AS the first anniversary of this halting revolution approaches, spare a thought for General Musharraf's confusion. When more in response to the brilliance of the Sharifs (God's gift to Pakistan) than to any vaulting ambition of his own, Musharraf seized power - or rather his generals on the ground seized power for him - the gushing enthusiasm of a nation always on the lookout for miracles hailed him as redeemer, national saviour and Ataturk. A year down the road, with reality reasserting itself and that gushing enthusiasm subsiding, the same person, no worse or better than before, is being attacked by every lamp post within striking distance.

A year ago every pundit in the land was calling upon the General to complete his agenda, even if it seemed unclear what his agenda was. Now the same pontiffs, not a whit put out by their misplaced zealotry, are criticising the General. Is this dramatic turnaround - everything in Pakistan being dramatic - a reflection of the General's shortcomings or a mark of a volatile nation given to swinging from one extreme to another?

The General came in the darkness of the night. He had no agenda, even if he put on a brave face and pretended to have a deeply thought-out manifesto for national revival. It was the nation which was tired of the "heavy mandate" and looking for a reprieve. When it got a reprieve (let's not go into the sequence of cause-and-effect) it seized it with both hands. What is more, on the reprieve it cast all its thwarted hopes and desires.

But let us bear witness. The General did not seek the role of a saviour. It was thrust upon him by a nation - or, to be more precise, a corps of pundits - in no mood to take no for an answer. If after a year honey dew has not been harvested on the mountains or if the waters of the Indus have not turned to holy wine who is to blame?

What is wrong with the present lot of generals ruling Pakistan? All in all, they are competent professionals with sound instincts and the good of the nation at heart, their collective calibre on a par with the best on offer in the country. Of course, they committed a sin: seizing power and, if that was made inevitable by the brilliance of the Sharifs, then by holding on to it. For this they should have been criticised right from the start. But this was not done. On the contrary, the General and his team were received as miracle-makers. When they failed to live up to our exaggerated expectations we began pulling them to the ground and judging them by standards more appropriate to the tales of Scherezade than to politics in the times of Mian Muhammad Sharif and President Rafiq Tarar. (They say improbable names do not rise to historic prominence. Could an Adolf Schicklegruber have become German Fuehrer? Rafiq Tarar disproves this thesis. If he can be president, anything is possible.)

So, holding onto the middle ground betwixt excessive effusiveness and perverse cynicism, how runs the balance sheet of the last twelve months? Forget, as a reference point, Musharraf's seven-point agenda which he announced in his justification speech soon after the "heavy mandate" was consigned to the limbo of history. As much a product of darkness as the rest of that stormy night, it serves no purpose to run a comb through that lack-lustre check-list. Far better to look elsewhere for the General's successes and failures.

Wittingly or otherwise, the General's foremost success has been to calm the nation's nerves and to steady the ship of state, the very dullness of the political scene, and the repetitive nature of what the press has to offer, being a reflection of this soporific state of affairs. Reflect how things were a year ago - the uncertainty spawned by Kargil, the tense standoff that followed between Sharif and the army command, the sense of dissatisfaction running deep through the ruling party itself, the uneasy feeling that things were bad and Sharif not the man to improve them - and only then is it possible to appreciate the balminess of the present season of dullness. Musharraf after a year in power is no more popular than Sharif was at this time last year, but at least there is no feeling in the air, as opposed to the sentiment in some newspaper columns that things are on the verge of spinning out of control.

The military government has kept a steady course in Afghanistan which is no mean thing given the constant carping and snide remarks of the outside world. The Taliban may be in no position to win a fashion contest anywhere but Pakistan, condemned by geography to share the burden of Afghanistan, cannot be choosy. Other countries which helped create Afghanistan's problems when it suited them, and then walked away when their interests were no longer involved, can afford the luxury of softchair liberalism. Not Pakistan which would be stupid to ignore the fact that the Taliban, whether one approves of their manners or not, hold sway over most of the country.

On Kashmir and "cross-border terrorism" the military government has had to put up with much out-door preaching and lecturing on the part of the Clinton administration. But it has rolled with the best punches the US and India (both newly-locked in a post-cold war embrace) could throw without losing its cool or retreating (as would have been all too easy) into a Myanmarish isolationism.

And despite everything the government has engaged successfully with international philanthropy as signified by the IMF and the World Bank. Harsh conditions have been met and the rupee has been allowed to bleed, but at the end of it all an IMF package of sorts will in all likelihood come Pakistan's way, allowing it to adjust its debts and get on with life.

On the downside of military performance is the sullen mood of much of the populace, embittered by the feeling that military rule far from delivering anything has made economic conditions worse. This has been the General's weakest spot. Prices are high and purchasing power is down. With no economic activity in the country, those on daily wages or restricted incomes are feeling the pinch. And laying all their troubles at Musharraf's door.

But when criticism is freely offered, all sides of the question must be examined. What choices did this team have? What magic wand to deliver Pakistan from its budgetary and debt problems? The good times, with the easy money that came with them, stopped rolling a long time ago. Since then everything has been coming to a head. Governments which should have looked ahead got by with gimmicks. General Musharraf has the exasperating habit of reciting hollow statistics to signify economic progress. Perhaps he would be better off if he eschewed this habit. But when it comes to economic policy at least he does not shoot from the hip. For right or wrong, the economic direction Pakistan is taking is underpinned by institutional decision-making.

True, Pakistan is still bereft of a sense of direction, Muharraf being no visionary or inspirational leader. But, if I am allowed the paradox, Pakistan is facing in the right direction. It is engaging with the outside world and trying hard to dissipate the fallout of Kargil. At the same time, aware of domestic realities, it is not upsetting the country's internal balance by swinging too abruptly in any one direction. Hence, to the dismay of armchair liberals, the studied attempts not to inflame clerical sentiment in the country.

On strategic direction, therefore, the Musharraf government is on course. Which again is a paradox because these were the generals who got tactics right and strategy hopelessly wrong during the Kargil operation. Now it is just the other way round. On day-to-day handling of policy, which is what forms a government's image in the eyes of the people, this has to be the most inept bunch of operators in the nation's history: rootless civilians trying to pass off as old political hands, amateurs trying to pass off as professionals, tough-sounding rookies convinced that stern oratory is the essence of good government.

Compounding the sense of a shambles on the cards is the glasnost prevailing in the country, with the press more free, and certainly more adventurous, than any time in its history. Past defence deals have been questioned. The army has been criticised by name like at no other time in the past. To his credit, Musharraf (the odd outburst against lifafa journalism notwithstanding) has remained cool and unflappable under fire, his own temperament and style contributing in no small measure to yet another paradox to be found in Pakistan today: militarism with a human face.

Ultimately, the question boils down to one of alternatives. The arguments against military rule are well-rehearsed, so no point in going over them again. But I ask myself that if I was able to resurrect the past and have a choice in the matter, under whom as an ordinary citizen would I prefer to live: Bhutto, Zia, Benazir, Nawaz Sharif or Musharraf? The answer horrifies me: the statistic-chewing General.