I HAVE before me a yellowing copy of a special 12-page issue of The Observer dated March 16, 2003. Put together by a team of reporters, it is titled ‘The path to war’, and gives details about the preparations for the invasion of Iraq.

What a difference four years can make. This time in 2003, we were all glued to our TV sets, watching American cruise missiles and bombers rain death and destruction on Baghdad. ‘Shock and awe’, the Americans called their blitzkrieg, and it certainly shocked us. Almost as bad as the sight and sounds of human suffering brought into our living rooms by CNN, BBC and Al-Jazeera was the triumphant rhetoric emanating from western cheerleaders in support of the war.

The Observer special report ends with these fateful words:

“The soldiers are waiting for the sky to light up any day soon, and the earth to shudder under the onslaught of bombs and missiles and shell-fire. Troops will start moving. War will begin. And then? Nobody – not soldiers, not politicians, not diplomats, not fathers or mothers, not sons or daughters – knows what will happen after the fighting begins. Not for sure. They will find out when it is over.”

Four years later, it’s still not over. Well over 150,000 Iraqi and 3,000 American lives later, the struggle continues. But the nature of the war has morphed from a straightforward invasion and occupation into a multi-dimensional conflict without end. Firstly, it is a struggle to evict the hated foreign invaders. Secondly, it is a sectarian war that threatens to split Iraq into its three pre-colonial, Ottoman entities. Thirdly, there is a tussle going on over Iraq’s huge oil reserves. Fourthly, the Americans are engaged in an ideological struggle with the Iranians on Iraqi soil.

The different outcomes of these different campaigns will determine the future of the region for a long time to come. Indeed, the whole world is walking a tightrope as Washington and Tel Aviv contemplate an attack on Iran. Should this come to pass, the post-Second World War global structure will be changed beyond recognition.

On the eve of the war on Iraq, the United States was master of all it surveyed, a behemoth wounded on 9/11. Its might and fury were awesome to behold. The French had coined a word to describe America: ‘the hyper-power’.

With a defence budget greater than the rest of the world’s put together, it seemed that the Iraqis would succumb just as the Afghans had seemed to.

To repeat myself: what a difference four years can make. Suddenly, competing poles have emerged in Beijing, Tehran and Moscow. South America is no longer Washington’s backyard. The statements emanating from the White House and the State Department are now pleading for discourse and diplomacy. And many of those who backed the war now regret their support for Bush and Blair.

Indeed, the war is driving the political agenda in the United States and Britain. Never have the two war-leaders been as deeply unpopular.

These domestic, regional and international changes are the direct outcome of the fierce resistance American forces are facing in Iraq. Had the Washington-led alliance triumphed in its efforts to subdue Iraq, I have little doubt it would have set its sights on Iran as the next target. And although the Iraqis are suffering terribly, the fact is that their resistance has severely eroded both American moral authority, and its global power.

The recent settlement reached with North Korea is one outcome of this new reality. Had the Pentagon not been already over-stretched, it is doubtful the Americans would have negotiated with Pyongyang over its nuclear programme. This may yet be a model for Washington’s relations with Tehran, provided, of course, that President Ahmadinejad can bring himself to control his tongue.

Ironically, the American invasion of Iraq is a major factor behind the fierce independence Chavez, Putin and Ahmadinejad can now afford to demonstrate. All three are major oil exporters, and the Iraq war has pushed up prices to their present high levels. This has filled the exchequers of the very states Washington wanted to intimidate.

The law of unintended consequences has also made Iran the biggest winner of the conflict. Not only has its arch-enemy in Baghdad been overthrown and executed, the Sunni Taliban have been replaced by a friendlier government in Kabul.

The Shias now have a major say in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the Shia majority is in power. In Lebanon, the Shia Hezbollah has gained a great deal of influence following the misjudged Israeli attack last year.

Thus the last four years have radically transformed the regional scenario in Tehran’s favour. Obviously, this is the last thing the neo-cons in Washington would have wanted. American weakness has had other side-effects as its great crusade to spread democracy in the Middle East has come to a grinding halt.

After Hamas won the elections in Palestine, and the Islamic Brotherhood did very well in Egypt, despite Hosni Mubarak’s unsubtle meddling in the elections, Washington’s enthusiasm for a democratic Middle East has waned. And in Saudi Arabia, with rising oil revenues and an American leadership that suddenly needs Riyadh’s support, there is no longer any urgency to reform a mediaeval political system.

Leaders often think that political power and influence are infinite commodities, only to discover that they should be frugally spent. When Bush and Blair took their countries to war, they used subterfuge and fear to get their countrymen behind them. But once exposed, they lost their popularity together with their moral authority.

Internationally, once America was perceived as being bogged down and militarily over-stretched in Iraq, is rivals began taking this weakness into account. American power can only deter as long as it is seen to be available. But once the American people turn against war, and there are few troops left to deploy, nobody will take Washington’s threats seriously.

It is not always as easy to find a way out of a morass once you have blundered in. This is Washington’s dilemma: how to emerge from Iraq without losing all credibility as a war-torn nation breaks apart? And the longer it remains, the more it loses in blood, treasure and moral authority.

What a difference four years can make…