When I visit Lahore, I usually stay with my old friend, Ijaz ul Hasan. One of the finest painters in Pakistan, he is also a wonderful conversationalist (even though he doesn't always finish his sentences).

As I arrived at his house from the airport last weekend, his wife Mussarat told me he had moved to a friend's as the police had arrived the night before, wanting to arrest him. The reason, of course, was that Ijaz is a senior member of the Pakistan People's Party, and the government was rounding up politicians who were determined to hold a Pakistan Day rally at the traditional site of Mochi Gate. I went across to the friend's house and spent a very convivial evening there.

The next morning, this newspaper on its front page had a photograph of a senior politician being arrested, while the back page showed Qazi Hussain Ahmad addressing a large rally in Rawalpindi. This juxtaposition neatly encapsulates the perception that General Musharraf is backing right-wing political parties, even though the reality is that the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) was asked to move the venue of its meeting to another site, but was determined to provoke a confrontation.

This minor fracas spotlights the slippery slope this military government is on as it gropes towards the contradictory goals of restoring democracy while keeping General Musharraf at the helm of affairs as a powerful president. Consider the contradictions that have surfaced.

Firstly, the Supreme Court ruling giving the general a maximum of three years in power stipulated that no significant changes in the Constitution would be permitted. However, the position of the president in this document is that of figurehead, and virtually all real power is with the elected prime minister. To enable General Musharraf realize his ambition to not only stay on for another five years, but also render the elected prime minister impotent, will require some very creative bending of constitutional provisions and the Supreme Court judgement. Compounding the problem is the law that bars serving civil or military officers from contesting elections.

Secondly, the route currently being explored to give the general five years is that of a referendum chosen by his military predecessor, General Zia, in 1984. On that occasion, we were asked if we supported an Islamic dispensation in the land; a 'yes' vote meant that we wanted the dictator to rule for another five years. Talk about a loaded question! While Zia was no stickler for legal niceties, times have changed; in any case, it is difficult to formulate a question to the effect that if we want economic reforms, then Musharraf should stay for another five years.

Also, while the Constitution has a provision for consulting the people through a referendum, it is for specific issues, not for electing an individual. Nor can the recently elected councillors be used for the purpose of an electoral college, the other option currently under examination. Legalities aside, there is also the need for legitimacy: we all remember the farcical referendum of 1984 in which, despite the pathetically low turnout, the government claimed a massive endorsement for Zia. The fact is that in Pakistan, voters come to polling booths to support their candidates and parties, not for some abstract idea emanating from Islamabad.

Thirdly, how does Musharraf ensure that his precious devolution plan will survive the changes that will be set into motion after the elections? As it is, all the major political parties have rejected the system despite paying lip service to the underlying idea of transferring power to local bodies. The reality is that under this system, most provincial ministers will have very little clout and will therefore sabotage it. So although the plan may look fine on paper, it will not last long unless it is supported by its authors.

As things stand, this will spark off an immediate conflict between the councillors and the winners of the national and provincial elections on the one hand, and the latter and General Musharraf on the other. In this struggle, the bureaucracy is likely to side with the elected politicians as they have been rendered largely irrelevant under the devolution plan.

Then there is the question of jobs for the boys: currently, the military government has packed the bureaucracy and state corporations with serving and retired military officers. Elected politicians will naturally want to position people loyal to them in these slots. Over the years, the military has become a significant vested interest in its own right, running large corporations manned by retired officers. Also, General Musharraf will probably wish to retain some of his cabinet ministers, while elected politicians will naturally want to send them packing.

Given this potential minefield, it is not surprising that Musharraf should want a pliable political party to get elected with a prime minister who will do his bidding. And here lies the rub: currently, most political observers agree that given the shambles the Muslim League is in (can you recall its many factions?), the PPP is most likely to emerge with the biggest number of seats and therefore in the best position to form a government, with or without Benazir Bhutto. However, she is unlikely to do a deal with this government and confer legitimacy on Musharraf unless he withdraws the cases against her and her husband, Asif Zardari.

The intense manoeuvring currently going on in Islamabad is aimed at somehow keeping the PPP out, even though sources very close to Musharraf assert that while the party is acceptable, Ms Bhutto is not; however, any nominee of hers could become prime minister if the party wins. Nevertheless, it is an open secret that the rump faction of the Muslim League led by the Chaudris of Gujrat is the king's party and is the GHQ's first choice.

But this bid to keep the PPP out has certain unpleasant consequences: it forces the government to go easy on the religious parties at a time when it stands committed to crack down on extremism. Thus, 1300 activists out of the 2000 arrested a couple of months ago have already been released, and Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of the Jaish-i-Muhammad, has been transferred from jail to his house, and his family is being paid 10,000 rupees a months "sustenance allowance".

To further woo the religious parties, Musharraf has expressed his displeasure over the celebrations that went on at Basant, and PTV has been instructed to stop airing dancing. It seems that the slight liberalization of cultural expression that was allowed recently has ground to a halt.

But as Musharraf tries to reconcile the many contradictions his conflicting goals have given rise to, he would do well to remember that several of his predecessors have tried to control and manage the democratic process, but all they succeeded in doing was to further destabilize the system.