THE oft-postponed visit by Secretary John Kerry had been eagerly awaited in Islamabad.

According to the pre-arrival briefing provided by State Department officials to the press team which was accompanying Kerry, the visit was taking place at a time when the repair of ties had been under way for the period since the Abbottabad and Salala episodes caused a rupture.

The visit was very brief. While this could be attributed to the fact that it was taking place in Ramazan one can be certain that security considerations had a part to play. The jailbreak in Dera Ismail Khan a couple of days earlier must have given Kerry’s security team pause and confirmed the wisdom of the decision to keep the visit short.

At the background briefing, however, this incident was used to provide evidence that even while Kabul, Islamabad and Washington looked at the rise of “violent extremism” from different perspectives this incident was “exhibit A” in establishing that the new government in Islamabad had to exert more sovereignty if it was to succeed in “anything [stability and economic development] that’s of core importance to Pakistanis”.

Earlier in the briefing the officials had said that “safe havens for extremist groups clearly threaten our interests, our allies in the region, and most of all really Sharif’s own ability to execute on his reform agenda and provide greater economic stability. And so how we continue to deal with those issues of cross-border militancy is something that will be a key piece of this conversation”.

In the course of the visit, which has generally been perceived as a success in both Islamabad and Washington, Kerry’s public pronouncements tried to emphasise other facets first. He said, “America does not want to have a transactional relationship, we do not want to have a relationship … based on an issue such as counterterrorism or Afghanistan but we want a relationship with the people of Pakistan for the long term”.

This was the same theme that was first articulated just before 9/11 by then deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage when he talked of moving from a US-Pakistan relationship based on being ‘against something’ — such as communism or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — to a relationship based on furthering the interests of Pakistanis.

He announced that agreement had been reached on resuming the ministerial level ‘Strategic Dialogue’ that had been suspended in 2010 and which carried the promise of securing for Pakistan the expanded trade opportunities and the targeted economic assistance that would help further the new government’s economic development plans.

Perhaps even more important from the point of view of the new government, he conveyed an invitation from President Barack Obama for our prime minister to visit Washington.

There is no doubt that in the medium and long term the US is genuinely interested in the sort of relationship Kerry has described because it believes that this best serves America’s own interests. The ultimate Washington nightmare is that Pakistan, the world’s second largest Muslim country and a nuclear power, may be taken over by extremists, with incalculable consequences for the region and for the world.

More immediately, the US has an interest in securing Pakistan’s cooperation to exit from Afghanistan and promote reconciliation with the Taliban since this alone could ensure that civil war does not break out in post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

Kerry’s principal goal during this visit was to try and convince the new leadership that these were objectives that Pakistan should also aim for in its own interest. He asserted: “The reality is that the fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are intertwined.” A Pakistan so convinced would perforce not only promote reconciliation but also tackle the problem of “safe havens” and cross-border raids because these promoted instability within Pakistan itself.

The constant refrain throughout the visit was ‘will the forces of violent extremism be allowed to grow more dominant, eventually overpowering the moderate majority?’

As expected, the drone issue was raised at every public appearance. In an effort to be placatory Kerry did say in an interview that “the programme will end as we have eliminated most of the threat” and “the president has a very real timeline, and we hope it’s going to be very, very soon”.

This of course was a reference to Obama’s speech in May at the National Defence University, US, in which he had laid out the rationale and legal justification for drones. He had, however, been careful to avoid suggesting that the modifications he signalled would apply to the CIA-conducted drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A State Department spokesman clarified that not only was there no definite timeline but that “in no way would we ever deprive ourselves of a tool to fight a threat if it arises”.

On the ground, however, what has happened is that there has been a significant drop in the number of drone strikes with 16 in 2013 as against 122 in 2010. Equally importantly, none of the recent strikes have been ‘signature strikes’. Reliable information is sparse but it also seems from the reports available that all the targets in recent strikes have been either Arab or Uzbek Al Qaeda operators or such Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan leaders as one would want eliminated.

Cool-headed thinking is required on this score as also on how we proceed on other facets of our relations with the US. Careful thought must go into preparing for the prime minister’s meeting with President Obama. This will presumably be either immediately before or immediately after the opening of the UN General Assembly session in late September.

Equally careful preparations will be needed for the Strategic Dialogue if the exercise is not to be as futile as it was in 2010. We would need to prepare a response to the demand for action against those killing Americans in Afghanistan. We would also need to prepare detailed proposals for projects for which we want direct US assistance or support with institutions such as the World Bank.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.