Yet, the fruits of this monumental realignment of our state have yet to be seen. The outgoing year saw a modest economic recovery, amidst escalating security risks and the suffocation of civil and political liberties. Though macroeconomic indicators showed signs of stabilisation — inflation eased and foreign reserves recovered thanks to debt rollovers, increased remittances and IMF injections — the momentum needed for a meaningful, sustained recovery remained missing, giving the lie to sporadic claims of an economic turnaround from the government.

Political imbroglio

The omens were there from the start. In January, Imran Khan and Bushra Bibi were handed 14 and seven years, respectively, in the £190m Al Qadir Trust case. The sentencing would set the tone for the rest of 2025, with the state maintaining its hard line against the PTI, and the PTI, in return, hardening its stance and rhetoric against those it sees as responsible for its predicament.

Access to Mr Khan would in the latter half of the year become a key challenge for the PTI, especially after the party made it clear it would not be taking any decision, big or small, without his express consent and involvement. Whether this was a strategic decision taken to preclude the possibility of the much-talked-about ‘minus-one formula’, only the party’s bigwigs can tell. Whatever the rationale, it seems to have proven useful in keeping Mr Khan at the front and centre of national political discourse.

As in years past, the state seemed intent on demonstrating the logic of power over law, repeatedly blocking court orders, refusing the jailed ex-prime minister visitation rights or phone calls with his children, and breaking up opposition gatherings and protests with force. The heavy-handedness on display cemented the perception that the so-called ‘hybrid regime’ of yesteryear had evolved into something new, and that it now had a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for political dissent.

Not all was hunky dory within the ruling coalition’s ranks either. A major dispute flared up early in the year between the PPP and PML-N over a proposal to irrigate the Cholistan desert. The PPP, which rules Sindh, accused the PML-N governments in the centre and Punjab of threatening the lower riparian province’s water rights. The proposal was eventually shelved. Another serious dispute arose when the PPP pushed for disbursal of relief and aid through the Benazir Income Support Programme after the devastating monsoon floods in Punjab, while the PML-N insisted on its own ‘relief card’ initiative. Matters turned ugly as the scions of both parties took jibes at each other. However, party elders intervened and the alliance remained intact, with the two parties even jointly contesting some by-elections in the latter part of the year.

Another development of note on the political front was the outlawing of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan. The far-right political party crossed one line too many by insisting on holding its ‘Gaza solidarity march’ in October, which was to start from Lahore and Faisalabad and culminate outside the US embassy in Islamabad. The state, still revelling in its newfound bonhomie with the Trump administration, would not have it, and made its intentions clear. Defying Section 144, internet suspensions, heavy policy deployment and road blockades, the TLP attempted to press ahead anyway. A violent confrontation ensued, which quickly turned deadly. The government was eventually successful in dispersing the party’s workers and arrested thousands in the ensuing crackdown. The party was officially banned by the federal cabinet on Oct 23, and its leaders remain absconding.

The fruits of this monumental realignment of our state have yet to be seen.

Judicial developments

Things were no quieter on the judicial front. The year saw profound changes to Pakistan’s judicial landscape, sparking intense debate over independence and institutional balance.

The seeds of the crisis were sown early in the year, when judges from other high courts were transferred to the Islamabad High Court. It quickly became clear that not only were the new judges being moved to ‘dilute’ the IHC’s ideological leaning, they would also displace its existing judges in the court’s seniority lists. Despite attempts to secure justice for the affected judges, the architects of this ‘reshuffle’ were ultimately successful in installing one of the transferred judges as the IHC chief justice.

And then came the kicker.

November brought with it the contentious 27th Amendment, which would completely upend the judiciary. Its enactment resulted in the creation of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), and the reconstitution of key bodies like the Judicial Commission of Pakistan and the Supreme Judicial Council. There was considerable criticism.

It was not without reason: the FCC stripped the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over constitutional matters, fundamental rights, and federal-provincial disputes. Even more problematic was the fact that the amendment granted the president (on the prime minister’s advice) the power to appoint the first batch of FCC judges, and to authorise the transfer of high court judges across provinces without their consent. It was clear to many that the existing judiciary had been completely neutralised. The amendment led to the immediate resignation of two senior Supreme Court judges on Nov 14, who regretted the “hollowing out” of the Supreme Court in their parting letters.

Internal security

The same year, Pakistan was grappling with the severest resurgence of terrorism in over a decade. By the end of the first three quarters of 2025, Pakistan looked set to surpass the previous year’s numbers. Through the first 11 months, independent monitoring by the Centre for Research and Security Studies had established at least 3,187 fatalities from violence-related incidents, surpassing the entire 2024 total of 2,546 deaths by more than 25pc. Close to 1,200 terrorism incidents had been recorded, with security forces killing close to 1,800 terrorists in response.

Like the preceding year, most of this violence remained concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. KP bore the brunt, thanks to relentless TTP assaults on security forces in the form of ambushes, suicide bombings, and raids. Balochistan saw a parallel rise in separatist attacks, with groups targeting infrastructure, convoys and ‘non-locals’. The March hijacking of the Jaffar Express, which resulted in dozens of deaths and hundreds held hostage, was the highest-profile example of terrorist violence in the outgoing year.

The year saw the term ‘fitna’ feature more consistently in security parlance, with ‘Fitna al-Khawarij’ and ‘Fitna al-Hindustan’ used as umbrella references to actors believed to either be affiliated with religious militants (khawarij) or foreign-backed elements (specifically, India). Introduced a year earlier, the narrative strategy seems to reflect a desire to focus the national security narrative on two hostile fronts, Afghanistan and India. Major security-related incidents were therefore categorised according to where the threat was perceived to have emanated from.

The making of a field marshal

The most perilous moment of the year arrived in May during the “Marka-i-Haq” (The Battle of Truth). Following a dastardly attack in Occupied Kashmir’s Pahalgam region in April, New Delhi continuously blamed Pakistan — without any proof — of orchestrating the incident. The Pakistani military leadership, to its credit, was well-prepared for any misadventure. When it eventually transpired, in the form of airstrikes launched in the dead of the night under ‘Operation Sindoor’, Pakistan retaliated with a stunning counterpunch that saw multiple Indian jets shot down by the Pakistan Air Force with the help of superior tactics and technologies. That marked the start of the first high-intensity drone and missile battle between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. On May 10, Washington finally stepped into the fray, to de-escalate what the US president would later describe as imminent nuclear armageddon.

The imprint left by this military standoff bears a closer look. One of the most consequential decisions taken by the Pakistani leadership in the aftermath was the promotion of the then-Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, to the rank of Field Marshal. This made him only the second person in Pakistan’s history to hold the title. The move paid off in more ways than one.

The promotion seems to have been aimed at establishing FM Munir as more than just a ‘general’. Becoming the face of Pakistan’s military prowess, he seems to have successfully secured the attention of the American president. Mr Trump would later describe FM Munir as his “favourite field marshal”. The relationship between the two appears to have been cemented during their first meeting, a private lunch in Washington in June, shortly after which Pakistan would publicly nominate Mr Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

FM Munir was subsequently elevated further to Chief of Defence Forces of Pakistan through the 27th Amendment. The post, which abolishes the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, introduced a unified command structure across the armed forces of Pakistan, making the CDF the highest-ranking officer of the army, navy and air force combined. This has placed unprecedented power and authority in the hands of the field marshal, giving him authority in making strategic decisions on behalf of the entirety of the armed forces.

Whether this will yield more benefits, like reducing friction between Pakistan and potential military partners where it comes to strategic agreements, remains to be seen. With the Middle East in turmoil and new arrangements being shaped to ‘manage’ its affairs, Pakistan has emerged as one of the frontline players in the regional power matrix. It will seek to capitalise on this opportunity under its new CDF.

Conclusion: a hardened state

Pakistan witnessed a notable regression in civil rights in 2025, particularly in the realm of digital freedoms. It began with the enactment of more amendments to Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act to expand government powers over online content and expression. Critics argued that the vague provisions would enable further suppression of dissent, journalism, and criticism of state institutions. Protests by media organisations, and legal challenges in courts couldn’t amount to much.

As 2025 closes, Pakistan is a country with a vastly different institutional map than it had a year ago. With a newly minted field marshal and a government-friendly Constitutional Court, the state has centralised power more than at any point in the last two decades. However, with millions directly suffering amidst a simmering economic crisis and denied a voice in their future, the ‘stability’ claimed by the leadership remains a thin veneer over a nation under deep stress.

It is imperative upon the national leadership to secure a political ceasefire and chart a collective course forward. Immense resources have been expended on maintaining the status quo, even though it is clear it isn’t viable in the long term. The history of this present dispensation doesn’t offer much room for optimism, yet the desire for normalcy still survives. Perhaps 2026 will be the year it is finally realised. One can only hope for the best.

The India front

Since 2021, the opinion within Pakistan’s top brass regarding its approach on how to deal with an assertive India was largely divided. Views were at odds on whether to have careful limited engagement through backchannel diplomacy; resume trade and normalise diplomatic relations; or continue with the status quo in its relationship with the eastern neighbour. However, New Delhi’s decision to impose an armed conflict on Pakistan in response to the Pahalgam incident proved a ‘strategic shock’ to Islamabad. This ‘strategic shock’ has brought ‘strategic clarity’ in Islamabad’s power corridors regarding how to pursue its relationship with an aggressive eastern neighbour.

The military conflict in May equally tested Pakistan’s defence and diplomatic capabilities. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan unleashed an unprecedented campaign during and post-conflict, which bore fruit in garnering international support against Delhi’s aggression. The world in fact sympathised with the families of the victims of the Pahalgam terror attack, but didn’t buy Delhi’s justifications for Operation Sindoor. The 87 hours of armed conflict resulted in downing of seven Indian fighter jets, including three Rafales. However, Pakistan also saw strikes on some airbases. In the first-ever multi-domain conflict in the subcontinent, drones were used by both sides for various purposes including intelligence gathering and overwhelming each other’s air defences. Indian missile and drone attacks also martyred over 40 Pakistani civilians, including women and children.

Although the US-brokered ceasefire has ceased armed hostilities between the two nuclear neighbours, tensions and mistrust persist on both sides. Islamabad has a strategic question post-May conflict: how should Pakistan respond if Delhi resumes Operation Sindoor 2.0?

The Afghanistan front

Since the 2021 return of the Afghan Taliban in Kabul, Pakistan has witnessed a significant surge in terror activities in the country. The banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has regained organisational strengthen by convincing over 35 splinter groups to return to the terror outfit. Nato’s leftover modern weapons have also enhanced operational capabilities of the TTP. Islamabad tried several diplomatic means including bilateral negotiations, appeasement through economic and diplomatic engagement, and third-party influence to convince the Afghan Taliban to abandon their support to the TTP. However, Pakistan observed gradual increase in the TTP’s infiltration attempts from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

From Jan to Dec 15, 2025, Pakistan recorded at least 4,200 and 1,453 infiltration attempts of terrorists from Afghanistan into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, respectively. Similarly, out of 2,395 terrorists killed during intelligence-based operations (IBOs), 220 were identified as Afghan nationals. During 2025, 1,338 security officials were martyred while 2,562 faced serious injuries. Officials also insist that TTP operates over 60 camps across Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Khost and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan, serving as infiltration hubs into KP. Likewise, over 300 terrorists of violent Baloch separatist outfit BLA are concentrated in Kandahar, Nimroz, Helmand, Herat, Farah and Kabul. Pakistan has identified four training camps of BLA in Afghanistan.

Citing the gravity of the situation emanating from the aforementioned numbers coupled with several failed diplomatic attempts to convince the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan decided to carry out air strikes in Afghanistan on TTP’s hideouts. In October and November, Pakistani air strikes hit multiple locations inside Afghanistan including Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika, which resulted in border clashes at Pak-Afghan border points. Trade was the major victim of border tensions between the two countries. Although the armed clashes at the Pak-Afghan border and Pakistan’s air strikes have been halted due to mediatory efforts of Turkiye and Qatar, the underlying issues, mistrust, and tensions persist between the two countries.

Islamabad has a strategic question post-May conflict: how should Pakistan respond if Delhi resumes Operation Sindoor?

A new doctrine

The May conflict with India pushed Pakistan to the decision of reconfiguring its security architecture and strategic doctrine for any prospective confrontations with New Delhi. In this context, after announcing the establishment of the Strategic Forces Command, the Shehbaz Sharif government promoted chief of the army staff to the rank of field marshal and later appointed him as the first chief of defence forces. This reconfiguration of the tri-services should improve coordination through Defence Forces Headquarters. Moreover, this structural transformation will also help the armed forces to respond swiftly across multiple domains during conflicts against any external aggression.

Apart from structural reconfiguration of security architecture, the doctrinal shift in Islamabad’s strategic calculus is also visible. With consolidation of power and fighting armed conflicts with India and Afghanistan, the strategic doctrine of the military leadership is gradually unfolding. This doctrine has two primary pillars: cost-imposition strategy for India, and deterrence through punishment for Afghanistan.

Costs for India

Cost-imposition strategy refers to a deterrence posture designed to make any act of aggression prohibitively expensive for Delhi. Since 2016, India has violated Pakistan’s sovereignty on three occasions under the assumption that limited conventional operations under the nuclear overhang are feasible and politically advantageous.

Pakistan’s initial response posture was characterised by denial and strategic restraint. In 2016, Islamabad officially rejected India’s claim of surgical strikes. In 2019, Pakistan exercised extraordinary restraint. Although its forces had locked multiple targets deep inside Indian territory, the decision was made not to strike designated sites, and the captured pilot of a downed Indian jet was returned unconditionally as a de-escalatory gesture. Delhi considered these de-escalatory gestures from Islamabad as a ‘strategic weakness’.

Following the 2019 crisis, Pakistan recalibrated its crisis-response mechanisms and articulated a QPQ+ (Quid Pro Quo Plus) strategy. This represented a calibrated retaliatory posture designed to impose costs slightly above proportionality, while maintaining escalation control. There is consensus in Islamabad that Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression was befitting.

However, the dynamics of the May 2025 confrontation have reshaped the strategic calculus of Pakistan’s military leadership. The recurrent pattern of Indian cross-border strikes, ie 2016, 2019, and now 2025, has demonstrated that a strategy of unilateral restraint imposes greater strategic cost than a deliberate cost-imposition approach.

Today Pakistan’s military leadership increasingly recognises that New Delhi is unlikely to cease the limited military operations strategy; rather, India appears willing to expand the scale and lower the threshold of armed conflict to achieve both strategic and domestic political objectives after every few years.

Consequently, any future attack or potential resumption of Operation Sindoor must be rendered significantly costly for India. In Field Marshal Asim Munir’s words, the next conflict with India will lead to Pakistan’s response “beyond the expectations of its enemies”. Similarly, Islamabad appears determined not to allow Delhi to control water flows. In simple words, Islamabad will not engage in a future conflict on Indian terms; instead, it intends to introduce ‘strategic surprises’ designed to end New Delhi’s recurring pattern of surgical strikes.

Under this revised posture, Pakistan’s response options would not be confined to tactical or operational military targets alone; instead, counter-value economic hubs and critical infrastructure nodes could be designated as legitimate targets to inflict strategic-level costs on the Indian economy. Moreover, Pakistan might deem it necessary in any future conflict to strike India’s controversial dam infrastructure that is intended to divert the natural flow of rivers feeding Pakistan. In August 2025 the military leadership pointed out that Pakistan will strike deeper within India if future military escalations occur. Pakistan intends to transform India’s strategic depth into a liability, which was traditionally viewed in New Delhi as a source of military strength. The newly constituted Army Rocket Force Command is a first step in this direction. Similarly, any limited conflict scenario would be addressed through integrated tri-services operations, ensuring a joint, swift, and escalatory-dominant response to deter further adventurism.

Punishment for Afghanistan

This means that crossing certain boundaries will trigger severe consequences for the Afghan Taliban. Islamabad has calculated that any major terror attack emanating from Afghanistan, or involving Afghan nationals, will result in punitive actions such as air strikes and border closures. Pakistan will impose strategic and economic costs on Afghanistan for the killing of innocent people in Pakistan. Field Marshal Asim Munir has repeatedly offered a clear choice to the Taliban regime: it must choose between maintaining cooperative relations with Pakistan or continue to enable terrorist outfits, ie the TTP and BLA.

This strategy has evolved after repeated attempts made by Islamabad for diplomatic resolutions. Islamabad is frustrated that the Afghan Taliban have not upheld any international agreement, be it the Doha Accord (2020), the Pakistan-Afghanistan-UAE Trilateral Agreement (2024), or the repeated Pakistan-Afghanistan-China strategic dialogues.

At the bilateral level, since 2021, Pakistan has conducted four visits by the foreign minister, two defence minister and DG ISI-led missions, five special representative visits, five secretary-level meetings, one NSA visit, and conducted eight Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) sessions. It has also held 225 border flag meetings, presented 836 protest notes, and issued 13 demarches to Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. Despite these trilateral and bilateral engagements, Pakistan could not deter the Afghan Taliban from supporting the TTP.

Now, Islamabad is determined that this new strategy will effectively deter the Afghan Taliban from openly supporting the TTP or BLA. In case of non-compliance, Islamabad is prepared to expand the scale of ‘punishment’. Through this strategy, Islamabad believes it will ensure elimination of TTP and BLA’s training camps, and elimination of their leadership on Afghan soil.

In the short term, this approach has begun to pay dividends. After repeated punitive measures and closed-door negotiations brokered by Turkiye and Qatar, the number of terrorist incidents emanating from Afghanistan has declined. In the similar context, the Afghan Taliban recently organised a major gathering of over 1,000 religious scholars and issued a fatwa declaring it forbidden for Afghan nationals to participate in militant activities outside Afghanistan. These are positive strategic signals that could improve the prevailing situation between the two countries.

Strategic flexibility

Pakistan, as per Field Marshal Asim Munir’s doctrine, will now follow a 2-Ds model: dialogue and deterrence with its neighbours. Islamabad will encourage dialogue with its neighbouring countries to resolve issues. Pakistan is ready to negotiate with India and Afghanistan on all outstanding issues. This is why Islamabad has supported any prospect of bilateral dialogue, third-party mediation or facilitation. Pakistan welcomed Donald Trump’s offer for mediation between India and Pakistan, and entered into the dialogue process when Turkiye and Qatar extended mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This shows that Islamabad will remain open to any kind of candid dialogue with Kabul and New Delhi.

This is ‘strategic flexibility’ that has been introduced by the field marshal for Afghanistan and India. However, he is also ensuring through military preparedness that if dialogue fails to achieve the desired outcomes, or if any country chooses military confrontation over dialogue, deterrence through punishment and cost-imposition strategy will ensure protection of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The writer is an analyst of South Asian affairs.

The views expressed are his own.

X: @itskhurramabbas

THIS was the year of stabilisation, when Pakistan’s economy was pulled out from one of the worst bouts of instability it had ever seen; 2025 was also the year when the limits of stability were discovered.

Stability of the sort that an IMF programme brings is a strange place for any country to be. One cannot stay in that state for very long. In the case of Pakistan, an estimated 2.5 to three million new entrants enter the labour force every year and creating jobs for them is one of the biggest challenges for economic managers. Economists have estimated that a GDP growth rate of six per cent per annum is needed at a minimum to create enough jobs to productively employ all these people. That is the minimum required to keep pace with the core requirements of Pakistan’s society. Anything less and the ranks of the unemployed start to swell and with that comes widespread disaffection in society. If the trend of low growth and rising unemployment persists for a few years, the society turns into a pressure cooker.

Pakistan teetered on this edge all through 2025. The economy had just emerged from one of the biggest bouts of instability it had ever seen in its history. An inflationary fire raged from 2021 all through 2023, reaching a historic peak of 38pc year-on-year in May of that year before tapering off all through 2024. Foreign exchange reserves hit near default levels in the summer of 2022 and remained at that level until an emergency bailout from the IMF in July 2023, which pulled the country away from the edge of catastrophe. They remained around $12 billion till the opening months of 2025 when they began to climb slowly, recovering to a level sufficient to pay for 2.5 months of imports only in the second half of the year.

Both hallmarks of the extended post-Covid crisis that gripped Pakistan’s economy — inflation and foreign exchange reserve depletion — were overcome in 2025. This was the year stability took root and the economy turned the corner out of what was decidedly one of the gravest crises it had ever been through. At the start of the year the current account was registering strong surpluses, reaching $2.1bn by June 2025, what the IMF described as “Pakistan’s first surplus in 14 years”. This helped lift foreign exchange reserves to above two months of import cover after many years, and put it on course to hit the projected level of 2.7 months of import cover by the middle of 2026.

Two critical catastrophes were averted — default and inflation. But the problems had not been solved.

Inflation also receded in 2025. Having hit a peak of 38pc in May 2023, the fire died down by the end of 2024 to reach single digits. At the opening of 2025 inflation was at an all-time low of less than 1pc before starting to rise again and hit 6pc by year end. The most ferocious inflationary fire that ever raged in Pakistan’s history was finally extinguished, and 2025 was the first full year when the economy saw low inflation since Covid.

Two critical catastrophes were finally averted — default and inflation. But the problems had not been solved.

This feat, of stabilising the economy, was achieved the same way it had always been done: with an IMF programme that immediately choked off all growth. GDP growth fell to around 3pc and according to the IMF programme signed in late 2024, it cannot revive much beyond that level for at least another two years, while the programme is still on and in its immediate aftermath.

And therein lay the most critical problem facing the government and the economy. Inflation was doused and default was averted by extinguishing growth, which killed the demand for imports and brought down the trade deficit, and threw the current account into surplus. The State Bank ran up high interest rates in preceding years, cutting them slowly as inflation fell but stopped once they hit 11pc, drawing howls of protest from the business community. And the tax effort was ramped up.

Business was now reeling beneath the weight of high taxes and high interest rates. All year this state of affairs continued with no relief in sight. By the time 2025 ended the prospects for growth still seemed remote but the outline of how the government intends to pull itself out of this quagmire began to take shape.

The May war with India had sent a strong signal to countries around the world that Pakistan had built able defences for itself, and done so using Chinese technology. In the second half of the year countries began lining up to ask if Pakistan could help build such defences for them as well. A defence agreement was signed with Saudi Arabia and towards the end of 2025 the President of the UAE, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, also came to Pakistan for a trip that was in large part official, and in small part personal. And the privatisation of PIA later in the year heralded not just the restart of the privatisation programme that had been stalled since 2005. The participation of Fauji Fertiliser Company in the consortium that bought out the airline signalled an interest in the military to start acquiring stakes in the economy.

Following the departure of Sheikh Zayed, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar announced that an agreement has been reached on a debt equity swap where the UAE will accept shares of companies owned by the Fauji Foundation in return for its $1bn deposit that is set to mature in March of 2026. The outlines of how growth could be restarted had begun to appear. A new model of public-private ownership of large assets in sectors like infrastructure, minerals and others is likely going to be used to either attract direct investment from bilateral partners, or undertake more debt equity swaps against the deposits placed in Pakistan’s central bank by Gulf countries.

The year 2025 was when the tide turned in the economy. Pakistan suddenly found a new place in the eyes of important countries around the world following its performance in the May war against India, and leveraged this to put in place bilateral partnerships that its government began using to help underwrite its transition from stabilisation to growth. In short, 2025 was the year when a new opportunity for a geopolitical rent dawned on the country and a path out of a crippling stabilisation programme began to open up.

Depending on how the government plays its cards in the first few months of the new year, the transition to growth could come about in 2026. And in the process, the shape of Pakistan’s economy could undergo a profound structural transformation, just not of the sort that reform-minded economists have been calling for.

Pakistan ranks among the world’s highest crypto adopters. In 2022, it stood sixth globally for crypto adoption and climbed to third place by 2025, according to Chainalysis, a leading blockchain analytics firm. While the country may be struggling to adopt digitisation, this is one sector where the regulation is trying to catch up with reality.

Over time, the government and state institutions have come to recognise that crypto cannot be ignored or wished away. In 2018, the State Bank issued a notice strongly indicating that trading in cryptocurrencies was illegal. As recently as May 2025, after the Pakistan Crypto Council was officially launched in March, both the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance said that cryptocurrency remains banned in the country and all its transactions are illegal under current regulations.

However, whether crypto is officially legal remains a grey area. The country’s virtual assets regulator, the Pakistan Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority, still displays “launching soon” across key sections of its website, including regulations, licensing, and its public register. That may be understandable: the authority itself is barely five months old, having been formally constituted in July 2025.

What is striking is the timing. Renewed official interest in crypto gathered pace around the same period that a high-profile delegation from World Liberty Financial visited Islamabad. World Liberty Financial is a decentralised finance project linked to the Trump family, with Donald Trump listed as co-founder emeritus, a role he relinquished after assuming office.

The crypto ecosystem in Pakistan is now intertwined with Binance, the Trump family’s crypto interests, and a regulatory framework still under construction.

In multiple interviews, his son Eric Trump, also a co-founder, has laid out the family’s pivot towards crypto. Following the January 2021 US Capitol incident, he claims the Trump family was “debanked,” with hundreds of accounts shut down by major financial institutions, including Capital One, Deutsche Bank, and Signature Bank. The family also faced civil and criminal investigations into its finances. Eric Trump has argued that the financial system was weaponised against them for political reasons.

Seeking to regain control over their finances, the Trumps entered the crypto space with World Liberty Financial in September 2024. Reuters estimates that the family earned more than $800 million from crypto asset sales in the first half of 2025 alone.

Under Donald Trump’s second presidency, the regulatory environment in the United States also shifted sharply. Several Biden-era lawsuits against crypto firms, including Coinbase and Binance, were dropped. Binance — one of the world’s largest crypto exchanges — had pleaded guilty in 2023 to violating US anti-money laundering laws and paid over $4 billion in penalties.

In 2025, MGX, a firm linked to the Abu Dhabi government, purchased $2bn worth of USD1 stablecoins issued by World Liberty Financial to acquire a minority stake in Binance. Soon after, Binance founder Changpeng Zhao, who had served a four-month sentence for compliance failures last year, was pardoned by President Trump, effectively clearing his criminal conviction in October.

Before the pardon, Zhao met Nawaz Sharif and Maryam Nawaz in April, shortly after the Pakistan Crypto Council was formed, and was appointed its strategic adviser. Binance remains one of the most popular crypto apps in Pakistan, ranking seventh in the finance category and holding the third-most-downloaded finance app position for two consecutive years, according to the Pakistan State of Apps 2024 report by Data Darbar.

Binance has since signed a memorandum of understanding with JazzCash to explore crypto-linked payments and broader digital-asset use cases. It has also entered into a non-binding letter of intent with the Fauji Foundation — whose ecosystem includes Askari Bank — to examine collaboration across blockchain, Web3, and crypto infrastructure.

On the regulatory front, the government has issued no-objection certificates to Binance and cryptocurrency exchange HTX, allowing them to begin structured engagement ahead of full licensing. Separately, Pakistan and Binance have signed an MoU to explore the tokenisation of up to $2bn in sovereign bonds, T-bills, and commodity reserves.

In short, the crypto ecosystem in Pakistan is now intertwined with Binance, the Trump family’s crypto interests, and a regulatory framework still under construction.

“President Donald Trump is making crypto a national priority, and every country, including Pakistan, will ultimately have to follow suit,” Mr Saqib has said in an interview. Yet even as policy momentum accelerates, the true scale of Pakistan’s crypto economy remains opaque.

Some media reports suggest an informal market worth $25bn with roughly 20 million users. That works out to an average of $1,250 per user, a figure that does not seem implausible but remains impossible to independently verify in an ecosystem that has operated largely in the shadows.

According to Chainalysis’s 2025 Geography of Crypto report, stablecoins in Pakistan are used as a hedge against inflation, while many freelancers receive payments in crypto. Much of the crypto activity, however, takes place through peer-to-peer channels that operate without know-your-customer checks. This has raised red flags.

Earlier this year, Malik Bostan, chairman of the Exchange Companies Association of Pakistan, estimated that the country may have lost as much as $600m to illegal crypto transactions; flows that could potentially draw scrutiny from the Financial Action Task Force.

Regulating the crypto ecosystem, then, is not a policy choice so much as a national imperative. However, the speed of Pakistan’s regulatory pivot must be matched by infrastructure that is both robust and tailored to local risks, from consumer protection to financial crime oversight. If bringing crypto into the regulatory fold also aligns with Pakistan’s geopolitical interests and plays well in Washington, so be it. But the primary test of any framework will be whether it protects citizens first.

That said, there were plenty of positives to take forward, including the introduction of TV dramas centred on youth and the revival of some of the best Pakistani songs through Pakistan Idol.

TV’s meaningful turn

Pakistan’s TV dramas remained the country’s biggest export during the last 12 months. Not only did dramas that carried on from 2024 manage to make an impact, but so did those that premiered in 2025. If Duniyapur and Faraar kept action enthusiasts entertained, Meem Se Mohabbat and Shirin Farhad charmed their way into viewers’ hearts. However, nothing could beat Tan Man Neel o Neel, which shocked audiences with its thought-provoking climax.

If Behroopia stood out thanks to Faysal Qureshi’s adaptability in playing nine different characters, then Aye Ishq-i-Junoon, Qarz-i-Jaan, and Naqsh grabbed the audience’s attention with their stylish execution. One must also commend Saba Qamar for her performances in Pamaal and Case No. 9, in which she portrayed two very different characters without losing her edge. Her character in Pamaal highlighted the plight of women in toxic relationships, while in Case No. 9, she played a rape survivor who takes her rapist to court.

Naumaan Ijaz was not far behind, with his charisma making Parwarish and Sharpasand popular throughout the year. While he played second fiddle to youngsters Samar Jafri and Aina Asif in the former, he was at the top of his game in the latter, portraying a deceitful character with no qualms about being so. The same makers also came out with Sher, which was well received due to Danish Taimoor’s unlikely turn as a non-toxic hero.

There were many watchable dramas on the small screen, though most cinema releases failed to impress.

On the one hand, TV channels experimented with youthful stories; on the other, there was the Wahaj Ali and Seher Khan-starrer Jinn Ki Shaadi Unki Shaadi, whose special effects became a viral trend. Then there were Jama Taqseem, which dealt with the pros and cons of the joint family system; Dastak, which tackled the survival of a single parent; Goonj, which revolved around workplace harassment; and Dil Dhoondta Hai Phir Wohi, which discussed dementia at length.

The year wasn’t ideal for dramas with huge star casts, which is why neither Main Zameen Tu Aasmaan nor Main Manto Nahi Hoon managed to make an impact. Zafar Mairaj’s Biryani was expected to be good, but its execution was so substandard that it ended up being forgettable.

Actors like Adnan Qavi Khan and Amena Khan (Jama Taqseem), Aamina Sheikh and Navin Waqar (Case No. 9), Noman Masood (Tan Man Neel o Neel), Saima Noor (Main Manto Nahi Hoon), Sanam Saeed (Doosra Chehra and Main Manto Nahi Hoon), and Sarwat Gillani (Biryani) also made their much-awaited comebacks to TV.

Film industry: still struggling

Pakistani filmmakers had a disappointing 2025. Out of the 13 films that made it to cinemas, only two were worth remembering. What was encouraging, however, was the return of Rahul Aijaz’s Sindhi film Indus Echoes and the release of the first-ever Burushaski-language film, Hundan.

The two films that kept cinemas alive were Humayun Saeed and Mahira Khan’s Love Guru, and Faysal Qureshi and Sonya Hussyn’s horror flick Deemak. As their titles suggest, the former was a romantic comedy in which love ultimately prevails. The latter revolved around a haunted house in which the grandmother, played by Samina Peerzada, is possessed by demons.

Not only did these two films generate profits for their producers, they also kept audience hopes alive — hopes somewhat dashed by the Fawad Khan-Mahira Khan starrer Neelofar. Unlike the two hits released during Eidul Azha, Neelofar came out in the last week of November and failed to appeal to audiences.

Even so, it was still better than most of the other films released throughout the year. While Kabeer is inexplicably aiming for a re-release, Lambi Judai, Qulfee, Welcome to Punjab, Hum Sab, and Item did more harm than good simply by releasing in cinemas. There appeared to be little thought or discussion behind these projects, as most were poorly executed.

Two English-language films were also released in Pakistan, featuring local actors and filmmakers. Veteran Hollywood actor Faran Tahir appeared in both, playing central characters. While Shaz Khan’s The Martial Artist suffered from the release of a dubbed Urdu version ahead of its original English cut, Sami Khan-Faysal Qureshi-Suhaee Abro’s The Window was neither properly marketed nor given bankable slots in cinemas. It would have helped both films had they been released on non-holiday occasions, as they might have raked in some moolah at the box office.

Return of Pakistan Idol

The year also marked the return of Pakistan Idol after more than a decade, with a new strategy. Instead of being restricted to a single TV channel, the show expanded to multiple channels, making it even more popular. Youngsters from across the country were welcomed with open arms and judged by a panel comprising Fawad Khan, Zeb Bangash, Bilal Maqsood, and Rahat Fateh Ali Khan.

The show’s most significant contribution was reviving old Pakistani classics that were no longer getting much airtime, keeping today’s audience connected to a glorious musical past. The new year will bring the final round, where one contestant will be declared the winner, and audiences are impatiently waiting for that moment.

Unrelenting monsoon

The first warnings appeared early. By late June, the monsoon arrived with unusual persistence and intensity, saturating soils across the country. Although these rainfall events were not always extreme, their cumulative effect pushed rivers towards danger levels far earlier in the year than expected. Flash floods followed in hilly areas and urban centres alike, while continued rain across large areas fed already swelling rivers downstream.

By early October, the National Disaster Management Authority’s final consolidated monsoon report recorded 1,037 deaths, 1,067 injuries, over 229,000 houses damaged or destroyed, and more than 22,000 livestock losses between June 26 and Oct 1. These numbers show how quickly scattered weather events escalated into a national emergency.

Overlaying climate-driven shocks was a diplomatic dispute over India’s water releases.

Punjab’s fields under water

The pattern of destruction differed sharply across provinces. Punjab, Pakistan’s agricultural core, experienced the most extensive riverine flooding. Floodwaters entered hundreds of villages, forcing the evacuation of more than a million people at the peak of the crisis. Large swathes of standing crops were submerged at a critical point in the agricultural calendar, threatening farm incomes and food supply chains.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the deadliest episodes were sudden. Cloudbursts and short, intense rain spells triggered flash floods, landslides, and lightning incidents across mountainous districts, killing hundreds within days. Steep terrain, settlements hugging riverbanks and roads cut into unstable slopes left little room for error once rain intensified. In many valleys, warning time was measured in minutes rather than hours.

Melting glaciers, bursting lakes

Further north, Gilgit-Baltistan faced a more complex threat. Rising temperatures accelerated glacial melt, swelling lakes held back by fragile natural dams. When heavy rain coincided with this melt, glacial lake outburst floods tore through downstream communities, washing away bridges, roads and water channels. These incidents were part of a growing pattern. Pakistan now ranks among the countries most exposed to Glof risk, yet protective infrastructure and monitoring remain limited to a handful of valleys.

Sindh’s experience was shaped less by dramatic river surges and more by persistence. Heavy rainfall, poor drainage and already stressed canal systems left water standing for weeks in low-lying areas. Even when floodwaters receded, the damage lingered in ruined homes, contaminated drinking water and rising health risks.

Balochistan, too, suffered from damaging rains and flash flooding that disrupted transport links and underscored how fragile basic services become when extreme weather hits sparsely governed regions.

In Azad Jammu and Kashmir, heavy rainfall triggered landslides and infrastructure losses, cutting off remote communities.

India’s water releases

Overlaying these climate-driven shocks was a diplomatic dispute over India’s water releases, a factor that significantly worsened flood impacts in Punjab. The concern is not merely that water was released during the monsoon, but how abruptly and at what moment.

Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar stated that sudden releases into the Chenab occurred without adequate advance warning and at a sensitive stage of Pakistan’s agricultural cycle, when predictability of river flows is essential for irrigation planning and crop protection. Under this perspective, the damage is not limited to short-term flooding but extends to farm livelihoods, food security and economic stability.

Government officials further link the issue to the breakdown of cooperative mechanisms under the Indus Waters Treaty framework. They argue that reduced data-sharing and weakened communication channels in 2025 left Pakistan more exposed to sudden changes in river flows precisely when rivers were already running high from monsoon rains. Even routine releases can translate into dangerous downstream surges under such conditions, forcing evacuations and compounding losses.

India claims the releases were part of standard reservoir management during heavy rainfall. But for Pakistan, the year reinforced the hard lesson that when political tensions disrupt transparency and coordination, downstream risks multiply. And it is farmers and flood-prone communities who pay the price.

Aid, recovery, and unfinished work

By the final quarter of the year, attention shifted from rescue to recovery. Humanitarian agencies continued to warn that needs would outlast the monsoon season, particularly for housing, sanitation and livelihoods. Damage assessments moved slowly, reflecting both the scale of losses and the administrative strain on provincial authorities.

As in past years, rebuilding has been uneven. Some embankments were repaired and roads restored, but deeper vulnerabilities — unsafe settlement patterns, weak urban drainage, and under-resourced disaster preparedness — remain largely untouched.

The road ahead

The floods of 2025 point to five unavoidable priorities. Floodplain governance must change, with enforcement replacing post-disaster regret. Early warning systems must reach the last mile, especially in mountainous regions. Glof risk reduction must move from pilot projects to national planning. Cities must be treated as flood infrastructure, not afterthoughts. And Pakistan must push for predictable, transparent cross-border water management even amid wider political disputes.

The floods did not arrive as a single catastrophe but as a sequence, each wave exposing a familiar weakness. Treating them as aberrations would be a mistake. They are signals of a climate that has already changed, and of governance systems that must now change with it.

Amongst the two biggest developments in the Middle East were the Gaza ceasefire taking effect in October — the result of Mr Trump’s grand scheme for the battered, occupied Palestinian enclave, and the region at large — as well as the devastating 12-day Iran-Israel war in June. Elsewhere, the American leader claimed that peace in the Ukraine-Russia war was “closer than ever”, though his European allies and the Ukrainians themselves seemed less enthusiastic about the prospects of peace. The Americans also rattled their sabres at Venezuela conquistador-style, and as the year ended, the chance of a real shooting war between Washington and Caracas remained high.

A genocide paused

The Israeli genocide, overtly and covertly supported by many in the ‘collective West’, was mercifully halted in October, as the Trumpian peace plan was accepted by all sides, announced with great fanfare in the Egyptian Red Sea resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh. While an earlier ceasefire had also been reached between Israel and Hamas in January, this subsequently collapsed in March thanks largely to Tel Aviv’s frequent breaches of the truce.

However, the truce signed in October has largely held, backed as it is by several Muslim states, including Pakistan, and despite flagrant Israeli violations. As per one count, over 400 Palestinians have been butchered by Israel since the October truce came into effect.

But both before and after the October truce, the Palestinians’ suffering was immense. As per the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a famine was declared in Gaza in August, largely due to Tel Aviv’s blockades of food and aid. Meanwhile, several international bodies and experts agreed that Israel was carrying out a genocide in Gaza, including the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry and the International Association of Genocide Scholars. Even after the genocide was paused following the Sharm el-Sheikh truce, Gaza’s civilians continued to face the elements in pathetic conditions, with reports of several infants dying of cold due to insufficient shelter.

The future of the American-led ‘peace plan’ is even more shaky, as progress towards phase two of the scheme has been excruciatingly slow. Critics have dubbed the Trumpian plan a neocolonial exercise to put Gaza under indefinite foreign occupation, particularly through the so-called ‘Board of Peace’, to be headed by Mr Trump himself, and the International Stabilisation Force, a military contingent made up of foreign troops supposedly to keep the peace in Gaza.

Many states, including Arab backers of the peace plan as well as Pakistan, have begun to have second thoughts about joining the ISF, considering the fact that it would entail disarming Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups by force. In effect, the American plan seeks to do through Arab and Muslim states what Israel has thus far failed to achieve: defeating the Palestinian resistance.

Critics have dubbed the Trumpian plan a neocolonial exercise to put Gaza under indefinite foreign occupation.

The fact is that the insistence on the disarmament of Hamas, and Israel’s decision to occupy considerable parts of Gaza permanently, may mean that in 2026, the Gaza peace plan may well collapse. Hamas is willing to lay down its arms once a commitment to a Palestinian state is made. Israel has done everything possible to ensure a viable Palestinian state never emerges. Moreover, the fact that the Israeli defence minister has said they will “never leave Gaza”, points to a permanent occupation, which will automatically torpedo the Trumpian peace plan. If the plan does collapse, one can expect the unfortunate possibility of Israel resuming its genocide in Gaza with even more ferocity.

Rising lion, true promise

The other major conflagration of global import in 2025 was the June 12-day war between Israel and Iran. While both protagonists had traded blows twice in 2024 — largely in connection with the Oct 7, 2023 events and their aftermath — last year Tel Aviv and Tehran engaged in their first fully fledged hot war.

In the run-up to the June war, Iran had been engaging indirectly, and in some instances directly, with the US to try and resolve the nuclear issue. Though progress was not significant, the talks reflected the fact that a diplomatic solution could possibly be found to peacefully resolve Iran’s nuclear question.

However, Israel is not in the business of peaceful resolutions of issues, and just a day after the International Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran was not complying with its nuclear obligations — Tehran argued the IAEA’s findings were “politically motivated” — Tel Aviv launched its unprovoked attack on Iran through the so-called Operation Rising Lion.

The initial hit was devastating. It seemed that the Iranians had been caught off guard, as Israel obliterated the upper echelon of the Iranian military structure. Among the major targets were top generals of the Sipah-i-Pasdaran, as well as Iran’s army chief Gen Mohammad Baqeri. As with the Hezbollah pager attack in Lebanon a year earlier, many felt that Tel Aviv could not have carried out such a thorough attack without inside information from within Iran.

But after the initial shock, the Iranians dusted themselves off and replied to Israel in kind, through what they termed Operation True Promise III (parts I and II had taken place in 2024). In total Iran lobbed hundreds of missiles and up to 1,000 drones at Israel. Israel also hit major Iranian targets throughout the conflict, but Tel Aviv maintained strict military censorship to obfuscate the true extent of the damage suffered from Iranians missiles. Yet amongst the reported targets was the Weizmann research facility and several Israeli military bases and intelligence facilities. At the end of the 12-day war, Israel was said to be critically low on interceptors, and if the war dragged on, it could have spelt serious trouble for the Zionist state.

At one moment during the war, when Donald Trump bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, it appeared that the Middle East was on the edge of an apocalyptic new conflict. But realpolitik prevailed, and after Tehran symbolically struck an American base in Qatar, the belligerents stepped back and accepted a ceasefire.

However, Israel appears to be itching for another round. This time, Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly trying to convince Donald Trump to hit Iran’s ballistic missile facilities. Mr Trump’s remarks after both men met at his Florida mansion on Dec 29 strengthen this impression. Therefore, it may be very possible that in 2026, we may see the next round in this battle. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said earlier in December that Israel, the US and Europe were waging a “full-fledged war” on his country and that Iran would deliver a “decisive response”. All indications, therefore, point to another round of hostilities between Iran and the US/Israel in the new year.

Lebanon and Syria

Elsewhere in the Middle East, Lebanon and Syria remain flashpoints. In 2025, there was much talk of disarming pro-Iran Lebanese armed group Hezbollah. Former army chief Joseph Aoun, who was elected president in January, made no bones about disarming Hezbollah. Yet the Lebanese Shia movement had no such plans. In the meantime, Israel violated the Lebanon ceasefire thousands of times, killing hundreds. It seems there is a unique definition of the word ‘ceasefire’ in Tel Aviv. There are strong chances that wholesale Israeli aggression against Lebanon may resume in 2026 as important actors in Tel Aviv have said they will disarm Hezbollah by force. The Lebanese group says its arms are essential to ward off the Israeli threat.

Meanwhile, Syria also remains unsettled a year after its jihadist liberators set the Bashar al-Assad regime packing. As Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, once known as jihadi commander Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, tries to consolidate his rule over Syria, he has to contend with sectarian massacres, often involving his ideological comrades, as well as the Israeli occupation of large swathes of Syrian territory.

Signalling Mr Sharaa’s full rehabilitation and embrace by the collective West, he was granted three audiences with Donald Trump in 2025; for the first time in Riyadh in May, secondly at the UN General Assembly in New York in September, while finally receiving a White House reception in November. Yet friendship with America did little to stop Israeli assaults on Syria. Israel consolidated its illegal occupation of Syrian territory in 2025, while continuing its military strikes against the country. In one attack, Tel Aviv reportedly struck only a few metres from the presidential palace, sending an unambiguous message to Mr Sharaa.

At the same time, there were several serious incidents of sectarian strife in the outgoing year. In clashes between members of the Alawi community and pro-government militias in March, nearly 2,000 people were reportedly killed, mostly Alawi civilians. There were also clashes between the Druze community and Bedouin tribes in April and July, while the year ended with mass protests as an Alawi mosque was bombed in December. These sectarian fault lines, together with ethnic fissures with Syria’s Kurds, and the lurking danger of jihadi groups going rogue, presents a major challenge to the Sharaa administration.

The Ukraine imbroglio

Throughout 2025 there were several instances where Mr Trump indicated that peace in Ukraine was ‘close’, but as the year closed, a peaceful denouement to the Russia-Ukraine war seemed remote. In February, during a meeting at the White House, Mr Trump and his Vice-President J.D. Vance tore into visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with reckless abandon, accusing him of being “ungrateful” to America. In contrast, Mr Trump rolled out the red carpet for Russian President Vladimir Putin at their Alaska summit in August. Later meetings between Trump and Zelensky were less pugnacious. But the back and forth between America, Ukraine and Russia seemed little more than political theatre. Even if the Ukraine conflict is somehow magically resolved in 2026, the confrontation between Europe/Nato and Russia seems like a fait accompli. After all, in 2025, top Swiss, British, German and Polish generals all warned their people to prepare for a future war with Russia. Perhaps the most chilling warning came from the French chief of staff in October when he said that France must be prepared to “lose its children” in a potential conflict. Therefore, there are very real chances that the proxy war between Russia and the collective West may metastasize into something even uglier in 2026 and beyond.

In other trouble spots, Thailand and Cambodia clashed at the border in two major engagements, in July and in December. As these lines were being written the ceasefire between the neighbours remains tenuous.

Meanwhile in the Caribbean, the US began a military build-up to encircle Venezuela, accusing Caracas of everything from narcoterrorism to sending criminals in the guise of illegal migrants towards the US, threatening the Latin American state with regime change. It designated Nicolas Maduro’s government a ‘terrorist’ group, while seizing Venezuelan ships. Caracas has deemed this “international piracy”. While militarily there is no match between the two, America’s gunboat diplomacy against Venezuela sets a dangerous precedent, and puts into question, yet again, Mr Trump’s supposed aversion to foreign wars.

The fear is that these separate and seemingly unconnected conflicts may coalesce into a larger global conflagration in the new year. While talk about World War III may be alarmist, the gathering storm clouds on the horizon certainly do not point to a more stable and peaceful world in 2026.

THE four-day conflict between Pakistan and India in May had the world on tenterhooks as it threatened to transform into a much larger and much more devastating war. Thankfully it was it was decided enough was enough, a ceasefire was called and of course, as we have been reminded repeatedly, we have US President Donald Trump to thank for that.

Apart from the disruption and loss of life, the war resulted in the biggest marketing campaign for Chinese warplanes and air-to-air missiles. And a not-so-glamourous one for the French. While historians recorded the seconds and the minutes of the battles, people, on the other hand, created memes for popular history.

The government in Pakistan undid the restrictions on social media. And the results were spectacular. Instead of giving in to anxiety, the freedom had Pakistanis weaponising sarcasm, unleashing a viral wave of hilarious, biting memes that exposed absurdity with humour. Karachiites especially weren’t forgiving of their civic facilities.

As the conflict magnified in proportion, Indian media blared the Indian navy’s ‘attack’ on Karachi. It was fake news, but enough to give Karachiites a moment to shine online. Social media lit up with memes, transforming geopolitical tension into digital satire. Pakistani netizens often mocked Indian media and political narratives, joking that the only thing ‘under attack’ was credibility itself — poking fun at panic-driven coverage.

But perhaps the standout meme of the conflict was a Chinese creation that mocked the Indians, through a hilarious song and dance with New Delhi’s jets front and centre.

Standing with the oppressed

ONE of the largest efforts to break the Israeli stranglehold of Gaza was made last year in October by the Sumud Flotilla. Activists from all across the globe were on board to draw attention to Gaza’s plight. A total of 500 participants in 40 to 50 vessels were part of the flotilla. Famous personalities included Greta Thunberg, Mandla ‘Nkosi’ Mandela and Ada Colau (former mayor of Barcelona). Among them was Pakistan’s very own ex-senator Mushtaq Ahmad Khan.

A senior Jamaat-i-Islami leader, he was arrested by the Israeli forces soon after they intercepted the flotilla. Senator Mushtaq’s detention highlighted concerns over the treatment of peaceful activists in international waters and reignited debate about the legality and humanitarian impact of the Gaza blockade. Mr Mushtaq described the experience as difficult but reaffirmed his commitment to advocating for Palestinian rights through peaceful means. The incident has resonated strongly in Pakistan, sparking discussions about international activism, diplomatic constraints, and the role of political leaders in global human rights causes.

E-challans & traffic chaos

KARACHI’S chaotic traffic underwent a modern change in 2025 with the introduction of e-challans. People had complained over the years that drivers get away with crimes simply because of the incompetence of those managing the traffic. In order to finally do away with the complaints, a modern traffic enforcement system, aimed at promoting discipline and reducing corruption through digital monitoring, was introduced. And it worked. Cameras were soon catching and penalising drivers not wearing seatbelts. Speeding was curtailed. Cars were snapped standing at the signal, behind the line. A positive step toward smarter urban management was finally here. However, its implementation has sparked public frustration, especially when viewed alongside the city’s severely broken road infrastructure.

Karachi’s roads are riddled with potholes, uneven surfaces, uncovered manholes, and poorly marked diversions. Overflowing sewage, broken traffic signals and faded lane markings are major obstacles to orderly traffic. Motorists are often forced to swerve, slow abruptly or cross lanes simply to avoid damage to their vehicles. In such conditions, e-challans are sometimes issued for unavoidable actions, such as lane violations or sudden stops, leaving drivers feeling penalised for circumstances beyond their control.

Many citizens argue that enforcing traffic laws without fixing roads creates an unfair burden. Broken roads also contribute directly to traffic congestion and accidents. Vehicles stuck in damaged patches slow down entire corridors, increasing the likelihood of violations and fines. Though the e-challan system was applauded, many want the road network to be improved as well. Many citizens believe that traffic discipline cannot be achieved through enforcement alone; it must be supported by safe and functional infrastructure.

Cricket & cross-border politics

THE cricket Champions Trophy 2025 in February ended prematurely for the hosts, Pakistan. A heavy defeat in the opening match versus New Zealand was the start of an ominous journey. One in which they had to play their match against India outside the country. The final too, which India eventually won. The tournament had already been dented with India’s refusal to travel to Pakistan. A deal was reached and Pakistan agreed to play India at a neutral venue and reciprocated when an ICC tournament happened in India. However, this was definitely nothing compared to what came later.

During the Asia Cup in September, hosted by Pakistan, played in the UAE, in the shadow of the May conflict between Pakistan and India, the men in blue refused to act gentlemanly. Before the start of the tournament, India threatened to boycott Pakistan. Then when it did play them, three matches, all of which India won, the players were instructed not to shake hands with the men in green. When India won, they refused to collect the trophy from president of the Asian Cricket Council Mohsin Naqvi, who is also chief of the Pakistan Cricket Board and the country’s interior minister.

The cricket world was flabbergasted. The gentleman’s game was no more. The trophy is still with the ACC chief and India continues to insist that they will not receive from Mr Naqvi. Still despite the shenanigans, the excitement of the rivalry is one of the most sought-after sporting moments in the field as well as on TV. The match result still makes headlines. Everyone’s looking forward to a good game of cricket. And nothing else.

Socialist Zohran to lead capitalist New York

ZOHRAN Kwame Mamdani, the 34-year-old self-described democratic socialist, won the historic election for the post of mayor New York in November 2025. He will take the oath of office on January 1, 2026.

Mamdani, a member of the New York State Assembly, representing Queens, ran on an affordability and equity platform that resonated with diverse voters and secured broad support across progressive coalitions. However, his tenure is also marked by controversy, including criticism over his stance on Israel, where he has refused to change his views. His willingness to take on Donald Trump further elevated his popularity graph in a city that both he and his adversary call home.

Born in Uganda to Indian-American filmmaker Mira Nair and academic Mahmood Mamdani, Zohran’s rise symbolises a generational shift in urban politics. His leadership will be closely watched as he navigates policy priorities and community concerns in America’s largest city.

Expanding tariffs

SOON after starting his second term in January, US President Donald Trump set up strengthening the US economy through questionable measures. Imposing tariffs on friends and partners remains a central and contentious feature of his administration’s economic policy.

A sweeping tariff regime continues to reverberate beyond US borders, reshaping trade relationships and economic performance worldwide. Countries with deep trade ties to the US, such as Canada and Mexico, have faced sharply higher costs on key exports like automobiles, energy and agricultural products, adversely affecting economic growth prospects and potentially leading to job losses. China and India have reduced purchases of American crude, LNG and coal amid rising costs. European Union exporters, particularly in sectors like automotive and agriculture, have reported competitiveness challenges under higher American tariffs.

Pakistan, though in the US’s good books, too was on the receiving end. The textile sector is especially vulnerable. For a brittle economy this is especially troublesome. Efforts to negotiate tariff reductions and diversify export markets are seen as essential to mitigate these impacts.

Reciprocity was expected. China ignored US soybean farmers. India went about seeking trade deals elsewhere. American energy products saw a sharp decline in Asia as trade tensions doubled down. ‘America First’ import duties produced a mixed international response and significant economic effects. As the policy unfolds, debates intensify over whether tariffs are a tool for protecting American industries or a catalyst for higher consumer prices, supply chain disruptions and geopolitical friction.

Valley of the blind

PAKISTAN’S internet connectivity in recent years has faced repeated disruptions, highlighting the growing gap between rising digital dependence, the resilience of national infrastructure and the needs of national security, and 2025 was no different. With an estimated 125 million broadband users and internet penetration crossing 50pc, digital connectivity has become critical to economic and social activity. However, frequent slowdowns, outages and service quality issues have affected users across the spectrum, from households to enterprises and government services.

These disruptions have carried a measurable economic cost. Industry estimates suggest that internet shutdowns and slowdowns have cost Pakistan over $1.5 billion annually in lost productivity, disrupted e-commerce and reduced export earnings from IT and freelancing. Pakistan’s freelance economy alone, comprising nearly 1.5m workers and generating around $2-3bn in annual revenues, is particularly vulnerable to unreliable connectivity.

At the same time, Pakistan continues to aim for the ambitious move toward 5G spectrum, despite structural challenges in the telecom sector. The exit of a major international operator such as Telenor, which served over 45m subscribers, has raised concerns about investor confidence and market sustainability. While policymakers have indicated plans for a 5G auction, the sector continues to grapple with high taxation, declining average revenue per user (ARPU) and limited fibre penetration.

The contrast between ongoing internet disruptions and aspirations for 5G underscores a critical challenge for Pakistan. While 5G represents a forward-looking vision for connectivity and economic growth, its success depends on addressing foundational issues such as network stability, fibre infrastructure, policy consistency and investor confidence. Bridging this gap will be essential if Pakistan is to transition from managing connectivity challenges to fully realising the benefits of advanced digital technologies.

Passing the baton

PRINCE Karim Al-Hussaini, Aga Khan IV, the 49th leader of the Ismaili Muslims and a globally renowned humanitarian, passed away at the age of 88 in February. His death was widely mourned across the world, including here in Pakistan where his decades-long contributions to development and social welfare left a lasting impact. Following his death, Prince Rahim assumed the mantle as the 50th hereditary Imam of Ismaili Muslims during the takht nashini ceremony held in Lisbon, Portugal.

Aga Khan IV served as the hereditary Imam of Ismaili Muslims for nearly 67 years. In Pakistan, his work through the Aga Khan Development Network transformed lives through initiatives in healthcare, education, rural development and poverty alleviation, particularly in Gilgit-Baltistan, Chitral, Sindh and other regions. Leaders across the political spectrum paid tribute, acknowledging his deep attachment to Pakistan and his role in uplifting marginalised communities.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed condolences, calling his passing a “colossal loss” and praising him as a man of vision, faith and generosity whose contributions brought hope and progress to communities in need. International leaders and figures, including UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, also paid tribute to his legacy of service and compassion.

Prince Karim Al-Hussaini was laid to rest in the Egyptian city of Aswan. His funeral at the Ismaili Centre in Lisbon was earlier attended by more than 300 guests, including Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb, then Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau, Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, leaders of the Ismaili community and other dignitaries.

MNCs’ exit and cooling of economy

IN recent years, several multinational corporations (MNCs) have exited Pakistan or scaled down their operations citing a need for global restructuring and lack of business in the country. However, the exits have raised concerns about the country’s economic environment.

Names like Procter & Gamble, Microsoft, Careem, and Yamaha all left or reduced their presence in 2025. These exits came on the heels of major economic, political and as a result operational crises that the country faced. Experts said high inflation, currency devaluation and declining purchasing power have reduced consumer demand, making it difficult for international companies to maintain profitability. Energy shortages and supply chain problems, especially in a post-Covid scenario, have also impacted the market.

Policy inconsistency and regulatory uncertainty, frequently fluctuating taxation policies and compliance requirements have increased operational costs for multinational firms. Many companies found it difficult to plan long-term strategies in an unpredictable policy environment.

The exit of MNCs has economic consequences, including job losses, reduced foreign direct investment, and a decline in technology transfer and global best practices. However, this situation also highlights the need for structural reforms. By ensuring policy stability, improving ease of doing business, and supporting investor-friendly measures, Pakistan can work towards restoring confidence and attracting multinational companies in the future.

Catholics elect a new leader

CARDINAL Robert Prevost was elected in a surprise choice to be the new leader of the Catholic Church, taking the name Leo XIV, becoming the first American pontiff in May. He became the 267th Pope after the death of Pope Francis, who was the first Latin American Pope and had led the Church for 12 years.

Pope Leo appeared on the central balcony of St Peter’s Basilica around 70 minutes after white smoke billowed from a chimney atop the Sistine Chapel, signifying that the 133 cardinal electors had chosen a new leader for the 1.4 billion-member Catholic Church.

Aged 69 and originally from Chicago, Prevost spent most of his career as a missionary in Peru and became a cardinal only in 2023. Ahead of the conclave, some cardinals called for continuity of his predecessor’s work. Pope Francis enacted a range of reforms and allowed debate on divisive issues such as women’s ordination.

Many among the older generation used to complain that Pakistan’s youth have very little appreciation of the political and social turmoil they witnessed in the past. This thinking used to manifest in the comparisons often drawn between the present day and the Ziaul Haq era. Those comparisons have recently stopped. As of the end of 2024, younger Pakistanis can finally claim their inheritance from Pakistan’s generational trauma, having seen much of it reprised firsthand.

Over the course of 2024, they were brought to terms with the notion that laws and rules be damned, “power is power”. They realised just how unjust Pakistan’s justice system can be, and how ugly electoral transitions can become. They finally understood how easily manipulable the state’s institutions are and how superficial the systems of checks and balances on their power. The year also saw a resurgence in terrorist activity, with violent incidents escalating in both scope and impact over the year.

Though the surge in terrorist activity threatened to undo much of the gains Pakistan had made over the years and even imperil the future of economic cooperation with global partners, both the government and the security apparatus seemed much more concerned with social media and the internet, especially the danger from “digital terrorism”. As a result of such concerns, internet services were periodically disrupted on one ‘national security’ pretext or the other. There was little observable impact of these interventions on terrorist activity, however, which continued uninterrupted throughout the year.

As of the end of 2024, younger Pakistanis can finally claim their inheritance from Pakistan’s generational trauma.

Judicial collapse

The Supreme Court’s year began with several high-profile cases of a political nature, most prominent among which were appeals against the lifetime disqualification of lawmakers, as well as the infamous ‘bat symbol’ case. A favourable ruling in the former allowed PML-N supremo Nawaz Sharif to finally hope for a fourth stint as prime minister; the latter case would be used to all but knock out his primary challenge, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), from the election altogether.

The same judgement was used unlawfully by the ECP to deny the PTI’s status as a parliamentary party and, subsequently, to rob it of the reserved seats it was entitled to. The SC’s failure to intervene at this moment would later trigger a stand-off over the reserved seats and, ultimately, split the court. The failure to prevent abuse of the judgement also provided the coalition government enough time and opportunity to tamper with the Constitution. This feat was eventually accomplished in the form of the 26th Amendment, which put paid to judicial independence by splitting the court’s powers and having the government pick and choose its senior-most officers.

The SC, under Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, also failed to address serious complaints regarding the interference of intelligence agencies in judicial affairs. Though several instances of this alleged interference were brought to light in a formal complaint, the matter remained unresolved till the end of the year. Likewise, the legality of military trials for civilians — which a SC bench had settled last year, though the verdict was suspended — could not be decided, with stop-gap measures taken twice to provide band-aid ‘relief’ to those being held in military custody while the entire legality of their detention remained in question.

Chief Justice Isa’s tenure drew to an ignominious end: his bold judgement in the Mubarak Sani case was meekly ‘corrected’ by his own hand after a strong reaction from religious leaders. He failed to uphold the SC’s verdict in the reserved seats case and then undermined it by declaring it ‘non-implementable’. He endorsed an ordinance that reversed the same Practice and Procedures Bill that he had made a fuss about before assuming power, and which he had made it a point to take up as his first case as chief justice.

He would use this ordinance to appoint a handpicked bench to reverse a previous ruling on the validity of votes cast in special cases by defectors. The circumstances triggered speculation that, for the first time ever, a chief justice may also be interested in an extension.

Electoral farce

The signs hadn’t been promising as Pakistan neared the February general election. Contrary to expectations, however, the people of Pakistan delivered a verdict on Feb 8 that completely upset the picture. The PTI, though much was done to ensure its failure, pulled ahead in early results and seemed headed for an unprecedented victory. Late night on election day, the PML-N, which had organised a ceremony to celebrate its victory, quietly told reporters to pack up and return.

Hours later, the ECP’s results system once again experienced a catastrophic failure, and the nation woke on Feb 9 to a vastly different scenario than the one they had expected based on the projections on their TV screens just a few hours earlier. The results continued to shift over the next few days.

Unsurprisingly, the losing candidates and various election observers cried foul over what they alleged was blatant engineering to change the results. It is worth pointing out that the rigging controversy was never settled, and election tribunals have, to date, not decided the bulk of election petitions even though legal deadlines lapsed months earlier.

Throughout this fiasco, the Election Commission’s role remained highly questionable. It may be recalled that the ECP had already delayed holding elections for almost a full year, in direct contravention of constitutional edicts, arguing that it needed time to prepare to deliver an election that was free, fair, impartial and inclusive. The actual conduct of the belated 2024 general election was a far cry from even the most concessionary interpretation of those requirements.

The ECP not only endorsed a slew of measures taken by the state that interrupted and complicated the exercise, but it also later took several illegal decisions that directly and seriously affected electoral outcomes. As if this was not enough, the ECP also actively blocked the appointment of additional election tribunals for Punjab and even moved petitions from one tribunal to another in Islamabad when it seemed like its results could be overturned. Finally, it outright disobeyed the SC’s clear and repeated instructions in the reserved seats case, and the majority judgement remains unimplemented to this date.

A political recession

Since the PTI refused to accept the full election results, the PPP and PML-N found themselves forced into a shotgun wedding. Under their agreement, the PPP took most of the constitutional posts and none of the responsibility for the government’s performance. The prime ministership fell once again to Shehbaz Sharif, who seemed eager enough to reprise his old role.

The government, hounded by doubts over its legitimacy, mired itself deeper into controversy by repeatedly reaching for problematic measures to ensure its survival. Legislative interventions in this regard included tinkering with laws pertaining to election tribunals, and then a law to prevent reserved seats from being given to the PTI. To further block the PTI, parliament also enacted laws making it difficult to hold protests. Meanwhile, the government frequently imposed blanket prohibitions on public gatherings and political activity and, at one point, introduced a short-lived proposal to ban the PTI outright. Thankfully, it found few takers for this ‘solution’.

Meanwhile, the PTI continued on the path of chaotic confrontation, launching protest after protest without clear direction or even full buy-in from its on-ground leaders. The party appeared rudderless and prone to infighting, often attacking its own with the same zeal with which it attacks others. It continued to make much noise while having nothing of substance to offer and seemed to be pulled in different directions as it struggled to figure out its political future.

State of insecurity

Despite the announcement of another major counterterrorism initiative (Azm-i-Istehkam) in the middle of the year, the Pakistani state clearly struggled to contain the growing threat from militancy and terrorism. Violent attacks occurred throughout the year with alarming regularity, resulting in an escalating body count that continued piling up in the last days of December.

According to statistics shared by the Ministry of Interior, there were 1,566 terrorism-related incidents in the country in the first 10 months of 2024, which resulted in 924 deaths and 2,121 injuries. Of the total casualties, security personnel accounted for 573 deaths and 1,353 injured. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan bore the brunt of the violence, accounting for 948 and 582 attacks, respectively. Most of the deaths of security personnel took place in KP, where 437 of the 573 were martyred.

Attacks on foreign workers were a cause for major alarm. Chinese expats were targeted in two high-profile attacks: the first occurred in Bisham early in the year and resulted in the deaths of five Chinese nationals working on the Dasu dam project. Then, on Oct 6, a suicide attack right outside the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi resulted in the deaths of three, including two Chinese nationals, just a week before a high-profile Shanghai Cooperation Organisation conference in Islamabad.

Apart from this, there was also a foiled suicide bomb-and-gun attack on Japanese workers in Karachi in April. The Japanese workers thankfully remained unharmed, but a guard and two bystanders were injured.

The media’s capitulation

It is most unfortunate that, on most occasions in this fraught year, the Pakistani media appeared incapable of serving the public interest. A large part of this may be attributed to the fact that the state continued to exert significant pressure on national media, either by direct interference in editorial activities through fear tactics and coercion or by abusing public funds to reward and penalise media houses through government advertisements.

Voices critical of state excesses were thus stifled and suffocated, and various tactics, like arrests and disappearances of journalists, were used to attempt to strike fear among those who continued to resist. On the other hand, those who agreed to ‘cooperate’ were lavished with state funds, resources and grants. The media’s abdication of its responsibility to the people continued to erode public trust, leading to more people relying on social media for their information.

Prognosis

As the year ended, there was hope, too, of a reset in the political situation, with major political parties seemingly moving towards a dialogue. Although optimism for the success of such initiatives has now worn thin, one still holds out hope that the stakeholders will finally see sense.

The realisation increasingly is that there needs to be a pullback from the present state. As it is, the struggle between the PTI, the ruling coalition and the security establishment has consumed much time and national resources while hollowing out the political structure from within.

Still, the only viable way out of the crisis lies through a political ceasefire and negotiation on some ground rules for how matters proceed hereafter. How, and most importantly, when this will happen is important. Much is predicated on the coming few weeks, with a leadership change thousands of miles to the west expected by some to trigger key changes over here.

Chasing such dreams would be unwise, however. Pakistan needs indigenous solutions to the problems it has created for itself. Before it does so, it cannot escape this regressive cycle.

Header image: Shehbaz Sharif is congratulated by his elder brother in the National Assembly upon his securing the prime minister’s slot. — Dawn archive

The geography of infection reveals a widespread vulnerability in the country’s immunisation infrastructure. Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and least developed province, reported 27 cases. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh followed with 19 each. Punjab, despite its better infrastructure, recorded one case. Even Islamabad, the relatively prosperous capital, did not escape unscathed.

The inability to vaccinate every child remains at the core of the problem. Approximately 60 per cent of the children affected in 2024 had not received even a single dose of the oral polio vaccine. This points to big gaps in outreach efforts, particularly in remote and underserved areas. The Independent Monitoring Board revealed in September that over four million planned vaccinations were missed in 2024 alone. It further revealed that the pressure to meet vaccination targets has fostered unethical practices such as fake finger-marking and concealing unvaccinated children. Such practices compromise the accuracy of immunisation data and undermine efforts, particularly in high-risk areas like KP and Balochistan. On top of this, logistical issues, such as maintaining the cold chain for vaccine storage and distribution, are still a hurdle in many parts of the country.

Threat of violence

Adding to these challenges is the unrelenting threat of violence against polio workers. In Balochistan’s Mastung district, a bomb attack in November targeted a police vehicle on its way to escort polio vaccinators, killing nine people, including five children. Similar incidents occurred in KP, where health workers and their security escorts were targeted by militant groups leading to the deaths of 20 people. The perpetrators draw strength from conspiracy theories that permeate communities across the country, casting vaccination campaigns as Western plots.

The inability to vaccinate every child remains at the core of the problem.

Alarmingly, hostility towards polio workers is not limited to militant groups. In some instances, local families and individuals have also resorted to violence against vaccination teams. In December 2024, a polio team in Karachi’s Korangi district was attacked by a family when they insisted they must administer the vaccine. The confrontation resulted in injuries to three health workers. These attacks, though less publicised than those by militants, are equally disruptive and demoralising for the health workers on the ground.

Misinformation remains another formidable obstacle in the fight against polio. In Sindh, over 43,000 cases of vaccine refusal were reported in a single month. This highlights the critical need for effective communication strategies to counteract false information and encourage vaccination. In many communities, parents, influenced by baseless rumours that the vaccine causes infertility or contains ingredients forbidden by religious edicts, deny their children the essential protection. While national media campaigns occasionally highlight the importance of immunisation, these efforts often fail to engage local influencers or address the cultural nuances that drive vaccine hesitancy. As a result, polio continues to find refuge in areas where ignorance outweighs scientific evidence.

Coordination between the federal and provincial governments also remains a pressing issue without which the effectiveness of vaccination campaigns and the overall strategy remain compromised. The decision to delegate the anti-polio programme to external global health agencies in 2021 is believed to have worsened the situation, underscoring the necessity for unified efforts within the country’s health infrastructure.

The government’s efforts to combat polio, while appreciable, appear insufficient. In 2024, multiple nationwide immunisation campaigns were launched, aiming to vaccinate over 45m children. PM Shehbaz Sharif endorsed the National Emergency Action Plan for Polio 2024-2025, which sought to strengthen outreach and improve coordination with international stakeholders. Special focus was placed on cross-border collaboration with Afghanistan to curb the virus’s spread. However, the execution of these initiatives left much to be desired. Security measures for health workers remained reactive rather than proactive, and the logistical shortcomings persisted, especially in the country’s most vulnerable regions.

Way forward

What is to be done? First and foremost, the safety of health workers must be prioritised. Deploying well-trained security personnel and utilising technology such as GPS tracking and emergency alert systems could mitigate risks in high-threat areas. Secondly, the fight against misinformation requires a nuanced approach. Engaging religious leaders, local influencers, and community elders in awareness campaigns can help counteract myths and build trust in the vaccine. Tailored public service messages that resonate with specific communities are essential to dismantle the barriers of mistrust. Improving vaccine coverage must also be a priority. Investing in cold chain infrastructure and training health workers to navigate remote terrain can ensure that no child is left unvaccinated. Joint efforts with Afghanistan, including synchronised immunisation campaigns in border regions, could significantly reduce cross-border transmission. Additionally, institutional transparency and accountability are critical. Regular audits and independent evaluations of the polio programme can identify weaknesses and drive reforms where needed.

This crisis presents an opportunity to refine strategy and recommit to eradication. The dedication of Pakistan’s health workers, who risk their lives daily, deserves matching political resolve and international support. Yet the stakes extend beyond Pakistan’s borders. As one of the last reservoirs of wild poliovirus, the country’s failure threatens global eradication efforts. The world has eliminated smallpox and nearly vanquished polio. Pakistan’s stumbles risk squandering this progress. The virus’s resurgence in 2024 should serve as a wake-up call and we must answer it.

Header image: A. M. Syed/Shutterstock/File

IN 2024, Lahore once again found itself at the epicentre of Pakistan’s worsening air quality crisis, with November and December seeing the city’s air quality index frequently breaching hazardous levels. With an AQI of 1,067 recorded on Nov 3, Lahore registered the worst air quality in the world at the time, with PM2.5 concentrations far surpassing the World Health Organisation’s safe limits.

The choking smog brought life to a crawl. Reduced visibility forced routine closures of major roads and motorways, while schools shut intermittently and office hours were cut short. Hospitals reported alarming spikes in respiratory illnesses, with cases of asthma, chronic bronchitis, and other ailments overwhelming health services. Meanwhile, residents, grappling with toxic air, turned to air purifiers and masks as makeshift defences.

A drier-than-usual September and October exacerbated the crisis, creating ideal conditions for pollutants to linger. At the same time, enforcement gaps allowed major contributors — factories, brick kilns, and stubble burning in Punjab’s agricultural belt — to carry on. Each year, stubble burning coincides with cooler weather and stagnant winds, trapping pollutants close to the ground. These emissions mix with vehicular exhaust, industrial pollution, and construction dust, creating a toxic cocktail that chokes the city for months.

Efforts by the government to combat the crisis have been inconsistent at best. While crackdowns on violators occasionally make headlines, enforcement gaps allow the prevalence of polluting practices. Without urgent, systemic action, smog will remain a recurring menace for Lahore, jeopardising public health as reactive, short-term measures have repeatedly failed to address the structural causes of the crisis.

The smog in Lahore, heatwaves all across, the north’s melting glaciers, and widespread floods illustrate a country under siege from environmental forces.

Innovations like super seeders, which can help manage crop residue without burning, have shown potential but remain out of reach for many small farmers due to high costs. Meanwhile, though the Punjab government’s ‘smog war room’, set up to monitor air quality and coordinate responses, may bring improvements in data collection and even some enforcement, pollution levels have continually been breaching hazardous limits.

Lahore’s smog is only a chapter in the larger story of climate upheaval that gripped Pakistan in 2024. Across the country, everyday life is routinely disrupted by events that reveal just how vulnerable our ecosystems have become.

Melting glaciers

The north of the country presented a starkly different, yet equally alarming, climate story: the accelerated melting of glaciers due to rising global temperatures. Himalayan glaciers are receding at alarming rates, posing a severe threat to the water security of millions of people. In contrast, some glaciers in the Karakoram range are exhibiting stability or even slight advances, a phenomenon known as the Karakoram Anomaly. However, many other Karakoram glaciers are also retreating, particularly during the summer months, leading to significant ice loss.

The rapid melting results in temporary surges in river water levels and, more dangerously, triggers devastating glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs). Regions like Hunza and Gojal are particularly vulnerable to these events, with over 33 glacial lakes at critical risk. The floods that hit Chitral in August, serve as a reminder of this lingering threat.

Scorching heat

In the summer months, prolonged heatwaves gripped much of Pakistan, with temperatures in cities like Jacobabad soaring up to 52 degrees centigrade, disrupting daily life, straining power grids under increased air conditioning demand, and leading to an alarming increase in heat-related illnesses and deaths. Parts of Sindh saw health facilities running out of beds to treat patients suffering from dehydration and cardiovascular complications. The urban heat island (UHI) effect compounded the crisis in Karachi, where dense populations and extensive concrete infrastructure amplified the heat. The scarcity of green spaces further intensified the UHI effect, leaving residents with little reprieve. In rural areas, prolonged heatwaves dried up reservoirs faster than anticipated, creating acute water shortages that disrupted agricultural activities and exacerbated food insecurity.

Monsoon flooding

While climate-induced challenges pose significant threats to Pakistan’s coastal regions, the country’s vulnerability to extreme weather events extends further. The year saw Pakistan facing catastrophic flooding with the monsoon season beginning with unprecedented heavy rains in July, with rainfall levels up to 318 per cent above normal in some areas, leading to the displacement of entire communities. The floods caused extensive damage to infrastructure — homes, bridges, and vast swaths of roads. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was hit particularly hard, reporting significant fatalities and damage to homes. The agricultural sector was also impacted with farmlands inundated, compounding losses for farmers struggling to recover from previous disasters.

The human cost of these events defies quantification. Families are torn apart as breadwinners migrate in search of work, leaving behind children and elderly relatives. Schools are shuttered, not just by smog but by floods and heatwaves, depriving a generation of stability and opportunity. Mental health crises quietly proliferate as the unrelenting strain of survival wears people down. And in a nation where the bonds of community often serve as a buffer against hardship, these bonds begin to fray under the weight of these severe circumstances.

The government has implemented measures such as reforestation drives and disaster response enhancements, but these efforts are insufficient to address the worsening crisis. A major challenge lies in policy misalignment: Pakistan’s heavy dependence on fossil fuels and inadequate investment in renewable energy are significant barriers to transitioning to a low-carbon economy. Stronger domestic initiatives are urgently needed to improve renewable energy infrastructure and diversify energy sources. Additionally, international cooperation is essential to secure climate finance, which is critical for promoting sustainable development practices. Without comprehensive reforms and a clear commitment to reducing reliance on fossil fuels, Pakistan faces increasing vulnerability to climate change, endangering both its environment and the livelihoods of its people.

Some initiatives in renewable energy offer potential pathways for improvement, such as wind energy projects in Sindh and Balochistan. In November, the Sindh government announced it was undertaking a comprehensive renewable energy programme to enhance the province’s energy infrastructure, including the distribution of 200,000 solar packages to low-consumption households, as well as developing solar parks and grid modernisation. Sindh has secured $49 million in carbon credits and a long-term loan from the World Bank to support the Sindh Alternative Energy Programme.

Furthermore, in 2024, the State Bank of Pakistan disbursed Rs94.7 billion for renewable energy projects, financing more than 4,500 initiatives with a combined capacity of approximately 2,061 MW. And while these projects demonstrate a strong commitment to shifting the energy landscape, tangible impact will only follow their sincere, successful execution.

Parallel to energy reforms, efforts to bolster natural defences and infrastructure resilience continued in 2024, with the GLOF-II Project taking measures to mitigate glacial lake outburst flood risks in 16 valleys of Gilgit-Baltistan and eight valleys of KP. The project engages local communities in managing these risks and improving disaster preparedness, with a focus on supporting sustainable livelihoods and enhancing food security with an emphasis on women’s participation.

In Sindh, restoration campaigns led to the planting of 55,555 hectares of mangroves from 2020 to 2024. However, even with these measures, challenges persist due to rapid urban development. In Karachi, areas of protected mangroves have been cleared for housing schemes and commercial projects, raising concerns about ecosystem loss, with local leaders calling for bolstering conservation efforts and addressing illegal logging and land reclamation.

To fully realise the potential of these initiatives and to ensure a sustainable future, it is crucial to empower and engage local communities. While grassroots movements and advocacy groups have made significant strides in raising awareness and driving change, their efforts often remain isolated due to limited support mechanisms. Strengthening these networks and integrating them into national frameworks could help amplify their impact. Education and capacity-building initiatives are equally critical, equipping citizens with tools to adapt to and mitigate climate change effects. From adopting water conservation practices to advocating for cleaner energy solutions, collective action is essential.

Pakistan’s climate challenges paint a stark picture of a nation on the frontlines of the global climate crisis. The smog in Lahore, heatwaves all across, the north’s melting glaciers, and widespread floods illustrate a country under siege from environmental forces. These events are interconnected, driven by systemic governance failures and deep-seated socioeconomic inequities, with measures falling short of addressing the escalating challenges.

Ultimately, addressing climate change is both a moral and a practical imperative. Pakistan’s experiences in 2024 underscore the urgent need for a paradigm shift in environmental approaches as the cost of inaction far exceeds the investments required for a sustainable future. As the world strives to meet global climate goals, Pakistan’s struggles serve as both a cautionary tale and a call to action.

A detailed version of this article can be found at www.dawn.com.

The year 2024 ended more or less the same way it began, with Pakistan struggling to stay on course to stabilise its economy from the debilitating instability of the previous three years. The spectre of default retreated, inflation subsided after a ferocious three-year run starting from May 2021, the exchange rate found its moorings and the country went from one IMF programme to another with barely a four-month interval in between.

The groundwork for all this began in July 2023 as the curtain dropped on what was arguably the single most troubled parliament ever in Pakistan’s history. The interim government that took the country’s reins in July 2023 began implementing a tough but manageable Standby Arrangement (SBA) negotiated hastily by the outgoing PDM government in its final days.

At the start of 2024 the interim government was holding the course in the stabilisation programme it was assigned to implement. One of the key targets was to achieve a primary surplus equal to 0.4 per cent of GDP by the end of FY24 from a deficit of 1pc of GDP. But in the first six months of the fiscal year, running from July to December 2023, the interim government managed to post a surplus equal to 1.7pc of GDP, surpassing its annual target in six months.

All talk of an impending default had ebbed away once the SBA was announced and foreign exchange reserves doubled in July 2023 on the back of IMF inflows coupled with a $1 billion support line from the United Arab Emirates. Reserves continued to improve in the months ahead, helped in large measure by a collapsing current account deficit as the economy ground to a halt. Reserves had fallen to dangerously low territory in the days when talk of default swirled thick. But by the end of 2024, the finance minister was able to assure the business community that import cover had risen to 2.5 months, and by end of FY25 it would have crossed three months, which is regarded as the safe level as per international conventions.

The economy was stabilised on the back of predatory policies.

Problems persist

But problems brewed beneath the surface. The fiscal position had improved and reserves had risen, undoubtedly. But a closer look at the numbers showed the government had missed key revenue collection targets, and the reserves position seemed to be contingent on the economy remaining stagnant. As 2024 wore on these problems became more and more visible until November when they prompted an extraordinary visit to Pakistan from the IMF’s mission chief and his team.

At the end of FY24, for example, the government posted a surplus in its primary account that was more than twice its target in the SBA. But its tax collection fell short of target by more than Rs1 trillion, or almost 10pc of total tax revenue. So how did they still manage to post a primary surplus larger than target? “The … government achieved a primary surplus of 1.8 percent of GDP” wrote the IMF staff in its final review, “exceeding projections of 0.4 percent of GDP, driven by strong PDL, excise and direct tax revenues”. This, coupled with large reductions in development spending allowed them to squeak past the goalpost without triggering an alarm.

Likewise on the foreign exchange reserves side. The year opened with $12.5bn in total reserves and closed with $16.6bn. The entire increase was accounted for by an almost 50pc increase in State Bank reserves (as compared to reserves held by banks). On the surface this sounds like a good story, and to some extent it was. This was the reason why talk of default faded into memory, why the exchange rate found its mooring and a sense of stability restored permeated the business community.

But a closer look revealed a less favourable picture. First of all the reserves were built up by throttling the economy. The current account — which measures the sum of all non-liability creating foreign currency flows into and out of an economy — swung into surplus in the middle of 2024 and stayed there till the end. This helped build up the reserves and as exports rose, the money markets were flush with foreign exchange liquidity for which there were few buyers because imports had fallen sharply. The State Bank used the opportunity to buy up dollars in large quantity, building up its reserve cover.

This is why the exchange rate remained more or less range bound throughout the year. There were fewer takers for the foreign currency liquidity in the system, and if rumours were to be believed, the State Bank was quietly warning the banks to not allow the price of the dollar to rise beyond certain limits. With ample supply and possibly a controlled price, the dollar stabilised after three years of intense volatility and devaluation.

The volatility that the state was grappling with through all this was undoubtedly formidable. Pakistan had just lived through the most ferocious inflationary fire of its history, a fire that burned harder and longer than any other in the past. The bout of devaluation the rupee saw since 2021 was also stronger than any other period in the past. Pakistan came closer to defaulting on crucial private debt service obligations than it had come since any period since 1999, the days of sanctions. In every metric the economy was overheating catastrophically and a near emergency situation existed. So extreme measures were required and the interim government that entered office in July 2023 began undertaking them.

Throughout 2024 those measures remained in place. But it could be said that the economy was stabilised on the back of predatory policies. Import restrictions, directions to money markets, forced and gunpoint renegotiation of power purchase agreements, a rain of taxes on salaried people and industry, the list went on and on. Facing unprecedented volatility and armed with rudimentary and blunt policy tools, the state struggled to put out the fire and in 2024 its efforts finally bore fruit.

But having turned fully predatory and milked its revenue machinery as much as it possibly could, and throttling its economy to a near standstill, the state now faces the question of how to transition out of this stability towards growth without giving rise to volatility once again. Pakistan’s allies are now weary of the country’s chronic requirement for bailouts and foreign currency support. With American soldiers gone from Afghanistan the country’s relevance to the geopolitics it was accustomed to has now disappeared.

Growth can be restored under two scenarios. One is a revival of geopolitics should another superpower war find its way into our neighbourhood and once again Pakistan is offered dollars in return for playing its part. Given developments in the Middle East such a scenario cannot be ruled out. The second scenario is an organic one. The year 2024 is when the state discovered the limitations of its own economic system, whether the lack of buoyancy in its revenue system, the lack of competitiveness in its industrial base or the lack of efficiency in its power system. All the deficiencies that were growing in Pakistan in the absence of meaningful reform over the decades meant the country faced its most intense storm of volatility when it tried to pump growth in the post-Covid years, and the state had to turn extreme in its predatory actions in the stabilisation phase. By 2024 this story was complete.

The year 2024 now asks us whether we can embark on building a better Pakistan in 2025, one that can grow without overheating. Otherwise, the year 2024 warns us, this is as far as you can go with this growth model.

This is the most significant action that the government is implementing ostensibly to punish tax dodgers, improve compliance and enforcement to ensure that everyone pays tax according to their income and consumption level, as well as to complete the value chain of businesses to raise the nation’s abysmally low tax-to-GDP ratio of below 10 per cent to 13pc in the next three years to meet one of the core goals of the ongoing IMF $7 billion bailout loan. Its immediate purpose is to pull off the tax target of nearly Rs13 trillion for the present fiscal year, which the FBR is struggling to keep pace with due to a collection shortfall of around Rs350bn in the first five months to November.

The bill proposes to empower the tax authorities to seal business premises, and seize property and bank accounts of tax non-compliant individuals and businesses besides suggesting several punitive restrictions on spending by persons who either aren’t active taxpayers or do not file tax returns at all on purchase of immovable property and automobiles beyond a certain threshold to be determined by the FBR. Further, it puts similar curbs on investment in stocks, etc by tax evaders in addition to barring them from maintaining or opening bank accounts.

Other salient features of the bill include permission to taxmen to retrieve financial data of tax dodgers from banks where their tax data and other financial information available with the FBR is at variance with their transactions through banking channels or accounts. Active taxpayers defined as “eligible persons” in the bill will be exempt from these restrictions as long as their spending and investments match their income or financial resources declared in their wealth statement. Their immediate family members who don’t file their tax returns will also be considered eligible persons and would not be subjected to the proposed restrictions.

Dr Ikramul Haq, a leading tax law expert and author, argues that the bill is self-contradictory since it does not abolish the withholding and advance income tax regime introduced to punish non-filers with higher-than-normal tax rate and compel them to become tax filers. “The FBR wants to keep these punitive indirect taxes on incomes because of the significantly large revenues these yield and ease of collection.” That is not all.

He finds the measures proposed in the bill in clear breach of the fundamental right to purchase and dispose of an asset and freedom of doing trade and business as enshrined in the Constitution. “It is worth mentioning here that a similar condition made in the Finance Act, 2018 barring the ‘non-filers’ — residents as well as non-residents — to buy immovable property exceeding Rs5 million was later withdrawn because it was anti-business and violative of the Constitution,” he contends. “Placing restrictions on economic transactions will hurt the business environment and discourage new investments.”

Successive governments have miserably failed to fix the country’s iniquitous, inefficient, and corrupt tax system that leaves out of the net entire sectors of the economy like urban property, retail, agriculture, and so on due to their political or agitational power at the cost of worsening public service delivery and diminishing resources for development projects critical for future economic growth. Only a fraction of the population files their tax returns as the ineffective system neither has the capacity nor is willing to go after delinquents.

Consequently, the state is disproportionately taxing the salaried classes, compliant organised businesses, consumption, and imports to harvest easy money. The deficiencies of the system and the lack of political will to broaden the tax base became too obvious in the current year’s budget when the authorities exponentially raised taxes on incomes of salaried individuals and the corporate sector while letting powerful lobbies off the hook. Still, it has been unable to meet the revenue targets. For example, a media report suggests that additional taxation measures worth Rs1.4tr introduced in the budget haven’t yielded the targeted revenues. The FBR has so far collected just Rs143bn against the targeted Rs491bn from the new tax policy measures during the first five months of FY25.

Many insist that the sweeping changes in the country’s tax policy suggested by the FBR through the tax amendment bill are unlikely to deliver the desired results without deep reforms to increase the use of technology, and make the system equitable, fair, and transparent by taxing all irrespective of their source of income or their political clout and agitational power. At best, the experts insist, it will give more discretionary powers to corrupt FBR officials to harass and coerce individuals and businesses without any discernible impact on tax-to-GDP ratio. At worst, we may see Pakistan’s structural economic imbalances worsen going forward, feeding into challenges like low exports and investment, and informality of the economy due to coercion in the name of compliance and enforcement, higher tax burden on compliant persons and policy uncertainty.

AS Gaza continued to burn and Lebanon withstood a barbaric Israeli assault, and while Iran and the Zionist state traded blows in a historic open confrontation, perhaps the defining moment in the Middle East/West Asia of 2024 — amidst a multitude of monumental events — was the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime in December, and its replacement with a jihadist proto-democracy.

It would be safe to say that epochal events that normally change the course of history occurred with incredible frequency in the outgoing year. Indeed a new Middle East was being shaped, baptised with blood and fire, as competing forces — primarily the US-led Western combine with Israel as its regional vanguard lined up against the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’ — battled to define what the new Mideast would look like. Though other players are also involved, it is these two camps that defined the geopolitics of West Asia in 2024 and will continue to shape future outcomes, while the ripples these changes cause will be felt across the globe.

Syria’s fall/liberation

In a series of seismic events, the one that had perhaps the greatest global impact was the ‘fall’ or ‘liberation’ of Syria — depending on one’s geopolitical perspective — at the end of the year. For local and regional supporters of the Assad regime, the shocking collapse of his government came seemingly out of the blue, while those opposed to the Syrian strongman celebrated his departure on a cold December night to Moscow, ending over five decades of his family’s iron-fisted rule over this ancient, historic land.

The rebels — now masters of Damascus — had been fighting the Assad regime since the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. In fact the conflict had sucked in regional and global players; Russia and Iran had come to Mr Assad’s defence while the US, Turkiye and the Gulf states bankrolled and armed various factions in order to defeat him. Bashar al-Assad held off for over 13 years, yet as a renewed rebel advance, led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, a ‘reformed’ version of Al Qaeda sanctioned by the UN, started in late November, few would have believed that by Dec 8, the rebels would march into Damascus as Mr Assad flew gently into the night to his Russian exile.

Will Syria’s moderate extremists live up to their promises of pluralism, and will the country survive as a sovereign, united state in 2025?

The rebel advance was stunning, as the various groups, led by HTS, took city after city, while the Syrian Arab Army collapsed without a fight. This was not only a defeat for Mr Assad, but also for Russia and Iran, while Turkiye became the major foreign power broker in Syria. Meanwhile, Israel gloated, proceeding to demolish all of Syria’s defences and grabbing more of the Arab state’s land as the mighty jihadists who had just dethroned Assad watched on as the Zionist state rode roughshod over their country. Apparently, they were too ‘tired’ for more war.

The new face of Syria was Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, the HTS head, a ‘reformed’ extremist who traded in his fatigues for sharp suits and talked of inclusivity and friendship with all, expect Iran. The million-dollar question in 2025 will be: will the moderate extremists live up to their promises of pluralism, and will Syria survive as a sovereign, united state?

Gaza, Lebanon pummelled

Meanwhile, Israel continued its genocidal war on Gaza, killing and starving the besieged Strip without mercy. The conflict that had been sparked by Hamas’ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Oct 7, 2023, transformed into a one-sided extermination of the Palestinian people. So strong was the revulsion amongst many in the international community that the International Criminal Court issued warrants for Israeli ruler Benjamin Netanyahu and ex-defence minister Yoav Gallant in November for their role in the Gaza massacre. Warrants were also issued for Hamas leader Mohammad Deif.

Despite the spin many Western governments and mainstream media outlets — apparently marching in lockstep in a ‘sacred’ defence of Israel — put on the situation, brave voices called out the Gaza slaughter as a genocide. These included UN committees, as well as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Since Oct 2023 Israel has butchered over 45,000 people in the occupied Strip. Many hundreds or even thousands more are believed to be buried under Gaza’s apocalyptic ruins. In multiple instances Israel committed mass-casualty attacks on civilians. But to the high and mighty in the West, this was ‘self-defence’.

Keeping with its policy of ‘decapitation’, Israel murdered Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in late July as the Palestinian leader was in Tehran for Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidential inauguration. This hit — which Israel only officially acknowledged in December — was a major embarrassment to Tehran, as an honoured guest and a key member of the Axis of Resistance was murdered by Tel Aviv on Iranian soil. Haniyeh’s successor Yahya Sinwar would meet a similar fate, as he went down fighting Israeli invaders in Gaza in October.

Yet despite the loss of its senior leadership, Hamas remained undefeated; eradicating the Palestinian armed movement was a stated war aim for Tel Aviv, an aim which it has clearly failed to achieve. There were talks of a ceasefire off and on, but as the year closed, it was obvious that Israel was not interested in stopping its slaughter in Gaza, and was looking to permanently reoccupy the coastal Strip.

Along with Gaza, Israel also expanded the theatre of conflict to Lebanon, fighting the pro-Iran armed group Hezbollah in the most intense exchange of fire since the 2006 war. Israel’s justification for its war on Lebanon were the Hezbollah rockets that kept hitting Israel “in solidarity” with the Palestinians.

While the Zionist state and Hezbollah had been trading fire soon after Oct 7, 2023, in 2024 things got out of hand quite rapidly. In September thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by the Lebanese armed group exploded, in an elaborate act of sabotage orchestrated by Israel. Days later Tel Aviv would start a savage bombing campaign of Lebanon — just as it had done in previous decades — murdering thousands of innocent people.

Amongst the biggest casualties was Hezbollah chief Sayyad Hassan Nasrallah, a charismatic figure who had led the group for over three decades. An arch-nemesis of Israel, Tel Aviv used the aggression against Lebanon to finish Nasrallah — a long-standing Israeli desire — using massive American bombs to demolish the Beirut complex he was based in.

Soon after, in another strike Nasrallah’s cousin and reported successor Hashem Safieddine was murdered in October, leaving a shaken Hezbollah in the hands of Naim Qassem, a member of the movement’s old guard. Over 3,000 people had been killed by Israel in Lebanon since Oct 2023.

A battle of nerves

While the Iran-Israel shadow war had been ongoing for years, in 2024 matters came to the fore as Tehran and Tel Aviv directly traded blows. As usual, it was Israel that played a key role in precipitating this confrontation, as a powerful April strike carried out by Tel Aviv against an Iranian diplomatic facility in Damascus threw the gauntlet to the Islamic Republic: would Ayatollah Khamenei and his men ignore this provocation, as they had ignored several other Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria, as well as the assassination of Iranian scientists and military men within the Islamic Republic? Or would they hit back. The answer came in mid-April.

For the first time in history, the Iranians directly hit Israel with a swarm of missiles and drones. Though the damage was said to be minimal, the message was clear. Things did not end there. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the wiping out of the Hezbollah leadership — particularly Nasrallah’s assassination — did not go down well in Tehran, and the reaction to Tel Aviv’s aggression came in the form of another Iranian missile salvo targeting Israel on Oct 1. Though the Zionist state would conduct strikes against Iran later that month, a major conflagration was averted as the Americans and Arabs reportedly warned Israel against hitting Iranian nuclear and oil facilities.

Requiem for an axis?

Though many commentators have declared the death of the Iran-backed ‘Axis of Resistance’, these obituaries may be premature. Without doubt Iran and its allies have been weekend with the overthrow of Assad, and the pummelling of Hezbollah as well as Hamas.

Yet both Hezbollah and Hamas remain intact as organisations. Moreover, Yemen’s Houthis, also known as Ansarallah, that country’s de facto rulers, remain relatively unfazed, even though they remain far from the actual theatre of conflict. Yet their blockade of the Red Sea in solidarity with Palestine of ships belonging to or trading with Israel has had a major impact on global commerce. The Houthis have also been targeted by US, British and Israeli air strikes, yet continue to resist.

Meanwhile, Iran’s capabilities remain considerable despite the setbacks. Therefore, in the new year, one can expect the conflict to intensify, as the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire expires in January 2025, which could lead to the resumption of hostilities, and Tel Aviv refuses to end its genocide in Gaza. A great unknown will of course be Donald Trump; the incoming US president is known for his aversion to foreign wars, though his evangelical Zionist and neocon supporters will be itching for a fight against Iran, and to implement the ‘final solution’ on all of Israel’s adversaries. If they go ahead with their unhinged, messianic plans, then one can expect even more chaos in the Middle East in the new year.

And here is Niall Stokes, a seasoned journalist and commentator, who spares no adjectives and says it is hard to know where to start “with a stupid, nasty, malevolent, greedy, lying, thieving, unethical, amoral, self-serving, corrupt, narcissistic, hypocritical, misogynistic, bullying, […] rapist.”

Regretfully, Trump’s own language is far from what it should be of an American president. During his election campaign Trump said his country was “under siege”, US cities were being “flooded with illegal aliens” and Americans were being “squeezed out of the labour force, and their jobs are taken.”

This authoritarian streak in him arouses doubts about his commitment to democracy. He is, for instance, a great admirer of Hungary’s President Viktor Orbán, who destroyed Hungary’s democracy. Orbán was rightly dubbed ‘Trump before Trump’ because the Hungarian president cracked down on universities to pre-empt liberal ideas from ‘polluting’ the younger generation. Trump’s Vice President-elect is J.D. Vance who says Orbán is an inspiration, who “we could learn from in the United States.”

After losing the presidential election in 2020 Trump declared that he wanted to overturn the election. He even called for the “termination” of the US constitution to reinstall him as president immediately.

Trump also appealed to the American state of Georgia’s secretary of state to find nearly 12,000 votes to reverse the presidential results.

An essay in The New York Times, referring to Trump’s behaviour after he lost the 2020 election, says never has any “president who was voted out of office been accused of plotting to hold onto power in an elaborate scheme of deception and intimidation that would lead to violence in the halls of Congress.”

The paper then asks: “Can a sitting president spread lies about an election and try to employ the authority of the government to overturn the will of the voters without consequence?”

The NYT quoted Jack Smith, a lawyer of repute, as saying Trump knowingly spread false allegations to “create an intense national atmosphere of mistrust and anger and erode public faith in the administration of the election.” The Times characterises Smith’s case as one that charges Trump with “one of the most sensational frauds” in American history, one “fuelled by lies” and animated by the basest of motives, the thirst for power.“

There are four charges against him: one, seeking to defraud America by overturning the election result, two counts of obstructing ‘voter certification’ and one count of conspiracy to violate civil rights by overturning legitimate election results.

As president he has the power to pardon himself on the federal charges, but no such option would be open to him if he were convicted at the state level in Georgia. While the US Supreme Court ruled that a president can’t be prosecuted for “official acts,” according to Campaign Legal Centre, a nonpartisan legal organisation, presidents can still be held accountable for acts that are not within their official responsibilities.

Even while talking about economic issues, Trump sounds threatening. He repeatedly spoke of deportations of what he calls ‘aliens’ without realising that deportations will do immense harm to the American economy. Experts point out grim figures if Trump’s mass deportation plan is implemented — there are 11 million illegal immigrants, and 8.3m work as “labourised” people. One of the biggest losers will be the hospitality industry. This industry will lose one in 14 workers, including domestic hands. A total of 3.2m people will be deported.

The president-elect makes no secret of his fondness for big money. For instance, Elon Musk, whose fortunes are estimated at over $400bn, attended Trump’s rallies. No wonder Trump should announce his decision to give him a major role in his administration.

Trump also seeks control over institutions like the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Communications Commission. This prompts harsh Democratic reaction. Gavin Newsom, the Democratic governor of California, says Trump has “all the power in the world, but we’re not some small isolated state and we’re not going to be navel-gazing either,” adding: “We’re going to be firm and aggressive.”

The writer is Dawn’s External Ombudsman and an author.

IN 2024, South Asia found itself in the midst of profound transformation. The region is navigating a complex geopolitical landscape characterised by political upheavals, shifting alliances, and the expanding influence of China.

The interplay between India’s regional ambitions, China’s strategic outreach, and the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy underscores the intricate power dynamics shaping the region. Additionally, significant political changes across key countries have created a fragile environment where entrenched rivalries and external influences heavily impact the region’s trajectory.

“In 2024, South Asia’s geopolitical landscape was radically altered, to the detriment of India and to the benefit of China and Pakistan. … China has won the mini-Cold War in South Asia, defeating the principal proxy of the US, which is a big setback to America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” commented Senator Mushahid Hussain, former head of the Senate’s influential foreign affairs and defence committees.

Looking ahead, the impending presidency of Donald Trump in 2025 introduces an air of uncertainty. Will his policies sustain the existing dynamics or disrupt the status quo in ways that redefine the region’s future? One thing is clear: South Asia’s stability and power dynamics hang in the balance, making the coming year pivotal in determining the course of this strategically vital region.

Mass protests in Bangladesh over economic grievances, job quotas, and political repression culminated in Sheikh Hasina’s resignation and exile.

Dr Maleeha Lodhi, former envoy to the US, UK, and UN, believes the region will remain an arena for superpower competition “even though US interest in the region as a whole, save its deepening partnership with India, seems to have waned after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

Modi’s triumph

Narendra Modi secured a historic third term as India’s prime minister in 2024, though the BJP fell short of a parliamentary majority, necessitating a coalition government. This election outcome reflected a shift in voter priorities, with economic grievances such as unemployment and income inequality overshadowing Hindu nationalist themes and India’s big power aspirations.

Despite challenges, the BJP regained momentum in subsequent state elections, achieving victories in Haryana and Maharashtra, and strengthening its position in by-elections. With a majority in the Rajya Sabha, the BJP is now better placed to deal with the demands of regional allies while advancing contentious reforms like labour laws, privatisation, and the Uniform Civil Code.

India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ strategy continues to emphasise ties with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Relations with China showed cautious improvement after Modi’s meeting with President Xi Jinping in Kazan on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit leading to resumption of high-level talks over border disputes and selective trade cooperation.

However, ties with Pakistan remained in a diplomatic deadlock, with India prioritising counterterrorism and showing little interest in dialogue on Kashmir. Strategic partnerships with the US and the Quad, meanwhile, continued to be robust, but simmering strains in India-US ties became more pronounced in 2024. The US recognises that its convergence with India on China has limits due to India’s domestic challenges and the militarised Sino-Indian land border, which restricts India’s ability to engage beyond its immediate backyard. The rise of the Philippines as a more attractive US partner in countering China and the Quad’s underperformance have also contributed to Washington exploring alternatives.

Further incidents straining India-US relations included the White House warning India over a reported plot to assassinate a Sikh activist on American soil and the indictment of Indian tycoon Gautam Adani by a US court for allegedly bribing Indian officials for power supply projects.

Efforts to position India as a manufacturing hub were hindered by limited structural reforms and sluggish foreign investment. Growth rates have been continuously slipping. GDP growth for the July-September 2024 quarter was 5.4 per cent — the lowest for any quarter in two years and the third consecutive slowdown due to sluggish manufacturing and mining performance.

Hasina’s departure

Meanwhile, mass protests in Bangladesh over economic grievances, job quotas, and political repression culminated in Sheikh Hasina’s resignation and exile, marking the end of her tenure. Dr Muhammad Yunus now leads an interim government backed by the military, tasked with stabilising the country and preparing for elections.

Mushahid Hussain described Hasina’s fall as “the biggest blow to India since Pakistan became a nuclear power in 1998.”

Yunus’s policies, including lifting bans on Islamist groups, have raised concerns about extremism. India, previously a close ally under Hasina, views these developments with apprehension, fearing increased anti-India sentiment. Meanwhile, China sees an opportunity to expand its influence, leveraging economic and military ties. Yunus’s engagement with the West, however, counters Beijing’s sway, potentially reshaping Bangladesh’s geopolitical stance.

As we enter 2025, South Asia stands at a crossroads. While external forces undoubtedly play a role, the region’s future hinges on its capacity to confront internal vulnerabilities and cultivate greater cooperation. Fostering deeper economic integration and expanding trade within the region will be essential to buffer against global economic headwinds. Furthermore, by embracing diplomacy, multilateralism, and robust regional cooperation, South Asia can unlock its vast potential and chart a sustainable course towards economic recovery and stability.

A detailed version of this article can be found at www.dawn.com.

PAKISTAN’S confused approach towards modern technology in the country continued unabated. And the repercussions were there for all to see. In 2024, Pakistan experienced significant disruptions in internet services, notably the blocking of the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) and a nationwide slowdown in internet speeds. In February, the authorities blocked access to X, citing national security concerns — the usual mantra. People switched to VPNs to access X. Even government bodies were using VPNs to send out statements. And as soon as the country had settled into the rhythm, there came the internet slowdown.

Internet users in Pakistan began experiencing problems in connectivity in early August. Reports indicate that by mid-August, there was a significant degradation of approximately 1.5 terabits per second in internet capacity. First the government denied it, then blamed VPNs! There was of course the usual suspect — international cable damage. Then it was acknowledged that work on a firewall, for national security purposes, was the reason. The IT minister gave reasons that really put into question her ability to run the ministry.

Pakistanis lost online assignments. P@SHA, the association of software houses, estimated potential economic losses of $300 million due to connectivity issues and concerns about a national firewall. Lawmakers haven’t been able to rectify the problem, as the country continues to suffer.

Maryam the First!

CONTENTIOUS results were the hallmark of the 2024 general elections. However, they did allow for history to be made when Maryam Nawaz Sharif was elected as the first woman chief minister in Pakistan, of Punjab. Following in the footsteps of her father Mian Nawaz Sharif, the former PM of Pakistan and also an ex-CM of Punjab, Maryam, the 30th chief minister of Pakistan’s most populous province, took the reins in turbulent times. She secured a victory with a very slim margin against rival Rana Aftab Ahmed Khan of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC). However, things were never going to be a bed of roses.

Her political rivals, from across the benches and even within, raised hue and cry about her governance and of course charges of irregularities. In her victory speech, Maryam promised to transform Punjab into an economic hub, work on youth upliftment, launch free ambulances and medicine delivery, ensure school transport and make women’s safety, education and employment a priority. She said women’s harassment was a “red line” and announced that a “special package” was in the works for the transgender community. Recently, she went to China to court investment for the province. Only time will tell how the daughter of the Sharifs fares at the helm.

The Ambani wedding

RICH people have rich weddings. Then there’s the Ambani wedding.

From July 12 till July 30, the world was glued to the extravagant opulence of Anant Ambani and Radhika Merchant’s wedding. Hosted primarily at the family home Antilia and the Jio Convention Centre in Mumbai, the son of Mukesh Ambani, chairman and managing director, Reliance Industries and the bride, daughter of Viren Kumar Merchant, CEO of Encore Healthcare company, enjoyed fairy-tale nuptials in the presence of entertainment and business royalty.

The estimated $1bn wedding started five months prior to the actual functions. In March the pre-wedding party featured Rihanna (reportedly paid $6m to perform her first concert in almost eight years) and 1,200 guests. A light show with 5,500 drones. A $150m Mediterranean cruise, whose 800-guest wedding party had the people of Genoa calling the police. And then the sangeet night had Justin Bieber performing in Mumbai at a cost of $10m. Of the guests in attendance, there was the Indian PM and then of course Bollywood royalty, along with cricketers. Former British prime ministers Tony Blair and Boris Johnson, Saudi Aramco CEO Amin H. Nasser, American politician John Kerry and celebrities Adele, David Beckham, John Cena and the Kardashians too made appearances.

Among the floral décor, 60 floral animal sculptures each required 100,000 to 200,000 flowers. To balance off the exuberance, the families engaged in charitable activities, such as feeding underprivileged communities and hosting a mass wedding for 50 couples from underprivileged backgrounds, covering all expenses as a gesture of goodwill.

Criticism at the expense followed; people in general were dumbstruck while one politician said it was the “most vulgar and ostentatious marriage ever seen”. In a country like India and its financial capital Mumbai, where people still sleep on the streets, it was certainly vulgar.

A champion is born

ON Aug 8, just six days shy of the country’s 77th birthday, Arshad Nadeem sent Pakistan soaring on a pedestal of glory that the country had never experienced before. He threw his javelin 92.97 metres, creating an Olympic record at the Paris 2024 Games, securing Pakistan’s first gold medal in athletics, Pakistan’s first individual gold medal, the country’s first gold medal at the Olympics since 1984 and its first athletics record on the global stage.

In doing so he beat fellow thrower, India’s world champion Neeraj Chopra, who came in second. The camaraderie between the two, as they hugged each other, was a sight captured by the press corps present. At Tokyo 2020, Nadeem finished fifth with a best attempt of 84.62m, while Neeraj won the top honours. Nadeem is now aiming for world glory, a throw of 95m. But if he wants to better his best, then he will have to throw in excess of 98.48m, a mark set by Jan Železný (Czech Republic) in 1996. Best wishes to Arshad.

Pakistan’s lunar odyssey

INSPIRED by the achievements of its neighbours, Pakistan launched not one but two space missions in 2024.

First, Pakistan’s inaugural lunar satellite iCube-Qamar, part of China’s Chang’e-6 lunar mission, was launched from Hainan province on May 3, successfully entering the moon’s orbit at 1.14pm on May 8. Soon after, it transmitted the first-ever images captured by it from the lunar orbit. The lunar module was designed by Islamabad’s Institute of Space Technology (IST) in collaboration with China’s Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) and Pakistan’s national space agency Suparco.

The landmark images were unveiled at a ceremony organised at the China National Space Agency (CNSA) to mark the successful mission. The iCube-Q orbiter carries two optical cameras to image the lunar surface. The module is a cube satellite or cubesat — miniature satellites typically characterised by their small size and standardised cubic design.

Then, the country’s first multi-mission satellite, PAKSAT-MM1, became operational in orbit. Expected to remain operational for over 15 years, PAKSAT-MM1 offers broadband, VSAT connectivity, and other services, contributing to Pakistan’s ambition of becoming a digitally empowered nation. The satellite operates in C, Ku, Ka, and L bands, showcasing Pakistan’s advancements in space technology.

Word of the year

AS per tradition, several dictionaries released their pick of word of the year. Merriam-Webster selected ‘polarisation’. Cambridge Dictionary named ‘manifest’ while Collins voted for ‘brat’. Oxford University Press chose ‘brain rot,’ a term highlighting concerns about the impact of consuming excessive low-quality online content, especially on social media. More than 37,000 people voted for their favourite word after OUP’s language experts created a shortlist of six words to reflect the moods and conversations that helped shape the past year. The list comprised of brain rot, demure, lore, slop, romantasy and dynamic pricing.

Brain rot is defined as “the supposed deterioration of a person’s mental or intellectual state, especially viewed as the result of overconsumption of material (now particularly online content) considered to be trivial or unchallenging. Also: something characterised as likely to lead to such deterioration”.

The first recorded use of brain rot was in American essayist Henry David Thoreau’s 1854 book Walden which reports his experiences of living a simple lifestyle in the natural world. “While England endeavours to cure the potato rot, will not any endeavour to cure the brain-rot — which prevails so much more widely and fatally?” Thoreau wrote.

Going bananas

ITALIAN artist Maurizio Cattelan wanted to create an impression in the art world. Instead he ended up creating history. Maurizio’s art piece, the “Comedian”, a banana duct-taped to a wall, was sold for an agonisingly staggering $6.2m at a Sotheby’s auction in New York City on Nov 20. That’s Rs1,663,653,606 in case you are wondering. The buyer, Justin Sun, a crypto entrepreneur and avid art collector from Hong Kong, immediately vowed to eat the banana, adding another layer of controversy and intrigue to this already bizarre art piece. And he did on stage, in front of furiously clicking cameras.

For those grasping at the straws of common sense, “Comedian” is not just a banana; it’s a commentary on the art market, the concept of value and the power of the artist’s name. Cattelan is known for his provocative and often absurd works, and has questioned the very nature of art with this piece. By creating a simple, everyday object and assigning it an exorbitant price tag, he challenges our perceptions of what constitutes art and what determines its value. Well, he certainly got the world’s attention. Some labelled it brilliant, thought-provoking. Others found it frivolous and absurd. A Rs30,000 steak is frivolous; this needs a new synonym altogether!

This was the third of Maurizio Cattelan’s “Comedian” series. The first one sold in 2019 for a then astronomical $119,000. Another was donated while the third one became a six-million-dollar snack! I wonder how this will be bettered in 2025? An eight-million-dollar mango maybe!

Freedom for Assange

2024 was the year when the founder of the whistleblowing website, WikiLeaks, Julian Paul Assange, was finally a free man. The 53-year-old had been on the ‘run’ since battling the US, UK and Swedish governments’ efforts to bring him to ‘justice’.

Mr Assange burst into the limelight in 2010 when his website uploaded secret cables, hundreds of thousands of documents of the US military’s actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, some of which could be billed as war crimes by US forces. One of the files, a video, shows the gun camera footage of an airstrike that killed 18 civilians in Iraq. Two of them were Reuters journalists Namir Noor-Eldeen and his assistant Saeed Chmagh. Though the information shone a light on America’s actions in Iraq, it was also the start of Mr Assange’s 14 years of trouble.

Soon the Swedish sought his extradition from the UK, on an unrelated charge. But the American authorities, furious at his leaks, wanted him on much more serious charges. In 2012 Assange took refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in London. This ended in 2019. Thereafter he spent some time in a UK jail for jumping bail as the US government unsealed indictments charging Assange with conspiracies related to the leaks. Finally in June 2024, he was set free after reaching a deal with US authorities and flew back to Australia.

For the first time in living memory, there was no tree, no celebration and very few worshippers. The streets of Bethlehem, widely believed by Christians to be the birthplace of Jesus Christ, usually bustling with pilgrims and tourists at this time of year, were empty on Dec 25, 2023.

A pall of gloom has descended over the city in the occupied West Bank, with the usual crowds of pilgrims staying away as Israel continues with its unrelenting and barbaric killing of the innocents in Gaza. The usual celebration, a huge Christmas tree at Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity, was replaced by an art installation expressing solidarity with Gazans: grey statues of Mary and Joseph placed in a pile of rubble. On the building next door hung a large banner that read: “Stop the genocide, stop the displacement, lift the blockade” on Gaza.

A huge Palestinian flag was unfolded in the centre of town, along with a banner: “The bells of Bethlehem ring for a ceasefire in Gaza”. The Latin patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierbattista Pizzaballa, arrived on Sunday at the Church of the Nativity, clad in the traditional black and white keffiyeh, which has since become a global symbol of the Palestinian cause. Bethlehem’s Mayor Hanna Hanania, added, “The deaf international community must hear our voice”. Alas, in the midst of the carnage that has claimed the lives of over 21,000 innocents, the UN Security Council and the major powers remain silent.

The nation was then bitterly divided — as it is now — on political lines, riven by economic, social and economic problems, still not having recovered from the trauma of the eastern wing’s loss. But even in these difficult circumstances, the parties in parliament began the torturous yet vital task of framing a new basic law. Since then it has witnessed many upheavals. Still it continues to be a guiding light for the continuation of people’s power in the country.

The PPP had formed an alliance with the PML-N and JUI-F, while the JI had the support of the PTI. Mr Wahab secured all 173 expected votes, while Hafiz Naeem only managed to get 160 after 30 union council members abstained from the polling process. PPP’s mayor and deputy mayor candidates failed to secure a simple majority — 184 votes — in the house. However, the present Sindh local government law stipulated that any candidate who secured a majority of votes could be elected mayor even if they failed to get a simple majority in the 367-member City Council of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation.

Son of the late senior PPP politician Fauzia Wahab, Murtaza, a barrister, has come to rule over a city that was not too long ago considered the citadel of the MQM (which boycotted the local polls) and to a lesser extent the JI. Though 40-year-old Murtaza Wahab may have taken over the reins of the largest city in the country, he surely has his work cut out for him. An out-of-control metropolis that feeds the country cannot take care of itself mainly because of decaying infrastructure and high crime. Maybe Mayor Wahab can change that?

While the men’s cricket team couldn’t really achieve much in 2023, it was left to the women sporting the green shirts to bring glory to Pakistan, earned through hard work and dedication. There were of course lows — their whooping by the host Aussies at the start of the year, and then at Bangladesh — but there were pleasant surprises as well.

Muneeba Ali was the headline-grabber when she became the first woman to score a T20I hundred for Pakistan and only the sixth ever in a T20 World Cup, laying the foundation for Pakistan’s victory versus Ireland. Meanwhile, Nida Dar become the highest wicket taker in T20I. She is currently joint first with M. Schutt of Australia with 130 wickets to each players’ name.

In a sign of progress that the game has made, the PCB awarded domestic contracts to 74 female cricketers. The contracts will run for 11 months, and include 43 players classified as emerging cricketers, in addition to 16 under-19 cricketers.

Then came South Africa to Pakistan, where the hosts sealed their first ever series clean sweep against the visitors. It included their highest run chase.

Pakistan lost out on the Asian Games medal. There was another loss in Bangladesh. But what came after couldn’t have been scripted better. Pakistan beat hosts New Zealand in the T20 series. The 10-run win brought up Pakistan’s first T20I series win away from home since October 2018, and their first T20I series victory outside Asia and Ireland. Later they denied the hosts a washout in the ODIs. Lookout world, the women in green mean business!

AROUND this time last year, when the elegies for 2022 were being written, pervasive ‘uncertainty’, to most observers, had been the single most important challenge for those making decisions at the top. Uncertainty about where the country was headed had already wreaked much havoc in the political, social and economic domains as the nation stepped into 2023.

Addressing it, therefore, should have been the number one item on the state’s agenda as it attempted to steer Pakistan through one of its worst periods of crisis. However, as the dates on the 2023 calendar ran out, it was clear that any order or stability would still be a long time coming.

An explosive demise

On the political front, there was little to celebrate in 2023, with national leaders plumbing new depths of cynicism and self-interest.

The ‘great unravelling’ of the political order, triggered a year earlier by the fall of Imran Khan’s government, reached an ugly denouement in the summer with the PTI’s falling out with its once benefactors culminating in the shocking violence of May 9.

On the day, protests triggered by the unseemly manner of Imran Khan’s arrest from court premises — an action that was later declared unlawful — saw angry men and women take to the streets, clash with security forces, and unleash their rage on some of the most visible symbols of state power.

The tide would turn rapidly over the next few days, as the state responded by unleashing its full wrath on the citizenry, rounding up thousands and incarcerating anyone believed to have been involved.

Yet May 9 was no surprise. One could have sensed it coming. The outbreak of violence had been preceded by months of legal wrangling between various petitioners, the Supreme Court (SC), and the PDM-led government, triggered by the Election Commission of Pakistan’s (ECP) failure to follow the constitutional scheme and hold due elections to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab assemblies within a 90-day window. The two assemblies had been dissolved on Imran Khan’s insistence around mid-January as a ploy to force the government to call nationwide polls months before they were due to take place.

However, Mr Khan miscalculated, likely believing that the PDM government would not be able to accomplish what his own government had failed at a year ago: short-circuiting the Constitution to avoid an untimely demise. But the PDM, unlike the PTI, had the state behind it. It not only managed to deny the PTI early elections by deflecting the ECP’s half-hearted demands for resources and assistance, but it also neutralised the threat from the superior judiciary by exploiting its internal divisions.

The prolonged stalemate over the delayed elections and the SC’s seeming incapacity to enforce the law while the Constitution was so casually violated resulted in months of frustration for the PTI’s already agitated support base. Its anger was fanned by the party’s leadership, which continued to point a finger at the establishment. By May, the party was a powder keg: the widely shared visuals of Rangers personnel smashing through windows and then dragging former prime minister Imran Khan by his clothes to his arrest provided the spark that blew it.

The new ‘selected’

Following the May 9 violence, the state made an all-out effort to put the PTI out of commission. Other hopefuls jumped at the opportunity. Two new splinter parties emerged from the PTI: sugar baron Jahangir Tareen’s Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party, and former PTI stalwart Pervez Khattak’s PTI-Parliamentarians.

Under pressure from the state, Imran Khan’s lieutenants began to jump ship. The deserters were encouraged to join one of the two new parties as part of their ‘plea bargains’ with the powers that be. Some opted for a slightly less humiliating route by quitting politics altogether. Meanwhile, preparations got underway for the long-awaited return of the PML-N ‘quaid’, Mian Nawaz Sharif, to Pakistan.

Though Mr Sharif had absconded to London in 2019, his return to this much-changed Pakistan was a triumphant one. His party — which led the PDM government — had prepared for his homecoming by introducing a slew of legislation tailored to neutralise his legal troubles.

The state, too, seemed eager to forgive and forget. Upon his return, the cases against Mr Sharif collapsed thanks to the more accommodative mood at the National Accountability Bureau, and he won acquittal after acquittal in cases in which he had been convicted in the past. Sensing which way the winds were blowing, the other political parties began crying foul, complaining that they were being denied a level playing field.

Great expectations

Over the course of the year, the ECP repeatedly failed to deliver. It was unable to hold elections according to the constitutional timeline and found excuses aplenty as it continued to dodge its responsibilities without visible remorse.

Its failure to hold due elections to the KP and Punjab assemblies had devastating consequences; it then thought nothing of delaying the general elections as well. The commission was backed enthusiastically by the PDM government, which passed several laws to endorse its transgressive actions.

Despite the ECP’s insistence that the extra time it was taking would be used to ensure that the elections would be free and fair, the consensus towards the end of the year was that they would be anything but. In fact, so complete was the lack of faith in the ECP that the fate of the elections remained in doubt well after the commission assured the SC it would hold them on Feb 8. It was only after the apex court called an emergency session to compel the ECP to issue the election schedule that some clarity was restored.

Separately, the SC underwent an important transition in September, with the incumbent Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa taking over after prolonged internal turbulence within the institution. With the court neatly divided on a host of key issues, the preceding chief justice, Umar Ata Bandial, faced unprecedented trouble in his last months as some of his senior-most colleagues publicly challenged his insistence on doing things ‘the old way’.

Justice Isa announced himself by ushering in reforms foisted upon the SC by the PDM-led legislature earlier in the year, most significant among which was the concession to share the powers vested in his office with the two next senior-most judges and bring about greater transparency in the process of bench formation.

In line with the image Justice Isa had cultivated before his ascension, he avoided the limelight as chief justice and resisted getting involved in the political chaos gripping the country. Instead, he turned his attention to several ‘cold cases’ — such as former dictator Pervez Musharraf’s treason trial, his own verdict in the Faizabad dharna case, and an appeal against the conviction of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The most important ‘current’ case that was heard, pertaining to the military trials of civilians, was left to junior judges, who promptly made history by ruling unanimously against them.

However, this momentous judgement would later be suspended in a controversial move by a larger bench apparently formed in violation of the very same rules that had been freshly enforced by the chief justice.

Missing the beat

Elsewhere, the military, under its new chief, began the year on an unsure footing, facing pressures from both within and without over the new leadership’s decision to continue backing the PDM coalition while Imran Khan grew increasingly aggressive. It only gained the upper hand following the May 9 violence.

However, the military consistently failed to find the right pitch for its responses: at first, it responded too defensively, allowing Imran Khan to run away with the narrative. It then dialled up the aggression to extreme levels post-May 9. This approach greatly weakened its narrative and made it impossible for it to maintain consistency in its public posturing.

While the new military leadership largely shunned the spotlight, the overwhelming perception by the end of the year was that it was firmly in the driving seat: everywhere and in control of everything.

Speaking of the media, 2023 was a year of shame. There seemed to be very little of the independent-mindedness of yesteryear on offer, with broad sections of the media seemingly content with unquestioningly reproducing official talking points instead of offering any critical assessments of Pakistan’s lived realities. A large part of this may be blamed on the environment of obsessive control fostered by powerful quarters, but still, it was most disappointing to see the media lose its voice and will to fight at a time when the country faced some of its most pressing existential challenges.

Old nemeses

Though politics dominated headlines, terrorism and militancy also made a strong resurgence in 2023. Bombings, assassinations and suicide attacks resumed with a vengeance amidst deteriorating ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Once again, Pakistani security agencies, armed forces and civilians found themselves in the crosshairs of groups committed to various violent ideologies.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan bore the brunt of the bloodshed as terrorists and militants continued to strike with near impunity, marking nearly every month of the year with at least one major incident. January saw a series of attacks targeting security forces, concluding with the horrific bombing of a Peshawar mosque frequented by policemen and other security personnel.

The devastating attack claimed 84 lives and caused more than 200 injuries, setting the tone for the remainder of the year. Between the January mosque bombing and the Daraban police station massacre in December — which claimed 23 lives and led to 34 injuries — there was a series of terrorism-related incidents that varied in scale from roadside bombings to the brazen attempt to storm the Mianwali airbase.

Looking forward

With a new year, it is time to turn a new page. Though a general election is right around the corner, any hope for a turnaround seems remote. The national mood has lately seemed funereal; with crushing inflation robbing the people of their wealth and the state’s policies robbing them of hope, there seems very little to cheer about.

It was most unfortunate that, as 2023 drew to a close, the citizenry was still being treated to recurring displays of state excess. The last days of December saw the state unleash irrational violence on unarmed protesters, led by women, who had marched on Islamabad to demand the return of Baloch missing persons. Shortly thereafter, reports of police personnel harassing or abducting PTI candidates or snatching their nomination papers for the upcoming elections flooded the media.

It was difficult to ignore the message that was being broadcast: the will of the many matters little to the unaccountable few who run the country. One wonders what sort of ‘order’ this attitude will deliver in 2024. The silenced citizenry has sullenly borne its torments, hoping that it will still get a chance to be heard through the ballot box. What happens if this chance is denied is anyone’s guess. The omens seem dark. One can only hope for good sense to prevail.

In early October, the caretaker government announced a mass deportation plan, the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan, which, while ostensibly applicable to all illegal foreigners, appeared to disproportionately target undocumented Afghans.

Pakistan, home to an estimated three to four million Afghan refugees and migrants — including 600,000 who arrived since the Taliban rode into Kabul in August 2021 — initiated these deportations by the month’s end, forcing many to return to their crisis-wracked home country within a terribly short time frame.

The urgency and scale of these repatriations, with reports of tens of thousands heading for the border, underscored the dire situation many Afghans faced. As of Dec 20, state media says about 440,124 Afghans have been repatriated to Afghanistan.

As the year progressed, the policy’s implementation revealed a complex tapestry of motivations and consequences. The government cited security concerns, particularly the threat from the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, as a key driver.

The expulsions came months after terrorist attacks in Balochistan’s Sui and on a military installation in Zhob claimed the lives of a dozen soldiers. At the time, it was the military’s largest single-day death toll in 2023. It would be surpassed by another, deadlier militant attack on a compound being used by the army in Dera Ismail Khan in December. It ended up claiming 23 lives. Another two soldiers fell in a separate operation that same day. The Zhob and D.I. Khan attacks were claimed by the Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan, considered an offshoot of the TTP.

Islamabad’s frustrations with the Taliban regime in Kabul, especially regarding the TTP’s activities, were evident. The deteriorating relations between the two governments, once allies, now strained under the weight of mutual recriminations and escalating security challenges.

The human toll of the expulsions was stark. Many Afghans, including those with valid documents, fled Pakistan to escape police harassment. Reports of authorities confiscating migrants’ money exacerbated the difficulties these individuals faced upon their return, thrusting them into deeper poverty and vulnerability.

Internationally, the situation drew criticism and concern. Humanitarian organisations, foreign governments, and rights groups urged the government to reconsider its approach, highlighting the policy’s potential to violate international law and principles, particularly the principle of non-refoulement.

The United Nations and other agencies called for a compassionate and legally sound handling of the situation. Ironically, among the foreign governments sounding the alarm were the US and Britain, whose conspicuous failure to resettle the Afghans they had pledged to take in has been glaring. Their inaction has exacerbated the crisis, leaving many Afghans in a state of precarious uncertainty.

The historical role of the US and Britain in shaping Afghanistan’s trajectory is significant and cannot be overlooked. Their decades-long involvement in the region, by way of military and political interventions, has been a critical factor in the unfolding of current events. The apparent reluctance of these nations to now offer refuge and support to those affected by their policies raises critical questions about their commitment to humanitarian principles and international responsibility.

On the Afghan side, the Taliban’s response highlighted the difficulties of managing the sudden influx of returnees. Afghanistan, already grappling with a severe humanitarian crisis, found itself ill-prepared to accommodate and support the large numbers of returning Afghans. The winter season further exacerbated the hardships faced by these returnees, many of whom arrived with limited resources and prospects.

All the while, government officials continued to emphasise the country’s long history of hosting refugees and the need to regulate their presence legally. Their perspective highlighted the challenges Pakistan faced in balancing humanitarian responsibilities with national security concerns.

As the expulsions continue, the realities faced by returning Afghans are grim. For many of these individuals, Pakistan was more than just a refuge; it was a home where they had lived for decades, and their forced return to Afghanistan represents a disconnection from their lives and communities.

The situation also has broader implications for regional stability. The mass deportations have the potential to fuel further displacement and migration, affecting neighbouring countries and beyond. The policy’s potential to drive individuals towards criminality or armed opposition, including the possibility of some joining the ranks of the TTP, also raises serious security concerns. As the world steps into the new year, the future for Afghan migrants, those within Pakistan as well as those repatriated, remains uncertain.

The international community’s role in addressing this crisis, through diplomatic efforts, humanitarian aid, and resettlement programmes, will be crucial in shaping the outcomes. It is a poignant reminder that behind every policy are human lives irrevocably changed. It also reminds us of the long-lasting impacts of geopolitical decisions and the enduring moral responsibilities that accompany them.

THIS was the year Pakistan came closer to a catastrophic default than any other time, and pulled back just in time. The first half of 2023 was defined by the approach to default, fears of which peaked in June. The second half of the year was defined by pulling back from the brink, which began in July with the commencement of a rapidly negotiated and sudden IMF programme.

That IMF programme stands as a summit of uncertainty in the middle of the year, flanked on either side by a graph rising towards catastrophe in the first half, and descending away from it in the second.

This was not the country’s first brush with default. The months immediately following the nuclear detonations of May 1998 until the Standby Arrangement negotiated with the IMF which began in November 2000 were also marked with default fears. The months leading up to November 2008 were another such period, although overt fears of default on sovereign external debt were not as pronounced in that time as fears of a full-scale financial sector meltdown.

What made 2023 different was the sheer lack of interest on the part of the outgoing PDM government to tackle the underlying issues that were driving Pakistan towards default, as well as its outright refusal to do what was necessary to stay in the IMF programme that was resumed under its watch in August 2022. Miftah Ismail’s ouster from the finance ministry and replacement with Ishaq Dar was the trigger. Dar’s stubborn refusal to let the rupee devalue in the face of the serious erosion of foreign exchange reserves became a key sticking point in the review of the troubled programme. As a result, the programme stalled, disbursements from the Fund were halted, all other associated inflows stopped in consequence, and the country careened dangerously close to a default on its external debt service obligations.

While default was staved off in 2023, inflationary pressure remained high.

The first half of the year was spent in conversations about a default. Will it happen? What does it mean for the country if it does? How much will day-to-day life be impacted in the event of a full-scale default?

The Sri Lanka situation

Pakistan learned more about Sri Lanka, its history, economy and politics, in the year 2023 than it did in all preceding decades. The name Sri Lanka became synonymous with a “situation” and the question “are we headed towards a Sri Lanka-type situation?” became ubiquitous, on the airwaves as well as the drawing rooms.

Along with questions about Sri Lanka, the country learned to ask searching questions about “debt restructuring”. The country’s credit rating had been plummeting all through 2022, and in September of that year Moody’s issued a cautionary note about the possibility of debt restructuring in Pakistan. From that point on, the credit rating fell into junk territory, with all issuers rating the possibility of a default as high. The year 2023 opened in the shadow of these rating actions, which hit rock bottom in the months after February 2023, when all rating companies downgraded Pakistan to the lowest credit rating the country had seen in decades.

The surprise Standby Arrangement with the IMF came in June, and the programme commenced in July. Almost immediately the prospects of a default began to fade. Details of the programme showed it was designed to basically arrest the country’s slide into financial unviability. The end programme targets were all far more relaxed from those given in the Extended Fund Facility that came to a troubled and inconclusive end in June 2023. The Fund was basically asking Pakistan to go into a holding pattern for nine months, while the country sorted out issues connected with the holding of elections. The programme was scheduled to end in April 2024, only a few days before the maturing of a major billion-dollar bond. It had two reviews embedded with it. One review would take place at the beginning of the interim government’s tenure. The second one at the end. The facility would pave the way for a successor programme that is expected to come almost immediately after the Standby ends. And with that programme the path of structural adjustment and serious macroeconomic stabilisation is set to resume.

Uneasy stability

Until then the country found an uneasy stability under an interim political set-up that began in August 2023, and a Standby Arrangement of the IMF that began a month earlier in July. Both regimes are interim in nature and designed to accomplish very limited, and very specific purposes. The interim government is mandated to hold elections, and the Standby Arrangement is designed to ensure the country does not drift into a default at a time when it is preparing for an important transfer of power.

But around July another development began to exert its own influence over both of these transitory regimes. The announcement of the creation of a Special Investment Facilitation Council, with participation from the office of the chief of the army staff, captured the imagination of the country’s investors as well as its creditors. In meetings with the business community, the army chief reportedly conveyed the message that large-scale flows of foreign exchange were about to commence from the Gulf countries and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and even an amount of $25 billion was apparently attached to the expectation.

The claims were published in newspapers and carried by television news broadcasts, and prompted questions from the country’s creditors because it seemed as if the interim leadership of Pakistan was banking on arranging a very large injection of foreign exchange with which to restore its tattered reputation among foreign investors, and kick-start economic growth after a calamitous two years in which the economy stalled and inflation spiralled like a prairie fire.

Peaking dollar, high inflation

With the inauguration of the interim government, and the IMF Standby, some stability began returning to the economy. Massive price adjustments were made along the way. The rupee stood at 225 to a dollar when the year opened, hit a peak of 307 in September as the IMF-mandated “market-based exchange rate” was ushered in, then retreated again to 281 by December. The retreat was the result of massive clampdowns on cross-border trade, along with fanning hopes of a huge inflow expected imminently from the Middle East. Power tariffs were hiked considerably in July, prompting street protests in September once bills containing the revised tariff were delivered. Gas prices surged in September in an attempt to contain the growth of the gas circular debt. With each hike, and the devaluation of the rupee, inflation surged.

As 2023 drew to a close, inflation was refusing to come down, despite massive monetary tightening by the State Bank which took interest rates to a historic high of 22 per cent in 2023. Inflation plateaued out around 30pc by November of 2023, but the expectations of the State Bank that it would decline have not yet materialised. The interim government ran a tight fiscal ship, keeping spending under control, which helped in reducing the growth of domestic debt. And the erosion of the foreign exchange reserves slowed considerably from July onwards. The months in the second half of the calendar year saw the return of nascent stability around a very low growth equilibrium. But the expectations of a massive infusion of foreign exchange and the reduction of inflationary pressures had not yet materialised.

The spirited application of the Standby Arrangement’s conditions, especially regarding energy prices which began to be adjusted upward from July onwards until November, boosted earnings of energy related companies, many of which are listed enterprises. As a result, one unexpected byproduct of these adjustments was a jolt to the PSX 100 index on the stock market, since many of these energy companies carry large weight in the index. Coupled with energy stocks, banks reported their most profitable quarter in the July to September period as well, on the back of earnings from high interest rates that had hit record levels in the first half of the calendar year. Banks and energy companies powered a surge in the stock market that began in July until it finally hit its zenith in December. In six months, the stock market registered a surge of 50pc, a rare occurrence.

The year ended with stability returning, but uncertainty continuing to haunt the outlook. The key questions swirling around the economy were whether or not elections would be held on time, how credible would their results be, how willing would the next government be to quickly seal a successor facility with the IMF, and whether or not the SIFC would deliver in the way it had been promoted. Calendar year 2024 will be the year in which these questions will be definitively answered. But the return of growth still seems, at this point in time, to be a very distant goal.

For its part, the caretaker government, which has been trying to privatise some public enterprises to meet the IMF bailout deal’s goals, selected a consortium led by Ernst & Young as financial adviser to push privatisation of the national flag carrier. However, plans to sell off the PSM, which ceased operations in 2015, hit a snag when two of the three Chinese investors interested in its acquisition pulled out of the process, forcing the authorities to take it off the privatisation list over transparency concerns.

The painfully slow ‘progress’ on privatisation plans for PIA and PSM underscores how challenging it has become to divest these loss-making enterprises. Even the plans to sell two LNG-based power plants, and outsource operations of three major airports to Gulf investors under a public-private partnership, have not moved forward.

Yet 2023 also saw the authorities making a little bit of headway in creating a legal and policy framework to “strengthen governance, transparency, and efficiency of public enterprises” as required under the IMF bailout deal: the SOEs (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023 was passed by parliament in February and the ownership and management policy approved in November as part of a broader reform to strengthen their corporate governance framework and limit fiscal risks stemming from their operations.

These two actions are crucial steps towards achieving the broader objectives of a triage reform process the government had initiated in 2020 to meet a structural benchmark for the extended fund facility (EFF) programme signed with the IMF in 2019. The exercise was meant to identify SOEs that should be privatised as opposed to those that could be restructured or retained or needed to be wound up.

While some progress, albeit painfully slow, has been made on the legal and policy front, a serious effort is yet to be initiated to achieve the goals of the triage exercise under which the government is required to retain only those SOEs that are determined to be strategic on the basis of significant security or social importance, or owning and managing strategic assets that could not be entrusted to only private ownership.

The objective is to reduce the size of SOEs in the public sector as well as to make those which remain in the public sector become more competitive, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the citizenry.

Over time, the public enterprises have become an enduring feature of Pakistan’s economic landscape with a strong footprint in almost every sector of the economy — energy, transport and communication, manufacturing, finance, insurance, and even retail to name a few. The triage exercise shows that the 212 public enterprises left with the government make up 98 per cent of its assets and account for almost 100pc of losses. A World Bank report, Pakistan Federal Public Expenditure Review 2023, lists the country’s state-run firms as the worst in Asia. Since financial year 2016, Pakistan’s SOEs have been in a net loss. Every year, the loss is getting higher. The report says the top 14 loss-making SOEs guzzle more than Rs458bn of taxpayers’ money annually to stay afloat, although many of them should have been wound up or sold a long time ago. That their combined loans and guarantees rose to almost 10pc of GDP or Rs5.4 trillion in FY21, up from 3.1pc of GDP or Rs1.05tr in 2016, shows the kind of stress these entities are putting on the budget by contributing to high fiscal deficits over the last several years. They “impose a significant fiscal drain and pose a substantial financial risk to the government,” said the report.

The report says federal annual fiscal support to SOEs, in the form of equity injections, subsidies, and loans, has been substantial and growing, reaching 1.4pc of GDP in FY21. In addition, many government loans to SOEs are overdue and not being serviced. Moreover, contingent liabilities, in the form of loan guarantees provided by the government for SOEs to seek commercial loans, have been rapidly rising and were almost 4.5pc of GDP at end-FY21; taxes and dividends from SOEs averaged just 0.4pc of GDP during FY16-21, significantly lower than the government’s direct transfers amounting to 1.3pc of GDP to them.

Indeed, the performance of each SOE, or the lack of it, varies from sector to sector, and depends on the sectoral policies and governance structure of the companies concerned. The losses are mostly concentrated in the power and transport sector. Others such as oil and gas companies are still generating profits. This contrast in performance encourages many to suggest that the loss-making firms can still be salvaged through better management without disinvesting them.

The reality is that with no easy money available to continue financing these resource guzzlers, most would have to be sold or liquidated because they cannot be privatised, repaired or restructured as ‘going concerns’.

BY all accounts, the event that shook the international order to its core in 2023 was the monstrous Israeli slaughter in Gaza, which commenced after the Hamas blitzkrieg targeting the Zionist state on Oct 7. This ‘black swan’ event relegated the Ukraine war from the headlines to the margins, while eclipsing the other major event in the Middle East this year, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, backed by China.

It also left in tatters the process of normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which was the subject of fervent media speculation, and was being pushed by the Biden administration as a major foreign policy goal. Furthermore, the Gaza massacre exposed the hollowness and nadir of the US-led international ‘rules-based order’, and buried the two-state solution under the rubble of Gaza, amongst other outcomes.

But above all, there was the unspeakable suffering of the Palestinian people, particularly of the bloodied, maimed and dying children of Gaza that cried out for help, only to hear the stony silence of the ‘international community’ in response. As these words were written, the death toll since Oct 7 in Gaza had crossed 21,000, the majority of these fatalities consisting of women and children, as Israel sought to exterminate the Palestinian population of Gaza as an added ‘bonus’ in its futile quest to eliminate Hamas.

A conflict is born

While pro-Israel voices were quick to term the Hamas raids the biggest attack on Jewish people since the Holocaust, the truth is that the history of violence in the region — particularly violence perpetrated by the Zionists targeting the indigenous Arabs of Palestine — goes back over a century. True, the targeting of Israeli civilians is problematic. However, the wounds of the Palestinian people had been festering for over a hundred years, and when a nation is pushed to the wall and all peaceful avenues for resolution are blocked, armed struggle is the natural corollary.

The Israeli assault on the besieged Strip eclipsed all other geopolitical events of 2023.

The Palestine question is one rooted in the colonial history of the region, when the remnants of the Ottoman Empire were devoured by the imperial powers of Europe, most notably Britain and France. Perhaps the genesis of the Palestine conflict can be traced to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, when the British foreign secretary bearing that name declared on behalf of the government of George V that the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine would be supported. It would not be wrong to say that with one stroke of the imperial pen, the Palestine conflict was birthed.

From thereon commenced a history of appropriation, occupation, violence and displacement that culminated in the 1948 Nakba, or catastrophe, as the Palestinians remember the creation of Israel. Jewish settlers from Eastern Europe and elsewhere began to replace the native Muslim and Christian Arab population, which had been living in the Holy Land for generations. It is this grave injustice, which birthed many more injustices in historical Palestine, that explains the context of the events of Oct 7.

The global response

In the days since the Oct 7 events, several discernible trends have emerged globally where the Palestine issue is concerned. Much of the Global South, as well as a critical mass of common people in the Global North, have decried Israel’s bestial violence in Gaza as going beyond anything resembling self-defence, and have called out the wanton slaughter of a defenceless civilian population. Tens of thousands of people have marched in solidarity with Gaza in London, New York, Washington as well as Sana’a, Baghdad, Beirut, etc, calling for a ceasefire.

Yet in contrast to the global masses, the global elite has clearly indicated that it stands with the aggressor, and that Palestinian lives matter little. The US and its Western allies top the list of Israel’s foreign cheerleaders, upholding Tel Aviv’s right to self-defence even as it obliterates Palestinian children. While some in the Western camp, such as France and Spain, have expressed growing unease with Israel’s blood-soaked methods of self-defence, America continues to offer iron-clad support to the Zionist state in the international arena, as well as billions of dollars in cash and military equipment seemingly to ensure that Hamas, together with the civilian population of Gaza, is wiped off the face of the earth. A growing number of states have backed calls for a ceasefire, except, of course, for the biggest military power on earth: the US will have none of it. There was not even a pretence of neutrality in the White House. As Joe Biden told a Hanukkah event: “I am a Zionist”.

Meanwhile, the actual Zionists were busy dehumanising the Palestinian people. The Israeli defence minister termed Palestinians ‘human animals’, while that country’s president basically endorsed collective punishment by saying there were no innocent people in Gaza. Another Israeli minister suggested nuking Gaza. If such inflammatory rhetoric had been used by any other nation, there would have been a global uproar. But along with a right to ‘self-defence’, perhaps Israel’s powerful foreign friends feel it also has a right to justify the ethnic cleansing and atomic annihilation of the Palestinian people. For Israel, every man, woman and child in Gaza represents Hamas, and thus have targets on their heads. That is what Tel Aviv has practically demonstrated by butchering over 21,000 Gazans, targeting hospitals, refugee camps, homes and schools — such wholesale massacre by any other state would have been considered a war crime.

Silent ummah

Yet while the Western bloc was vocal in its support for Israel, the ummah, true to form, remained a spectator as Israeli butchery continued. There were tepid statements of condemnation from the Arab League and OIC, but little else. In fact, when, at a joint Arab League/OIC summit in Saudi Arabia in November Algeria and Lebanon suggested cutting off oil supplies to Israel, the move found few takers, with some of the Gulf states reportedly leading the opposition.

But the Arab/Muslim street was another story, with calls for boycotts of Israeli and American products finding varying levels of support amongst Muslim consumers. Meanwhile, in countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, which have all normalised relations with Israel, marchers on the streets were clear that their sympathies lay with the people of Palestine.

Regional escalation

There were well-founded fears that the Oct 7 events could spiral into a wider regional conflict, pulling in combatants from the far reaches of the globe. After all, the West, particularly America, is committed to the defence of Israel, while Hamas is part of the loose Iranian geopolitical alliance known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’, which counts Syria as well as a number of powerful armed groups across the region as its members. The US and other Western powers had started moving in ships and other military equipment to the region, while Iran and its allies also indicated their “fingers were on the trigger”. Caught in the middle were the Arab regimes that are American allies but could not let themselves be seen as openly supporting Israel as it pummelled Gaza.

Thankfully, a regional explosion did not take place, but that did not mean that calm was to be restored soon. In fact, the new normal in the Middle East entails slow-burn conflicts that have within them the potential to expand into full-blown confrontations. Many expected Lebanese armed group Hezbollah to take the fight to Israel, but the group’s leader Hasan Nasrallah has played his cards carefully. Nasrallah broke his long silence in early November, where he warned the US and Israel, but refused to plunge into the conflict 100 per cent. But deadly clashes between Hezbollah fighters and Israel continue on a near-daily basis, with Israel evacuating northern communities, while Hezbollah has lost nearly 100 men in the conflict so far. If this situation continues, the Lebanese front could heat up very quickly.

Elsewhere, pro-Iran Iraqi militias have also attacked American bases, while Yemen’s Houthi Ansarallah movement vowed to hit Israeli ships, or those linked to the Zionist state, transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait to the Red Sea. When the Yemeni group delivered on their pledge, major shipping lines said they would abandon the route for the time being. The Houthis have also tried to hit Israel directly, and at this point in time, as America has mustered a naval flotilla of the willing to confront the Yemeni faction, the Red Sea could become the theatre of an ugly conflict with the Houthis unleashing their guerrilla tactics on the American behemoth and its allies.

Turbulence ahead

Many naive friends and cynical enemies have faulted Hamas for failing to pursue the path of dialogue. Dialogue is indeed the preferred solution to any problem, but it takes two to tango. From the Oslo Accords onwards, Israel and its foreign friends have thrown scraps at the Palestinians, and expected them to be grateful for their ‘benevolence’. When the Palestinians have demanded to be treated as equals, they have been criticised for being rigid and not wanting peace. Palestinian intellectual giant Edward Said put it very eloquently when, in 2003, he stated that “most Israelis and what seems like the majority of American Jews have made every effort to deny, avoid, or negate the Palestinian reality. This is why there is no peace”.

Palestinian writer and freedom fighter Ghassan Kanafani was even more blunt when asked by an Australian journalist in 1970 why the Palestinians didn’t talk to the Israelis: “You don’t mean exactly peace talks. You mean capitulation, surrender.” When pressed further why they did not talk to Israeli leaders he pointedly said, “That’s a kind of [a] conversation between the sword and the neck. I have never seen any talk between a colonialist case and a national liberation movement ... to us … to liberate our country, to have dignity, to have respect, to have our mere human rights, is something as essential as life itself.”

Over five decades later, little has changed. If there is to be peace in Palestine and the wider Middle East, the Palestinians must be treated as equals, with a viable path to a functional state, not disconnected Bantustans overseen by Israel. To think that the Palestinian should just be grateful to be allowed to pick up the garbage and run the municipalities of Ramallah and Gaza City is an insult to their dignity.

As the sun rises on 2024, the situation can go either of two ways: Israel can succeed in exterminating the Palestinian population of Gaza or displacing them as the world watches the livestreaming of genocidal violence. Or the red-hot region can explode, with Gaza as the catalyst, and front lines spread from the Levant to the warm waters of the Gulf.

Addressing a press conference after the talks with President Xi, Biden, replying to a question whether he still considered his Chinese counterpart a dictator, said, “Well, he is, I mean he is a dictator in the sense that he is a guy who’s running a country, a Communist country, that is based on a form of government totally different than ours.”

As expected of a mature statesman, Xi himself seemed unruffled by the American president’s remarks saying once the door to China-US relations was opened, it would not be closed again.”

Did the four-hour talks at Woodside, California, succeed even marginally? Yes, one should declare categorically ‘yes’, because the world’s two top head honchos knew the dialogue was too important to fail. One of Xi’s aims was to reach home triumphantly, while Biden, blamed worldwide for his inability to stop the slaughter of the civilian population in Gaza, was keen to show something positive to his people.

The issues they had to tackle were obvious, each one of them explosive in nature: Taiwan, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, military to military communication, Iran, the Middle East and Ukraine.

Must we pooh-pooh as diplomatese what they said for public consumption? Of course, things were not that easy, because the readouts from both sides revealed tough talk. On Taiwan, Biden satisfied Xi by repeating America’s standard position — that Washington believed in one China but his country would stand by Taiwan if Beijing used force.

One reason for a hardening of the views on Taiwan was former House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in 2022. Incensed by Pelosi’s visit, Beijing broke off military to military communication. No wonder Biden and Xi quickly agreed to restore military communication.

On Ukraine, Biden warned Xi against supplying arms to Russia, and that is where we need to take a look at America’s relations with a Russia ruled by an ex-KGB man whose ego US leaders had hurt deeply and repeatedly. Barack Obama had dismissed his country as a regional power which posed no threat to America, and in March 2021, a few months after becoming president, Joe Biden called him “a killer”. No wonder Russian President Vladimir Putin was among the last few leaders to greet Joe Biden on his election as America’s 46th president.

Nevertheless Putin took the initiative and made a phone call to begin a dialogue on the need for renewing the START treaty, which was due to expire in February 2021. The Russian president called because the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks required of the two nuclear giants to limit the size of their stockpile. But a chauvinist like Donald Trump was unwilling to go along. Nevertheless, in March 2021 a new START treaty was signed by Biden and Putin extending the new START by five years.

In June 2021, Biden and Putin met in Geneva and agreed to restore their ambassadors to their posts but no progress was made on key issues.

In March 2014, claiming an allegedly controversial referendum as his reason, Putin attacked and annexed Crimea leading to sanctions from America against some of Russia’s energy, financial and defence companies, but the relations with the US hit a new low in February 2022 when Putin attacked Ukraine. This attack on a sovereign country that was also seeking Nato’s membership was indeed a provocation to the West. However, America and its allies were fully conscious of the risks involved. The US-Nato response was in the form of massive economic and military aid to Ukraine, with Biden making a surprise visit to the country. Nevertheless, the US and its Nato allies were careful not to escalate the conflict, because Putin had warned of a nuclear conflict if Russia’s “territorial integrity” was threatened.

As things stand today, Putin is in no position to conquer Ukraine, exposing his military weakness by seeking military aid from North Korea, while the America-led West sees no problem in prolonging and enjoying Putin’s plight, as the Ukraine conflict has reached a stalemate.

The writer is Dawn’s External Ombudsman and an author.

THE last 365 days saw a lot of developments in the entertainment industry, the most important being the resumption of cinema culture, even though it had more to do with the success of The Legend of Maula Jatt. The blockbuster Punjabi flick went on to become the most successful film from Pakistan ever, but no other subsequent release was able to match its success in 2023.

While the film industry was unable to bank on the cinema culture revival, the fortunes were exactly the opposite for the TV industry where nearly every channel had a blockbuster up its sleeve. However, the sad demise of renowned showbiz personalities left their fans saddened since most of them were active on the circuit, such as theatre veteran Zia Mohyeddin, TV and film legend Qavi Khan, and veteran TV actor Shakeel to name a few. Let’s take a trip down memory lane to find out how the entertainment industry in Pakistan fared during the last 12 months.

Restored faith in cinema

In an ideal world, 2023 would have been one of those years where the game would have changed drastically for the good, considering Pakistani cinema reached its zenith in the final quarter of the outgoing year with the success of The Legend of Maula Jatt. However, it turned out to be a year when only a couple of films were able to shine because they dared to be different and took a stand against the tried and tested formula that was the main ingredient of the other releases.

It was the year when the two Eids saw a maximum number of releases, and while none of the films managed to register a staggering performance at the box office, a few films such as John and Gunjal managed to outshine the competition. Both the films highlighted the plight of their main leads who were shown to be members of the Christian community, who had to carve a separate niche for themselves to get ahead in the world.

The last 12 months will be remembered as the year of TV hits, flop films, and the departure of showbiz legends.

While John suffered mostly because it was released on the same date as Tom Cruise’s Mission Impossible: Dead Reckoning Part One, and one week before the release of the biggest hits of the year Barbie and Oppenheimer, the release of Gunjal was moved by a week to give another film a solo run, but sadly both films suffered because of that move.

The four Urdu films to release on Eidul Fitr featured Money Back Guarantee, Daadal, Dor, and Huey Tum Ajnabi. While on paper they all seemed different to each other — one was a heist film, one related to the Lyari gang warfare, one was an old-style Lollywood flick and the last one was a period film set around 1971 — they all had the same fate and couldn’t recover their finances.

The retitled Kukri was finally released all over Pakistan but the Javed Iqbal biopic had so many edits that it left more questions than it answered. The next Eid saw Pakistan’s first 3D animated film Allahyar and the 100 Flowers of God hit the screens alongside an anthology film Teri Meri Kahaniyan, a romantic comedy targeted at teenagers, Babylicious, a gangster flick Madaari and low-budget movies like VIP and Aar Paar. None of the films managed to impress the audience and it was a sad year until John was released in cinemas in mid-July.

Featuring Ashir Wajahat in the lead, it was a Saleem Mairaj-vehicle since it provided the veteran actor a chance to prove his mettle, which he did. However, his next venture 13 couldn’t do well at the box office, and the same fate followed Pakistan’s official submission for Academy Awards In Flames.

The release of Dhai Chaal (inspired by Kulbhushan Yadav’s capture) was deemed not cinema-worthy by critics whereas Gunjal raised the hopes of the audience with its impressive screenplay, direction, and performances. Ahmed Ali Akbar, Amna Ilyas, and Resham were the mainstays of the movie which was followed by a similarly themed Chikkar which revolved around lynching incidents in the country. Featuring Usman Mukhtar in the lead, the film suffered from its OTT-styled treatment and lengthy duration but did impress those who love to watch Netflix and Prime Video in Pakistan.

TV’s year all the way

The past year would be remembered for the successes the TV industry enjoyed mostly because different kind of content was presented to the viewers. It was the first time in many years that a drama based on Cricket (22 Qadam) premiered as did a young love story (College Gate); Kabli Pulao highlighted the plight of Afghan refugees in Pakistan while Siyaah gave the audience a taste of local X-Files. Jannat Se Aagay revolved around the fake world of morning shows whereas Sar e Rah, Razia, Jurm, and Gunah led the mini-series revival on the smaller screen.

There were plays like Jeevan Nagar (inspired by Prisoner of Zenda), Pinjra (revolved around bullies), Kuch Ankahi and Tumhare Husn Ke Naam (old-styled family drama), Jindo (action serial), and Mayi Ri (revolving around child marriages) which dominated the ratings throughout the year but the most watched dramas of the year were Tere Bin and Baby Baji. They captured the audience’s imagination mainly because of the perfect performances of their cast led by Wahaj Ali and Yumna Zaidi in the former, and Samina Ahmed and Munawar Saeed in the latter.

And then there was Fairy Tale, a ‘Ramedy’ (Ramazan comedy) featuring Hamza Firdous and Seher Khan which became so popular that the second season was ordered, produced, and aired in the same year.

The final exit

As we enter the new year, we must remember the many showbiz personalities who couldn’t make it to 2024. Fifty Fifty’s famed Majid Jahangir was the first known celebrity to leave for his heavenly abode on January 10 due to illness whereas playwright and poet Amjad Islam Amjad followed him a month later. The man behind countless TV hits namely Waris, Samandar, and Ya Naseeb Clinic died due to cardiac arrest at the age of 78.

Veteran thespian and renowned actor Zia Mohyeddin’s death on February 13 at the age of 91 left his fans saddened considering he was active till his last breath in the development of theatre in the country. Veteran film, TV, and theatre actor Qavi Khan also lost his life to cancer on March 6 in Canada. The 80-year-old was not just a popular face on TV but also had acted in more than 300 films during his seven-decade career.

Another actor Khalid Saeed Butt passed away on April 13; he was not just the father of Osman Khalid Butt and Omar Khalid Butt but also served as DG of the National Council of Arts and Lok Virsa, and received the Pride of Performance for his services to arts and entertainment. TV and film actor Shabbir Rana’s death also left a void in the entertainment industry.

May 6 will forever be remembered as the date on which actor, host, writer, and educationist Shoaib Hashmi passed away. The late actor wasn’t active on TV for the latter part of his life but helped shape the careers of many including Arshad Mahmud, Nayyara Noor and Farooq Qaiser to name a few. Another big name in the entertainment industry Yousuf Kamal aka Shakeel also bid farewell to his friends, family, and fans on June 29, leaving a legacy of hit dramas like Zer Zabar Pesh, Shehzori, Uncle Urfi, Aangan Terha, Ankahi, Uroosa, and Chand Girhan behind him.

The year ended with the death of actress Nausheen Masud to cancer and veteran actor Nisar Qadri who played memorable characters during his career which spanned over 50 years. He was last seen in Shaan Shahid’s film Zarrar in a supporting role and will forever be remembered for his famous catchphrase ‘Maachis hogi aap ke paas’.

This year, perhaps like every year, several books were published in Pakistan representing all sorts of categories: fiction, nonfiction, poetry, literary theses, political analyses, economic surveys, social commentaries, etc; and in a variety of languages. Sadly, not many of them were celebrated the way they merited. Some of them were launched, and therefore discussed, at literature festivals and conferences, and a few were talked about in private literary circles.

In Urdu fiction, Akhtar Raza Saleemi came out with his third novel Lawakh. His second work of fiction Jindar (2018) was a critically acclaimed one. Asghar Nadeem Syed’s novel Jahanabaad ki galiyan garnered quite a bit of attention. A reviewer called it a fusion between ‘myth and history’.

Osama Siddique, who came to prominence in 2017 for his English novel Snuffing Out the Moon, published a novel in Urdu Ghurub-i-shehr ka waqt. He has now established himself as a bilingual writer of high merit.

Saeed Naqvi’s Adhoori kahani and Tahira Iqbal’s Harappa also came under the spotlight for their content and narrative. Makhota by Najiba Arif and Muqaddas gunah by Naina Adil were highly praised at the 16th International Urdu Conference held in the first week of December.

As far as short story collections are concerned, Koi kahakshan nahin hai by Shahnaz Shoro was recognised for the variety of subjects that the stories in it contain.

Poetry is, arguably, the most popular form of expression in Urdu literature. This is why books published by poets often outnumber those penned by prose writers. However, in 2023, not an awful lot of collections saw the light of day. Umair Najmi published his collection titled Aik. Seasoned poet Sabir Zafar’s book Khazana haey gham-i-dahr ke faqeer is another work of poetry worth mentioning. The complete works of Baqi Siddiqui and Sirajuddin Zafar compiled by Fahim Shanas Kazmi were appreciated by the literati, too.

In 2019, poet Inaam Nadeem developed a formidable reputation as a translator by rendering Rabisankar Bal’s novel Dozakhnama into Urdu. In 2023, his translation Qaidi of Omar Shahid Hamid’s English novel The Prisoner featured prominently at literature-related functions and attracted readers at the book fair. That was not his only effort this year. Nadeem’s translation of Muriel Maufroy’s novel Rumi’s Daughter as Dukhtar-i-Rumi earned him accolades from the literati.

Nonfiction books are usually read by those who want to keep themselves abreast of the latest sociopolitical goings-on in society. This year some books were read and fervently deliberated upon by the left and the right of the reading spectrum. The first and foremost example is Ishq nama by Farrukh Yar. With the poetry of Shah Hussain at its centre, the book in detail analyses mysticism, Punjab and poetry. It is a quality work of research.

Nasir Abbas Nayyar is one of the foremost Urdu critics of our times. His book Naey naqqad ke naam khutoot addresses the younger generation of critics in the form of an epistolary piece of criticism.

Another noticeable work with reference to communication is Murasalat, a series of correspondence between eminent short story writer and critic Naiyer Masud and translator M. Umar Memon.

For those who are interested in regional politics, Syed Irfan Ashraf’s The Dark Side of Journalism: The Culture and Global Economy of Global Media in Pakistan and Afghanistan is an important addition to the list of publications on the topic.

Journalist Zahid Hussain’s Face to Face with Benazir was another noteworthy book in that category. It’s a compilation of the journalist’s interviews with the former prime minister of the country, covering decades of interactions between the two of them.

Last but not least, human rights activist and scholar the late I.A. Rehman’s memoir A Lifetime of Dissent was posthumously published. It’s a must-read for those who wish to know about his struggle for freedom of the press and democracy.

FARAH Gogi, whose real name is Farhat Shahzadi, is the one reason why former prime minister Imran Khan’s shiny personal record is under much scrutiny. Touted as the BFF of ex-PM’s present wife Bushra Bibi, she is also considered a close friend of former Punjab chief minister Usman Buzdar’s wife. It’s said she’s the one who played a role in having Buzdar named the Punjab CM.

The plot thickens. However, it’s her alleged wheeling and dealing in supposedly having major posts in the Punjab government settled in exchange for financial favours, and exerting influence over Bushra Bibi as well as facilitating the sale of a bejewelled MasterGraff wristwatch gifted to ex-PM Khan by the Saudi crown prince, that has brought her humdrum life into much public scrutiny.

She came into the limelight when Aleem Khan and Maryam Nawaz rang the bell on her purported activities. Farah on her part has always denied such claims. Even the audio leak in which it is reported that she is claiming a diamond set from Malik Riaz for favours. The final nail was what has come to be known as the Toshakhana scandal, a blot on Imran Khan’s personality; the watch that told all. The gifted watch ended up in the hands of UAE-based businessman Umar Farooq Zahoor, who says he bought the precious timepiece from Farah Gogi after paying a hefty amount of $2 million.

The opposition claims Ms Farah did all of this at the behest of the ex-PM. In response to the allegations, Gogi threatened to sue the media outlets that alleged the allegations. Billions were discussed, still dwarfing the amount she is alleged to have taken.

Gogi sprinted out of Pakistan as soon as IK’s government was toppled and ever since she has been fighting her battles from Dubai.

Murder most foul

PAKISTAN has an unfortunate history of targeting journalists. And in 2022, the most shocking such case was the mysterious killing of anchor and journalist Arshad Sharif.

Mr Sharif was gunned down in Kenya in October, while in self-imposed exile, after being booked in sedition cases for allegedly criticising state institutions. According to Kenyan police, he was gunned down due to mistaken identity. However, Pakistani investigators contested the version put forth by the Kenyan police and observed that the “transnational roles of characters in Kenya, Dubai, and Pakistan” in this assassination cannot be ruled out.

Arshad Sharif was part of an investigative documentary titled Behind Closed Doors that highlights corruption of some elite Pakistani political figures and their families. It also looks into offshore leaks that revealed that politicians use the British financial system and offshore jurisdictions to launder, hide and reinvest their wealth into the global financial system.

The late journalist left behind a wife and five children.

A bit of joy

THE year 2022 saw the return of cinema after the Covid-induced hiatus. And while the expected international blockbusters like Top Gun Maverick met expectations, Pakistan’s very own The Legend of Maula Jutt (TLMJ) went beyond everyone’s wildest expectations.

A remake of a Pakistani classic, after multiple delays due to copyright infringement lawsuit filed by the producer of the original film and subsequent global lockdown due to Covid, TLMJ opened to great expectations in September 2022. It didn’t disappoint.

TLMJ went on to rake in more than $10m in its national and international release, an unprecedented number for an industry that has long been declared dead.

Meanwhile, Joyland became the first Pakistani movie to be shortlisted for an Oscar, despite the fact that it faced significant opposition from powerful local quarters due to its subject matter. Joyland was also recognised at Cannes.

The sweet song of victory

AROOJ Aftab may have been a known singer and musician, but after her win at the 2022 Grammys she’s reaching for the stars. The first Pakistani to win the prestigious Grammy Award in the Best Global Performance category for her song ‘Mohabbat’, the 37-year-old who has lived in New York for around 15 years, Arooj has been steadily gaining global attention for her work that fuses ancient Sufi traditions with inflections of folk, jazz and minimalism.

After receiving the award, a visibly stunned Arooj said onstage at the 64th Grammy Awards, “I think I’m [going to] faint ... should this be called the yacht party category”.

Vulture Prince, her third studio album, was released in 2021 to critical acclaim. But it was when former US president Barack Obama included the track ‘Mohabbat’ on his 2021 summer favourites list that it gained even more attention.

Arooj is the second Pakistani to be nominated for a Grammy award. Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan was nominated in 1996, but he didn’t win. After the award was announced, Pakistani social media was flooded with congratulatory messages for her. The Foreign Office felicitated the singer, tweeting: “She is the first Pakistani Singer to win at #GrammyAwards. We are proud of you!”

Heroes of Pakistan: Where cricket lost out to England and hockey disappeared completely, it was left to snooker, weightlifting and javelin (huh!) to keep the flame burning for Pakistani sports. Teenage sensation Ahsan Ramzan elevated his stature when he outpaced former runner-up Iranian Amir Sarkhosh 6-5 in an epic final to lay his hands on the International Billiards and Snooker Federation World Snooker Championship in Doha.

At the Commonwealth Games in Birmingham, weightlifter Nooh Dastagir Butt won the gold medal for Pakistan with a record lift of 405kg. Then, at the same games, javelin thrower Arshad Nadeem cemented his status of a national hero as he rewrote record books to secure gold. Nadeem not only bagged gold but also became the first javelin thrower from the subcontinent to surpass the 90-metre mark at the Birmingham Games. His exceptional feat at the CWG ended a 56-year medal drought in track and field at the Games for the country.

Humayun’s foray: Humayun Saeed was already an established name in the Pakistani entertainment industry. However, in 2022 he really reached for the skies with his portrayal of Dr Hasnat Khan, the London-based Pakistani cardiac surgeon who was purported to be Lady Diana’s love interest.

In Season 5 of the Netflix series The Crown, he starred alongside Australian actress Elizabeth Debicki who is playing Lady Di. His performance won praise all across the globe. He even won over his female lead: “I absolutely adored Humayun — he was such a lovely actor, and such a beautiful person. You never know how that’s going to feel when you’re playing things like that with an actor. So I was very lucky to have him and I think he does such a beautiful job.”

A Cup to remember: Argentina won the World Cup while Qatar won the world. The month-long celebration of the most beloved sport in the world came to an amazing conclusion when Messi’s boys beat Les Bleus on penalties to lift their third and probably Messi’s only World Cup. The final itself cemented its place in history; it saw Frenchman Kylian Mbappé score only its second hat trick. The tournament ended on a high, though it was not plain sailing for Qatar. Ever since it won the rights to host the football World Cup in 2010, Qatar became the target of sustained media spotlight, most of it from the West. However, haters were largely drowned out when it became apparent that the small Gulf state had pulled off a class act.

Published in Dawn Yearender, January 1, 2023