AS a general principle, states which remain at peace with their neighbours stand better chances of development, growth, peace and prosperity. The fact that neighbouring countries usually have differences over border issues and dichotomies of political interests cannot be ignored.

However, what has helped keep the two apparently opposing realities from spilling over into conflict zone is the formation of regional blocs. The best example is the formation of the European Union, which has not only provided space for neighbouring countries to negotiate conflicting interests but has also opened up new avenues of political, economic and strategic cooperation.

Keeping this in view, we can disentangle the love-hate relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While there are only main areas of conflicting interests, there are a dozen in which both countries can cooperate to the advantage of their peoples. The two areas of concern are the Durand Line and the fear of uprising among ethnic Pakhtuns living on both its sides. These have clouded understanding on myriad other converging interests.

One of the main stumbling blocks that hinders understanding is the rampant stereotyping promoted by sections of the media and political elite in both countries. Stereotyping precludes understanding of the real challenges and opportunities of cooperation.

The first stereotype that has become endemic in political, security and academic circles in Pakistan is the perception of a homogenous Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ‘Northern Alliance’ as opposed to ethnic Pakhtuns in the east and south of Afghanistan. It is perceived that the Northern Alliance represents pro-Indian and anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan and the Taliban represent pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian forces. It is further perceived that the Taliban represent the ethnic Pakhtun population, Pakhtun nationalist feelings and the Pakhtun yearning for liberation. Nothing can be further from the truth.

The Northern Alliance came into being in 1996 to fight the incumbent Taliban administration in Kabul and broke apart in 2001. Though it mostly consisted of Tajik and Uzbek warlords, it also had Pakhtun representation. Abdul Qadir, a well-known Afghan leader of Nangarhar, an eastern province of Afghanistan, was also a part of the Northern Alliance. At present, the Taliban are not only fighting the Afghan administration dominated by ethnic Pakhtuns but are also in a minority in south and east Afghanistan.

We can make a credible prediction that even if there is civil war in the near future, it will be fought between the Taliban and an alliance of Pakhtun tribes in east and south Afghanistan and the future Afghan administration. We can predict this on the basis of the fact that two among the three strong candidates of Saturday’s presidential elections, Ashraf Ghani and Zalmai Rassoul, were ethnic Pakhtuns from southern Afghanistan. The third strong candidate — Abdullah Abdullah — is half-Pakhtun, half-Tajik.

The most important fact in this regard is that the Northern Alliance ceased to exist after 2001.

The second stereotype seems to be a corollary of the first. A section of the Pakistani mainstream media is busy depicting Afghanistan’s democratic transition as chaotic and one that lacks credibility due to the Afghan Taliban’s capacity to disrupt elections. There are two realities ignored in this sweeping generalisation.

First, whatever the result and aftermath of the current elections, the fact that Afghans voted in large numbers on Saturday has been confirmed. And in the run-up to the polls, large public meetings were held regularly by candidates in urban and rural Afghanistan.

Second, if we compare the current security situation in Afghanistan to the one in Pakistan during the 2013 elections, we can reach some conclusions. Three months before the elections in Pakistan and a few days after, “298 people lost their lives and 885 others were injured between January 1 and May 15 across Pakistan in 148 reported terrorist attacks on political leaders and workers, and voters, and 97 incidents of political violence” according to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies.

Moreover, three political parties in Pakistan were virtually blocked out of the electioneering process in KP, Karachi and Balochistan. On the contrary, we saw far fewer attacks and casualties and greater participation of people over the past three months in Afghanistan in the run-up to polls there.

Importantly, women and youth participation seemed far higher. In fact, one of the strong presidential candidates had a woman running mate in the elections.

Academia, media and political and security elite in Pakistan need to rethink their understanding of the importance of Afghanistan as an independent sovereign state. The people of both Pakistan and Afghanistan can benefit from a realistic understanding of the complex relationship between their two countries.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

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