AFTER a year and a half of untrammelled power, clearly there is much that is wrong with the Musharraf government, as indeed there would be with any mortal dispensation especially of the subcontinental variety.

The principal criticism that can be brought against it has to do with the limitations of the Pakistan army as a political institution. The fighting doctrine of the army rests on waging short and snappy wars. For anything lasting longer than 17 days it has not shown any convincing stamina. Yet the same army on assuming political power settles into a pace more appropriate to a lengthy war of attrition than to a short and decisive blitzkrieg.

Herein lies a paradox. A Cromwellian intervention can only be justified on the grounds that it will achieve swift results and cut through the nonsense of established procedures. But when instead of seeking vindication in swiftness a military government is like an elephant on the march, much of its rationale disappears.

But this important caveat notwithstanding, in important areas the Musharraf government could have done much worse. It could have taken the easy route of military repression. In knee-jerk fashion it could have suppressed press freedom. By succumbing to neither temptation it has achieved two purposes, albeit unwittingly. It has acquired a benign image for itself and gained an important window on public opinion.

In Pakistan's current milieu no clumsy or ill-conceived action of the government's goes unpunished. It is easy to think that a military government has a thick hide and is impervious to what people say about it. But this impression is false. Criticism wounds and fierce criticism damages self-esteem. To the extent that the generals have taken often savage criticism on their chins, and have even modified their behaviour under its impact, the credit goes to them.

In what respects has behaviour been modified? Consider these few examples. Lt-Gen Haider, the interior minister, is less free with his shoot-from-the-hip declarations about curbing this and suppressing that. Realizing the fiasco of the tax survey drive of last summer, the military government is less keen to ruffle the feathers of the business community, even as it continues to play ball with the IMF. The change of guard at the National Accountability Bureau is a step in the same direction.Towards the religious parties and so-called jihadi outfits the government's tone has changed. While the Afghan and Kashmir policies remain intact, the government is less willing to be blackmailed by these outfits. There is also a blushing realization in government quarters that spurious religious knights like the Pontiff of Munara have made a monkey of the government besides giving the country a bad international image.

As far as relations with India are concerned, Musharraf, with his repeated calls for a dialogue, sounds very much the peacenik. Gone is the hawkish stridency which he displayed soon after coming to power. In the light of this change it is not far-fetched to say that the Kargil Boys have come out of the shadows of that doomed adventure. To the extent that this outcome reveals anything, it is the mental resilience of Pakistan's Commando-General.

Does this mean Pakistan is out of the woods? Certainly not. But it means that from the depressing lows of last summer and winter the Musharraf government's graph has risen. While all is not well (when is it ever?), this much at least can be hazarded that just as the initial hopes attached to the military takeover were exaggerated, the later debunking of the Musharraf government was likewise an exercise in premature wishfulness.

True, in many respects this government continues to act like a college of innocents. But as time passes there seems to be a method to its simplicity. As that maiden whose name was Bholi (Innocent) said to the gentleman whose advances left little doubt about his intentions, "I may be Bholi but not that bholi."

Consider in the above context the fury that seized the Moral Middle Class when Nawaz Sharif and kin were packed off into exile. Steaming with indignation, its members felt betrayed. We are an impulsive people and one of our more pronounced traits is to rush to judgment. Distance lends perspective, however. So it has proved in the case of Nawaz Sharif's exile. He and his family have saved their skins by opting for flight over resistance. But they have done grievous harm to their political standing. Is any fight left in the PML-N? And what about the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy? The wind has been taken out of its sails.

Much has also been made of the Supreme Court's partial relief to Benazir and Zardari in the SGS-Cotecna reference with the case now remanded for retrial. But Benazir is no fool and realizes that unless the decks are completely cleared she cannot risk coming to Pakistan. In any event, in recent days she has made placatory noises about the military. But is the Musharraf government under any compulsion to accept her overtures? With the political field desiccated, the Muslim League split and the PPP rudderless, the initiative lies squarely with the generals and not Pakistan's demoralized and discredited politicians.In a recent article Pakistan's other great innocent, Imran Khan, has complained that the ban on outdoor political activity inhibits the ability of the smaller parties, like his Tehrik-i-Insaf, to emerge as alternatives to the established political order. Obviously, Imran does not know his history well. The founding of the PPP in 1967, and its subsequent emergence as a major political force, occurred against the backdrop of far severer restrictions than exist at present. While touring the country Bhutto could address only indoor meetings without the help of loudspeakers. In the press his voice was barely heard. Yet, despite these limitations, he managed a feat of political mobilization which remains unmatched to this day.

If people are not willing to listen to the political parties, whose fault is it? Pakistan faces not only a crisis of leadership but also one of faith and trust. The old idols have broken down and there is nothing to take their place.

This does not mean the Musharraf government has all the answers. In many respects it remains a bungling dispensation, learning on the job and indulging in costly experimentation. But the initiative is with it. When it gives its political award who will oppose it? What have the political parties to offer? At a time when the political parties are hard-pressed to define their relevance, does it behove them to talk of exit strategies for the military? They should be thinking of survival strategies for themselves.

But the most burning question of all remains. Although we know who is winning the on-going war of attrition, for whose benefit is it being fought: the army or the people? The army's political victory means nothing if the country's condition does not turn. Suppose Musharraf is in power not just for the next year and a half but for much longer. (To think how long Ayub and Zia remained at the helm of affairs is enough to send a shudder down the toughest spine.) But if he rules and nothing else much changes what will be the point of it all?

If this government has a benign and liberal face, it is an accident of history related to the personalities of this coup rather than to anything deep-rooted in the army. Unchecked rule by anyone has spelt disaster for Pakistan before. We don't need to go down that route again.

Musharraf is moving towards civilianization or a form of it. The Supreme Court's order stressing elections within three years is a deadline the generals must meet, for their own good if for nothing else. But will this civilianization be quick enough? Will it be inclusive enough? Will it satisfy Pakistan's quest for a polity both stable and democratic? This is the test before the country as also before Musharraf's College of (well-meaning) Innocents.