucrats and senior executives of the public sector companies — popularly classified as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The list of guilty officials is a ‘Who’s Who Directory’ — Zhou Yongkang, former security chief and retired Politburo Standing Committee member; Liu Zhijun, former Minister Railway; Liao Yongyuan, former senior official of Petro China; CaiZhefu; former senior executive of State Grid; and a former regional head of ZTE.

Most officials found guilty have been removed from office, investigated and punished severely. State enterprises officials such as Ma Zehua, Chairman COSCO (a large state owned shipping company) have been severely reprimanded for failing to address ‘socio economic’ issues while taking strategic measures such as the possible merger with another state owned shipping company.

By one estimate, more than 400,000 officials have been disciplined and another 200,000 prosecuted in the courts. The campaign took an even serious turn when US State Department recently confirmed that China’s legal authorities have provided a list of 150 corrupt officials believed to be hiding in the USA — US State Department committed to cooperate to help extradite them.

The anti-corruption campaign in China has many lessons for Pakistan considering that a similar half hearted campaign is underway and in the past many botched attempts have been witnessed. Whereas, in China, the senior most leadership has thrown its weight behind the anti-corruption campaign, in Pakistan, the investigating department has been directly warned from the top to ‘take it easy’.

In China, it is an across the board anti-corruption campaign. In Pakistan, it is clearly selective. Effectively, their unambiguous message is one of seriousness of purpose. The Chinese Government has empowered their investigating institution(s), we are trying hard to curtail the powers of the investigating agency and its officials. Today’s leadership in China is unequivocally clear about the definition of the ‘conflict of interest’ and is not burdened by its weight; conversely, ours is tainted by such conflicts.

Considering that many of the Chinese SOEs, whose officials have been found guilty or are under investigation, are also pursuing mega projects in Pakistan, it should be a source of concern and challenge for our government. If they are being investigated elsewhere for corruption including the country of origin, how do we ensure an above board and transparent dealings by such companies in Pakistan, knowing the strength of our officials.

Does the relevant Pakistani authority vet such entities or our own unscrupulous officials and decision makers who willingly become their partners? So far, our track record has been far from excellent.

In one case for example, a large telecom enterprise was able through its subsidiary to secure a letter of interest and hundreds of kanals of land in Punjab for a large solar park and benefited from other projects within Pakistan. Half-way down, someone realised the extravagance of the tariff and put his foot down to limit it by one-third.

The company is facing criminal investigation in more than 20 countries around the world for indulging in bribes, not completing projects in time and misrepresenting during the bidding process.

Its officials face corruption charges in Zambia where the government cancelled a $210m CCTV cameras contract.

In Nigeria, the same firm is under investigation for a $470m, similar security surveillance contract. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, with more than $800bn investments, decided in 2013 not to invest in that Chinese company as part of its portfolio due to the reputational risks.

Does this pose a reputation and financial risk to Pakistan government, especially in case of public sector projects?

Even a couple of billion dollars off $46vbn CPEC is enormous an amount. Every dollar of the Chinese investment lost to corruption means a loss for the Chinese public

exchequer as well as an extra burden on the people of Pakistan Streng­thening of institutional arrangements and vigilance is of utmost importance from the beginning.

Published in Dawn, Business & Finance weekly, March 7th, 2016