THE Generalissimo's address makes at least one thing clear. The military is not about to leave in a hurry. It is here to stay. The good thing is this message came through without any of the rank hypocrisy a nation fooled once too often will forever associate with that earlier commander of the faithful, General Zia-ul-Haq. If anything, the message was brutally frank: no return to a "sham" democracy. The political class, depressed and dispirited as it is, can read what meaning it likes into this.

There is no harm, however, in taking note, if only for academic reasons, of the major contradiction sitting astride this latest takeover. The army says, and rightly so, that it had not planned it and that Sharifian adventurism forced its hands. Not only is this correct. It is also true that if the army had not acted the way it did, it would have stood guilty in its own eyes. But having conceded this much, it follows that the army action should have fitted the provocation and not exceeded it as it obviously has done. After foiling Nawaz Sharif's conspiracy, and taking the adventurists to task, the army should have returned to barracks, satisfied that it had repelled a move which, if successful, would have shaken the Republic's foundations.

But this argument is scholastic in nature and removed from reality. When power flows from the barrel of a gun it comes accompanied with its own logic. Newspaper editorials, however fancifully written, or resolutions, however angrily worded, passed by political parties out in the cold leave little impression on this logic. If it is affected by anything it is the pressure of adverse circumstances: if the domestic situation spins out of control, if the economic situation gets tough (that is, tougher than it is already) and if the world turns hostile.

In the present instance, however, the American ambassador, obviously a smart person and living in the real world, has given a certificate of approval to the new regime and the regime, no doubt overcome by a sense of relief, has run this certificate at length on television. So much for the fearless independence of our proud nation. Even President Clinton has given a cautious nod of approval to Pakistan's new rulers. Which only proves that whatever State Department spokesmen might say for public consumption, it is pragmatism which still rules the world. And in these matters always will.At home the military face no problem at all. If anything, the rush of support for them in these early days is almost embarrassing since it shows what a mess we have made of our democracy. The political parties are discredited and in disarray and the people, bitten once too often, have little sympathy for their travails. Benazir Bhutto in statement after statement is begging to be taken into the army's confidence but to her chagrin, and the quiet delight of most Pakistanis, her overtures are being met by an indifferent silence.

The stalwarts of the Muslim League, afraid even of their shadows, are temperamentally averse to any kind of political defiance. Expect no thoughts of insurrection from them. As to how Nawaz Sharif and his inner coterie, thought of upstaging the army will remain a mystery forever. Nawaz Sharif was the greatest political product the army ever produced. And here he was about to do a Hitler on his generals. With his inside view of events Mushahid has the chance of writing a bestseller.

The religious parties, preaching and practising jehad in Afghanistan and Kashmir, will not oppose the army, certainly not an army which has nurtured them and which, lest they forget, scaled the heights of Kargil. Ironically, therefore, it is General Musharraf who is favourably placed to moderate if not curb the fundamentalist tendencies in Pakistani society which so feed western nightmares. Also the best person, since he cannot be accused of softness towards India, to de-escalate tensions with India. This would be a classic variation on the Nixon theme: a conservative, if not an outright hawk, making peace with the enemy. The Americans at least seem to have caught on to the advantages of dealing with the new military set-up and, if they are on board, what remains of the bite of the IMF and the World Bank?

So with things looking up for the military it is foolish even to think that in these early days they would be thinking in terms of a time-frame for a return to democracy. On their minds is the thought of cleaning up the national stables and of ushering in an era of reform. How they go about this task, or whether they even fully comprehend its complexity, is another matter. But it is there. Is Ataturk the model before the Generalissimo? Vaguely, perhaps yes. General Pervez Musharraf even speaks Turkish. So here we have a profound affinity right from the start.

At this point, the case for cynicism or perhaps caution is easily set forth. The sound of jackboots marching into the political arena is not a rarity in Pakistan. Generals have come before, promised all kinds of things and then, overwhelmed by problems beyond their ability to comprehend let alone resolve, have fled in ignominy leaving a trail of disaster behind them. Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, a trio of characters which has been deadly for Pakistan. What reason to believe Musharraf will be any different?

Furthermore, not to mince words, the intellectual tradition in the Pakistan army, apart from some notable individual exceptions, has never been very strong. Because of this the army's grasp of the causes of social and political decline has seldom been profound. What compelling reason to suppose it will be any different this time?

Pakistan's problems are complex. The army's solutions, to judge by the taste of them we have had in previous spells of military rule, are usually over-simplistic. Let us also not forget that this is the same command which at Nawaz Sharif's bidding went into areas - WAPDA, KESC, road-building, police training - it had no business entering. The same army command which misread, to put it no stronger than that, the entire Kargil situation is now expected to acquire political sophistication and address itself to the social, administrative and economic malaise which afflicts the country. Which is not to say the task is impossible. But for its accomplishment it will require more clarity and vision than the military in its previous Ataturk incarnations ever betrayed.

There are three things ordinary people in Pakistan urgently want (to the extent of course that a journalist can presume to speak on behalf of the people). First, an improvement in their economic condition by which is meant not wine and cheese on the table but simply more job opportunities and an easing of inflation. This calls for a revival, howsoever slight, of the economy.

Second, a sense of security or the feeling that in their dealings with the state - whether in the form of the thana, the tehsil, the kutchery, WAPDA or the identity card office - they will get justice. This requires overhauling the administrative machinery.

Third, across-the-board accountability, swift and ruthless and with no exceptions dictated by political expediency.

These are simple desires, not tall expectations, which says a lot about the narrow straits to which Pakistan has been reduced. But even satisfying these basic wants will require more than bluster and tough-sounding pronouncements. Reviving economic activity, reforming the administration and setting in motion the wheels of justice: it sounds so simple yet in history these tasks, more inter-connected than we might suppose, have tested the wisdom of the greatest kings. Will General Musharraf succeed where his great predecessors - Ayub, Yahya and Zia - so miserably failed? In trying to answer this question let us always bear in mind the sobering thought that in the beginning the army is always looked upon as the solution. Very soon it is perceived as part of the problem.

Two factors, however, are strongly in Musharraf's favour. Greatness and the mantle of Ataturk have been thrust on him. For this he must thank Nawaz Sharif and his closest gauleiters. Otherwise he is not burdened by any messianic baggage as Ayub Khan was when he walked the floor of his Claridge's suite and thought how utterly urgent it was for him to step into the political arena and save Pakistan. Half the world's miseries can be traced to shallow reformers of this sort and if General Musharraf is not of this mould, and it seems he is not, it is no small cause for mercy.

Secondly, no spectre sits at his feast as Bhutto's ghost sat at Zia-ul-Haq's table. Half the contortions that Zia as a ruler went into were dictated by the need to exorcise that ghost. Musharraf is under no such compulsion. He can pursue his agenda, if he has one, without having to look over his shoulder all the time. Nawaz Sharif will haunt no one. This is one measure of his ordinariness and one measure of Pakistan's peculiar destiny that it should have remained in thrall to such a figure.

Anyway, we are once again trapped in circumstances from which there will be no getting away in a hurry. True, Pakistan's democrats blew their chances. Of this there should not be the slightest doubt. In any country it would be hard to pick a duo more conspicuously inept and corrupt than that of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. And to think that an entire decade and some more of our history was dominated by these two figures.

But it is also true that the record whose scratchy sounds we are now hearing has been played many times before. Will it engender a new mood this time? If only one could divine the future.